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1 
Introduction 
Background to the research  
Forest governance is high on Ghana’s development agenda. The government, together 
with international donors, civil society and the private sector, is undertaking several 
initiatives to strengthen the governance process. Examples are the Ghana Natural Re-
source and Environment Governance (NREG) Review, the Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT), the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the 
European Union to combat illegal logging and strengthen forest governance and Reduc-
ing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation plus (REDD+). Thanks to these ini-
tiatives the management and distribution of forest resources have become a major socie-
tal concern.  
However, widespread conflicts over forest and tree resources and the absence of con-
structive conflict management mechanisms undermine these attempts to ensure good 
forest governance and sustainable forest management, as well as people’s livelihood 
sources (Ostrom 1999, Yasmi 2007). The latter may threaten food security and efforts to 
minimise poverty in forest fringe communities. According to the World Bank (2004: 1) 
forest resources contribute to the livelihoods of 90% of the 1.2 billon people living on 
less than one dollar a day.
 
These people depend fully or partly on these resources to 
meet their daily needs for subsistence and cash income. Forest resources also play an 
important role in rural livelihoods in Ghana (Falconer 1992, Dadebo & Shinohara 1999, 
Blay et al. 2008, Marfo 2009 & 2010, Ros-Tonen et al. 2010, Appiah et al. 2010).  
Illicit forest activities, especially illegal timber exploitation and chainsaw milling, as 
well as the excessive exploitation of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and the use of 
farming land in forest reserves due to population increase and the need for fertile soils 
for crop cultivation, play an important but not exclusive role in these conflicts. The un-
derlying drivers are multiple and interdependent. They include vague policy directions, 
institutional failure, competition between different land uses, and poverty (Tyler 1999, 
Ostrom 1999, Marfo 2006). Other factors include tenure insecurity, greed, corruption 
and weak law enforcement (Contreras-Hermosilla 2001, Kaimowitz, 2003). These ham-
per forest governance processes and present challenges to both the state and non-state 
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actors. Forest governors therefore face difficult choices when it comes to creating an 
enabling governance environment for sustainable forest management and to ensuring an 
equitable distribution of resources for diverse actors.  
The Forest and Wildlife Policy (FWP) of 1994 initially provided a glimmer of hope. 
It resulted in the concept of collaboration, with the anticipation of the involvement of all 
stakeholders at different levels of scale. It created hope that on-going decentralisation 
and co-management with local people could contribute to sustainable forest manage-
ment and improvement in forest governance and livelihoods. True to this, the govern-
ment of Ghana, through the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and the Forestry 
Commission, as well as civil society and the donor community, have pursued several 
programmes aimed at promoting good forest governance and enhancing forest and tree-
based livelihoods. Contrary to expectations, these programmes have not produced the 
desired impact due to some of the aforementioned problems.  
According to the World Bank (2009), conflict management is a key building block of 
forest governance, but it has received little or no consideration in most of the ongoing 
governance initiatives in Ghana, except for the REDD+ process (FC 2010: 19 & 63). 
Understanding and finding means to deal with forest and tree livelihood conflicts be-
came an important research area under the ‘Governance for sustainable forest-related 
livelihoods’ programme carried out as a joint effort by Tropenbos International (TBI) 
Ghana, the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) at the University 
of Amsterdam and Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) 
from 2008-2012. The overall objective of this programme is to generate insight into and 
formulate recommendations on governance arrangements that enhance forest-related 
livelihoods so as to contribute to sustainable forest management and poverty alleviation. 
The present PhD study, the focus of which is outlined below, is part of this programme.  
The study area  
The study was undertaken in the high forest zone of Ghana, an area of about 7.5 million 
hectares. It is a zone where most of Ghana’s forests are found and most conflict and 
illegalities occur with regard to the use and management of forest and tree resources. 
The zone is endowed with 204 forest reserves of which the Tano-Offin forest reserve 
and its environs in the Nkawie Forest District were selected as the study area (Figure 
1.1). The Tano-Offin forest reserve has different management regimes, namely protec-
tion (the Globally Significant Biodiversity Area), a plantation regime (the modified 
taungya system) and a production regime, each of which was taken as a case in which 
governance arrangements, conflicts and conflict management were analysed. The inten-
tion was also to analyse conflicts in the off-reserve area, but there a scenario of coopera-
tion prevailed rather than conflict. A mixed method approach was employed to triangu-
late quantitative data obtained from structured and semi-structured survey question-
naires with actor’s perceptions of conflict issues and dynamics. Qualitative data was 
obtained by using research methods like focus group discussions, community meetings 
and stakeholder workshops, structured and semi-structured interviews, field observa-
tions and document analysis (see Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the methodol-
ogy). 
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Objective, research questions and propositions 
The challenge of relevance in the context of this study is the absence or ineffectiveness 
of mechanisms to manage competing claims to forest and tree resources (i.e. to accom-
modate them and ensure cooperatives actions), which often results in conflict. Such con-
flicts, when not handled well, mostly impact negatively on the resources and the actors 
whose livelihood sources are affected. This study aims to provide insight into construc-
tive conflict management pathways capable of minimising conflicts and contributing to 
the strengthening of the ongoing forest governance process in Ghana. The overall re-
search question addressed in this study is ‘How can forest and tree livelihood conflicts 
in Ghana’s high forest zone be understood and constructively managed?’  
The central argument in this thesis is that forest resource use and management are 
complex, dynamic and involve multiple actors at different level of scales and, conse-
quently, are characterised by conflicts. Diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale are 
essential components of natural resource systems, which are addressed in interactive 
governance theory (Kooiman et al. 2005, 2008). The use of this theory, complemented 
with conflict analysis, is therefore considered as being appropriate for an understanding 
of the governability of the systems studied. Analysing the nature of conflicts and means 
of dealing with them in terms of governance interactions between the system-to-be-
governed and the governing system helps to assess how and why governance sometimes 
falls short of desirable outcomes (Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009).  
Kooiman et al. (2005) defined interactive governance as ‘the whole of public, as well 
as private, interactions taken to solve societal problems and create societal opportuni-
ties’ (Kooiman & Bavinck 2005: 17). It is a theory that facilitates an analytical under-
ACRONYMS 
FR = Forest Reserve 
GSBA = Globally Significant 
Biodiversity Area 
Figure 1.1  The study sites  
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standing of system components before proposing interventions. In this thesis, this ap-
proach is complemented with the conflict analysis wheel (Mason & Rychard 2005), 
which is a tool that can be used to understand the nature and various dimensions of con-
flicts (i.e. context, issues, actors, causes, dynamics and conflict management options).  
In order to find answers to the main research question, the study is divided into eight 
empirical studies with each study constituting a chapter. Sub-questions addressed in 
these chapters include: 
1. What are the natural and socioeconomic characteristics of Ghana’s high forest zone 
and how do they interact? (Chapter 4) 
2. What are the characteristics in terms of features, orders, modes and elements of the 
governing system that contribute to the governability of Ghana’s forest sector and 
how does it deal with forest and tree-related conflicts? (Chapter 5) 
3. What are the perspectives of forest governors and experts in the forest sector regard-
ing the nature of forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts and conflict management 
options in Ghana’s high forest zone? (Chapter 6) 
4. What conflicts occur with regard to forest and tree resources and what conflict man-
agement strategies are employed under several governance regimes in the Tano-
Offin forest reserve (Chapter 7 on a protected area, Chapter 8 on a plantation forest, 
Chapter 9 on a production forest) and what are their implications for forest govern-
ance?  
5. What factors facilitated the cooperation between the local community and the timber 
operator in Tano-Offin off-reserve area? (Chapter 10) 
6.  What are the characteristics of forest offences and their judgments in law courts in 
Nkawie Forest District and the views of representatives of law enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary regarding institutional challenges and means to overcome them? 
(Chapter 11) 
 
Table 1.1. further specifies the research questions addressed in each chapter. 
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Table 1.1  Research questions addressed in the various chapters 
Chapter Sub-question addressed Sub-questions 
4 What are the natural and socio-
economic characteristics of Gha-
na’s high forest zone and how do 
they interact?  
1. What is the nature of Ghana’s high forest zone in 
terms of diversity, complexity and dynamics? 
2. What forest users prevail and how do they interact 
with the natural system? 
5 What are the characteristics in 
terms of features, orders, modes 
and elements of the governing 
system that contribute to the gov-
ernability of Ghana’s forest sector 
and how does it deal with forest 
and tree-related conflicts? 
1. What is the historical context of the Ghanaian 
forest governing system in terms of its policies, leg-
islations and conflicts? 
2. What features prevail in the forest governance 
process (in terms of diversity, scale, complexity 
and dynamics)?  
3. What is the quality of the three governance orders 
(principles, institutional arrangements and day-to-
day management of conflicts) in the forest govern-
ing system? 
4.  How responsive is Ghana forest governance in 
terms of the governance modes (hierarchical, co-
governance and self-governance) ? 
5. What is the fit of governance elements (in terms of 
forest actors’ images, instruments and actions) with 
conflict management and how do actors assess the 
potential to strengthen forest conflict management 
in the governance process? 
6 What are the perspectives of forest 
governors and experts in the forest 
sector regarding the nature of 
forest and tree-related livelihood 
conflicts and conflict management 
options in Ghana’s high forest 
zone? 
1. What are respondents’ images regarding forest and 
tree-based livelihood options and associated con-
flicts? 
2. What are respondents’ perceptions regarding the 
instruments available to manage these conflicts? 
3. What actions do forest governors and experts pro-
pose to improve conflict management? 
7 What conflicts occur with regard 
to forest and tree resources and 
what conflict management strate-
gies are employed in the Globally 
Significant Biodiversity Area in 
the Tano-Offin forest reserve and 
what are their implications for 
ongoing trends in forest govern-
ance such as the VPA or REDD+?  
1. What are the characteristics of the Tano-Offin 
GSBA as a system-to-be governed in terms of the 
natural and socio-economic sub-systems and the in-
teractions between the two? 
2. What governing systems operate within the Tano-
Offin GSBA? 
3. What are the perceptions of the inhabitants of 
Kyekyewere regarding the nature of forest and tree-
related livelihood conflicts in Tano-Offin GSBA? 
4. What do the findings mean for ongoing trends in 
forest governance such as the VPA and REDD+ 
processes? 
8 What conflicts occur with regard 
to forest and tree resources and 
what conflict management strate-
gies are employed in relation to 
the modified taungya system in a 
plantation forest in the Tano-Offin 
forest reserve and what are their 
implications for the co-
management scheme? 
1. What are the characteristics of the plantation forest 
(i.e. MTS scheme) in the Tano-Offin forest reserve 
as a system-to-be-governed, particularly with re-
gard to the interaction of local communities with 
the natural system in their efforts to secure their 
livelihoods? 
2. What are the characteristics of the governing sys-
tem (i.e. institutional arrangements) that steers the 
plantation regime?  
3. What are the perspectives of the inhabitants of the 
communities at the forest plantation fringe regard-
ing the nature of forest and tree-related conflicts in 
the plantation regime? 
4. What conflict outcomes arise and what are their 
effects on the governance arrangements? 
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9 What conflicts occur with regard 
to forest and tree resources and 
what conflict management strate-
gies are employed in a production 
forest in the Tano-Offin forest 
reserve and what are their implica-
tions for law enforcement? 
1. What are the characteristics of the production forest 
in the Tano-Offin forest reserve as a system-to-be 
governed, particularly with regard to the interaction 
of local communities with the natural system in 
their efforts to secure their livelihoods? 
2. What governing system (i.e. institutions and policy 
instruments) function in the production regime?  
3. What are the perspectives of the inhabitants of the 
communities at the production forest fringe regard-
ing the nature of forest and tree-related conflicts in 
the production regime? 
4. What are the implications of the findings for law 
enforcement under VPA? 
10 What factors facilitated the coop-
eration between the local commu-
nity and the timber operator in 
Tano-Offin off-reserve area? 
1. What are the characteristics of the Tano-Offin off-
reserve area as a system-to-be-governed in terms of 
the natural and socio-economic sub-systems and 
the interaction between the two? 
2. What governing systems (i.e. challenges and oppor-
tunities, access to farming lands, customary and 
statutory arrangements) operate within the Tano-
Offin off-reserve area? 
3. What are the perceptions of the inhabitants and the 
timber operator on why crop damage compensation 
and SRA conflicts are minimal or absent? 
4. What are the views of government officials with 
regard to crop damage compensation and recom-
mended actions for improvement? 
11 What are the characteristics of 
forest offences and their judg-
ments in law courts in Nkawie 
Forest District and the views of 
representatives of law enforce-
ment agencies and the judiciary 
regarding institutional challenges 
and means to overcome them?  
1. What are the characteristics of the Nkawie Forest 
District reserves as a system-to-be-governed? 
2. What governing system (i.e. institutions and legis-
lative framework) with regard to law enforcement 
is available in the forest district? 
3. What governance interactions arise from the sys-
tem-to-be-governed and the governing system and 
what are their outcomes? 
4. How do officials of the Forestry Commission, the 
Ghana Police Services and the judiciary perceive 
their institutional roles in dealing with forest of-
fences?  
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These questions are supported by four propositions that contribute to identifying 
relevant information and serve as a reference point for generalising the results. 
 
1. Forest resource use and management are complex, dynamic and involve multiple 
users at different levels of scales and are consequently characterised by conflicts. A 
clear understanding of these users’ perceptions of their common and conflicting in-
terests at different levels of scales will contribute substantially to our understanding 
of the nature of conflicts and their underlying factors as well as the prevailing man-
agement mechanisms.  
2. Ineffective conflict management and absence of appropriate conflict management 
systems in the forestry sector are the main causes of the widespread conflicts and the 
resultant rapid deforestation rate. If constructive conflict management strategies and 
systems of relevance to natural resource management (taking account of the multiple 
interest groups) are institutionalised in policy and programmes, they will go a long 
way towards strengthening forest governance arrangements and improve livelihoods, 
especially those of the rural poor.  
3. The interactive governance approach provides an analytical and normative means of 
understanding the governability of the different forest management regimes (i.e. pro-
tection, plantation, production and off-reserve areas). 
4. The interactive governance approach complemented with conflict analysis generates 
a picture of forest actors’ images (that guide conflicts and conflict management), in-
struments (that link images to actions) and actions (that put the instruments into ef-
fect) in relation to conflict under various forest regimes. 
Justification 
A review of sources available on forest research in Ghana reveals that research on for-
est-related livelihood conflicts is still scarce. Within the context of the TBI-Ghana pro-
gramme, a PhD study was carried out on forest conflicts (Marfo 2006), but this focused 
on actor-response processes, power relationships and actor empowerment, and not so 
much on livelihood-related conflicts. This study looks beyond the forestry (i.e. timber) 
sector proper to include the perspectives of other stakeholders from NGOs, the interna-
tional community, academia, the private sector and local communities to obtain a deeper 
understanding of the societal problem at hand and identify opportunities. Going beyond 
the timber sector allows the full range of forest-related livelihood activities to be cov-
ered around which conflicts occur in the high forest zone and the full range of forest 
management regimes, namely protection, plantation, production and off-reserve areas. 
This study further analysis both the statutory and customary structures that govern the 
various management regimes. The theoretical debates in which this study is embedded 
include political ecology as the overarching theoretical perspective and three strands of 
literature to which it is linked: those on forest-based livelihoods, conflict and conflict 
management theories and interactive governance theory (see Chapter 2). The interactive 
governance theory coined by Kooiman and colleagues has hitherto been applied exclu-
sively to fisheries. Bringing this concept to forestry is feasible because of the similari-
ties of system inherent characteristics (i.e. diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale) 
which influence both the forest system-to-be-governed (including the natural and the 
human sub-systems) and the governing system.  
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Thesis outline 
This thesis is presented in twelve chapters. Chapters 1-3 present the introduction to the 
research, the theoretical strands underpinning the study and the methods used to conduct 
the study. The empirical chapters begin with Chapters 4 and 5 that analyse the context 
of the study, presenting the high forest zone, its sub-systems and forest users (i.e. local 
communities, timber operators etc.) as the ‘system-to-be-governed’ and the institutions, 
instruments and mechanisms that govern the system-to-be-governed as the ‘governing 
system’. Chapters 6-11 present the analysis of the case studies conducted in the high 
forest zone, more specifically the Tano-Offin forest reserve management regimes and 
off-reserve area in the Nkawie Forest District. All the empirical chapters are part of an 
overall research design (outlined in Chapter 3) and follow the same format (introduc-
tion, methodology, results, discussion and, sometimes, recommendations) so that each 
of them can be read as a study in its own right. The core of each chapter is as follows. 
 
Chapter 1 briefly introduces the study. It presents the reader with general back-
ground information, a brief introduction to the study area, and the problem statement, 
objectives, research questions, propositions and justification for the study. It further 
presents the outline of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the theoretical debates in which this study is embedded. It en-
compasses four strands of literature: political ecology, literature on forest-based liveli-
hoods, conflict and conflict management theories and interactive governance theory. 
The interactive governance theory was coined by Kooiman and colleagues and hitherto 
applied exclusively to fisheries. This theory focuses on interactions between the govern-
ing system and the system-to-be-governed, with the latter comprising both the natural 
and socioeconomic system and the interactions between them referred to as the govern-
ance interactions. In this study, interactive governance theory, complemented with the 
conflict wheel as an analytical tool developed by Mason & Rychard (2005), forms the 
basis of the conceptual framework that guides the data analysis. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the research design and the methods that guided data collection 
and analysis. It highlights the rationale for selecting a case study approach and justifies 
the selection of the study areas, units of analysis and respondents. It also examines the 
research methods and addresses issues of validity and reliability as well as techniques 
used for data analysis.  
 
Chapter 4 is the first of the empirical chapters and describes Ghana’s high forest 
zone and key forest resource users as the system-to-be-governed. Using interactive gov-
ernance theory this chapter explores the characteristics of the natural and socio-
economic characteristics of the high forest zone, as well as how the natural and socio-
economic sub-systems interact.  
 
Chapter 5 aims to contribute to the governance debate by applying interactive gov-
ernance theory to assess the status of Ghana’s forest governing system and the govern-
ability limitations it faces with regard to dealing with forest and tree-related conflicts. It 
also explores the opportunities that the interactive governance approach holds for the 
forest sector of Ghana to manage forest-related conflicts from a normative perspective. 
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Chapter 6 analyses conflicts for the full range of forest and tree-based livelihood 
components from the perspectives of forest governors and experts. It does so by em-
ploying a scaled methodology that promotes a shared problem definition and ownership 
of recommendations on much-needed changes in forest governance among those who 
have to implement them.  
 
Chapter 7 addresses the livelihood implications for inhabitants situated in the mid-
dle of a protected forest regime (Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas (GSBAs) and 
the associated conflicts that arise from this location. The chapter discusses the implica-
tions of these conflicts for ongoing forest governance initiatives such as the Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU to combat illegal logging and enhance forest 
governance. 
 
Chapter 8 analyses the co-management context of the modified taungya system 
(MTS) in the plantation regime and the arising conflict issues from the perspectives of 
members of local communities. It ascertains whether the MTS functions as a process 
from which lessons can be learned for further governance improvement or whether it is 
a fixed-state system meant to serve the interests of the Forestry Commission to secure 
timber supplies for the future.  
 
Chapter 9 examines conflict incidences in the production forest regime in Ghana’s 
high forest zone and the implications of the findings for law enforcement under the 
Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA). It analyses the interaction between the pro-
duction regime (the system-to-be-governed) and the governing system (the institutional 
and legislative frameworks) with respect to conflicts related to forest resources, opera-
tional conflicts with timber utilisation contracts (TUC) holders, and land-use conflicts. 
 
Chapter 10 reports on the off-reserve case where a scenario of cooperation between 
local people and a timber contractor contrasts the frequently cited conflict scenario. This 
achievement is based on the construction of social capital such as networking, shared 
responsibility, and the provision of incentives and creation of social ties and trust by the 
timber contractor, which was reciprocated by the local people. 
 
Chapter 11 provides insights that may support the national objective to strengthen 
law enforcement by analysing forest offences and their judgments in law courts in 
Nkawie Forest District and the views of representatives of law enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary regarding institutional challenges and means to overcome them. 
 
Chapter 12 brings together the various issues raised in the chapters whilst reflecting 
on the thesis statement and questions. It does so by providing answers to the research 
questions and identifying the theoretical and policy implications of the study. It also 
presents suggestions for future research. 
 
  
 
 
2 
Theoretical outlook 
Introduction  
This chapter presents the theoretical debates in which this study is embedded. Taking 
political ecology as a starting point, it links up with three strands of literature: forest-
based livelihoods, conflict and conflict management theories and interactive governance 
theory. The first section discusses political ecology. The next one looks at scholarly 
literature on forest-based livelihoods and how these are subject to conflicts. Then the 
chapter unearths scholarly literature on conflict theories and conflict management para-
digms related to natural resource management, with a focus on forest resources. Subse-
quently, the chapter looks at interactive governance theory coined by Kooiman and col-
leagues and hitherto applied exclusively to fisheries. This theory focuses on interactions 
between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed, with the latter compris-
ing both the natural and socioeconomic systems. The end of the chapter integrates the 
various theoretical strands and presents the conceptual framework that guides the analy-
sis in this study. The overall objective of this theoretical framework aligns with how 
governance is understood in interactive governance theory, namely as ‘the whole of 
public, as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create socie-
tal opportunities’ (Kooiman & Bavinck 2005: 17). In this case, the aim is to understand 
the societal problem relating to conflicts about forest and tree resources and the societal 
opportunities relating to the functioning of conflict management strategies. 
A political ecology perspective  
Political ecology is a discipline that emerged during the 1980s as a neo-Marxist-
influenced analysis of resource use and environmental conservation (Ros-Tonen 2012). 
This discipline has been evolving dynamically, focusing on the politics and the com-
plexity of human interaction with the environment (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987, Gezon 
1997). The studies carried out in this field address cross-cutting issues from local to 
global concerns. Major themes in political ecology include power imbalances and social 
action (e.g. Peluso 1992, Escobar 1995, Bryant 1998), the role of politics of knowledge 
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and discourses in natural resource management (e.g. Byrant 1998, Fairhead & Leach 
1996, 1998, 2003), conflicts in forest conservation and institutional politics (e.g. Gezon 
1997, Dietz 1999) and gender and the environment (Rocheleau et al. 1990). As Ros-
Tonen (2012) highlighted, themes that have become more prominent in political ecol-
ogy since the turn of the century – in line with other literature on environmental change 
– include the dynamics of cross-scale interactions (e.g. Adger et al. 2006, Neumann 
2009) and resilience and adaptation to global change (e.g. Adger 2000, 2009, Batterbury 
& Mortimore 2011).  
This chapter links the political ecology approach with debates on forest-based liveli-
hoods, conflicts and conflict management and interactive governance. There are several 
reasons for taking political ecology as a starting point for my theoretical framework. In 
the first place, political ecology (or political environmental geography as Dietz (1996, 
1999) termed it), examines the dynamic interactions between people’s needs and nature 
as a resource and sinks, helping to access the power structures behind the causes of en-
vironmental problems and attempts to solve them (Dietz 1996: 33). This focus on dy-
namic interactions aligns well with Kooiman and Bavinck’s interactive governance con-
cept quoted above, while it allows an unravelling of the power structures on which 
conflicts are based. Secondly, political ecology pays particular attention to the scalar 
dimensions of conflict situations, situating the actors involved within the broader envi-
ronmental and socio-political contexts in which they are embedded (Bryant 1992, Dietz 
1996, Gezon 1997). This allows us to understand the roots of conflicts that may be his-
torical, or based on social, economic and power relations (Blaikie & Brookfield 1987, 
Peet & Watts 1996), while also providing an analytical perspective to unravel the multi-
level character of conflicts, with interactions between actors operating at different levels 
of scale. Thirdly, political ecology pays particular attention to uneven access to re-
sources, which allows us to analyse conflicts in terms of competing claims to forest re-
sources.  
Forest-based livelihoods 
The World Bank (2004) estimates that 60 million indigenous people are almost wholly 
dependent on forests and 350 million people depend on forests for a high degree for 
subsistence and income. In addition, about 1.2 billion people rely on agroforestry farm-
ing systems. Hence, forest resources contribute immensely to the livelihoods of people, 
and particularly the world’s poor. Indeed, according to the World Bank (2004: 1), forest 
resources contribute to the livelihoods of 90% of the 1.2 billon people who live on less 
than one US$ a day.
 
These people depend fully or partly on these resources to meet their 
daily subsistence and commercial needs.  
Ellis (1998: 4) defines livelihood as ‘the process by which rural families construct a 
diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival 
and in order to improve their standards of living’. According to the DFID Sustainable 
Livelihood Guidance Sheets (1999: 1), it encompasses the assets (human, financial, 
physical, natural and social capital), the capabilities
 
and the activities needed for a 
means of living. Attention to livelihoods from the perspectives of the poor received a 
boost with the Sustainable Livelihood Approach developed by authors like Chambers 
and Conway (1992), Carney (1998), Scoones (1998), Bebbington (1999) and Ellis 
(2000). Attention for the role that forests play in people’s livelihoods dates back to 1978 
when the FAO held the VIII Forestry Congress under the title Forestry for People’ (Col-
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chester et al. 2003, cited in Ros-Tonen et al. 2005), but has acquired a more prominent 
place on the agenda since the World Conference on Environment and Development 
(WCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Chapter 11 on combating deforestation in Agenda 
21 (UNCED 1992), which was the outcome of the Rio conference, not only recognises 
the rights of forest dwellers to have an economic stake in the forest, but also highlights 
the cultural and spiritual value of forest and the need to protect indigenous rights.  
Sunderlin et al. (2005) mention several ways in which forest resources play a role in 
people’s livelihoods. First, forests are an important source of maintaining agriculture, 
both directly as a source of farming land (i.e. shifting cultivation) and indirectly through 
soil formation and securing water supplies. Second, timber resources are a major source 
of revenue for those working in the timber industry and for the country as a whole. In 
Ghana, for example, the formal timber industry contributes about 6% to the Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) and 11% to Ghana’s export earnings (Marfo 2010). It also creates 
about 100,000 jobs through direct employment in the legal timber industry and an esti-
mated 130,000 jobs in chainsaw milling (Ibid.: xi & 2). Third, non-timber forest prod-
ucts (NTFPs), such as food items, medicinal plants, bushmeat, forage and fibre play an 
important socio-economic role in most local communities, not only for subsistence and 
commercial purposes, but also for their cultural and spiritual values (see Falconer 1992, 
Blay et al. 2008, Bell 2010, and Bokhorst 2011 for the role of NTFPs in Ghana). NTFPs 
can be an important source of cash and non-cash income for forest-dwelling people 
(Bell 2010), but overall they function mainly as a ‘safety net’ (in times of emergency) 
and ‘gap filler’ (in times of low agricultural income) (Sunderlin et al. 2005: 1386) rather 
than as a potential route out of poverty (Belcher et al. 2005, Kusters et al. 2006, Vedeld 
et al. 2007). The fourth way forest resources contribute to livelihoods is through envi-
ronmental services which support farming and agroforestry systems (such as soil forma-
tion and securing water supplies as mentioned above). Environmental services may be-
come more important as a source of cash income through carbon and other payments for 
environmental services (PES) within the framework of Reducing Emissions from De-
forestation and Degradation (REDD+) schemes, as compensation for keeping the forest 
intact. Finally, Sunderlin et al. (2005) mention a number of indirect livelihood benefits, 
such as the boosting of local markets due to the presence of a logging workforce and the 
creation of a road network which facilitates access to markets, health services and edu-
cation. In addition, people may receive logging compensation payments. In Ghana such 
compensation payments take the form of Social Responsibility Agreement (SRA) and 
crop damage compensation which are discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
Despite their importance as sources of livelihood, the use of forest resources also 
creates challenges associated with illicit uses, restricted access, an unfavourable govern-
ing system and competing claims that undermine their importance to forest dwellers and 
the nation’s wellbeing. Such competing and conflicting interactions often result in con-
flicts. Tropenbos International Ghana (TBI 2005) identified challenges facing forest-
based livelihoods in Ghana during focus group discussions held in 2005 on ‘Alternative 
livelihoods and sustainable forest management’. These are summarised as (i) inadequate 
incentives for local communities in forest resource management, (ii) inadequate explo-
ration of the opportunities for improving forest employment, (iii) inefficient utilisation 
of NTFPs hindering their promotion as assets for livelihood improvement, (iv) a lack of 
proper analysis of forest-dependent livelihoods resulting in deficient decision making, 
and (v) conflicts inherent in livelihood activities relating to forest and tree resources 
(TBI 2005). Some of the problems and associated conflicts also result from the incom-
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patibility in the statutory and customary tenure system inherited from the colonial and 
post-colonial era (Castro 2008). This issue is addressed in more detail in Chapter 5. First 
and foremost, I review the theories on conflict and conflict management. 
Conflict theories and conflict management paradigms 
The scholarly literature on conflict theories and conflict management have been evolv-
ing in scientific and policy debates for decades and interface with many disciplines (e.g. 
Pondy 1967, Fink 1968, FAO 1996, Glasl 1999, UNEP 2009). There seems to be a con-
sensus that ‘conflict’ is generally ill-defined. The term ‘conflict’ is often used inter-
changeably with the term ‘dispute’. However, Burton (cited in Spangler & Burgess 
2003) makes a clear distinction between the two concepts, based on different scopes 
(‘conflict is a larger umbrella under which smaller and short–term disputes occur’), time 
frames (‘disputes are short-term phenomena while conflicts are long-term problems’) 
and degrees of negotiability. With regard to the latter, ‘conflicts are different to disputes 
because they manifest themselves in issues that are seemingly non-negotiable’ (Ibid.: 2). 
Despite the variation in definitions and lack of consensus on a definition, most scholars 
agree that conflict is a ‘process’ (Pondy 1967, Fink 1968, Glasl 1999). According to 
Pondy (1967: 299): 
‘Conflict can be more readily understood if it is considered to be a dynamic process. The 
reason being that conflict relationship between two or more individuals in an organization 
can be analyzed as a sequence of conflict episodes. Each conflict episode begins with condi-
tions characterized by certain conflict potentials. The parties to the relationship may not be-
come aware of any basis of conflict, and they may not develop hostile affections for one an-
other. Depending on a number of factors, their behaviour may show a variety of conflict-
prone traits. Each episode or encounter leaves an aftermath that affects the course of suc-
ceeding episodes’. 
This section focuses on natural resource conflicts and first reviews literature on the 
causes of conflicts. After that it examines theories on conflict characteristics and dy-
namics, and then reviews various paradigms regarding conflict management. 
Natural resource conflicts: causes 
Conflicts differ according to context (Moore 2003, Wall & Callister 1995) and causes. 
In order to understand the latter, Tosi et al. (2000) developed a model that presents the 
dynamic conflict process (Figure 2.1) based on the ‘process school of thought’ (Pondy 
1967, Hickson et al. 1971, Thomas 1976). Tosi et al. (2000: 277-278) explained the first 
three conflict stages as follows: 
Antecedent conditions: ‘the conditions that cause or precede a conflict episode’. 
Perceived conflict: ‘the requirement that, for conflict to exist, the conflict must be perceived 
by one or more parties involved’.  
Manifest conflict or behaviour: ‘a stage of conflict that occurs when parties that have per-
ceived a conflict behave in a way that makes the conflict observable. 
The perceived conflict is what Schmidt & Kochan (1972: 362) identified as being 
two underlying causes of conflict, i.e. ‘perceived goal incompatibility’ with respect to 
the resources and activities that the conflicting parties share and the ‘perceived opportu-
nity for interfering with the attainment of one another’s goals’. Glasl (1999) added to 
the intermediating variables that trigger conflicts the differences in perceptions, emo-
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tions and interests, which he labelled ‘sources of impairment’. Glasl’s impairment 
model was adapted by Marfo (2006) and Yasmi & Schanz (2007) within the context of 
natural resource management. Marfo (2006) employed this model to understand the role 
of actor empowerment in the management of natural resource conflicts, whereas Yasmi 
& Schanz (Ibid.: 58) used the model to clarify conceptual confusion by recognising con-
flict as a two-actor constellation, with one actor behaviour experienced as an impedi-
ment by the other actor. 
 
Figure 2.1    The conflict process (Adapted from Tosi et al. 2000: 277) 
 
 
Several scholars (e.g. Homer-Dixon 1994, Buckles 1999, Le Billion 2001, Ohene-
Gyan 2004, Yasmi & Schanz 2007, Schanz 2007) have theorised and analysed conflicts 
specifically related to natural resources. This body of literature revealed a great diver-
sity of conflict occurrences. They can occur at household level, at local level within or 
between communities, at national level and at international level (FAO 1996, Fisher 
2000). Due to the complexity of natural resource conflicts there are usually many causes 
and many interconnected issues, and that makes it difficult to pinpoint the key issues in 
the conflict scenarios. Different scholars have symbolised these conflicts in different 
ways. Among the main driving factors are power plays (LeBillon 2001, Marfo 2006), 
competing and diverging interests and the needs of stakeholders (Warner 2000), the 
scarcity of environmental resources (Homer-Dixon 1999, Theisen 2008), the resource 
curse (LeBillon 2001), inequity in benefit sharing and the absence or inadequate consid-
eration of conflict management in national policies (Tyler 1999, Ohene-Gyan 2004). 
Given that it is a social process, the pivot of the conflicts is the human being – termed 
either as ‘stakeholders’ or ‘actors’ or ‘resource users’ (Grimble & Wellard 1996, Kotey 
et al. 1998, Marfo 2006).  
Three conflict theories have been reported as being essential in natural resource con-
flicts. According to Yasmi & Schanz (2007) the scarcity theory, usually labelled as a 
Antecedent conditions 
Perceived conflict 
Manifest conflict 
Conflict resolution or suppression 
Aftermath 
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neo-Malthusian approach, sees conflicts as being inevitable due to the increased scarcity 
of natural resources – resulting either from increasing demand, decreasing supply or 
‘structural scarcity’ caused by uneven distribution of resources – and emerging violent 
conflicts as a main threat for mankind (Kaplan 1994, Homer-Dixon 1994 & 1999). A 
contrasting view emanates from political ecology where the belief is that conflicts are 
largely determined by a set of broader processes of change within a specific historical 
context and embedded in the interplay of social, ecological and political processes (Pe-
luso & Watts 2001, Turner 2004). An arena of contested entitlements therefore exists 
which comprise the right to own resources, the right to use resources, and the rights to 
intervene in resource situations (Dietz 1996, Neumann 1998). A third theory, related to 
political ecology, is the ‘environmental framing model’, which views conflict as percep-
tion driven (Lewicki et al. 2003, Adams et al. 2003). According to Gray (2003: 11), 
framing is the process of constructing and representing our interpretations of the world 
around us. Adams et al. (2003: 1915) argue that differences in knowledge, understand-
ing, preconceptions and priorities among stakeholders provide a deeper meaning of why 
conflicts arise, but that they are often overlooked in conventional policy dialogue. Such 
knowledge allows stakeholders to define problems of resource use in three realms: (i) 
knowledge of the empirical context, (ii) knowledge of laws and institutions, and (iii) 
their beliefs, myths and ideas (Ibid.: 1915). A deeper understanding of these diverse 
frames creates opportunities for reaching consensus and/or compromise to facilitate 
conflict management.  
A different perspective is taken by Buckles & Rusnak (1999) who relate conflict 
causes to four characteristics inherent in natural resources:  
1. The interconnectedness of the space in which natural resources occur, as a result of 
which actions by one individual or group may generate effects for others, sometimes 
way beyond the actual site in which resources are used;  
2. The shared social space in which natural resources are embedded, with complex and 
unequal relations among a wide range of actors with diverging interests in the same 
resource; 
3. Their increasing scarcity due to factors identified by Homer-Dixon (1999), as cited 
above; 
4. Their symbolic value related to a particular way of life, ethnic identity, gender or age 
roles. 
Many of these characteristics are related to interdependency and interrelationships 
between resource systems, which often result in conflicts. 
Other authors also view institutional failures, lapses in policy and legislation, and 
governance failures as causes of conflicts. Tyler (1999: 263) asserts that the level of 
attention paid in policy to conflict management has been relatively low, and that this has 
had a ripple effect on ‘long-term sustainability and short-term economic feasibility’. He 
clarifies several ways in which public policy may become a cause of natural resource 
conflicts, including (i) uncoordinated planning and investment in protected areas and 
other natural resource sectors, (ii) inadequate information and consultation on natural 
resource policies, (iii) government-supported migration and displacement, (iv) discrimi-
natory or unclear tenure policies, (v) a piecemeal approach to tenure, decentralisation 
and natural resource management reforms, (vi) vague policy directions, and (vii) poor 
recognition of legitimacy of multiple stakeholders (see Tyler 1999 for further details). 
Furthermore, conflicts over natural resources arise because of the failure of mandated 
organisations to govern effectively (McKean & Ostrom 1995). The problem in conven-
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tional hierarchical governance is the state’s over-emphasis on law enforcement and con-
trol, while overlooking the interactive component of the natural resource system and its 
inherent conflicts (Jentoft 2007). How stakeholders frame their perceptions of resource 
use problems and solutions may also generate policy conflicts because of differences in 
knowledge and understanding between policymakers and stakeholders (Adams et al. 
2003). According to these authors, a failure to recognise such cognitive dimensions of 
conflicts results in shallow policy measures which fail to address the deeper underlying 
differences among the resource users (Ibid.: 1916). 
Natural resource conflicts: dimensions 
Other authors have examined natural resource conflicts in terms of analytical dimen-
sions. For example, Anderson et al. (1996) distinguish between actors (e.g. stake-
holders, government structures and private entities), resources (e.g. land, forest, owner-
ship, access) and stakes (e.g. economic, political, socio-cultural). This categorisation 
enables conflicts to be analysed either through an actor-oriented approach, a resource–
oriented approach, a stake-oriented approach or a combination of the three (Ibid.). Simi-
larly, Engel & Korf (2005) propose unravelling natural resource conflicts by looking at 
three interrelated elements, namely people, process and problem. Key factors to be con-
sidered as far as people are concerned are their feelings, emotions and perceptions of the 
problems and how they relate to each other and the natural resources over which con-
flicts occur (Ibid.: 20). According to Engel & Korf (2005: 20), processes are ‘the way 
decisions are made, and how people feel about it’. The authors argue that it is important 
to consider these processes as feelings of resentment and as being treated unfairly or 
powerlessness as a frequent cause or trigger of conflict. Problems are the concrete issues 
(or ‘root causes’ in the terminology of Engel & Korf) around which conflicts evolve. 
They may include diverging values, interests, needs or shares in resource access or 
benefits. Adams et al. (2003) also argue that attention should be paid to the cognitive 
dimension of conflicts (i.e. knowledge and understanding) between and among stake-
holders as an essential element in defining the root causes of the conflicts.  
Conflict analysis or what other scholars term ‘conflict assessment’ is an initial stage 
of conflict resolution in which parties seek to gain a deeper understanding of the dynam-
ics in their relationship. It could also be defined as the systematic study of the profile, 
causes, actors and dynamics of conflicts (Mason & Rychard 2005). Skutsch (1996) per-
ceives conflict analysis as an analytical framework which views conflicts on a case-by-
case basis. As an analytical approach which uses a number of different tools, conflict 
analysis is considered to be useful to the disputants, convener and assessor by (i) offer-
ing a reflective tool which clarifies their own interests, positions and issues with regard 
to the conflict, as well as revealing those of other stakeholders, (ii) building a shared 
body of information and knowledge, and (iii) reframing relationships and building trust 
and issue-based coalitions and providing insights into the type of intervention likely to 
succeed (Skutsch 1996, Shemueli 2003). There are several tools which can be used to 
conduct conflict analysis. These include strategic conflict assessment (SCA) (Oshita 
2003), the conflict assessment framework (USAID 2004), and the conflict wheel (Ma-
son & Rychard 2005) (Figure 2.2). In this thesis the conflict wheel is used. It is unique 
because it is a ‘meta’ conflict analysis tool that facilitates a multi-dimensional under-
standing of the causes and dynamics of conflicts, as well as the capacities for conflict 
management in Ghana’s high forest zone. The tool considers various conflict dimen-
sions, including the actors involved in the conflict situation, the issues at hand, the con-
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text in which the conflict is embedded, the causes and the options for conflict manage-
ment. The wheel enables a first overview of a conflict to be obtained which the serves 
as a basis for analysing specific aspects in greater depth (Mason & Rychard 2005). Such 
in-depth analysis involved the use of the interactive governance approach outlined later 
in this chapter. 
Natural resource conflicts: characteristics 
As indicated above, most authors agree that conflict is a process (Fink 1968). This dy-
namic process involves a sequence of stages, which can be categorised into ‘violent’ 
and ‘non-violent’, with variations in the level of intensity (Axt et al. 2006, Warner 
2000, Moore 2003, Buckles & Rusnak 1999). In between the violence and escape is 
what Noorduyn (2005) termed ‘cascade to violence or escape’ (Ibid.: 20). As cited 
above, Tosi et al. 2000 distinguished between antecedent conditions, perceived conflict, 
manifest conflict, conflict resolution or suppression, and aftermath. This corresponds to 
similar categorisations like the one by Pondy (1967) who distinguished between latent, 
perceived, felt, manifest and aftermath stages. Similarly, Brahm (2003) distinguishes 
between latent, emergent, escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, resolution and reconcilia-
tion. In practice it must be noted that not all conflicts complete the entire process or 
follow these stages in succession. Table 2.1 presents an overview of conflict categories 
adapted from HIIK (2005), which focuses on conflict intensity. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Overview of the conflict categories and intensities 
Conflict category  Name of intensity  Definition  
Non-violent  Latent conflict  A positional difference on definable values of national 
meaning is considered to be latent conflict if respective 
demands are articulated by one of the parties and per-
ceived by the other as such. 
Manifest conflict A manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are 
located in the preliminary stage to violent force. This in-
cludes, for example, verbal pressure, threatening violence 
explicitly, or the imposition of economic sanctions. 
Violent  Crisis A crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the 
parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents. 
Severe crisis A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent 
force is repeatedly used in an organised way. 
War 
 
A war is a type of violent conflict in which violent force is 
used with certain continuity in an organised and system-
atic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, 
depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is 
massive and long-term. 
Source: Adapted from HIIK (2005). 
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The key point that can be deduced from the work of scholars from the ‘process 
school of thought’ is that the process entails varying degrees of one party blocking or 
interfering with another party’s interests, goals, values, aspirations or needs (Pondy 
1967, Schmidt & Kochan 1972, Fisher 1990). However as indicated by Axt et al. (2006: 
5) one pitfall in conflict literature is that most studies are concentrated on violent con-
flicts (particularly wars) rather than on non-violent conflict.  
Conflict management paradigms and implications in natural resource conflicts 
There are various conflict management approaches that emanate from social sciences 
and natural resource management disciplines. These approaches not only differ accord-
ing to their underlying objectives and assumptions (Yasmi & Schanz 2007: 35) but also 
with respect to their coping strategies. Ways to resolve or minimise conflicts have been 
identified by scholars using different conflict management terminologies. These include 
conflict resolution (Coser 1967, Zartman 1991, Mayer 2000), alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) (FAO 2000), conflict management (Fisher & Ury 1981, Susskind et al. 
2000, Marfo 2006), conflict capability (Glasl 1999, Zapf & Gross 2001), alternative 
conflict resolution (ACR) (Ury et al. 1988, Hoffmann & Wagner 1993), integrated con-
flict management system (ICMS) (SPIDR 2001) and reframing (Spangler 2003, Lewicki 
et al. 2003). These terminologies are sometimes used interchangeably. 
Conflict management approaches and coping strategies employed in natural resource 
management can be classified in three categories, i.e. avoidance, consensual approaches 
(negotiation, facilitation, moderation, consultation, conciliation and mediation) and non-
consensual approaches (arbitration, adjudication and coercion) (Glasl 1999, Moore 
2003, Engel & Korf 2005, Wehrmann 2008). A definition of the various conflict man-
agement strategies can be found in Table 2.2. 
The underlying assumption of conflict management is that it is possible to promote a 
win-win solution, whereas strategies like avoidance, adjudication and violence in most 
cases lead to win-lose outcomes. These are often not considered desirable for conflict 
1.  Context 3. Actors 
4. Causes 
5. Dynamics 
6. Strategies/ 
Options   
2. Issues 
Figure 2.2    The conflict wheel as an analytical tool 
Source: Adapted from Mason & Rychard 2005 
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management (see Wall & Callister 1995, Engel & Korf 2005). From a conceptual per-
spective, conflict management is a systematic process geared towards finding mutually 
satisfying outcomes for two or more conflicted parties. It is therefore defined  
 
 
Table 2.2 Conflict management strategies  
Approaches  Conflict man-
agement or 
coping strat-
egy  
Definition Level of third 
party involvement 
No approach Avoidance  Acting in ways that prevent conflicts being ac-
knowledged publicly. 
No meeting be-
tween conflict 
parties or third 
party. 
Consensual 
approach 
Negotiation Parties reach agreement through consensus in a 
voluntary process. Consensus means a decision 
that all can support. 
 
Facilitation The facilitator helps the parties come together, 
with the parties still being able to resolve the prob-
lem by themselves. 
Moderation The moderator helps the parties come together to 
clarify and settle minor differences, with the par-
ties still being able to resolve the problem by 
themselves. 
Consultation The ‘tutor’ accompanies the process, working on 
the deeply internalised perceptions, attitudes, in-
tentions and behaviours of the parties in order to 
placate them. 
Conciliation This is a mixture of consultation and mediation. 
The conciliator helps the parties to negotiate while 
– whenever necessary – addressing internalised 
perceptions, attitudes, intentions and behaviours 
with the objective of reducing prejudices and hos-
tility. 
Mediation Mediation, too, requires the parties to be willing to 
face each other and to find a compromise. The 
mediator follows a strict procedure, giving each 
party the opportunity to explain its perceptions and 
to express its feelings, forcing the other party to 
listen and finally moderating a discussion aimed at 
finding a solution with which both parties can live. 
The mediator does not have the authority to im-
pose a solution. 
Non-
consensual 
approach 
Arbitration The parties submit the conflict to a mutually agree-
able third party who issues a non-binding decision. 
Arbitration follows strict rules. Unlike the modera-
tor, however, the arbitrator needs to make direct 
suggestions on how to settle the conflict. He is more 
influential and powerful than moderators, tutors or 
mediators and has decision-making authority. 
Adjudication The final decision is taken by a powerful authority 
(e.g. a judge). 
Coercion  Threatening or using force to impose a position.  
Source: Adapted from Glasl (1999), Moore (2003), Engel & Korf (2005) and Wehrmann (2008). 
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in this study as a ‘generic’ term that refers to all interventions in a conflict with the aim 
being to prevent and solve problems, transform relations, and change structures 
(adapted from Glasl 1999). 
The kind of conflict outcome relates to the academic debate about whether natural 
resource conflicts should be considered as being destructive and damaging to the people 
and the resource base or whether they should be seen as a factor of positive social 
change. Adams et al. (2003) are of the opinion that conflicts result in socio-political, 
economic and infrastructure stability. Scholars from the ‘positive school’ believe that 
constructive or positive conflicts have the potential to facilitate learning and bring about 
positive social change and policy reform if they are properly handled. Conflicts over 
natural resources have the potential to contribute to equality and equity in resource dis-
tribution (Castro & Nielsen 2001, Hirschman 1994, Peets & Watt 1996). The positive 
impacts of conflict, like this one, are examined in Chapter 8 which explores strategies 
for dealing with conflict in the modified taungya system (MTS) – a co-management 
arrangement between the Forestry Commission and local communities for plantation 
development – which resulted in more equitable sharing of MTS benefits and strength-
ened the democracy in the MTS group in Chirayaso community. There is a third cate-
gory of scholars who perceive conflict to have both negative and positive impacts. Ac-
cording to Deutsch & Coleman (2000) and Krisberg (1998) conflict is neither good nor 
bad. Rather it is the way in which they are handled which determines its constructive-
ness or destructiveness. Yasmi (2007: 2) endorses this statement by asserting that ‘the 
biggest challenge is how constructive aspects of conflict are fostered and destructive 
ones are prevented or limited’.  
Despite all the strategies and desire for win-win outcomes and positive social change, 
conflicts over forest resources are still widespread. There is therefore a need to search 
for alternative intervention strategies that fit rapidly into the changing governance proc-
esses. In exploring such an alternative strategy, this corresponds with Zartman’s (1997) 
notion that conflict management cannot be separated from governance, and that the 
right mechanisms should be put in place to deal with conflicts among groups before 
they escalate and block the governing process. However, in contrast to Zartman, who 
perceives the government as being the lead broker in terms of conflict management in 
the governance process, this chapter adopts the notion of ‘interactive governance the-
ory’ developed by Kooiman et al. (2005) as a starting point to assess its potential for 
facilitating conflict management, especially in the domain of forest and tree resources.  
Departing from this point, the conflict wheel is applied with a view to analysing con-
flicts over forest and tree resources from various forest actors’ perspectives (i.e. both 
state and non-state actors, local communities and timber operators). The analysis of the 
views of these respondents is blended with the analysis of the governing system. In 
Chapter 5 the historical perspective of forest and tree conflicts is analysed on the basis 
of documentary analysis. In Chapter 6 the conflict causes are categorised based on exist-
ing scholarly literature (notably Schmidt & Kochan 1972, Homer Dixon 1999, Tyler 
1999), whereas the distinction between antecedent conditions and manifest behaviour is 
used in the analysis of conflict cases in Chapters 7-9. In terms of conflict dimensions, 
conflict intensity levels are categorised as being violent and non-violent. The categorisa-
tion of conflict management paradigms in Table 2.2 is used in subsequent chapters to 
interpret respondents’ answers regarding ways of dealing with conflicts.  
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The governance concept and interactive governance theory 
This section begins with a brief description of the evolution of the governance concept 
from different disciplinary backgrounds and highlights the differences between govern-
ance and management. Next, it examines the notion of forest governance and the main 
challenges related to it. Finally, it presents interactive governance theory and how it can 
be applied to understand forest and tree resource conflicts and conflict management 
strategies that form the topic of this study. 
The governance concept 
Over the past three decades, governance as a concept has gained prominence in both 
academic and policy debates. At a global level, governance debates have been centred 
on three fields of studies, namely management, public administration and development 
studies. Within management studies, the governance discussion is linked to decentrali-
sation and neo-liberal reforms with concepts like participation and mobilisation (World 
Bank 1997, Stoker 2000, Nuijten et al. 2004). Scholars in the field of public administra-
tion perceive governance as an interactive process of governing and steering processes 
of both state and non–state actors (Kooiman 1993, Jessop 2002). The third group of 
governance debates stems from development studies and has been prominent since the 
early 1990s (Nuijten et al. 2004). Governance is not merely something governors do, 
but comprises the totality of the interactions between the governing system and the sys-
tem-to-be-governed (Kooiman & Bavinck 2005). Governance has different definitions 
according to its evolution into the different disciplines. However, three common fea-
tures in these varied definitions include (i) governing as a matter of public as well as 
private actors, based on the premise that government alone cannot solve societal prob-
lems, (ii) a blurred dividing line between public and private sectors, as a result of which 
interests among these actors are often shared, and (iii) the recognition that governance 
has its roots in societal developments (Ibid.: 15-16). The central theme in most defini-
tions is that the state cannot do things alone but needs non-state actors to assist in devel-
opment.  
Box 2.1 Distinction between governance and management 
 
 Governance is the most inclusive term followed by public policy and then man-
agement.  
 Governance goes beyond the problems at hand to consider longer-term societal 
trends and needs, while management is about implementation in a technocratic 
sense. 
 Governance does not limit itself to one particular sector but looks at the relations 
between sectors.  
 Governance is not the natural prerogative of government or of resource manag-
ers, but rather a widely practised activity and a broadly shared responsibility. 
 Governance transcends a problem-and-solution focus and brings in an interest in 
the creation and exploitation of opportunities. It balances a concern for difficulties 
and issues with an eye for new and promising opportunities.  
 Governance pays systematic attention to institutional arrangements for governing 
activities and to the normative principles that guide them. 
 Governance is about politics while management is about action. 
 
Sources: Béné & Neiland 2006, Kooiman & Bavinck 2005. 
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Adams (1996), who researched fisheries and aquaculture governance in the Pacific 
Islands region, questioned whether the terms management and governance could be 
used interchangeably. Although the two concepts are related, most scholars adhere to 
the view that a distinction must indeed be made (e.g. Béné & Neiland 2006, Kooiman & 
Bavinck 2005). Some key distinctions between the two concepts are outlined in Box 
2.1. In forestry, Ros-Tonen et al. (2008: 1483) summarise the difference as ‘forest gov-
ernance provides the political, legal and institutional framework in which (…) sustain-
able forest management can thrive’. 
Forest governance  
The concept of governance is a relevant discourse in the development of a global forest 
regime (Arts 2006). Applying this concept to the forest sector, Ros-Tonen & Kusters 
(2011) state that forest governance is about how and to what ends forests are managed. 
In their view, forest governance encompasses (i) the processes, mechanisms and formal 
and informal institutions in place to take decisions on forest use, (ii) the actors involved 
in these decisions and (iii) the way in which forest policies, laws and regulations are 
enforced on the ground (Ibid.: 189).  
Governance or the lack of it, in forestry is a central issue that affects millions of peo-
ple engaged in forest-related livelihood activities at all levels. For this reason, good for-
est governance is essential to protect people’s livelihoods and improve their well-being, 
and to protect them from the consequences of illegal logging and unauthorised removals 
of forest resources. At a global level, good and pro-poor forest governance faces several 
challenges. According to Brown et al. (2002), these include (i) the nature of the re-
source that offers multiple benefits to different people with diverse interests, (ii) the 
nature of property and access rights, and (iii) the value of forest resources (global vs. 
local values, marketed vs. un-marketed values, values of interest to actors operating at 
multiple levels of scales and with highly diverging powers, and values subject to illegal 
exploitation (Ibid.: 2). Mehta et al. (2001) add to these challenges the ecological, liveli-
hood, knowledge and socio-political uncertainties that may affect people’s use of natu-
ral resources. According to Bavinck et al. (2005: 28) such uncertainties can make gov-
ernance processes ‘very troublesome’. 
Interactive governance theory  
Focusing on ways to overcome some of the governance uncertainties, Kooiman & Bav-
inck (2005: 17) define governance as: 
‘the whole of public as well as private interactions that are initiated to solve societal prob-
lems and create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of princi-
ples guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them’.  
According to Kooiman & Bavinck (Ibid.), the most important feature of their gov-
ernance definition is interaction (see Box 2.2). For this reason, they label their approach 
to governance ‘the interactive governance approach.’ Three elements stand out in Koo-
iman and Bavinck’s views of governance as interactions: structure, actors and interac-
tion: 
 Structures are the frameworks within which actors operate, and which they take into 
account. They include culture, law, agreements, material and technical possibilities 
as well as inherited traits (Kooiman & Bavinck 2005: 17).  
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 Actors are social units that possess power of action, including individuals, house-
holds, associations, companies, institutions, NGOs, traditional authorities, local 
communities, leaders, political parties, militant groups, companies, NGOs, and gov-
ernment officials and all national, international and intergovernmental organisations 
(Ibid. : 17).  
 Interaction is defined as ‘a specific form of action, undertaken by actors in order to 
remove obstacles and tread new pathways’ (Ibid.: 17).  
Kooiman & Bavinck (2005: 18) perceive interaction as ‘a mutually influencing relation 
Box 2.2 Assumptions underlying interactive governance theory  
 
 Governance is the quality of the totality of the interactions between those 
governing and those governed (Kooiman et al. 2005: 19).  
 Governing as governance is principle, interactive and multi-stakeholder 
driven, contrary to traditional views that regard governance as unitary sin-
gle-minded, top-down and instrumental, therefore reducing governance to 
governing (Jentoft 2007: 361).  
 The goal of governance is to maximise participation and structure it ac-
cording to democratic principles (Kooiman et al. 2005: 19).   
 Governability is a property of natural resource systems as a whole, in 
which natural resource systems are defined as the totality of dynamic in-
terrelations among given entities (Kooiman et al. 2005: 342-3). 
 
Figure 2.3    Components of the interactive governance model and their linkages to governability  
    (Source: Chuenpagdee et al. 2008: 3) 
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between two or more actors possessing an intentional and structural dimension’. From a 
societal perspective Kooiman (1999: 75) distinguishes three kinds of interactions, in-
cluding (i) ‘interferences’ (regarded as uncoordinated, spontaneous interactions) (ii) 
‘interplays’ (semi-formalised modes of interactions like networks, modes of coopera-
tion, collaboration and group formation), and (iii) ‘interventions’ (interactions with a 
public or semi-public character which are often based on rules and regulations with 
some juridical imprints). As far as forest management in Ghana is concerned, a blend of 
these interactions occurs in the governing system, with interplays and interventions be-
ing the dominant interaction modes in the formal forest sector (see Chapter 5). As will 
be seen in Chapter 7, interventions can also occur under the traditional governing struc-
ture out of view of state actors when traditional authorities intervene in conflict man-
agement.  
From the interactive governance perspective, three components of the societal system 
stand out: the governing system (GS), the system-to-be-governed (SG) and a mediating 
component, which govern interactions (GI). Together these ensure the so-called govern-
ability of the system (Figure 2.3).  
According to this theory, the governing system and system-to-be-governed share 
similar structural attributes: they are diverse, complex, dynamic, and encompass multi-
ple scales (Box 2.3). Using fisheries as an example, the four system characteristics de-
fined by Kooiman & Bavinck (2005: 13-14) and Kooiman (2008: 76) are presented in 
Box 2.3. In addition to the structural attributes defined in Box 2.3, Jentoft (2007) adds 
‘vulnerability’ to the list, which refers to the fact that the systems-to-be-governed are 
very vulnerable. He argues in favour of corresponding qualities (or ‘demands’) for the 
governing system to overcome these structural attributes while ensuring governability.  
Diversity demands that the governing system is sensitive, complexity calls for inclu-
siveness, dynamics calls for flexibility and vulnerability means the precautionary prin-
ciple has to be applied.  
 
Box 2.3: System characteristics of interactive governance 
 
Diversity: is a characteristic of the entities that form fisheries systems and points 
to the nature and degree in which they vary. 
 
Complexity: is a function of the architecture of the relations among the parts of a 
system, and between a system and its environment. This depends on the inter-
actions among the actors and their interdependency. Interactions become 
lengthening when more actors become involved in a system and/or when the 
geographical distance between them becomes larger. 
 
Dynamics: apply to the tensions within a system and between systems. They 
create the potential for change, but can have disruptive consequences. 
 
Scale: refers to time and space dimensions of systems-to-be-governed as well 
as to governing systems. 
 
Sources: Kooiman & Bavinck (2005: 13-14) and Kooiman (2008: 176) 
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– The governing system (GS) 
Jentoft (2007: 360) describes the governing system as a ‘social and therefore man-made 
system which is made up of institutions and steering instruments and mechanisms’. In-
teractive governance theory analyses the governing system in terms of orders, modes 
and elements of governance (Kooiman et al. 2008: 5). 
Orders of governance are three interrelated levels of governance, with the first order 
encompassing interactions in day-to-day management ‘to solve societal problems and 
create societal opportunities’ while the second order refers to ‘the creation and care for 
institutions that enable the interactions’. The second order takes account of the mainte-
nance and design of institutions (structures, human resources, etc.) necessary to solve 
problems and create opportunities (i.e. the first order process). The third order refers to 
the ‘principles guiding those interactions’. This is also known as ‘meta-governance’, 
which refers to the main normative principles and values that guide first and second 
orders processes.  
The interactive governance framework presented in Figure 2.3 includes what Kooi-
man & Bavinck (2005) call ‘elements’, which consist of: 
 Images – which constitute the ‘guiding lights’ as to the how and why of governance 
and can take many forms such as visions, knowledge and goals. 
 Instruments – which link images to action and can be ‘soft’ in nature (e.g. informa-
tion, bribe or peer pressure) or ‘hard’ (e.g. physical force). 
 Actions – which put the instruments into effect. 
According to the authors, all these components are closely connected and not easily 
distinguishable. Based on research on fisheries, Kooiman & Bavinck (Ibid.: 21-22) 
identify three styles or modes of governance with some styles of governance being more 
relevant to particular governing systems than others:  
 Self-governance is a situation in which ‘actors take care of themselves’, largely out-
side the scope of government;  
 Hierarchical governance is a style of governing in which the state intervenes and 
interacts with its citizens in a top-down style. Steering, planning and control are key 
concepts in this governance mode, which is embedded in instruments such as laws 
and policies; 
 Co-governance is a collaborative way of governing in which responsibilities are 
shared between the State and societal parties with a common purpose in mind. This 
mode of governance is characterised by horizontal relationships, with no actor being 
solely in control. 
According to Jentoft (2007), the characteristics of the system-to-be-governed deter-
mine which mode is most adequate. Some general principles include contextualisation 
(the more diverse the system-to-be-governed, the more appropriate self-governance), 
coordination (the more complex, the more appropriate the co-governing mode), learning 
(the more dynamic, the more effective the co-governing mode) and safeguarding (the 
more vulnerable, the more adequate the hierarchical mode). In practice, several modes 
of governance co-exist (Kooiman & Bavinck 2005: 22). 
Despite being specific about properties, orders, elements and modes of governance, 
interactive governance theory is less specific about the actors in the governing system. 
This study regards the actors involved in forest governance as being all those that have 
roles, responsibilities and interests in forest resources. They include all individuals and 
organisations involved in (a) decision making regarding the allocation and regulation of 
forest and tree resources, (b) the implementation and enforcement of rules and regula-
26 
 
tions regarding forest and tree resource use, (c) forest and tree resource use and/or man-
agement, (d) forest and tree resource conflicts and/or (e) forest and tree conflict man-
agement. To arrange actors and their interactions, a common distinction is made be-
tween the state, market and communities (Lemos & Agrawal 2006, Kooiman & Bavink 
2005). Lemos & Agrawal (2006: 310) refer to these as social mechanisms or systems, 
and highlight the partnerships between them. Ros-Tonen et al. (2008) add civil society 
coalitions and NGO-community partnerships to the picture, taking account of civil soci-
ety actors at levels of scale higher than the community level. Considering the transi-
tional nature of the Ghanaian governance process, a number of actors do not fit neatly 
into one specific category. Most previous studies on actors in the Ghanaian forest sector 
have placed actors under either the state, civil society or the private sector or catego-
rised them at different stakeholder levels such as primary, secondary and tertiary de-
pending on their roles and dependency on the forest resources (Mayers & Kotey 1996, 
Kotey et al. 1998).This study proposes filling the gap in interactive governance theory 
by arranging actors in six main governing structures: (i) actors in the formal/statutory 
governing structure, (ii) actors in the traditional or customary governing structure, (iii) 
actors in the market governing structure, (iv) actors in the civil society governing struc-
ture, (v) actors in the hybrid governing structure, and (vi) actors in the transnational 
governing structure. This categorisation, presented in Figure 2.4, guides the actor analy-
sis presented in the rest of the chapters. This is elaborated in more detail for Ghana as a 
whole in Chapter 5 and for the local level at which the four case studies are situated in 
Chapters 7-10. 
– The system-to-be-governed (SG) 
Chuenpagdee & Jentoft (2009) distinguish between two sub-systems within the SG, 
namely the natural and socioeconomic systems. The natural system refers to an ecosys-
tem and the resources it contains, whereas the socioeconomic system encompasses re-
source users and stakeholders that form political alliances and institutions (Jentoft 
2007). Like the governing system, the system-to-be-governed is characterised by diver-
sity, complexity and dynamics because of the linkages and interdependencies among its 
components (Kooiman et al. 2008). These system characteristics can manifest them-
selves at different levels of geographical and temporal  
scale (Kooiman 2008). Chapter 4 of this thesis analyses Ghana’s high forest zone as the 
key natural system that is the subject of this study. As regards diversity it examines dif-
ferent ecological zones and biological diversity, while complexity is assessed in terms 
of different management regimes. As far as scale is concerned, Chapter 4 considers the 
different ecological subsystems. Dynamics are analysed in terms of deforestation and 
reforestation. Similarly, the socioeconomic system, which is made up of resource users 
and stakeholders, is analysed in terms of diversity (in terms of actor composition, di-
verging interests and different roles in the forest governance system), complexity (in 
terms of resource rights, use and power constellations), dynamics (in terms of interac-
tions) and scale (in terms of the geographical scales at which actors are operating). Ac-
tors in the various governing structures (Figure 2.4) are discussed in Chapter 5 under the 
governing system.  
– Governance interactions (GI) 
In interactive governance theory, the governance interactions encompass the relation-
ships between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed. They constitute the 
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basic element of governance. The outcomes of these interactions determine the degree 
of governability of the system. Kooiman (2008: 173) argues that the governors, the gov-
erned and the interactions between them all contribute to the governability of the sys-
tem, as do all kinds of external influences. Kooiman et al. (2008) perceive governance 
interactions from the actor perspective and examine concepts like participatory, collabo-
rative and policy or management interactions. The authors also observe governance in-
teractions from a structural perspective as self-governance, co-governance and hierar-
chical governance. The governance interactions take place in two directions: actors in 
the system-to-be-governed try to influence the governing system, whereas actors in the 
governing system impact on the system-to-be-governed. Considering the properties of 
the system-to-be-governed and the governing system, the governance interactions need 
to address diversity, complexity and dynamics.  
– Governability and the system components  
The core of the interactive governance approach is an understanding of governability. 
Kooiman (2008: 173) defines the concept of governability as ‘the overall capacity for 
governance of any societal entity or system’. The inherent characteristics of the system-
to-be-governed and the governing system as well as the governance interactions chal-
lenge their governability. Chuenpagdee & Jentoft (2009) explain that systems which are 
more diverse, dynamic and complex and which involve multiple spatial and temporal 
scales are more difficult to govern. This gives a clear indication of the limitations of 
governance, which can be overcome by paying specific attention to each of the three 
components of governance, namely the system-to-be-governed, the governing system 
Figure 2.4    The governing structure framework for Ghana’s forest sector (adapted from  
    Ros-Tonen et al. 2010) 
                = Interactions between national and transnational governing structures 
                 = Actors from two or more governing structures to constitute the hybrid governing 
structure 
Transnational governing structures and their influence 
Arena of national governing structure 
 
Formal/ statutory  
governing structure  
Traditional/ cus-
tomary govern-
ing structure  
Market (industry)  
governing structure  
Civil society  
governing  
structure  
Hybrid governing 
structure 
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and the governance interaction. Jentoft (2007: 367) asserts that ‘interactive governance 
theory provides three opportunities to make a system more governable or increase its 
governability’. First, the governing system can be empowered if governors are given 
additional mandates accompanied by legal instruments, financial and intellectual re-
sources (Ibid.). Second, within the system-to-be-governed the governability could be 
enhanced if efforts are made to make them less diverse, complex, dynamic and vulner-
able for easy management and control (Ibid.). Third, the interaction between the two 
systems must become more interactive, more constructive and cost-effective (Ibid.). 
Furthermore, Bavinck et al. (2005: 49) also propose three ‘ways forward’ to enhance 
governability in fisheries. These include (i) widely understood values and principles, 
formulated in a vision, (ii) inclusion of all actor groups and shared responsibilities to 
enhance governance legitimacy and effectiveness, and (iii) a learning and adaptive ap-
proach to cope with uncertainty and change. 
Analytically, a governability assessment framework or matrix provides a tool to 
evaluate governance ‘by posing questions dissecting the key variables that help under-
stand how and why governance implementation falls short of achieving desirable out-
comes’ (Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009: 113). Governance interactions are analysed with 
a view to assessing governability, which is understood as being ‘the overall capacity for 
governance’ (Kooiman 2003 cited in Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009: 112). Chuenpagedee 
& Jentoft (2009: 114) and Chuenpagdee et al. (2008: 4) present a governability assess-
ment framework that considers the three governance components and their governability 
criteria. It is replicated in an adapted form in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 A governability assessment framework  
Governance component Governability criteria  
System-to-be-governed (SG) - Prevalence of properties (i.e. diversity, complexity, dynamics and 
scale) 
Governing system (GS) - Goodness of fit of elements (i.e. images, instruments and actions  
 - Responsiveness of modes (i.e. self, co- and hierarchical ) 
 - Performance of orders (i.e. first, second and meta) 
Governance interactions (GI) - Presence of interactions  
Source: Chuenpagdee et al. (2008: 4).  
 
The next section shows how this approach has been integrated in the conceptual 
framework of this study. 
Linkages of governance with other collaborative concepts  
Several concepts considered in this thesis are linked and relevant to (interactive) gov-
ernance. These are co-management, adaptive management and social capital (see Chap-
ter 8). Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2000: 7) describes co-management as ‘a situation in 
which two or more social actors negotiate, define, and guarantee amongst themselves an 
equitable sharing of the management functions, entitlements and responsibilities for a 
given territory or set of natural resources but does not only depend on power sharing’. 
This definition has similarities with co-governance as defined by Kooiman & Bavinck 
(2005: 22) who perceive co-management as one of the manifestations of co-governance. 
This is one of many other definitions, which have in common that they consider co-
management as (i) natural resource management (ii) a partnership between public and 
private actors, and (iii) a continuous problem-solving process rather than a fixed state 
(Carlsson & Berkes 2005: 67). These authors (Ibid.: 68) distinguish five images of co-
management, including co-management as an exchange system of goods, services and 
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information, as a joint organisation or formalised arena for cooperation, as a state-nested 
system in which resource users manage natural resources on state-owned land, as a 
community-nested system in which the State operates in a non-public sphere (e.g. moni-
toring the operations of private logging companies), and as a network. The latter image 
recognises that both resource users and the state are fragmented and have many faces 
and that it is the total of the relationships that make up the co-management system 
(Carlsson 2000, Carlsson & Berkes 2005). In later work (Berkes 2009), these multiple 
faces of co-management are described as (i) power sharing, (ii) institution building, (iii) 
trust and social capital, (iv) process, (v) problem solving, and (vi) governance. This 
brings the co-management concept close to the governance concept, as in Singleton’s 
(1998: 7) definition of co-management as ‘the term given to governance systems that 
combine state control with local, decentralized decision making and accountability and 
which, ideally, combine the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each’. Like gov-
ernance, co-management looks beyond government, towards public-private-civil society 
partnerships, and as a way of dealing with the shortcomings of single agency and top-
down management (Kooiman 2003, Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000).  
Adaptive management or ‘learning-by-doing’ is a management approach that ac-
knowledges the lack of unequivocal and definitive knowledge of the ways in which eco-
systems work, and the uncertainty that dominates our interaction with them (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2000: 11). It fits in with current resilience thinking about the co-
evolution of humans and ecosystems in social-ecological systems that unpredictably 
oscillate between multiple ‘stability domains’ (Holling 1973, Gunderson 1999). Adap-
tive management and co-management have been evolving towards a common ground 
because ‘maturing co-management arrangements become adaptive co-management in 
time, through successive rounds of learning-by-doing’ (Berkes 2009: 1699).  
The concept of social capital has also been used in literature on natural resource and 
environmental governance (see Pretty & Ward 2001, Trimble & Berkes, 2010). Various 
definitions exist for social capital. However, the central tenet of the concept is that ‘in-
teraction’ between or among individuals or institutions is bonded by trust, reciprocity, 
common rules, norms and networks among other features developed in an iterative 
process (Woolcock & Narayan 2002, Pretty & Ward 2001). This general principle of 
social capital aligns with interactive governance theory through the concept of ‘interac-
tion’ (between stakeholders in the system-to-be-governed, between governing actors 
and between the governing system and the system-to-be-governed (Kooiman et al. 
2005). In interactive governance theory, these interactions are analysed with a view to 
assessing governability, which is the overall capacity for governance aimed at finding 
solutions for societal problems and creating opportunities. If the ‘societal goal’ is the 
sustainable management of natural resources, this comes close to the focus in studies 
that relate social capital to environmental governance. Analysing the interactions be-
tween stakeholders in the system-to-be-governed in terms of social capital reveals a 
synergy between interactive governance theory and the social capital framework (Trim-
ble & Berkes 2010). The details can be found in Chapter 10 which examines a case of 
social capital construction between a timber operator and local community in the  
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Figure 2.5    Conceptual framework to understand forest and tree resource conflicts and conflict  
    management strategies from an interactive governance perspective 
31 
 
 
Tano-Offin off-reserve forest. The indication is that conflicts can be minimised by co-
operation based on the construction of social capital, such as networking, shared re-
sponsi-bility, and provision of incentives, social ties and trust by the timber contractor 
reciprocated by local people. 
Conceptual framework: Linking forest-based  
livelihoods, conflicts and interactive governance 
The above review of literature made it clear that, first and foremost, forest and tree re-
sources play an essential role in people’s livelihoods. However, forest resources are 
subject to excessive exploitation, resulting from a combination of increasing population 
pressure and competing claims from stakeholders with different interests, needs, goals 
and power. Such competing and conflicting interactions often result in conflicts. Con-
flicts have been shown to have two sides. On the one hand they can be destructive, and 
have disrupting effects on people’s livelihoods and the resource base. On the other hand 
they can be constructive, in which case a conflict brings a solution to injustices or ineq-
uities in the distribution of resource access and benefits. The challenge to resource users 
is how to balance these two facets.  
Secondly, as conflicts are inherent in interactions related to natural resources, and 
hence natural resource governance, different conflict analysis tools have been designed 
to help minimise these conflicts. Several conflict analysis tools, such as the conflict 
wheel, have been developed to analyse conflict as a first step towards their solution. 
However, considering the multifarious driving factors underlying natural resource con-
flicts, a tool like this alone will not be effective when it comes to managing conflicts. A 
conceptual scheme is therefore presented (Figure 2.5) that integrates interactive govern-
ance theory and conflict analysis as a basis for understanding forest conflicts and con-
flict management strategies, for assessing the governability of these systems, and for 
formulating possible interventions. In a case study in which cooperation rather than con-
flicts occurred, interactive governance theory is blended with aspects of theories on so-
cial capital to understand the factors that facilitated the cooperation. Interactive govern-
ance theory was selected for three reasons which are (i) its wide analytical application in 
fisheries, (ii) its compatibility with political ecology that focuses on the politics of the 
interaction between humans and nature, and (iii) because it enables one to analyse prob-
lems and opportunities from a system perspective, in which each part of the system and 
the interactions between the parts are thoroughly explored before prescribing interven-
tions. 
Figure 2.5 shows the interactive governance framework and its three components 
(the system-to-be-governed, the governing system and the governance interactions) and 
their inherent system features. In this figure, the system-to-be-governed is Ghana’s high 
forest zone, encompassing the natural sub-system and the socio-economic sub-system. 
The latter represents local communities and timber operators as the main resource users 
of interest. The other actors are analysed as part of the governing system and are those 
who have policy, management and law enforcement roles. The governing system in the 
conceptual scheme is characterised by system properties (diversity, complexity, dyna-
mics, scale), elements, orders and modes of governance) that influence actor’s access 
(formal and informal) to forest resources, land, benefits and use and entry rights. The 
outcomes of interactions between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system, 
as well as among resource users, can result in cooperation/collaboration, con-
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flict/competition or a mixture of these depending on the prevailing governing system, 
the state of the natural system and the interactions within the socioeconomic sub-
system. For an in-depth understanding of the nature of conflicts and conflict manage-
ment strategies under various governance arrangements, conflict analysis is mixed with 
the governability framework and elements of social capital theories to explore coopera-
tion and its implications on the governance system as a whole.  
Based on this conceptual framework, it is hypothesised that there are three possible 
governability outcomes as shown in Figure 2.5. Scenario 1 gives a positive outcome, 
which implies that the system is governable and that one can sense an atmosphere of 
cooperation or collaboration or even competition, but without conflicts. This also im-
plies that the interaction between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system 
is mutually responsive. Such a scenario does not often occur in reality, especially in the 
natural resource arena where different kinds of actors operating at different spatial 
scales compete for limited resources and where policies restrict access rights for some 
actors and other limitations occur, as will be shown in the empirical chapters.  
However, it is regarded as the ideal situation that interactive governance theory is 
looking for and one in which mechanisms and instruments are well formulated, policy 
becomes a learning process and actors are actively involved in the governance process.  
Under Scenario 2 the system is not governable, as might be indicated by social unrest 
or complete resource degradation and lawlessness. Such a scenario could happen in 
practice and may call for a complete reform or a new innovation, but did not apply to 
any of the cases analysed in this study. The last scenario occurs where the system is 
governable, but with limitations. Governability is challenged in that the interactions 
between components of these systems may not be mutually responsive. This confirms 
the statement by Jentoft (2007: 362) that ‘conflict is a permanent feature of the govern-
ing system which makes it inherently instable and dynamic and thus a challenge to han-
dle from a governability perspective’. Nonetheless, conflict theorists who see conflict as 
a tool for positive social change believe that such a limitation can be overcome. The 
components of the systems (either the system-to-be-governed, governing system or 
governance interactions) may face limitations, in which case improving the system by 
the amendment of legislations or by improving actor participation or the natural system 
to meet the demands of users may improve the system. This is indicated by positive and 
negative signs. 
This conceptual scheme provided a basis for data collection and analysis of the gov-
erning system, the system-to-be-governed, as well as the governing interactions in the 
subsequent chapters. In addition, the elements – images, instruments and actions (Koo-
iman et al. 2005) – are blended with the conflict wheel developed by Mason & Rychard 
(2005) for a more in-depth understanding of the nature of prevailing conflicts and con-
flict management strategies (see Chapters 6-9 and 11) and the case of cooperation ana-
lysed in Chapter 10. The natural sub-system, the socio-economic sub-system and the 
governing system of Ghana’s high forest zone and their inherent characteristics are ana-
lysed in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. This forms the context for the analysis of the 
cases in subsequent chapters. In Chapter 6, interactive governance theory is combined 
with the conflict wheel to understand conflict issues, actors, causes, dynamics and pre-
vailing conflict management strategies in Ghana’s high forest zone from the perspec-
tives of forest governors and experts. 
For the three case studies in the Tano-Offin forest reserve (Chapters 7-9) the govern-
ability framework is combined with the conflict wheel to understand (i) the governance 
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arrangements and their challenges and opportunities in each of the forest management 
regimes (i.e. protection, plantation and production) and (ii) the nature of conflicts and 
conflict management from the perspective of the local people. The latter is analysed in 
terms of images, instruments and actions. Chapter 10 presents a case of cooperation in 
the off-reserve area, in which the governability framework is integrated with elements 
of theories on social capital to understand factors that promoted such cooperation. The 
last case in Chapter 11 employs only the governability framework to analyse docu-
mented forest offences, judiciary judgements on forest offences and the perceptions of 
staff of forest law enforcement agencies (i.e. the FC, Police and Judiciary) on law en-
forcement based on images, instruments and actions.  
Conclusion  
This chapter presented the theoretical and conceptual framework that guides the analy-
sis in this study. From an overall political ecology and forest-based livelihoods perspec-
tive, a combination of interactive governance theory and conflict analysis tools is used, 
in particular, to unearth forest conflict and conflict management in order to identify gaps 
for interventions. Conflicts are ubiquitous in natural resource management and the ab-
sence of adequate mechanisms to minimise them poses many challenges to the ongoing 
forest governance process as well as to sustainable livelihoods. This can be explained by 
the fact that the system-to-be-governed is generally characterised by diversity, complex-
ity and dynamics and that multiple actors are operating at different levels of scale. An 
effective governance system would therefore mean that all key actors (those pertaining 
to the statutory, customary, market, civil society and hybrid governing structures) must 
be able to cooperate through consensus or compromise in a way that common needs and 
conflicting issues can be effectively addressed. The proposed combination of conflict 
analysis and interactive governance approaches is a first step in identifying the problems 
that hinder collective action and sustainable forest management. 
 
  
 
 
3 
Research design and methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design and methods that guided data 
collection and analysis. The next section describes the research design, highlighting the 
rationale for selecting a case study approach and justifying the selection of the study 
areas, units of analysis and sampling methods. After that, the data collection methods 
and sources are examined, issues of validity and reliability addressed and limitations 
and ethical considerations of the research presented. Finally, the chapter deals with the 
techniques used for data analysis.  
Research design 
‘Research design’ refers to the underlying plan or protocol for carrying out the research 
(Maxwell 2005: 2). It encompasses (i) the justification of research objectives and ques-
tions (discussed in Chapter 1), (ii) the conceptual framework and underlying theories 
(addressed in Chapter 2), (iii) the rationale that underpins the study design, (iv) the ra-
tionale that underpins the choices as regards participants, time and places of data collec-
tion, and (iv) concerns related to validity and reliability (Maxwell 2005).  
According to Trochim (2006) the research design joins the various parts of the re-
search in order to address the central research question (see Figure 3.1). In order to en-
able a holistic and in-depth investigation (Orum et al. 1991) of representative conflict 
situations regarding forest and tree resources and of conflict management strategies in 
Ghana’s high forest zone, this study combined a case study approach with a mixed 
methods approach (i.e. a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods). These 
instruments guided the analyses of (i) the challenges and opportunities in forest govern-
ance processes, (ii) the nature of conflict and conflict management strategies (i.e. issues, 
actors, causes, dynamics and prevailing strategies), and (iii) the options of identifying 
constructive conflict management strategies and governance mechanisms to minimise 
forest conflicts and improve forest governance process in the sector.  
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The rationale for selecting a case study approach  
A case study approach is capable of providing in-depth knowledge and insights for in-
formed decision making. It facilitates an understanding of a complex, interdependent 
and dynamic social phenomenon like natural resource conflicts, in which multiple actors 
compete for scarce resources. Yin (1984: 23) defines a case study as ‘... an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, espe-
cially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.’  
Several authors outline qualities of a case study approach that are particularly rele-
vant to this study. First, in terms of the research objective, it satisfies the exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory interpretation of data (Yin 1994: 4, Tellis 1997: 6).  
Second, as a methodology, it is responsive to research questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
(Tellis 1997: 4), and also covers both process and outcomes because of the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative data (Ibid.: 4).  
Data collection and data 
analysis 
Theoretical outlook 
Research questions and 
hypotheses 
 
Research case problem 
Research findings and recom-
mendations 
Contribution towards theory 
Knowledge contribution 
towards practice 
Critical literature review 
R
esearch
 m
eth
o
d
s 
Areas for further 
research 
Validity 
Research 
boundary –
local, region-
al and na-
tional levels 
of scale  
Reliability 
Problem definition and 
research objectives 
Figure 3.1     The research design process for a case study approach in applied research   
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Third, case studies provide the platform for multi-perspective analyses during which 
researchers consider not only the views of actors but also the interactions between them 
(Ibid.: 5).  
Finally, its ability to accommodate a variety of research designs, data collection 
techniques, epistemological orientations and disciplinary perspectives makes it particu-
larly relevant to any analysis of such a complex subject as forest and tree resource con-
flicts. 
Forest conflicts are complex and related to issues like institutional failures, inade-
quate and inefficient punitive conflict management mechanisms, lapses in governance 
processes, the multiple interests of parties in the sector, declining forest resources, ineq-
uitable benefit sharing, poverty in rural areas, land scarcity etc. as in the context of agri-
culture, mining and herding (Buckler & Rusnak 1999, Tyler 1999, Warner 2000, 
Ohene-Gyan 2004, Yasmi 2010, Ros-Tonen et al. 2010, see also Chapter 2). Under-
standing and analysing such complexities, diversity and interdependencies in space and 
time requires the study of several specific cases and various sources of evidence and 
perspectives of the situation. 
 Despite the limitations of a case study approach in terms of generalising research 
findings, there is a counter-argument that generalisation of case study findings is legiti-
mate based on the researcher’s understanding of the issue. Tellis (1997: 5) believes that 
the generalisation problem can be overcome by triangulating the study with other meth-
ods in order to confirm the validity of the process. Yin (2003) also indicated that results 
from case studies could be generalised through theory and by employing multiple case 
studies in order to strengthen or broaden analytical generalisations. 
A mixed method approach was used in order to triangulate quantitative data obtained 
from structured and semi-structured survey questionnaires with actors’ perceptions of 
conflict issues and dynamics. Qualitative data was obtained by employing research 
methods like focus group discussions, community meetings and stakeholder workshops, 
structured and semi-structured interviews, field observations and document analysis.  
Justification of the selection of study sites 
Though small in terms of size compared to the savannah zone, the cases were selected 
from Ghana’s high forest zone as it is the area where most of Ghana’s forests can be 
found and where most conflicts and illegalities occur with regard to the utilisation and 
management of forest and tree resources.  
Among the 204 forest reserves in Ghana’s high forest zone, cases were selected from 
the Tano-Offin forest reserve because, first, it is a reserve area designated simultane-
ously for the protection, production and plantation regimes, whereas off-reserve areas 
can be found in its surroundings where timber utilization contracts have been issued. 
Second, it is a reserve area where most forest and tree-based livelihoods can be found, 
including the modified taungya system, non-timber forest product (NTFP) and fuelwood 
extraction based on communal rights and on permits for commercial collection, logging 
based on timber utilisation contracts and illegal chainsaw lumbering and farming. Third, 
the inventory stage of the research revealed a considerable number of forest conflicts in 
this area, whereas little or no research had been done on the subject matter. Secondary 
considerations that influenced the selection of this forest reserve included distance and 
accessibility with regard to undertaking fieldwork within the limited timeframe for the 
completion of the research, and the possibility of linking up with other Tropenbos Inter-
national Ghana researchers (notably Thomas Insaidoo) in order to enable the exchange 
37 
 
 
of relevant information. A detailed description of the study area as a whole (i.e. the high 
forest zone and its environs, see Figure 1.1) is given in Chapter 4, where the area is ana-
lysed as ‘the system-to-be-governed’. In addition, each subsequent chapter briefly de-
scribes the specific study site that is subject to analysis in that chapter. 
The Tano-Offin forest reserve falls under two administrative districts, namely At-
wima Mponua and Ahafo-Ano South, which represent the southern and northern por-
tions of the reserve respectively. Forty-two communities border the reserve, including 
the ‘admitted’ village1 of Kyekyewere, which is located inside the reserve. Three com-
munities from Atwima Mponua administrative district and one from Ahafo Ano South 
administrative district were selected as case study sites for an in-depth analysis of con-
flicts over forest resources and conflict management strategies at local forest govern-
ance level. Their selection was primarily based on the prevailing management regime to 
ensure that it was representative of each of the four management regimes – protection, 
plantations, production and off-reserve area (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.2). Secondary 
selection criteria related to location and accessibility. Kyekyewere was the only village 
located in a strictly protected area and was selected for that reason. Chirayaso and 
Nyamebekyere No. 3 were selected because of their active involvement in the modified 
taungya system (plantation regime) and ongoing timber harvesting (production regime) 
in which the inhabitants had to encounter timber contractors in negotiating social re-
sponsibility agreements and compensation for crop destruction in off-reserve areas. 
Awisasu was selected because a timber contractor was active in the off-reserve area at 
the time of data collection (2009). All these selections were made with assistance from 
the FSD range supervisors. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Study communities selected in accordance with the management regimes 
Forest reserve  Study community Administrative district  Forest management regime  
Tano-Offin Kyekyewere AtwimaMponua Protected management regime – 
GSBA
a 
Chirayaso and  
Nyamebekyere No. 3 
AtwimaMponua and 
AhafoAno South 
Plantation management regime 
– the modified taungya system 
Chirayaso and  
Nyamebekyere No. 3 
AtwimaMponua and 
AhafoAno South 
Production management regime 
Awisasu AtwimaMponua Tano-Offin off-reserve area 
aGSBA = Globally Significant Biodiversity Area. 
 
Units of analysis 
The unit of analysis is the major entity analysed in a study. Trochim (2006) outlines five 
key units that may be analysed, including individuals, groups, artefacts (books, photos, 
and newspapers), geographical units (town, census tract, state) and social interactions 
(e.g. divorces and arrests). This study employed three main units of analysis:  
 
                                                 
1
  Admitted villages refer to the rights of people who had their village in the reserve area before its des-
ignation as a reserve to continue inhabiting the designated areas. Similarly, the law recognises admit-
ted farms in forest reserves to preserve the right to farm. 
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1. In terms of geographical unit, data was collected and analysed at (a) the sub-national 
level of Ghana’s high forest zone and (b) district and village levels in both on and 
off-reserve forest areas. 
2. In terms of actors, data was collected at individual level with analysis being based on 
actors’ perspectives. 
3. In terms of social interactions, the units of analysis were conflicts over forests and 
tree resources, conflict management strategies and forest governance arrangements.  
Sampling methods 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that the issue of population is extremely crucial when selecting 
cases because the population defines the set of entities from which the research sample 
is to be drawn. The selection of appropriate population controls and extraneous varia-
tion helps to define the limits for generalising findings. The population of interest for 
this study were actors involved in forest and tree use and management in Ghana’s high 
forest zone, more specifically actors that engage in conflicts and manage conflict inci-
dences related to forest and tree resources at community, district, regional and national 
levels. 
The selection of respondents for the study was based on the actor analysis discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
Figure 3.2     Study coverage  
Keys: Study 1 = Chapter 4: The system-to-be-governed; Study 2 = Chapter 5: The governing system; 
Study 3 = Chapter 6: Forest governors and experts views; Study 4 = Chapter 7: The protected area; Study 
5 = Chapter 8: The plantation area; Study 6 = Chapter 9: The production area; Study 7 = Chapter 10: The 
off-reserve area; Study 8 = Chapter 11: Forest offences and court judgements 
Tano-Offin reserve regimes  
Off-reserve  
Nkawie Forest 
District  
Boundary 
lines 
International 
level 
National and 
regional levels 
Study 4 
Study 1 
Study 2 
Off-reserve  
Study 3 
On-reserve pro-
tection area 
On-reserve plan-
tation area 
On-reserve pro-
duction area 
Study 5 
Study 6 
Study 7 
Study 8 
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– Respondents representing the traditional or customary governing structure  
The communities around the Tano-Offin forest reserve were first arranged into groups 
from the northern and the southern zone in accordance with their location in the two 
administrative districts. Community consultations began in November 2008 and in-
volved two representatives each from the 42 communities across the Ahafo Ano South 
and Atwima Mponua districts which are in the northern and southern parts of Tano-
Offin reserve respectively. With assistance from the Forest Services Division range su-
pervisors in charge of the reserve, respondents were purposively selected from the fol-
lowing stakeholder groupings: farmers engaged in the modified taungya system (MTS), 
NTFP collectors, chainsaw operators, traditional authorities, farmers with planted/nur-
tured trees on farmlands, members of community forest committees (CFCs), community 
biodiversity advisory groups (CBAGs), and community members who have had experi-
enced forest conflicts with internal or external actors. In order to minimise biases, the 
selection was made by the community elders in the presence of the research assistants 
who were familiar with all the villages. Furthermore, care was taken to ensure that the 
selected respondents actually represented the aforementioned stakeholder categories. 
Gender equity was also ensured.  
The respondents in each of the three case study communities in the forest reserve 
were selected randomly for the survey interviews using a simple random technique 
without replacement and a sample size ranging from 19-26% of the total adult popula-
tion in the villages (see specifications for each study earlier in this chapter). During 
community meetings held prior to the survey, the inhabitants were briefed on the issues 
to be discussed during the survey. The survey in each community was conducted with 
the support of four research assistants: three male students from the Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology and a female with an MSc in Water Manage-
ment. The researcher discussed the survey questionnaire with the research assistants in 
order to have a common understanding of the issues at stake prior to testing. During the 
testing, the researcher seized the opportunity to introduce the assistants to the commu-
nity members. In each of the communities, a maximum of two weeks was spent on ad-
ministering the questionnaires. 
The sampling procedure was different for the population in the off-reserve area, 
where data was collected through community meetings and focus groups and respon-
dents were purposively selected from farmers with trees on their farm or fallow lands 
(see Chapter 10). In this location, the researcher led the discussions with the support of 
two field assistants and an FSD range supervisor who took notes of the discussions and 
helped to conduct interviews with the farmers. In each of the communities, fieldwork 
was carried out during a maximum of three months, but the time spent in each study 
location was not continuous since data collection at community level involved a series 
of approaches including familiarisation visits, consultations with communities’ repre-
sentatives, the survey, interviews and a validation meeting. This enabled continuous 
reflection on the data gathered before the next step was taken in the data collection 
process. 
Purposive sampling was also used to select the respondents belonging to the catego-
ries below. According to Trochim (2006), most sampling methods are purposive in na-
ture because researchers usually approach the sampling problem with a specific plan in 
mind.  
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– Respondents representing the market governing structure 
Within this framework focus group meetings were held and telephone interviews con-
ducted with four timber contractors operating in Tano-Offin and its environs. An inter-
view was also held with an official of the Ghana Timber Association (GTA) based in 
Kumasi.  
– Respondents representing the statutory governing structure  
Forest governors and experts were purposively selected for the studies presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Forest governors are defined in this study as actors in the formal 
forest sector mandated to formulate policies and implementation of policy strategies in 
Ghana. Those considered as experts were representatives of governmental, non-
governmental institutions and individuals who have a role or stake in forest and tree 
management in Ghana. Among the key actors involved in this study were repre-
sentatives of the mandated insitutions such as (i) the Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources (MLNR), (ii) the Forestry Commission (national level), (iii) the Forest 
Services Division (FSD), (iv) the Wildlife Division and (v) the Resource Management 
Support Centre (see Chapter 5, Figure 5.1 for an organogram explaining how these 
organisations relate to each other). Other institutions involved in this study are those at 
local government level that are engaged in law enforcement and prosecution, land use 
and research, such as the Judiciary, the Ghana Police Service, the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MOFA), the Lands Valuation Division and the Faculty of Renewable 
Natural Resources at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
(KNUST) (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed analysis of the statutory governing 
structure).  
– The civil society governing structure  
Some staff of non-governmental organisations (local and international) based in Ghana 
were involved in the study through interviews, survey and a consultative workshop. 
Among them are Tropenbos International Ghana, the International Network of Bamboo 
and Rattan (INBAR), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
and the Rural Development Youth Association (RUDEYA). 
– The hybrid governing structure  
Under this structure, representatives of two institutions at national level – the Com-
munity Resource Management Area (CREMA) and the National Forest Forum – were 
purposively selected for this study. The same was done for two hybrid organisations at 
community level – the Community Biodiversity Advisory Groups (CBAGs) and Com-
munity Forestry Committees (CFCs).  
– The transnational governing structure 
Interviews were held with officials from organisations such as the Royal Netherlands 
Embassy, the Agriculture Development Bank, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) 
and the World Bank, especially with regard to their contributions to Ghana’s forest gov-
ernance process and conflict management. 
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Data collection methods and sources 
This study employed mixed methods (i.e. quantitative and qualitative methods) with 
different research techniques in the data collection process, including community meet-
ings, a survey, a self-completion questionnaire, interviews, validation meetings and 
workshops (see Appendix 1 for the questions guiding the various cases). As stated 
above, the main rationale for the use of mixed methods research in this study was to 
obtain a complete and comprehensive picture of forest resource conflicts and conflict 
management strategies from diverging actor perspectives and to enable triangulation of 
quantitative data with qualitative data. 
Primary data was obtained from the actors discussed in the section on sampling 
methods. Secondary data came from published and unpublished data sources from local, 
national and international levels. Most of these sources concern policies, laws and regu-
lations (statutory and customary), conflicts and conflict management, governance ar-
rangements at national levels and actors in the forest sector. Other relevant data sources 
at the district level included: 
 Unreported court judgements related to forest resources offence cases. 
 Official documents at Nkawie Forest District relating to documented offence cases in 
the forest reserves and off-reserve areas. 
At community level the MTS sites in the villages of Chirayaso and Kunsu Nyame-
bekyere No. 3 were visited to observe the state of the plantation developments in order 
to appreciate some of the conflict issues reported by the respondents.  
Data collection techniques and respondents for each study 
Chapters 4 to 11 are the empirical chapters of this research. Each chapter is a study in its 
own right with its specific research population, mode of data collection and data analy-
sis. This section presents an overview of the empirical studies in Figure 3.2 and a fur-
ther elaboration of the thematic issues dealt with in each chapter and the data collection 
methods on which they are based. 
– Study 1: The system-to-be-governed (Chapter 4) 
Chapter 4 is based on a review of literature, policy documents and internet sources 
which focused on Ghana’s high forest zone and the Tano-Offin forest reserve as the 
natural sub-system under the system-to-be-governed. Inception meetings with represen-
tatives of 42 communities living within and bordering Tano-Offin forest reserve were 
held in November 2008, for which letters and information were sent to the various 
communities to invite two representatives each to attend this meeting. In the same 
month, a meeting with representatives of government institutions (i.e. the FSD, MOFA, 
Judiciary, District Assemblies and Police) at the Nkawie Forest District was held that, 
together with the inception meeting with community representatives, contributed to the 
data on the socio-economic sub-system. This sub-system describes the local communi-
ties under the traditional governing structure and actors pertaining to the market govern-
ing structure (i.e. Timber Utilisation Contract (TUC) holders, illegal loggers and mill-
ers, hunters and traders in plant NTFPs etc.). 
– Study 2: The governing system (Chapter 5) 
The information in this chapter is based on a review of literature and a survey based on 
interviews and a workshop with forest governors and experts and transnational organi-
sations aimed at obtaining data on their knowledge, views and perceptions of forest 
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governance and conflict management. This study was carried out in five steps. 
First, it drew from secondary data sources which focused on the changing paradigms 
of forest governance process over the past decades. Second, informal interviews were 
held with key persons in the Ghanaian forest sector to identify relevant governance is-
sues and, based on these, self-completion semi-structured questionnaires were adminis-
tered between March and June 2009 to 30 forest governors randomly selected across the 
formal forest sector in the high forest zone. These involved representatives of the forest 
managers at district, regional and national level institutions, such as the Ministry of 
Lands and Natural Resources, the Forest Services Division (FSD) across the five re-
gions and five forest districts in the high forest zone, officials from the Resource Man-
agement Support Centre (RMSC) and the Forestry Commission headquarters. Eleven of 
the 30 respondents returned the questionnaires. These included forest guards, technical 
officers, district managers and regional managers within the formal sector. The core 
enquiry was on the nature of conflicts associated with forest and tree-based livelihoods 
in Ghana’s high forest zone, prevailing conflict management strategies and their chal-
lenges and potential for improving existing conflict management strategies.  
In order to compensate for the low response rate and to ensure triangulation, the third 
step was the organisation of a dissemination and consensus workshop for forest gover-
nors and experts at the Wood Industry Training Centre (WITC) in Kumasi, Ghana, in 
February 2010 with the support of staff of Tropenbos International Ghana. During this 
workshop, the results of the survey were presented for discussion and validation. The 
workshop was attended by 25 experts in professional forestry practices and academia, 
including representatives of the FSD, RMSC, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science 
and Technology (KNUST), Tropenbos International (TBI)-Ghana and the International 
Network for Bamboo and Rattan (INBAR). In August 2010 additional face-to-face in-
terviews were conducted with representatives of the MLNR, FC headquarters, Ghana 
Timber Association (GTA), Dutch Embassy, GTZ and IUCN, using the same semi-
structured questionnaire with a view to increasing the number of respondents and stake-
holder representation. Finally, the Forest Investment Project Joint Mission meeting that 
was held from 30 May to 6 June 2011 was used to expand the number of survey respon-
dents using the self–completion questionnaire. This involved five respondents from the 
World Bank, African Development Bank, Environmental Protection Agency, the Na-
tional Forestry Forum and the Community Resource Management Area (CREMA). This 
increased the number of respondents for the survey and interviews to a total of n = 22. 
– Study 3: Forest governors and experts’ views of conflicts and conflict management 
(Chapter 6)  
The study was carried out in four stages which partly overlap with those in Study 2. 
First, a desk study was carried out and informal interviews were held with key persons 
in the Ghanaian forest sector to identify relevant issues in conflicts in Ghana’s high for-
est zone. The second and third stages encompass the self-completion semi-structured 
questionnaires and the dissemination and consensus workshop described above. The 
participants in the workshop used the opportunity to develop action plans on two key 
challenging issues identified in the survey findings that hinder constructive conflict 
management as well as the forest governance process. For this process, the results of 
which are presented in Chapter 6, the participants were divided into two groups. The 
first group assessed the potential of re-introducing the forest prosecution system (a sys-
tem that enables resource managers to be trained in a judicial prosecution course) for 
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which a SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity and threat) analysis was carried out 
and confrontation matrix tools were employed. The second group formulated an inte-
grated conflict management model that could be piloted in the forestry sector. The 
SWOT analysis technique is credited to Albert Humphrey who led a research project at 
Stanford University in the 1960s and 1970s using data from leading companies involved 
in long-range planning processes. It generates information that is helpful in matching 
the goals, programmes and capacities of an organisation or group to the social environ-
ment in which it operates.
2
 The confrontation matrix is a tool which can be used to 
combine the internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and the external factors (oppor-
tunities and threats) to identify the main points for attention (Kuiper 2006). The fourth 
step in this study comprised additional face-to-face interviews conducted in August 
2010, using the same questionnaire that was previously used as a self-completion form. 
These additional interviews were held with a view to increasing the number and repre-
sentation of the study respondents, especially those from the MLNR and the FC head-
quarters. This increased the number of respondents for the survey and interviews to a 
total of n = 15. 
– Study 4: The protected forest area (GSBA) (Chapter 7) 
Data for this study was collected from September 2008 to February 2010. Secondary 
data from official documents provided information about the institutional and legislative 
instruments and strategies used to govern the resources (i.e. the governing system). 
Community meetings provided an insight into local inhabitants’ perceptions of the gov-
erning systems operating within the reserve and enabled us to list the number of people 
to be sampled for the survey. The survey, which was conducted in June-July 2009, in-
volved 119 individuals made up of 70% males and 30% females were selected using a 
simple random technique without replacement to respond to the semi-structured ques-
tionnaire from an adult population of 450. The skewed gender distribution in the study 
was due to the probability nature of the technique employed and to fewer women being 
present during the sampling process. The survey issues centred on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondents, types of forest resources that contribute to liveli-
hoods, the nature of conflicts and the prevailing management strategies. In February 
2010 a validation meeting was organised with representatives of the admitted village of 
Kyekyewere to fine-tune the findings.  
– Study 5: The plantation area: the modified taungya system (MTS) (Chapter 8) 
The study employed mixed data collection methods involving three steps carried out 
between 2008 and 2011. Step one was a literature review and assessment of legal 
documents on the MTS. This provided the study context. The second step was a visit to 
the study villages where meetings were held with the inhabitants to introduce the re-
search concepts and objectives and to visit the MTS sites in the reserve. Based on the 
familiarisation meetings, the baseline data gathered contributed to the design of the 
semi-structured questionnaire. Using a survey approach, the semi-structured question-
naires were administered to 212 respondents randomly selected in the two villages in 
2010 as shown in Table 3.2.  
The survey focused on the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, the 
contribution of the MTS to their livelihoods and the prevailing challenges. The respon-
dents were asked about the nature of conflicts in the MTS and conflict management 
                                                 
2
  URL: http://www.cipd.co.uk/subjects/corpstrtgy/general/swot-analysis.htm (accessed on March 2010). 
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strategies employed during conflict incidences. The third step involved meetings with 
36 and 45 community members respectively in the two villages to validate the survey 
findings and discuss additional issues related to anticipated conflicts and strategies to 
overcome them. In view of the anticipated conflicts mentioned, it was considered neces-
sary to hold informal interviews in January 2011 with four officials from the Resource 
Management Support Centre (RMSC) and the FSD about strategies (planned or already 
put in place) to minimise some of the conflicts anticipated by the MTS farmers.  
 
Table 3.2 Estimated adult population, number of respondents in the semi-structured survey and  
 participants in community validation meetings in the study villages in study of MTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Village 
Estimated 
adult popu-
lation*   
(>18 years) 
 
Number of respondents in 
the survey 
(N = 212) 
Estimated number of 
people present for 
validation meeting 
(n=81) 
Institutional 
conflict cate-
gory** 
(n = 192) 
Competing 
claims conflict 
category** 
(n = 20) 
Anticipated con-
flict category** 
Chirayaso 770     94  9 36 
Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 240     98 11 45 
* Source: Districts Electoral Commission data, 2010. 
** In this study, the respondents identified eleven conflict issues which the researcher grouped into three main cate-
gories for easy analysis (see Chapter 8 for more details). Institutional conflicts refer to conflicts within MTS groups 
and between taungya leaders and farmers (e.g. about disproportional allocation of MTS plots). Competing claims 
refer to conflicts between MTS farmers and other actors (e.g. hunters and chainsaw operators). Anticipated conflicts 
are related to uncertainty about the future, notably in relation to the sharing of future timber benefits.  
 
– Study 6: The production area (Chapter 9) 
Data for this study was collected from September 2008 to February 2010. Secondary 
data from official documents provided information about the institutional and legislative 
instruments and strategies used to govern the resources (i.e. the governing system). 
Community meetings provided insight into local inhabitants’ perceptions of the govern-
ing systems operating within the reserve area and enabled us to list the number of peo-
ple to be sampled for the survey. Of the 212 respondents who responded to the ques-
tions on the plantation (MTS) area in Study 5, 137 individuals representing 56% males 
and 44% females also responded to questions regarding production regime conflicts and 
conflict management (Table 3.3). 
The survey issues centred on the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, 
types of forest resources that contribute to their livelihoods, the nature of conflicts and 
prevailing management strategies. In February 2010, a validation meeting was organ-
ised with representatives of the two villages to fine-tune the findings.  
– Study 7: The off-reserve area (Akyikon off-reserverange) (Chapter 10) 
Chapter 10 is based on document analysis, a meeting with 45 inhabitants of Awisasu 
community, a semi-structured questionnaire with 17 farmers and a telephone interview 
with the timber contractor in 2009. Prior to this, a focus group meeting was held with 
 three off-reserve timber operators in the environs of the Tano-Offin forest reserve in 
November 2008. The views of the off-reserve issues that emerged from this meeting are 
also presented in Chapter 10. Another community meeting was conducted in 2010 to 
validate the findings. Even though there were no conflicts between the timber operator 
and the farmers, the apparent issue was how much compensation should be paid and 
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who should mediate during compensation payment negotiations. Informal interviews 
were therefore organised with officials of the District Forest Services Division, the Dis-
trict Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) and the Land Valuation Division of the 
Land Commission of Ghana. The interviews focused on their perceptions of their role in 
the compensation negotiation process in off-reserve tree management. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Estimated adult population, number of respondents in the semi-structured survey and  
 participants in community validation meetings in the study villages in the production area 
Village 
 
Estimated 
adult popu-
lation*   
(>18 years) 
 
Number of respondents in the survey (N = 137) 
Resource-based 
conflict category  
(n = 158)** 
Operational 
conflicts within 
TUC and permit 
holding areas 
(n = 37)** 
Land-based con-
flict category  
(n =20)** 
Chirayaso 770 98   9   6 
Kunsu-Nyamebekyere 
No. 3 
 
240 
 
60 
 
28 
 
14 
* Source: AtwimaMponua and AhafoAno South Districts Electoral Commission data, 2010.  
** N=137; respondents were able to answer questions related to more than one issue.  
 
 
In this study, the respondents identified nine conflict issues which the researcher 
grouped into three main categories for easy analysis (see Chapter 9 for details). Re-
source-based conflicts are conflicts on issues such as chainsaw milling, hunting and the 
gathering of non-timber forest products. Operational conflicts within timber utilisation 
contract (TUC) and permit holding areas involve log theft and conflicts over the fulfil-
ment of the social responsibility agreement. The land-based conflict category encom-
passes issues such as illegal farming and boundary disputes. 
– Study 8: Forest offences and court judgements (Chapter 11) 
Chapter 11 is based on document analyses of forest laws, a compilation of offences 
from offence records at the Nkawie Forest District from 2005-2010 and a compilation 
of court judgements on 12 forest cases in the Nkawie, Nyinahin, Mankranso Districts 
Courts and Kumasi Circuit Court in 2010. Furthermore, data for Chapter 11 is based on 
semi-structured interviews with 19 officials of the Forestry Commission, Ghana Police 
Service and the Judiciary mostly at Nkawie Forest District. The questions of enquiry 
centred on their perceptions of factors that facilitate and hinder effective forest law en-
forcement and sanctions in the law court.  
Validity 
According to Trochim (2006), validity is the “best available approximation to the truth 
of a given proposition, inference, or conclusion”. Hosker (2001) defines it as the ability 
of the research instruments to gather information on the “concepts it claims to be meas-
uring”. In this study, several steps were taken to ensure construct, external, internal and 
conclusion validity, which are cumulative. The most important of these were:  
 
Methodological, theoretical and data triangulation by using mixed methods, adapting 
concepts taken from different disciplines such as interactive governance theory applied 
to fisheries (Kooiman et al. 2005) and conflict theories, and by collecting data from 
different actors and other relevant sources. 
46 
 
1. Gathering data beyond the direct environs of the Tano-Offin forest reserve and the 
Nkawie Forest District, in order to ensure that the results of this research could be 
generalised for the high forest zone as a whole. This was done by interviewing sev-
eral actors across the high forest zone and actors operating at national level such as 
policymakers, representatives of international organisations, non-governmental or-
ganisations, the judiciary, the police and forest managers.  
2. Checking the outcomes of this research against existing data and literature on present 
forest governance issues such as law enforcement, co-management and social capital. 
Reliability 
In its everyday sense, reliability is the ‘consistency’ or ‘repeatability’ of the measures 
used in the research (Trochim 2006, Hosker 2001). In order to ensure the reliability of 
this study, the following measures were considered: 
 
1. The respondents for the surveys were randomly selected from the different stake-
holder groupings within the communities; 
2. The survey questionnaires were piloted in order to ensure that both the researcher, 
the field assistants and the respondents understood the questions at issue; 
3. A transparent description of the research process, primary and secondary data 
sources, research instruments and institutions involved in the study, so that these are 
available for future reference or replication of the research in the same or a different 
area. 
Limitations of the research and ethical considerations  
Although this study offers comprehensive analyses of governance arrangements, forest 
livelihood conflicts and conflict management strategies in Ghana’s high forest zone and 
its different management regimes from different actor’s perspectives, a few limitations 
were encountered. 
 
1. Involving an adequate number of respondents from the market governing structure in 
interviews and participation in the workshop was a challenge because of their busy 
schedules. Nevertheless, the few who participated contributed immensely to the re-
search issues. 
2. Interactive governance theory calls for an in-depth field analysis of the natural sub-
system within the system-to-be-governed in order to determine confidently the gov-
ernability of the system. However, conducting an ecological inventory was beyond 
the scope of this study, which focuses on forest livelihoods and the conflicts arising 
from it. Data on the natural system was gathered mostly from ecology literature, pol-
icy documents and focus group discussions. 
3. Literature indicates that conflict dynamics involves a sequence of stages categorised 
as ‘violent’ and ‘non-violent’ with various intensity levels (Axtet al. 2006, Moore 
2003). This study categorised conflict stages as non-violent and violent only, without 
distinguishing different levels of intensity between them. This is in line with how lo-
cal people gave meanings to the term ‘conflict’. In the local language, Twi, conflict 
has two meanings. It is either (i) ntawatawa, which indicates a difference in opinion 
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or misunderstanding, or (ii) ntokwa, which is a violent clash or indicates a more se-
vere conflict.  
In social research, ethical issues contribute directly to the integrity of the research 
(Bryman 2008). In this study, four ethical concerns were observed. First, the design of 
the survey questionnaire clearly spelt out that respondents’ consent was needed to par-
ticipate the research. They were therefore made aware of the purpose of the study and 
that their participation was completely voluntary. Without raising expectations about 
potential benefits, respondents were also informed that the study aimed to contribute to 
minimising forest livelihood conflicts. Second, even though respondents’ names were 
taken for data cross-checking where necessary, these were withheld from the thesis. The 
names of the forest offenders involved in cases taken from official records and pre-
sented in Chapter 11 were replaced with numbers in order to protect the privacy of the 
accused persons. Third, all the people in the photos presented in this thesis granted con-
sent for the use of their pictures in this book and were informed about the intention to 
use the pictures for this thesis in advance. Finally, the respondents were informed about 
the fact that the information provided was strictly confidential, unless otherwise agreed. 
The findings from this study are therefore presented as aggregate data. 
Data analysis 
The data gathered during the survey was analysed in three steps, including data prepara-
tion and descriptive statistics. The data preparation involved cleaning, coding and enter-
ing answers to closed, open-ended questions and interviews for analysis. The descrip-
tive statistics provided simple frequencies and percentages, and cross-tabulations were 
also used to investigate the research questions and draw conclusions from them, thereby 
satisfying conclusion validity. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and 
MS Excel was used in this study and there was, undoubtedly, some subjectivity in the 
grouping of the answers from the open-ended questions. However, the different meth-
ods used in this research did provide a high internal consistency. 
Workshop and focus group meetings outputs were content analysed to extract re-
spondents’ views. A documentary analysis was used to analyse the secondary data gath-
ered and the grey and academic literature. The data analysed has been presented in each 
of the above-mentioned cases, analysed from interactive governance and conflict theo-
retical perspectives. These results can be found in Chapters 4 to 11 of this thesis. 
 
  
 
 
4 
The system-to-be-governed:  
Ghana’s high forest zone 
Introduction  
Located centrally on the West African coast, Ghana is a country with a land area of 
about 23.9 million hectares (ha)
 
and a population of about 24.2 million with an annual 
growth rate of 2.1% (GSS 2010). The climate is tropical, warm and comparatively dry 
along the southeast coast with high mean annual precipitation in the south west and with 
a hot and dry climate in the north of the country. 
The forests in Ghana, which are part of the Guinea-Congolean phytogeographical re-
gion, cover about 24.2% of the country’s total land area. Ecologically the country is 
divided into a high forest zone to the southwest, accounting for about a third of the land 
area (about 7.5 million hectares), a savannah zone (14.7 million hectares) mostly in the 
north, and a transition zone (1.1 million hectares) (ITTO 2006).  
Ghana’s forest resources are subject to a state property regime, but most of the for-
estlands are owned by the stool (see Chapter 5), reflecting a dual property regime with 
respect to the ownership of land
1
 and forest resources (Ghana Constitution 1992). The 
formal timber industry contributes about 6% of Gross Domestic Products and it is the 
fourth contributor to Ghana’s foreign exchange (Marfo 2010). The forest is also the 
livelihood source of communities living within and around the forest and other resource 
                                                 
1
  Traditionally land is owned either by an individual or by a group of people (Ollenu 1992). Five land 
ownership types are described in Ghana: (a) State land refers to land that the government has compul-
sorily acquired under the State Lands Act 1962, Act 125. Such land is acquired in the interest of the 
public; (b) Vested land is vested in the state under the Administration of State Lands Act 1962, Act 
123, with the state acting as the trustee for the relevant stool; (c) Stool land is vested in the relevant 
stool on behalf of the community, as represented by the Chief or the Traditional or any other ruler in a 
fiduciary capacity for his people. Members of the land holding group have usufruct rights equivalent 
to a freehold. In a practical sense, such land belongs to members of the land-holding group and their 
interests are secure, inheritable and generally alienable. The alienation of such land by the stool or 
family requires the consent of the holder of this interest; (d) Family land is vested in a family whose 
head represents the family; (e) Privately owned land has a freehold interest and can be purchased out-
right by an individual or group of persons. This type of land invariably reverts to become family land 
should the owner die intestate (Ollenu 1992). 
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users. However, access to forest resources, benefits and rights are characterised by con-
flicts which influence the governance system. In order to explore and assess the govern-
ability of the forest system, this and the following chapter explore the context of this 
study. This is done by using the analytical components of the societal system distin-
guished in the interactive governance framework (Kooiman et al. 2005, 2008, see Chap-
ter 2): the system-to-be-governed (SG) (this chapter) and the governing system (GS) 
(Chapter 5).  
The analysis in this chapter follows the distinction by Chuenpagdee & Jentoft (2009) 
between two sub-systems within the SG, namely the natural and socioeconomic sub-
systems. Both are characterised by diversity, complexity and dynamics, which may 
manifest themselves at different levels of geographical and temporal scale (Kooiman 
2008). These notions guide the analysis of the SG in this chapter.  
The overall question this chapter seeks to address is: what are the natural and socio-
economic characteristics of Ghana’s high forest zone and how do they interact? This 
central question has been divided into two sub-questions: 
1.  What is the nature of Ghana’s high forest zone in terms of diversity, complexity and 
dynamics?  
2.  Which forest users prevail and how do they interact with the natural system?  
 
The chapter is based on a review of literature, policy documents, internet sources, and 
focus group discussions with representatives of the communities living within and bor-
dering Tano-Offin forest reserve. It also includes the views of representatives of gov-
ernment institutions at the Nkawie Forest District level in the Ghana forest sector (see 
Chapter 3 for a more extensive explanation of the methodologies used). The chapter 
provides a wider overview of the study context. 
The next section presents the natural system (i.e. Ghana’s high forest zone) and the 
section after that the socio-economic system with a respective focus on the diversity, 
complexity and dynamics of the system and the interactions between them. Next the 
governability of the SG is discussed based on a synthesis of the two preceding sections. 
The conclusions of the chapter are presented at the end. 
The natural system  
Ghana’s natural landscape comprises two major ecological zones. The southwestern 
part of the country is the high forest zone, which represents about a third of its land area 
(approx. 7.5 million ha), while the savannah dominates the north and the east. There are 
266 gazetted forest reserves, of which 204
2
, corresponding with 1.6 million ha, are 
found in the high forest zone and sixty-two covering 0.6 million ha are located in the 
savannah zone (Abebrese 2002, Ageyman 2010). Forests are categorised into reserved 
and unreserved forests.  
                                                 
2
  Information on the number of forest reserves and total area of Ghana’ high forest zone differs among 
various sources. Abebrese (2002) mentions a number of 266 gazetted forest reserves with a total area 
of 1.22 million ha, 200 of which are located in the high forest zone (1.6 million ha), while Kotey et al. 
(1998) count 214 reserves with a total of 1.634 million ha under the Forest Services Division and 
136,000 under the Wildlife Division, totalling 1.77 ha. This thesis follows Agyeman et al. (2010) who 
count 204 reserves in the high forest zone. ITTO (2006) mentions a total area of the high forest zone 
of 8 million hectares. However, based on the total in Table 4.1 and the estimated off-reserve area this 
thesis takes the total area of the high forest zone to be about 7.5 million ha.  
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The natural system under study: The high forest zone  
Just like any natural system, the high forest zone of Ghana is structurally characterised 
by diversity, complexity and dynamics. Kooiman & Chuenpagdee (2005: 326) define 
diversity as ‘qualitative differences within and between interacting social and natural 
entities, complexity as the multiple relations within and between these entities or actors, 
and dynamics as tensions within and between their interactions’. In this section, the fo-
cus is on diversity and dynamics. Complexity is addressed in the discussion section. 
Located in the southwest of Ghana (Figure 4.1), the high forest zone covers an area of 
approximately 7.5 million hectares. It covers five regions which include the Ashanti, 
Western, Eastern, Brong Ahafo regions and a portion of the Central region.  
 
Figure 4.1     Ghana’s high forest zone (shaded portion of the map) 
 
 
Within the high forest zone, 1.77 million hectares are permanently protected and 
managed by both the Forest Services Division (1.634 mln ha) and the Wildlife Division 
(0.136 mln ha) of the Forestry Commission (Kotey et al. 1998) (Figure 4.2). The rest of 
the high forest zone, corresponding to about 5.482 million hectares, constitutes the off-
reserve area (Affum-Baffoe 2009). 
Under the jurisdiction of the Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission there are 
another eighteen protected areas, including national parks, resource reserves, wildlife 
sanctuaries and coastal Ramsar sites / wetlands (see Figure 4.2). These are not discussed 
in any greater detail here because wildlife management falls outside the scope of this 
study. 
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 Figure 4.2      Protected wildlife areas in Ghana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Forest Services Division (FSD) of the Forestry Commission (FC) categorised the 
forest reserves under their jurisdiction into different management areas. The system is 
based on the forest protection strategy designed in 1993 to replace the old system based 
on production, protection and conversion ‘working cycles’, which had been ignored in 
practice for years (Kotey et al. 1998). These are the timber production areas [742,600 ha 
(47%)], where the forest area is designated primarily for the production of wood, fibre, 
bio-energy and/or non-wood forest products. The permanent protection areas [352,500 
ha (21%)] consist largely of hill sanctuaries, but also include swamp sanctuaries, 
shelterbelts, special biological protection areas, intact forest sanctuaries, provenance and 
fire protection areas. Of this area, 69% is inaccessible for logging (except at very high 
cost) and 16% is degraded. Only 15% (which is protected on grounds of genetic diver-
sity) is well stocked and accessible. The convalescence areas [122,000 ha (7%)] are 
Source: Adapted from the Ghana Wildlife Division Website 
http://www.wildlifeghana.com/wildlifeMain/map.html, accessed 12 September 2011 
 
52 
 
those with reduced stocking through overexploitation, fire and poor management, but 
which are considered capable of rehabilitation within one felling cycle (40 years). This 
category includes the conversion areas [127,200ha (8%)] that require planting and the 
areas that were not inventoried [270,000ha (17%)] (FD/FIMP 1995 cited in Kotey et al. 
1998).  
The high forest zone comprises seven forest types based on their ecological zones 
(Hall & Swaine 1981) (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3). The wet evergreen (WE) rainfor-
est experiences the highest amount of rainfall throughout the year. While the dry semi-
deciduous (DSD) type experiences lower amounts of rainfall distributed only at certain 
times of the year in a well-defined dry season. In the south-western part of the country 
is the wet evergreen (WE) forest type. Annual rainfall ranges between 1,700 to 2,030 
mm. Some usual tree species include Cynometra ananta, Heretiera utilis, and Tieghe-
melia heekelii. In terms of precipitation, the upland evergreen (UE) forest is similar to 
the WE but the two differ in their floristic composition and structure. The UE forests are 
on hills and mountainous areas and therefore referred to as mount forests. They receive 
up to 1,700 mm of rainfall and are wet throughout the year. One example is the Tano-
Offin globally significant biodiversity area (GSBA). The moist evergreen (ME) forests 
experience a lower amount of rainfall of between 1,500 to 1,700 mm per annum. They 
do not differ in structure from the WE forest except in floristic composition. The moist 
semi-deciduous (MSD) forests receive lower amounts of rainfall between 1,200 to 1,500 
mm annually compared to the evergreen sub-types. The MSD forest type has upper and 
middle strata in terms of species composition and exhibits the deciduous habit during 
the dry season. This forest type can be conveniently divided into the northwestern (NW) 
and southeastern (SE) sub-types (see Table 4.1). Ghana’s valuable timber species are 
included in these two forests sub-types (i.e. MSD-NW and MSD-SE (MES 2002). 
The dry semi-deciduous (DSD) forest type bordering the Guinea savannah has a low 
level of rainfall (1,100 mm to 1,200 mm annually) and pronounced dry season often 
associated with high temperatures. This forest type is also known as transitional zone. 
According to the MES (2002), the DSD forest sub-type is also recognised as ‘forest 
containing clearings of savannah’ or ‘savannah with clumps of forest trees’. Just like the 
MSD, this forest type has an inner zone (IZ) sub-type and a fire zone (FZ) sub-type. For 
instance, Odum (Milicia excelsa) which is a highly important timber species reaches its 
maximum abundance in the DSD/IZ sub-type but is currently endangered. The DSD/FZ 
sub-type is associated with the occurrence of periodic fires, especially during the dry 
season. The Southeast outliers (SO) on the other hand represent the driest of forest 
types, with an annual rainfall of about 750-1,275 mm. It is the least extensive forest 
area, occupying an area of approximately 20 km
2
 in small scattered patches. An exam-
ple is the Shai Hills Game Production Reserve on the Accra Plains. This forest type also 
has a low floral diversity coupled with sparse tree canopies. Within this forest type there 
are several rare tree species such as Talbotiella gentii and few commercial timber spe-
cies (c.f. MES 2002: 6-7). The characteristics of these zones greatly influence the type 
of tree species and agricultural crops growing across the forest area (Table 4.1).  
The biological diversity of the high forest zone is high and of global significance and 
rich in endemic species (Hall & Swaine 1976, 1981, Hawthorne & Abu Juam 1995,
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Table 4.1 Ecological zones in Ghana’s high forest zone and their characteristics   
Forest type/Abbreviations Estimated area 
(ha)* 
Characteristic tree species Characteristic 
crops 
Mean no. of 
species (per 625-
m
2
 plots)** 
Mean height of 
tallest tree in or 
near plots (m)** 
Mean annual  
rainfall 
(mm)** 
Wet evergreen (WE)   759,639 Cynometra ananta, Heretiera 
utilis, and Tieghemelia heekelii  
Cocoa, oil palm, 
rice  
138 32 ≥ 1750 
Moist evergreen (ME) 1,835,382 Percopsis elata, Chrysophllum 
spp., Aningeria spp. 
Cocoa, oil palm, 
rice 
120 43 1,500-1,700 
Upland evergreen (UE)   948,709 Guibotia dinklagei, 
Pterocarpus mildbraedii and 
Mansonia altissima 
Plantain, oil 
palm, cocoa  
113 40 1,500-2,000 
Moist semi-deciduous (MSD) 
 
- South-east type (MSSE) 
 
- North-west type (MSNW) 
 
        
1,726,122 
        
1,560,352 
Mansonia altissima, Entando-
phragma anglolense and En-
tandophragma utile 
Cocoa, citrus, oil 
palm, cassava, 
plantain, 
cocoyam  
 
              
108 
           
103 
 
        47 
        50 
 
1,500-1,750 
1,250-1,500 
Dry semi-deciduous (DSD) 
- Inner sub-type 
- Fire-zone subtype 
1,694,859 Milicia excelsa, Khaya ivoren-
sis and Triplochiton scleroxy-
lon  
Maize, cashew, 
vegetables, leg-
umes  
 
69 
81 
 
        38 
        33 
 
 1,250-1,500   
 1,250-1,500 
Southern marginal (SM) - Eucalyptus spp., Terminalia 
superba, Cedrella ordorata  
Cereals (maize, 
rice), mango, 
cassava  
47     28 1,000-1,250 
Southeast outliers (SO) - Talbotiella gentii, Millettia 
thonningii  
25 15   ≤1,000 
Notes: ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ refer to annual rainfall; upland forest lies above 500 m; in forest types classified as ‘evergreen’ the proportion of deciduous species is lower than 20%. ‘Southern 
marginal’ and ‘Southeast outliers’ are named after their location because they seemed to be unknown outside Ghana.  
* Both on and off-reserves in the high forest zone; ** Based on Hall & Swaine (1976)  
Sources: Adapted from Hall & Swaine (1976), MES (2002), FAO (2002), Kyereh et al. (2006), Affum–Baffoe (undated), Ministry of Environment and Science (2005, cited in Nunoo, 
2010) 
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MES 2002). Both indigenous and introduced species are considered in the assessments 
of the country's floral diversity. Some 3,600 endemic plant species exist, most of which 
are from the angiosperms represented by well over 2,974 indigenous and 253 introduced 
species (MES 2002). The wet evergreen zone/type exhibits the highest level of floral 
endemism and species richness compared to the other forest types (Ibid. 2002). Accord-
ing to MES (2002), terrestrial ecosystem fauna is relatively impoverished and comprises 
a diverse array of species including several of conservation concern. There are as many 
as 221 species of amphibians and reptiles, 724 species of birds, 225 mammalian species 
(with ninety-three recorded as inhabiting the savannah ecological zone). Some rare or 
endangered mammals include the bongo (Tragelaphus euryceros), Ogilby’s duiker 
Forest zones demarcated by broken line, simplified as follows: 
 
WE = wet evergreen 
ME = moist evergreen 
UE = upland evergreen  
MS (NW) = moist semi deciduous (Northwest subtype) 
MS (SE) = moist semi deciduous (Southeast subtype) 
DS (Z) = dry semi deciduous (Inner Zone) 
DS (FZ) = dry semi deciduous (Fire Zone) 
SM = Southern marginal 
SO = Southeast outlier 
 
Source: Adapted from Hall & Swaine (1981) by Waliszewski et al. (2005). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Ghana’s vegetation zones 
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(Cephalophus ogilbyi), Golden cat (Felis aurata), chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), forest 
elephant (Loxodonta africana cyclotis) and the pygmy hippopotamus (Choeropsis 
liberiensis) (Mensah-Ntiamoah 1989 cited in Kotey et al. 1998).  
Three species of frogs (Hyperolius aumanni, H. fusciventris and H. sylvaticus) and 
the lizard (Agama sylvanus) were found in the Bia Forest Reserve and the Atewa Range 
Forest Reserve (MES 2002). The same data source indicated that there are high numbers 
of butterflies in Ghana, where about twenty-three species have been classified as en-
demic or near endemic.  
Rivers and streams crisscross nearly all the forest reserves and feed the country’s ma-
jor rivers such as the Birim, Pra, Ankobra, Bonsa Offin, Densu and Tano rivers, which 
are sources of water supply to many communities including the urban ones (Environ-
ment News Service 2003). For example, the Tano-Offin forest reserve is home to many 
water bodies such as the Disiri, Offin, Tano, Nyasi, Tale and Supon Rivers that provide 
drinking water for the local communities and many towns in the Ashanti and Brong 
Ahafo regions. 
Species diversity and uniqueness in some of these reserves led to the creation of the 
globally significant biodiversity areas (GSBAs) in the late 1990s under the jurisdiction 
of the Forest Services Division (see Box 4.1 for background information on GSBA, 
Table 4.2 for an overview of GSBAs and Appendix 2 for a list of forest districts and 
reserves characteristics in the high forest zone). Ten of the thirty forest reserves in 
Ghana designated as GSBA are fully protected and twenty are under partial coverage 
protection. The protection of each of the thirty designated GSBAs is based primarily on 
the merit of endangered plant and animal species found within the reserves and their 
environs. 
Box 4.1: Background information on GSBAs in Ghana 
 
In the 1970s, Ghana boasted about 18,000 km
2 
of pristine rainforest in what ap-
peared to be well-secured forest reserves. However, over the years the forest has 
reduced in both size and quality. A combination of over-harvesting of timber, forest 
fires, encroachment and failed taungya schemes have resulted in vast areas of 
completely degraded forest areas. At present over 25% of the forest reserve area is 
completely degraded whilst about 8% is under convalescence. In the remaining 
closed forest, recurrent inventories have revealed a sharp decline in forest quality 
(structure and biological diversity), suggesting that successive logging has led to 
diminishing forest productivity. This situation demands that the country should re-
view its forest management strategies and establish systems that can ensure that at 
least as many forest blocks as possible are preserved in their natural condition for 
posterity. This thinking has been reinforced by scientific findings (Hawthorne & Abu-
Juam 1995, BirdLife 2001) that show that some forest reserves in the country are of 
special global biological conservation interest due to their unique flora and fauna, 
especially birds. Consequently, 30 of these Important Bird Areas (IBAs) have been 
designated as Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas (GSBAs). The GSBAs are set 
aside within a forest reserve to ensure that some forest blocks or entire forests are 
preserved in a condition that is as close to natural as possible in order to preserve 
unique flora and fauna. The GSBA concept is an innovation in Ghana’s conserva-
tion system that advocates the protection and conservation of all kinds and sizes of 
living organisms as well as the ecosystem (Kyereh et al. 2006: 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Globally Significant Biodiversity areas in Ghana’s high forest zone  
Forest reserve Total area (ha) GSBA area (ha) 
Total Coverage - Moist Forest  
Ebi River Shelterbelt  2,600  2,600  
Atewa Range  23,200  23,200  
Apedwa  400  400  
Dadiaso  17,100  17,100  
Yogaga  100  100  
TOTAL  43,400  43,400  
Partial Coverage - Moist Forest  
Tano-Offin  40,200  10,752  
Cape 3 points  2,000  1,000  
Neung North  4,500  2,688  
Ndumfiri  7,300  3, 768 
Boi Tano  12,900  3,328  
Boin River  27,800  7,552  
Jema Assemkrom  6,600  2,048  
Fure River  15,800  4,736  
Fure Headwaters  17,000  2,304  
Subiri River  58,800  5,120  
Bonsa River  16,100  2,304  
Tano Nimiri  20,600  3,456  
Disue River  2,400  384  
Draw River  23,500  12,800  
Neung South  11,300  7,304  
TOTAL  266,800  69,544 
Southern Dry Forest  
Abasuma  100  100  
Abonben  700  700  
Ahirasu1&11  100  100  
Obotomfo  200  200  
Akrobong  300  300  
Bandai Hills*  16,100  1,403  
Southern Scarp * 27,800  10  
Yongwa*  800  640  
Sapawsu & others in E/R*  1500  925  
TOTAL  47,600   4,378   
GRAND TOTAL  357,800      117,322  
* Partial coverage under dry forest types. 
Source: Forestry Commission Website. Accessed on 6 May 2009. 
 
The high forest zone contains several commercial timber species in both on and off-
reserve areas. In the latter case, these resources vary from scattered individual trees in 
farms and fallow areas to patches of intact forest. A group of species of great relevance 
to rural livelihoods are fuelwood and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). The latter 
range from edible and medicinal plants and their parts to species used for making tools, 
for thatching and bushmeat. More information on timber and non-timber forest products 
will be given in the next section. 
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The case study site selected is Tano-Offin forest reserve. There are three manage-
ment regimes in this reserve, namely protection (GSBA), production, and plantation 
development under the jurisdiction of Forest Services Division (see Figure 4.4). In 
terms of forest types, the Tano-Offin forest reserve is a blend of upland evergreen
1
 and 
moist semi-deciduous forest types that occur in Ghana. The reserve contains unique and 
rare tree species such as Guibortia dinklagei and Pterocarpus mildbraedii, which are 
rare and have a special conservation status in Ghana. In addition, there is a rare tree fern 
Cyathea manniana, used for medicinal purposes (JSTOR Plant Science).
2
 Important 
fauna include birds like the yellow-throated green bulbul (Criniger olivaceaus) and 
green-tailed bristle-bill (Bleda eximia) and (Illaposis rufenscencens) (Kyereh et al. 
2006). A variety of mammals (including chimpanzees) and reptiles have also been re-
ported in the reserve (see Chapter 7). 
Interactive governance theory is concerned with dynamics of the natural system, i.e. 
the fluctuations and change that occur because of the tension within a system and/or 
between systems (Kooiman & Bavinck 2005: 13). Within the forest context of Ghana, 
these dynamics are particularly reflected in deforestation and reforestation, with the 
slow development in plantations establishment being incapable of matching the rapid 
rate of destruction of the natural forests. Some of these changes occur because of con-
flicting interactions with other land-use systems like agriculture, mining and human 
settlements. Some direct and indirect causes of deforestation cited in literature include 
conversion of forestland to agriculture, mining, wildfires, population increase, all cou-
pled with weak institutional governance (see Kotey et al. 1998, Teye 2005, ITTO 2006, 
Appiah et al. 2009 ). As Jentoft (2007) remarked in relation to marine protected areas, 
there is often no direct cause-and-effect relationship to explain dynamics. Changes tend 
to be the result of many indirect causes and follow a non-linear and sometimes cyclical 
pattern. In view of the rapid changes in the natural system,
3
 both the state and individual 
investors have identified forest plantations as supplementary or alternative sources of 
timber. Even though the pace of reforestation cannot match the rate of deforestation, the 
government of Ghana initiated different plantation development schemes in 2001. A 
further elaboration of this can be found in the next section. The current area of produc-
tive plantations belonging to the FSD of the Forestry Commission is about 40,000 ha 
and that of the private sector is estimated to be approximately 29,200 ha (Agyeman et 
al. 2010). 
Forest and tree resources within the natural system 
As discussed in the previous section, the high forest zone is home to many plant and 
animal species that are essential for the wellbeing of the local people, as a source of raw 
material to the timber industry and as a source of revenue for the country. Three groups 
of forest and tree resources are discussed below based on literature review and focus 
group meetings with local communities in and around Tano-Offin Forest reserve. These 
                                                 
1
  The upland evergreen forest type in Ghana is considered botanically unique in terms of flora and 
fauna richness and diversity (Hawthorne & Abu-Juam 1995) and covers the Tano-Offin, Atewa Range 
and Apedwa forest reserves in the Nkawie and Begoro Forest Districts respectively. Both Atewa 
Range and Apedwa forest reserves are completely under GSBA protection, while in the Tano-Offin 
only a portion is designed as a GSBA (see Table 4.2).  
2
  URL: http://plants.jstor.org, accessed 17 January 2012. 
3
  According to the FAO (2011) the annual deforestation rate for Ghana is estimated at 0.5% or 115,000 
ha per year during the period 2000-2010.  
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are timber resources from on and off-reserve areas, non-timber forest products and plan-
tations. 
– Timber resources from on and off-reserve areas  
Ghana’s timber resources contribute significantly to the national economy. The formal 
timber industry contributes about 6% to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Marfo 
2010). Ghana earned an amount of US$ 384,680,952 (GHC 256,453,968)
4
 from the 
export of 426,221 m
3
 of wood products in 2009, which was a decrease of 31.29 % in 
value and 21.93 % in volume compared to 2008 (TIDD 2010). Total production of legal 
timber amounted to about 1.4 million m
3
 of industrial roundwood and 513,000 m
3
 of 
sawnwood in 2008 (FAO 2011). Nevertheless, the total amount of illegal timber is more 
than legal timber (Marfo 2010). The formal forest sector generates employment for an 
estimated 100,000 people (Adam & Dua-Gyamfi 2009 cited in Marfo 2010). In addi-
tion, an estimated 2.5 mln m
3
 is harvested illegally, employing an estimated 138,000 
people (Marfo 2010) directly and indirectly. Illegal harvesting is an issue of great con-
cern, as it deprives the government of revenues from stumpage, permit and conveyance 
fees, is a loss of revenue from compensation fees for farmers and social responsibility 
agreement benefits for local communities. It leads to forest degradation in protected 
areas and is an important source of conflict with forest fringe communities (Marfo 2010, 
see also Chapter 7). Furthermore, as asserted by Oduro (2005), illegal logging hampers 
any strategy which seeks to reduce overexploitation, forest degradation, and deforesta-
tion and ensuring sustainable forest management.  
In Ghana, commercial timber is exploited both on and off-reserve in production 
management areas. In the on-reserve areas, the management strategy is to partition pro-
duction areas into compartments. Each of these management units are about 128 ha in 
size. A group of such compartments constitutes a concession or timber utilisation con-
tract (TUC) area. Each concession or TUC area has a harvesting schedule, which is a 
timeline for logging in individual compartments for a forty year management cycle. 
Access to the timber resources from the on-reserve areas is given to timber contractors 
through competitive bidding and based on annual allowable cut (AAC). The AAC 
represents the volume of legal timber that can be sustainably harvested from a defined 
area of forest under a specific silvicultural regime.  
The management system of timber resources practised on-reserve is not applicable to 
off-reserve areas. Affum-Baffoe (2009) mentions two reasons for that. First, there is 
absence of an identifiable unit of management compartment, and timber operations may 
extend over a vast area. This results in poor monitoring. The second reason is the ab-
sence of understorey vegetation in off-reserve areas that supports natural regeneration in 
mixed tropical forests and thus presents a challenge to sustainable management of the 
tree resources in the off-reserve areas. In the off-reserve areas, timber is allocated to 
timber contractors using a quota system
5
 under which the TUC holder is entitled to op-
erate for a period of five years subject to renewal. The legislation governing the formal 
                                                 
4
  In its 2010 report on the wood exports from Ghana, the Timber Industry Development Division 
(TIDD) of the FC stated the amount in Euros (128,226,984), which are converted here to US dollar 
and Ghana cedi. As at the time of writing (January 2012), 1US$ = 1.5 GHC (Ghana cedi). 
5
  The quota system used for off-reserve areas is equivalent to the annual allowable cut (AAC) for re-
serve areas. However, unlike the forest reserves, where the overall guide is maintenance of the timber 
yield through sustainable harvesting practices, no such claim can be made for the off-reserve situation 
(GFS 1988). 
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allocation of timber to TUC holders is discussed in Chapter 5 and elaborated on in 
Chapter 9.  
In both management areas, the allocation of timber resources is subject to a star rat-
ing system which has been designed to assign each species to a category denoting its 
conservation priority (Hawthorne & Abu-Juam 1993 cited in Agyarko 2007).
6
 Scar-
let species are under imminent threat of economic extinction, red species are those for 
which current rates of exploitation present a significant danger of economic extinction 
and pink species are significantly exploited but not yet to such an extent that there is 
concern about their economic future (Agyarko 2007). The number of commercial timber 
species stands at eighty-two, fourteen are classified as scarlet star which means that they 
are subject to serious pressure from heavy exploitation and logging and that their ex-
ploitation is allowed only with a permit from the FC. There are also fourteen species 
classified as Red star which are relatively common within the high forest zone but 
which are under pressure from exploitation because of a good market. The pink star 
species, of which there are twenty-eight, are those that are common and moderately 
exploited (Affum-Baffoe 2009). This categorisation of star rating becomes important in 
the analysis of forest offences in Chapter 11.  
– Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) 
Non-timber forest products (NTFPs) comprise plant and animal products for subsistence 
and trade from forested landscapes, including human-modified ones (Ros-Tonen 2000, 
Ros-Tonen & Wiersum 2005). In Ghana, these products are found in both forest re-
serves and off-reserve areas (fallows and farmlands). They have been reported to play 
important socio-economic roles in the livelihoods of most local communities (Dadebo 
& Shinohara 1999, Blay et al. 2008, Appiah et al. 2009). They are essential for both 
domestic and commercial uses. Many NTFPs such as snails, mushrooms, chewing 
sponge, pestles, canes, palm, spices and chewing fruits, cola nuts, food wrapping leaves 
and wooden trays are very significant in the livelihoods of many urban and rural dwell-
ers (Falconer 1992, Kotey et al. 1998, Bell 2009).  
Many rural families derive a major proportion of their cash income from the sale of 
NTFPs collected from forest reserves and farmlands (Falconer 1992, Bell 2009). There 
is also a clear indication that the NTFP trade of both plants and animals is a very impor-
tant economic activity with a complex web of marketing involving gatherers, producers, 
wholesalers, and retailers (Kotey et al. 1998, Bokhorst 2011, see also Pfund et al. 
(2009) and Ingram (forthcoming) for value chain analyses of NTFPs in the Congo Ba-
sin). Bushmeat, which is a culturally very important delicacy (Van Vliet et al. 2011), is 
consumed by about 75% of the population of Ghana and is considered as the main 
source of meat for about 80% of rural populations in southern Ghana (Kotey et al. 
1998). This sector includes about 300,000 hunters who produce between 220,000 to 
380,000 tonnes of bushmeat annually. This bushmeat comes mainly from the forest and 
is valued at US $ 210 million to US $ 350 million (ITTO 2006).  
Recent insights make it clear that NTFPs are important to forest-dwelling people as a 
source of cash and non-cash income (Bell 2009), but that they function more as a safety 
net than as a potential avenue out of poverty (Belcher et al. 2005, Kusters et al. 2006, 
Vedeld et al. 2007). In support of this discourse, Agyeman et al. (2010) argue that, in 
                                                 
6
  FDB/EU/FAO (2003). URL: ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/003/AB567E/AB567E00.pdf. Accessed on 
17 January 2012. 
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spite of the importance of forest resources to rural livelihoods, the majority of the peo-
ple in Ghana who are dependent on forest products and farming are poor.  
Fuelwood is generally not classified as an NTFP (Schure 2012) but is by far the most 
important forest product worldwide, contributing an average of 20% of household forest 
income
7
. Globally, wood removals account for 0.7% of growing stock and nearly half of 
this wood is used as woodfuel. However, significant differences exist between regions, 
with more than two thirds of wood used as woodfuel in Africa and Asia and less than 
20% in Europe, North America and Oceania (FAO 2010). In Ghana, woodfuel removal 
in 1990, 2000 and 2005 amounted to 14,833 m
3
, 23,780 m
3 
and 23,780 m
3
 respectively. 
Unfortunately, there is no monetary value attached to these amounts (FAO 2010). The 
absence of a monetary value for woodfuel in the country indicates that fuelwood has not 
received as much attention as timber from a forest management perspective. Despite its 
importance for rural livelihoods, its value has not been formally recorded and remains 
inadequately represented in policy analysis (World Bank 2006).  
However, more than three decades ago, Assibey (1977) reported that fuelwood ac-
counted for more than 75% of all of Ghana’s energy needs and was used as a source of 
domestic energy by over 70% of Ghanaian households in both rural and urban areas in 
the form of firewood and charcoal. 
 
– Plantation development 
History indicates that timber plantation development in Ghana dates back to the late 
1800s as a localised project in the Trans-Volta Togoland, which was then a German 
colony (now Volta region) (Agyeman et al. 2010). However, plantation development 
has occurred on a national scale since the British introduced the taungya system in the 
1920s (Ibid.) as a system that combines plantation stands of woody species with agricul-
tural crops during the early years of plantation development (Nair 1985, 1991). The 
taungya system was suspended for several reasons in 1984, including financial prob-
lems. About 75,000 ha of plantations were established with the support of local people. 
However poor maintenance meant that only 15,000 ha can be considered commercially 
viable (Agyeman et al. 2010).  
Forest inventories
8
 revealed a rapid decline in the nation’s natural forest resources, 
both in on and off-reserve areas (Agyeman et al. 2010). This stimulated the government 
and decision makers in the forestry sector to find a strategy to address the deforestation 
problem and to curb the associated effects on the national economy and the local people 
(Zhang & Owiredu 2007, Foli et al. 2009, Agyeman et al. 2010). Consequently, in Sep-
tember 2001, the government launched the National Forest Plantation Development 
Programme (NFPDP) which aimed to establish 20,000 ha of forest plantations per an-
num across the country. The overall objectives of the NFPDP are (i) to restore forest 
cover of degraded forest reserves; (ii) to address the wood deficit situation in the coun-
try, especially timber; (iii) to create employment opportunities at rural community level 
and generate income for plantation owners, timber processors and the national econ-
omy, and (iv) to contribute to food production in the country. This programme included 
                                                 
7
  Preliminary data from a CIFOR study covering 8,000 households from 60 sites in 24 countries. See 
http://www.cifor.org/fileadmin/fileupload/media-release/PEN-New-global-study-shows-high-reliance-
on-forests-among-rural-poor.pdf (accessed on 6 September 2011).  
8
  Two forest inventory programmes conducted between the periods 1985-1989 and 2001-2002 indicated 
that there has been a rapid loss of forest resources from both reserve and off-reserve areas (c.f. Agye-
man et al. 2010: 27). 
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three different schemes, namely the modified taungya system (MTS) (see Zhang & 
Owiredu 2007, Agyeman et al. 2010), commercial plantations
9
 (see the NFPDP annual 
reports of the FC, Agyeman et al. 2010, Hoogenbosch & Ros-Tonen 2011) and the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funded plantations
10
 (see FC, NFPDP reports). 
In addition to these three schemes in degraded forest reserves, there are also a number 
of schemes in off-reserve areas, including the small farmer agroforestry scheme, private 
reforestation initiatives undertaken by individuals, groups and companies (Wagner et al. 
2008, Foli et al. 2009). Here the focus is on the MTS, which is one of the conflict cases 
that are part of this study (see Chapter 8).  
The MTS is an agroforestry system that was introduced in Ghana in 2002 in a bid to 
support both rural livelihoods and address Ghana’s deforestation problem. It is an 
adapted version of the old taungya system, which was suspended in 1984 partly due to a 
lack of farmers’ support (Marfo 2009, Agyeman et al. 2010). Under the MTS, farmers 
receive degraded forestland to grow food crops alongside the planted timber trees dur-
ing the early years of plantation development. Agyeman et al. (2010: 30) outlined two 
                                                 
9
  The commercial plantation scheme comprises the establishment of industrial plantations by local and 
foreign investors in degraded forest reserves in collaboration with the government, stool landowners 
and local communities, under a benefit-sharing arrangement that provides investors with a 90% share 
of the tree benefits, dividing the rest among the landowners (6%), FC (2%) and adjacent communities 
(2%) (Derkyi et al. 2010). 
10
  The HIPC-funded plantation scheme in degraded forest reserves was initiated by the then Ministry of 
Lands and Forestry in 2003, implemented by the Plantation Unit of the Forestry Services Division 
(FSD) of the FC, and financed by the US$ 5.5 million Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) fund 
(Derkyi et al. 2010, Hoogenbosch & Ros-Tonen 2011). It aims to improve the living conditions of de-
prived citizens of Ghana by serving as a source of short-term employment opportunities. Workers, 
who are mostly community members, receive monthly wages for tree planting and maintenance. Un-
der this programme, contracts are given to plantation supervisors (non-staff of FSD) who supervise 
the workers, who are sometimes allowed to cultivate food crops under the same conditions as those 
that govern the MTS.  
Box 4.2  Special features of the modified taungya system 
 
 Farmers are essentially the owners of the products with the Forestry Commission, 
landowners, and forest fringe communities acting as shareholders. The rights of 
the farmers are guaranteed under the Timber Resource Management Amendment 
Act, 2002 (Act 617), which states in Section 4, Subsection 3 that ‘no timber rights 
shall be granted in respect of land with private plantations; or land with any timber 
grown or owned by any individual or group of individuals.’ This means that timber 
grown by farmers even within reserves shall belong to them and not be subject to 
any timber rights held by the FC. This contrasts with the situation under the old 
taungya system, where the FC was the owner, with the landowners being the only 
beneficiary. Farmers benefited from their food crops but did not receive any bene-
fits from the timber trees.  
 Farmers carry out most of the activities, including tree planting, pruning, mainte-
nance and tending, whereas the FC is responsible for training the farmers to carry 
out these activities efficiently. The FC is also responsible for the supply of equip-
ment, tools, stock inventory, and auctioning or marketing of the timber products. 
 
Source: Agyeman et al. ( 2010) based on studies conducted across the country in 2002. 
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key features of the MTS based on the studies conducted prior to the launching of the 
MTS (see Box 4.2). In 2005, the legally binding Land Lease and Benefit Sharing 
agreement became a reality and farmers became co-owners of the plantations together 
with the Forestry Commission (see Chapter 5 for details about the benefit–sharing ar-
rangement among the stakeholders). Figure 4.4 depicts the complexity of the natural 
system under study and indicates the layers of different systems.  
The socioeconomic system  
The diversity of the socioeconomic system is primarily related to the composition of 
stakeholder groups and their interests and access rights (Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009). 
They are referred to as forest actors and are also defined in this chapter as all those who 
have roles, responsibilities and interests in (a) decision making regarding the allocation 
and regulation of forest and tree resources, (b) implementation and enforcement of rules 
and regulations regarding forest and tree resource use, (c) forest and tree resource use 
and/or management, (d) forest and tree resource conflicts and/or (e) forest and tree con-
flict management (adapted from Ros-Tonen et al. 2010). Forest actors are diverse in 
terms of composition, the levels of geographical scales at which they are operating, their 
interests, and their roles in the forest governance system. This section discusses two key 
actors who are direct users of forest resources: the local communities, which are based 
in the customary governing structure and the timber operators (both formal and infor-
mal), belonging to the market governing structure (see Chapter 5). Actors with a role in 
the governing system are discussed in Chapter 5. This section presents the interests and 
roles of forest users in terms of access to and use of forest resources. It also presents the 
local communities’ perceptions of the natural system and the way in which they position 
each forest actor under the five forest and tree-based livelihoods that the natural system 
offers, as an illustration of the diversity of interests among these actors. Similarly, the 
different perceptions held by the representatives of government institutions with respect 
to the interests, positions and power of key actors are analysed using a stakeholder 
analysis. The dynamics in the interactions between the various actors are also addressed. 
Off-reserve 
area 
On-reserve 
area HFZ (Nkawie Forest District) 
Forests of 
Ghana  
Other forest zones 
Tano-Offin off- reserve area  
Tano-Offin forest reserve 
Production regime 
Key:  
Levels of governance 
Governance interactions 
(GI) 
Plantation 
regimes  
Protection regime  
Figure 4.4    Schematic representation of the nested nature of the natural system-to-be-
governed and the interactions between the components 
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Local communities 
Local communities are defined in this study as being groups of people that share a par-
ticular geographical space (usually a village) and its natural resources, but they are not 
necessarily homogenous in terms of interests and socioeconomic positions. Following 
Asare (2000), who defines ‘community’ as a conglomeration of people with identifiable 
characteristics and common or differing interests, five categories of forest-related com-
munities can be identified: 
 
1. People with ownership rights over the forest; 
2. People living within or close (1-5 km) to the forest estate; 
3. People who use forest products such as timber, NTFPs or bushmeat;  
4. People who are affected by changes in the forest environment or negatively affect the 
forest environment; and  
5. People who provide services towards forest management. 
 
As is outlined in Chapter 5, ownership over land in Ghana is vested in chiefs, but the 
management of forest resources is vested in the State (see Chapter 5 for more details). 
In the southern part of Ghana mostly among the Akan’s where this study was under-
taken, queen mothers play a key role in the traditional system. Chiefs are installed by 
the queen mothers
11
. Defining a community in terms of ownership rights over the forest 
is therefore tricky, as these rights are not the same for all in the community. According 
to Amanor (2005), the legacy of colonial forestry policy disempowered rural farmers 
and empowered the state to expropriate forest resources through the chiefs, who benefit 
from this system through their rights to royalties and rent. Community members have 
the right to harvest forest resources, and especially NTFPs, for their own use but with 
permission from a forestry official especially in gazetted forest reserves. With respect to 
timber, a community is given the right to harvest trees granted by the FC in the form of 
a timber utilisation permit for non-commercial and development purposes. Within the 
country there are a number of sacred groves and two dedicated forests
12
 that are man-
aged by local communities, but which have no legal status. In the Ghanaian context, it is 
therefore impossible to define a community in terms of ownership rights over the forest 
resources.  
As regards the location vis-à-vis the forest estate under study, there are 41 communi-
ties (i.e. villages) surrounding the Tano-Offin forest reserve and one village (Kye-
kyewere) located in the middle of it (Figure 4.5).  
                                                 
11
  For more details on the process of installed of the current Asantehene see URL: 
http://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=6239 (accessed on 17 January 
2012). 
12
  In Ghana dedicated forests are designed to enable communities to manage their own forest ‘reserves’ 
based on approved management plans. They take the form of patches of forests, sacred groves and 
secondary forests in off-reserve areas. This was initiated in 1994 when two communities in Fosu Dis-
trict served as a pilot. Legislation was drafted in 1997, but no further action has been taken since 
(World Bank 2006). 
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As far as forest use is concerned, the interests of the chiefs (who have an interest in 
the state issuing timber concessions since they will then share in the royalties) and the 
farmers are different (Amanor 2005). The results of the consultation workshop held in 
November 2008 (see Chapter 3) therefore represent a ‘collective voice’ or a shared im-
age of how community representatives see the importance of the forest. The tangible 
and intangible benefits mentioned at the consultation workshop are summarised in Box 
4.3. However, each stakeholder group within the community has different interests and 
needs, and a different position and amount of power with regard to forest resource use. 
The twenty-two representatives from two case study local communities bordering the 
Tano-Offin reserve and the admitted village made a stakeholder analysis for five forest-
based livelihood components (see Figure 4.5 and Chapter 3 for details on the methodol-
ogy). These include access to NTFPs for domestic and commercial uses, admitted farm-
ing, chainsaw operations, MTS farming, and illegal farming. Their stakeholder analysis 
focused not only on local community groups, but also on other stakeholders, thereby 
highlighting whether the nature of interactions was compatible/complementing or con-
flicting. This stakeholder analysis also portrays the level of scale at which the different 
actors operate. This chapter presents only the stakeholder analysis for access to NTFPs, 
as similar analyses for the other forest-based livelihood components are discussed in the 
various case studies in subsequent chapters (Chapters 7-9). 
Box 4.3 Perceptions of representatives of communities within and 
 bordering the Tano-Offin Forest reserve  
 
Intangible benefits  
 Good breathing air  
 Access to water through the rivers and streams  
 
Tangible benefits  
 NTFPs: snails, canes, raffia, mushrooms, local sponge, bark of trees for herbal 
products, seeds, plants or plant parts for medicines, honey 
 Minerals like gold and bauxite  
 Through the GSBA, the Community Biodiversity Advisory Group (CBAG) mem-
bers, especially young people, are employed to clean the forest boundary  
 Forest trees for timber contractors  
 Communities, except Kyekyewere where no harvesting of commercial timber oc-
curs because it is located in a GSBA, benefit from social responsibility agree-
ments (SRAs)  
 Good fertile lands for farming under the MTS (except Kyekyewere village) 
 
Source: Community consultation meetings, November 2008. 
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Table 4.3 shows that access to NTFPs involves more actors than those at community 
level, especially if the means of access are no longer informal (i.e. requires a permit) 
and the FSD is involved. The shaded portions indicate the actors at community level 
and illustrate the diversity of stakeholder groups. The other actors mostly come from 
district level, except in cases in which the FSD official (i.e. forest guard) lives in the 
community. Each of these actors wields their power differently. The respondents be-
lieve that the community members, farmers and chiefs have less power compared to the 
FSD, District Assemblies and NTFP traders. In the absence of a permit to harvest 
NTFPs on a commercial basis, there are conflicting interactions between the NTFP 
traders on the hand and the chiefs and elders, FSD officials and/or District Assembly on 
the other. However, the interactions are compatible and complementary if the collector 
holds a permit. Generally, the relationships among actors were reported to be accom-
modating through the level of the ties (i.e. strong, weak, and neutral), depending on the 
actor group. For example, the NTFPs traders are usually people from outside the com-
munity who really need the assistance of the inhabitants to collect the forest products. 
Proper homage paid to the chief and elders of the town enables the establishment of a 
strong relationship with the local people. On the other hand, the absence of such a pro-
Figure 4.5   The Tano-Offin forest reserve indicating most of the forest fringe communtites 
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tocol often results in weak ties between the trader and the local people. Such weakness 
of ties could lead to the collector being reported to FSD officials if s/he has no permit.  
Another dimension to define a community is on the basis of their effects on, or the 
extent to which they are affected by, the forest environment. This largely coincides with 
the definition of a community as a locational unit in the proximity of the forest estate. 
As the following chapters demonstrate, this locational aspect is important when deter-
mining the nature of conflicts affecting the community. In terms of supporting forest 
resource management, communities contribute to wildfire prevention and control, and 
natural and plantation forest protection in return for 5% of the stumpage fee as social 
responsibility agreement (SRA) in timber utilisation contracts (TUCs). As outlined in 
the previous section, communities living close to degraded forest reserve areas are col-
laborating with the FC in plantation development under the MTS for a shared benefit of 
40% of harvestable timber products and 100% of food crops produce. Within the 
GSBAs, the FC has, for a fee, engaged some community members in forest boundary 
cleaning. 
In spite of their roles in forest management, the participation of community members 
in decision making and resource allocation has been largely ignored and is an issue ad-
dressed in the next chapter. 
Market actors  
The market actors consist of the timber utilisation contract (TUC) holders (both on and 
off-reserve), the illegal loggers and chainsaw millers, the commercial plantations devel-
opers, and the NTFPs traders. The timber industry is the most important actor within the 
market governing structure with its different categories and sub-categories of actors.  
The actors active in logging with legal recognition are TUC or concession holders 
and salvage permit (SP) holders who extract wood from areas to be transformed for de-
velopment purposes such as road construction, the expansion of human settlements or 
farm cultivation (Marfo 2010). Each of these holders may belong to one or both of two 
main professional organisations, namely the Ghana Timber Association (GTA) and the 
Ghana Timber Miller Organisation (GTMO). Mayers & Kotey (1996) argue that the 
main interest of this group of actors is to access logs from marketable species at the 
lowest possible prices with a view to converting them to high-value processed lumber 
for sale at high prices. The means available to these actors to achieve their interests are 
the strong influence they have at policy level as well as the de facto control over large 
forest areas.  
The second group in this category are the chainsaw millers and illegal loggers who 
operate at multiple levels of scale, ranging from micro (the local) to macro (the na-
tional) levels in Ghana’s geopolitical settings. These actors may come from a blend of 
formal, market and traditional governing structures. Even though their activities are 
illegal because it leads to a loss of revenue to the country and destruction of forest re-
sources, these actors paradoxically provide lumber for the domestic market (Marfo 
2010).  
The interest of investors in commercial timber plantations is to have access to de-
graded portions of forest reserves to plant trees using different arrangements with re-
spect to their engagement with local communities (Hoogenbosch 2011). There are also 
individuals or groups of people who engage in timber tree planting in off-reserve areas 
known as tree growers. This has become feasible because of Act 617 which gives the 
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ownership right of planted timber to individuals who plant trees on their own land or in 
agreements with other landowners.  
Traders engaged in NTFP – both plants products and bush meat – need a permit from 
the Forest Services Division and Ghana Wildlife Division respectively to access these 
resources. As shown in the stakeholders’ analysis in Table 4.3, the absence of such a 
permit results in conflicting interactions between them and other stakeholders, notably 
the FC, as well as actors at community level (see also Chapter 7). 
 
 
Table 4.3 Actor analysis by community representatives relating to non-timber forest product  
 (NTFP) use for domestic and commercial purposes  
 NTFP use for domestic and commercial purposes 
Actors  FSD offi-
cials  
Community 
members 
Farmers  NTFP 
collectors 
(traders) 
Chief & 
elders  
District 
Assembly 
Judi-
ciary  
Main 
concern 
Issue per-
mits and 
request one 
when 
monitoring 
forest use 
Protect the 
forest to 
safeguard 
daily use of 
NTFPs 
Protect 
the forest 
for daily 
use and 
to pre-
serve 
NTFPs 
Free 
collection 
Are to be 
consulted 
before 
entry 
Register 
collectors  
Imple-
ment 
the law 
and 
prose-
cute if 
needed 
Interest  Prevent  
unlawful 
entry 
NTFPs for 
daily use 
And sustain 
the NTFPs 
for the chil-
dren 
NTFPs 
for daily 
use and 
sustain 
the 
NTFPs 
for the 
children 
Daily 
collection 
To pro-
tect the 
NTFPs 
for the 
future  
To generate 
revenue 
from way-
bills during 
transport of 
products  
To 
ensure 
justice  
Needs Revenue 
from per-
mits  
-NTFPs for 
food and 
revenue 
- Nutrients 
and energy  
NTFP for 
food, 
medicine 
and fod-
der, to 
improve 
energy 
and herds 
and gen-
erate 
money 
NTFP 
extraction 
for money 
To pre-
vent 
unlawful 
activities 
that de-
stroy 
resources 
and 
revenue 
Revenue 
from 
NTFPs 
traders  
To 
main-
tain 
peace 
and 
order 
Power 
position 
* 
1 3 3 1 2 1 2 
* Key: most powerful = 1; powerful = 2; less powerful = 3. 
Source: Validation meeting with the three case study communities February 2010. 
 
Another stakeholder analysis was carried out in a focus group discussion with repre-
sentatives of the Police, District Assemblies, Judiciary, FSD (managerial and field offi-
cers) and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The participants’ images of the inter-
ests, position and power wielded by the various stakeholders in the forestry sector are 
presented in Table 4.4. The participants analysed stakeholders based on their interest in 
forest management or access to resources. With respect to their position, the stake-
holders were classified as primary, secondary and tertiary actors, indicating a direct, 
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intermediate or indirect stake in the forest. The concept of power and influence were 
used interchangeably during the discussions, and participants set four criteria to access 
number and power/influence of the different actors. The criteria used were the follow-
ing: 
 
A-stakeholders relatively small in number of people but powerful/influential  
B-stakeholders relatively large in number and powerful/influential  
C-stakeholders relatively small in number and not so powerful/influential  
D-stakeholders relatively large in number but not so powerful/influential  
 
 
Table 4.4 Government institutions representatives’ images of stakeholders in the forest sector  
Forest actors  Interests Position  Power/  
influence 
FSD  Ensures management and  
sustainability of the forest  
Primary  A 
Police  Protect the forest products  Secondary B 
    
Government Political interest, national security, 
revenue and conservation 
Primary A 
District Assembly Royalties, trees and food crops  Primary A 
Chiefs (landowners 
/odikro) 
Royalties and trees (especially those 
involved in the timber business) 
Primary A 
NGOs  Advocates for marginalised groups, 
protection of the environment, social 
development  
Secondary  C 
Academic institutions  Research Tertiary  C 
Timber contractors  Trees Primary A 
Chainsaw operators 
/illegal loggers  
Trees Primary B 
Sawn lumber sellers  Sawn trees mostly from illegal 
sources  
Primary B 
Carpenters  Lumber  Secondary C 
Community members  Access for resources for their  
livelihoods 
Primary D 
Hunters  Bush meat  Primary C 
Herbalists  Plants parts from the forest  Primary C 
Key: A = stakeholders relatively small in terms of number of people but powerful/influential; B = stakeholders rela-
tively large in number and powerful/influential; C = stakeholders relatively small in number and not so power-
ful/influential; D = stakeholders relatively large in number but not so powerful/influential  
Source: Focus group discussion with representatives of government institutions, November, 2008.  
Discussion  
This section starts with a discussion of the system to-be-governed as the interaction be-
tween the natural and the socio-economic systems from two perspectives. It first dis-
cusses the diversity, complexity, scale and dynamics of the high forest zone as the natu-
ral system. Secondly, it examines forest users and their interactions with the natural 
system. In both sub-sections an attempt is made to assess the governability levels based 
on the study findings 
The natural system: Ghana’s high forest zone and its attributes 
Chuenpagdee & Jentoft (2009) distinguish four attributes of the natural system, i.e. di-
versity, complexity, scale and dynamics. These are the key dimensions to be assessed 
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from a governability perspective as the responsiveness to these attributes determines the 
governability of the natural system and its limits (Ibid. 2009). The natural system under 
study is the high forest zone, which is a key contributor to the nation’s GDP, a source of 
raw material to the timber industry and a source of livelihoods to both rural and urban 
people. In terms of scale, it is a nested continuum of subsystems existing across five 
regions in Ghana at different levels of the geopolitical scale (Figures 4.1 and 4.4).  
The study revealed that the high forest zone is diverse as its holds a mixture of eco-
logical vegetation types ranging from evergreen rainforest to dry semi-deciduous forest 
(Hall & Swaine 1976/81). Such diversity is characterised by a wide range of flora and 
fauna species which influence the type of tree species and agricultural crops that grow 
across the forest area (Affum-Baffoe 2009). The uniqueness and richness of this system 
in terms of species composition has been confirmed in literature which refers to the 
presence of both endemic and extinct globally significant biodiversity (Hawthorne & 
Abu Juam 1995, Hall & Swaine 1981, MES 2002). From a user’s perspective, the spe-
cies composition can be categorised as timber (from natural forests and plantations) and 
non-timber forest products (from both plants and animals). Humans inhabit some of the 
reserves in the high forest zone, such as the Tano-Offin reserve.  
The high forest zone is not only home to biotic elements but also to abiotic elements 
such as water bodies, which serve as drinking water for many rural and urban communi-
ties in Ghana. The first forestry policy of Ghana, that guided the reservation policies of 
the 1920s, confirms the importance of the interaction of the biotic and abiotic factors, 
although more emphasis was placed on abiotic factors at the time of forest reservation. 
The policy statement declared:  
‘Conserving a sufficient area of forest suitably distributed throughout the country in order to 
protect water supply, prevent erosion and to ensure the maintenance of the present climatic 
conditions existing in the high forest zone which are essential factors in the cultivation of co-
coa, cola and other crops on which the prosperity of the colony largely depends.’ (Forest Pol-
icy of Ghana, unique clause, cited in Agyeman et al. 2007: 4) 
A system diverse in nature is also complex because of the interdependency and inter-
action within and among the different parts of the system. Kooiman & Bavinck (2005: 
13) define complexity as ‘a function of the architecture of the relations among the parts 
of the system and between a system and it environment. Interactions are exchanges that 
take place in a context of interdependency, and also affect the partners involved’. These 
interactions are inherent in a nested system like the high forest zone and can be ob-
served not only among the fauna and flora species in the food chain, seed dispersal and 
germination processes, but also in the human system in the competition for resources. 
Within the high forest zone another area of complexity lies in the different management 
regimes identified in this chapter and the (overlapping) legislative instruments that gov-
ern them (see Chapter 5).  
In terms of dynamics, the vision prevailing in the first forest policy shifted from an 
environmental perspective to a utilitarian perspective with a redefined forest policy in 
1948 (Chapter 5). This increased the high forest zone’s vulnerability to excessive ex-
ploitation. The nation’s natural resources declined rapidly as a result of deforestation, 
negatively affecting the national economy and the citizenry (Zhang & Owiredu 2007, 
Foli et al. 2009, Agyeman et al. 2010). The changes that occurred in the high forest 
zone resulted in the modification of the natural system through the introduction of plan-
tation development. In spite of this plantation development, most of the forest reserves 
in the high forest zones are generally degraded due to the overexploitation of timber 
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(illegal and illegal). In addition, plant and animal NTFPs declined because of increasing 
production and population pressure.  
The challenge resulting from the scale issues, diversity, complexity and dynamics 
outlined above is whether the high forest zone (and its embedded sub-systems) has the 
resilience to withstand the excessive pressure of over-exploitation of its resources. This 
determines how governable the system is and has implications for the governance proc-
ess and opportunities for sustainable forest management. A system’s governability is its 
ability to resist, restore and recover from overexploitation and associated degradation 
(Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009). Assessing the governability of the high forest zone is 
beyond the scope of this research, but the above analysis of the attributes of the natural 
system facilitates an understanding of the context in which conflicts occur and is used to 
assess the governability of these conflicts in the last chapter of this thesis.  
The socio-economic system: forest users and their interaction with the natural system  
Actors within the high forest zone are diverse in terms of composition, levels of geo-
graphical scales at which they operate, and their needs and interest as regards accessing 
forest resources. Within the socio-economic system, two key actor groups were identi-
fied, i.e. the communities and market actors, encompassing legal timber operators, 
chainsaw millers/loggers, commercial plantation developers and NTFP traders.  
As indicated by Asare (2000) the community is never homogenous, and neither are 
the market actors. The communities within the high forest zone are made up of different 
stakeholder groupings. Those identified in the study are the community members as a 
collective entity, the NTFP collectors, chiefs and elders. Other studies disaggregated 
community stakeholders groups in terms of gender, ethnicity, social ties and religious 
affiliation, as well as other dimensions (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Each of the three 
community actor groups identified in this study has a different position, interest, need 
and power with regard to access to forest resources. As they access these resources, in-
teractions take place between them at community level and with other actors included in 
Table 4.2. Such interactions bring about two kinds of conflicts. One kind are those over 
access rights which occur mostly between actors without a legal permit and forestry 
officials. The other kinds of conflicts are those between competing uses that occur 
across actor groups with different claims to forest resources. Analyses of such conflicts 
will be discussed in detail in Chapters 7, 8, and 9. The fact that the local communities as 
a collective body were able to distinguish between intangible and tangible benefits of 
the forest gives a clear indication of the richness of their images of the forest.  
The forest users operating in the market can be differentiated between those having 
legal rights to access forest resources (i.e. TUC holders, those holding a permit for 
NTFP collection or plantation developers) and those without such rights. According to 
the stakeholder analysis by representatives of local communities and representatives of 
government institutions, legal and illegal timber operators have a common interest in 
trees but differ as regards the mode of access. As discussed above, differential access is 
a source of conflict. The variety of actors within these two groups, their conflicting in-
terests in forest use and access to resources and differential power and needs pose chal-
lenges to the governance system and cause it to be less governable. Such governability 
limitations have manifested themselves in prevalent conflict incidences, which will be 
presented in the case study chapters. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the high forest zone is diverse as its holds a mixture of eco-
logical vegetation types characterised by a wide range of flora and fauna and abiotic 
factors that play important roles in the ecosystem in addition to a variety of human ac-
tors. However, the demand for these resources to generate foreign exchange for the 
country and provide raw material for the timber industry and a source of livelihood have 
put a lot of pressure on the natural system (i.e. the high forest zone), with negative ef-
fects on both biotic and abiotic elements. Both the natural and socio-economic systems 
face challenges. Within the natural system, the challenge is whether the high forest zone 
(and its embedded sub-systems) has the resilience to withstand the excessive pressure of 
over-exploitation of its resources, whereas the challenge confronting the socio-
economic system is for its diverse actors to derive sustainable social and livelihood 
needs from the forest resources. Another challenge is how the actors in the system will 
constructively manage conflicts over forest use and access rights. 
 
  
 
 
5 
The governing system: Features, orders, modes  
and elements of Ghana’s forest governance 
Introduction  
Globally, the evolution of governance processes in the forestry sector poses many chal-
lenges to policymakers, forest managers and forest users. These challenges range from 
overcoming weaknesses in the rule of law and enforcement, the illegal use of forest re-
sources, vague policy directions, institutional failure and competition with other land 
uses (Ostrom 1999, Tyler 1999, Marfo 2006). The challenges of relevance in the context 
of this study are usually the absence or ineffectiveness of mechanisms to manage com-
peting claims to forest and tree resources (i.e. to accommodate them and ensure coop-
erative actions), which often results in conflict.  
Current forest governance reforms in Ghana are oriented around stakeholder partici-
pation with a view to enhancing sustainable forest management and improving forest 
governance and forest-based livelihoods. In line with this the government of Ghana, 
through the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources and the Forestry Commission and 
in cooperation with civil society (with NGOs acting as ‘brokers’), the timber industry 
and ‘development partners’,1 has pursued several governance initiatives and pro-
grammes some of which are still ongoing. Nevertheless, forest and tree-related conflicts 
within the sector are ubiquitous. 
This chapter contributes to the governance debate by applying the interactive gov-
ernance theory developed for the fisheries sector by Kooiman et al. (2005) (see also 
                                                 
1
  In Ghana’s ongoing forest governance reforms, the term ‘development partners’ refers to international 
donors and development organisations that support the reforms. Examples are the EU with which the 
Ghana government signed the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) to combat illegal logging and 
improve forest governance, the World Bank with which efforts are being undertaken to reduce emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradations (REDD), and the National Forest Programme Facility 
(NFPF) of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) with which the Ghana gov-
ernment established national and regional forums to promote stakeholder consultation and participa-
tion for the enhancement of sustainable forest management (FC-FAO, n.d.). In the rest of this chapter 
the term ‘donors’ or ‘donor community’ will be used.  
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Jentoft 2007, Kooiman 2008, Kooiman et al. 2008, Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009 and 
Chapter 2 of this thesis) with a view to assessing the status of Ghana’s forest governing 
system and the governability limitations it is facing with regard to dealing with forest 
and tree-related conflicts. From a normative perspective it also explores the opportuni-
ties that the interactive governance approach holds for the forest sector of Ghana as re-
gards managing forest-related conflicts. The central question guiding this chapter is: 
what are the characteristics in terms of features, orders, modes and elements of the gov-
erning system that contribute to the governability of Ghana’s forest sector and how does 
it deal with forest and tree-related conflicts? This central question has been divided into 
five sub-questions:  
 
1. What is the historical context of the Ghanaian forest governing system in terms of its 
policies, legislations and conflicts?  
2. What features prevail in the forest governance process (in terms of diversity, scale, 
complexity and dynamics)?  
3. What is the quality of the three governance orders (principles, institutional arrange-
ments and day-to-day management of conflicts) in the forest governing system?  
4. How responsive is Ghana forest governance in terms of the governance modes (hier-
archical, co-governance and self-governance)?  
5. What is the fit of governance elements (in terms of forest actors’ images, instruments 
and actions) with conflict management and how do actors assess the potential to 
strengthen forest conflict management in the governance process?  
 
The information in this chapter is based on a review of literature and a survey among, 
and interviews and a workshop with, forest governors and experts and representatives of 
the donor community with the intention being to generate data on their knowledge, 
views and perceptions of forest governance and conflict management. 
The following sections present the results based on the research questions after 
which the findings are discussed against the background of scholarly literature on the 
subject matter, positioning them within the myriad of forest governance initiatives in 
Ghana. The conclusions are presented at the end of the chapter. 
Ghanaian forest governance in a historical perspective: Colonial legacy 
Historical background to Ghana’s forest policies and its legislative instruments  
Ghana’s forestry sector has undergone a massive transformation in policy reforms since 
scientific forestry was introduced in the first decade of the twentieth century (Table 
5.1). The first forest policy of 1908
2
 focused on forest preservation to protect water and 
boost cash crop production (see Chapter 4). In 1910 a Forest Bill was introduced which 
gave the colonial government the right to appropriate land for the creation of forest re-
                                                 
2
  Different versions of the first forest policy of Ghana are given. Kotey et al. (1998) recognise the first 
formal forest policy as being the 1948 policy, whereas Bilijo (2005) distinguishes three phases in the 
history of forest policy in Ghana, each of which is backed by a specific forest policy: one starting with 
the 1908 forest policy (colonial government), one with the 1948 forest policy (colonial/post-colonial) 
and the current phase which starts with the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy (post-colonial). The over-
view here (see Table 5.1) follows Bilijo (2005) who, in turn, strongly builds on Kotey et al. (1998).  
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serves. This was opposed by the Aborigines Rights Protection Society
3
, which inter-
preted the reservation process as an attempt by the colonial power to expropriate in-
digenous lands. It also led to the local people opposing and responding to this process 
by rapidly converting forests into farmlands in order to avoid reservation (Francois 
1987). Ultimately the Bill was withdrawn in 1911 (Ageyman et al. 2010).  
The 1908 colonial forest policy was supported by three complementary pieces of leg-
islation, i.e. the Native Authorities’ Ordinance No. 18 of 1927 (Cap. 111), the Forest 
Ordinance of 1927 (Cap. 157) and the Concessions Ordinance of 1939 (Cap. 136). Co-
lonial forest policy recognized the customary governing system of giving power to tra-
ditional authorities. With the consent of the traditional authorities, provisions were 
made to release stool lands to be constituted as forest reserves. Most of the demarcation 
and reservation processes took place between 1928 and 1939. According to Amanor 
(2005: 17), ‘the colonial forestry policy disempowered rural farmers to empower the 
state through the chiefs, by creating customary systems that vested land in paramount 
chiefs and facilitated expropriation of land for the creation of forest reserves’. Until 
then, land had been under the control of the town chiefs who consequently disputed 
these claims (Rathbone 1993, Addo-Fenning 1997). The ordinances of the 1920s and 
1930s gave traditional rulers the right to grant timber rights to commercial loggers, al-
beit with endorsement from the colonial legal system (court). Even though power and 
rights were given to the traditional authorities, the colonial rulers sought to gain control 
over natural resources. Colonisation through the native authorities gave them power 
over local communities in order to help foreign corporate access to land resources 
(Opoku 2006). These policies discouraged traditional subsistence activities and were 
intended to force communities into the cash economy away from the forest resources 
(Ibid.). Local communities were then forbidden to farm, fell trees or cause damage to 
trees in the forest except on the basis of permits endorsed by a Forest Officer (Agyeman 
et al. 2010).  
The year 1948 marked the start of an era in which the environmental perspective and 
its focus on forest protection shifted towards a utilitarian perspective with a focus on 
maximum productivity and value on the basis of sustained yield (Bilijo 2005.). The 
1948 forest policy document consisted of eight clauses but fell short of meeting the de-
sired objectives (Agyeman et al. 2010). During that period, timber exploitation was high 
on the political agenda and the period is therefore referred to as the ‘timberisation’ era 
(Kotey et al. 1998, Bilijo 2 005). The priority given to the timber industry resulted in 
immense cash income for the timber merchants and revenue for the state, but local peo-
ple’s NTFP livelihood base was destroyed by excessive logging. The new emphasis on 
timber production strengthened the British economy and met Europe’s post-war recon-
struction needs (Bilijo 2005). Furthermore, under the Forest Ordinance the royalties 
given to landowners were reduced from 70% to 40% because the colonial government 
shifted the burden of increased costs of reserve management to the landowners (Opoku 
2005). Nonetheless, when the Gold Coast attained independence and became the Re-
                                                 
3
  The Aborigines Rights Protection Society was formed in May 1897 by traditional leaders and the 
educated elite in Ghana society following the Crown Lands Bill of 1896 and the Lands Bill of 1897 
(Nti 2002). Kimble (1963: 330 cited in Nti 2002) attributes the historical roots of this organisation to 
(i) the chequered history of attempts to form associations among educated Africans, (ii) the growing 
tradition of protest against colonial government, (iii) the conscious revival of respect for national tra-
ditions, and (iv) a deep-rooted reverence for land as the foundation of community life. Colonial Gov-
ernment officials considered the Society as mere land speculators (Ibid.). 
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public of Ghana, the postcolonial government changed little in the structure and func-
tioning of forestry in Ghana and did little to curtail the power and privileges of the in-
dustry (Smith 1999 cited in Opoku 2005: 20). Instead it strengthened state control over 
local governance and natural resources (Sasu 2004).  
The Forestry and Wildlife policy of 1994 in Ghana marked a major paradigm shift 
towards collaboration and decentralisation initiatives in the sector during almost all of 
the past two decades. The period 1994-2011 is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
Table 5.1 outlines the timeline of different policies and legislations that have gov-
erned the allocation, use and management of forest resources, and the sanctions since 
scientific forestry was introduced in Ghana in the early 20
th
 century. 
 
 
Table 5.1    Timeline of Ghana’s colonial and post-colonial forest policies and legislations (1908-2011) 
1908-1948 
(40 Years in existence) 
1948-1993 
(44 years in existence) 
1994-2011 
(17 years in existence) 
Colonial period:  
Era of Protection 
Colonial and  
post-colonial period:  
Era of ‘Timberisation’ 
Post-colonial period:  
Era of pro-poor forest policy 
and emergence of governance 
Objectives of 1908 Forest 
policy: ‘Conserving a sufficient 
area of forest suitably distrib-
uted throughout the country in 
order to protect water supply, 
prevent erosion and to ensure 
the maintenance of the present 
climatic conditions existing in 
the high forest zone which are 
essential factors in the cultiva-
tion of cocoa, cola and other 
crops on which the prosperity of 
the colony largely depends.’ 
Objectives of 1948 Forest 
policy: ‘Management of forest 
reserves by methods which will 
achieve maximum production 
and value on the basis of sus-
tained yield.’ 
Objectives of 1994 Forest and 
Wildlife policy: ‘Manage and 
enhance a permanent estate of 
forest and wildlife resources; 
promote and develop viable and 
efficient forest-based industries;  
promote public awareness and 
involvement of rural people in 
forest management and conser-
vation; promote research-based 
and technology-led resource 
management and Develop insti-
tutional capacity at all levels.’ 
Legislative instruments 
*Native Authorities Ordinance 
No. 18 of 1927 (Cap. 111) - 
Established local government 
system with power being given 
to the paramount chief and his 
traditional council of elders. 
*Trees and Timber Ordinance 
No. 20 of 1949 (Cap. 158) – 
Responds to the regulatory 
needs of the fast-growing tim-
ber industry. 
Timber Resources Man-
agement Act, 1997 (Act 547) – 
Repealed the Concession Act of 
1962 (124) and provided for the 
granting of timber rights in a 
manner that secures the sustain-
able management and utilisation 
of timber resources. 
Forest Ordinance 1927 (Cap. 
157) – Constitution of forest 
reserves on (a) state land, (b) 
stool lands at the request of 
Native Authority, and (c) pri-
vate lands at the request of 
owners. 
*Local government ordinance 
(No. 51) – Repealed Cap. 111.  
**LI1649 Timber Resource 
Management regulation, 1998-
provided guidelines for the 
allocation and management of 
timber resources. 
*Concessions Ordinance 1939 
(Cap 136) – Regulated the 
granting of commercial timber 
rights by stool or ‘natives’ and 
endorsement by court through 
certificates of validity. 
*Forest Improvement Fund 
Act, 1960 (Act 12) – Deprived 
chiefs of their economic power 
by centralised collection and 
management of forest revenues. 
The Forestry Commission Act 
1999 (Act 571) – Repealed Act 
453 and re-established the For-
estry Commission as a semi-
autonomous corporate body. It 
also brought the forestry sector 
agencies under the FC.  
76 
 
 *Concessions Act, 1962 (124) – 
Vested all timber or tree rights 
in the state. 
Forest Plantation Development 
Fund Act, 2000(Act 583) – 
Consolidated the Forest Im-
provement Fund for the devel-
opment of private commercial 
plantations in the country. 
 Forest Protection Decree, 
(NRCD 243) – Defined forest 
offences and prescribed sanc-
tions and or penalties for such 
offences.  
Forest Plantation Development 
Fund (Amendment) Act, 
2002(Act 623) – Enabled both 
public and private plantation 
growers to participate in forest 
plantation development.  
 Trees and Timber Decree 1974 
(NRCD 273) – Extended For-
estry Department jurisdiction 
outside forest reserves. It also 
prescribed guidelines for par-
ticipation in the logging/timber 
industry and provided for the 
payment of fees and defined 
sanctions for non-compliance.  
The Forest protection 
(Amendment) Act 2002(Act 
624) – Repealed the forest pro-
tection (amendment) law of 
1986 (PNDCL 142) and in-
creased forest offences fines 
and introduced joint liability in 
the commitment and prosecu-
tion of forest offences. 
 
 
 *The Forest Protection 
(Amendment) law, 
1986(PNDCL 142): Increased 
the penalties/fines for forest 
offences.  
Timber Resources Man-
agement (Amendment) Act, 
2002 (Act 617) – Amended Act 
547 to exclude from its applica-
tion land with private forest 
plantation to establish a maxi-
mum duration and upper limit 
for the scale of operations for 
the total area under timber 
rights, and to provide incentives 
and benefits for investors in the 
forestry and wildlife sector.  
 *Ghana Forestry Commission 
Act, 1980 (Act 405) – Estab-
lished the Forestry Commission 
in line with the 1979 constitu-
tion. 
**LI1971-Timber Resources 
Management (Amendment) 
Regulations, 2003 – Amended 
LI1649 and established the 
basis for competitive bidding in 
timber resource allocation. 
 *Forestry Commission Act, 
1993 (Act 453) – Repealed Act 
405 and established the Forestry 
Commission as an advisory 
body. 
The 1994 Forest and Wildlife is 
under review since 2008.  
Note: There are 3 wildlife laws with 9 amendments (mainly gazetting Protected Areas and Resource Reserve 
governing the wildlife management in the Country (World Bank 2006) 
Key: * = These laws have been repealed; ** = These laws are subsidiary.  
 
Sources: Kotey et al. (1987), Opoku (2005), Bilijo (2005), Owusu (2005), Bamfo (2005) and Ghana forest policy and 
legislations documents available online at http://www.fcghana.org (accessed on 23 January 2010) 
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The governing system as a source of conflicts: A historical perspective 
Conflicts related to forest resources in Ghana took place in forest reserves and off-
reserve areas and across the different levels of geo-political scale in the country. These 
conflicts are multifaceted as they involve several actors such as farmers, timber opera-
tors, chainsaw operators, forest officers, and other interest groups. An insight into the 
historical background to some of these conflicts provides a basis for a better understand-
ing of the present situation. From a historical perspective, forest conflicts began in the 
era when forested lands were forcibly included in the forest reservation process. The 
buyout of the Forest Bill in 1911 led to another means of governing instrument termed 
‘Indirect Rule’ being used. The colonial government gave the chiefs the responsibility 
for native administration and therefore gave them power to control land, natural re-
sources and labour services. Under this new rule, chiefs were entitled to gazette forest 
reserves within a specific period of six months after prior notice had been given to the 
landowners (Amanor 2005, Agyeman et al. 2010). Whenever a chief failed to create the 
forest reserves, the colonial government intervened to ensure reservation. However, the 
regulations had created sufficient incentives for the chiefs to undertake the reservation 
process, as it enabled them to claim more lands and benefit from royalties. Local people 
lost out in the process as they were excluded from land that they could otherwise have 
used for agriculture or to negotiate concessions for the extraction of valuable timber 
resources (Amanor 2005: 17). Until then farmers in some parts of Ghana were entitled 
to sell a timber tree on their cleared land if they had permission from the local chief and 
they would then pay the chief part of the proceeds (Amanor 2005). According to Fran-
cois (1987), the colonial government failed to enter into a dialogue with the local com-
munities on how best to implement the reservation process and instead used force to 
achieve its objectives. As already mentioned, the local communities responded to this 
by rapidly converting forests into farmlands. As a consequence the reservation process 
and its governing instruments were fraught with conflicts right from the start. Personal 
communication with a retired forester revealed that most of the forest reserves consti-
tuted after 1952 were accompanied with reported conflicts incidences and offences be-
cause the reservation itself started life on the basis of misunderstandings and conflicts. 
He gave four reasons to support his assertion (Box 5.1).  
Another basis for conflict is the loss of negotiation rights on timber trees by the 
chiefs and landowners. Interestingly, the governing system that brought the traditional 
leaders into power as resource managers was also used to take away their right to nego-
tiate concessions on stool lands that had hitherto been under their jurisdiction. The 1962 
Concession Act assigned that power to the state. However, it could not take away the 
land rights since this move was fiercely opposed by the traditional leaders (Kotey et al. 
1998). Nonetheless, the poor demarcation and documentation of land rights became a 
source of forest conflict in itself. Even though colonial rulers did not contest the land 
ownership rights of the chiefs and other landowners, the Reserve Settlement Commis-
sion, which served as an arbitration platform, denied individual farmers the chance and 
choice to either dissent or commute their land rights into another form of interest 
(Ohene-Gyan 2004). Currently, many of the forest conflicts surrounding the expansion 
of admitted farms, for example, are still the result of this deficient tenure system. 
Illegal farming soon became prevalent after Ghana’s independence on 6 March 1957 
when several claims for admitted farms were made (England 1993, Ohene-Gyan 2004).  
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There was considerable pressure to release these farms and the government agreed to 
their exclusion from forest reserves. In a statement in the National Assembly on 10 July 
1957, the then Minister for Agriculture announced that all those who had already set up 
cocoa farms in forest reserves should be allowed to retain such farms after survey and 
demarcation (Hansard Cols.
4
 1874 and 1875). Thereafter the public was notified in Ga-
zette Notice (GN) 385 Gazette No. 16 of 20 February 1960. The notice set a time limit 
of three years from the date of the Minister’s announcement within which all claims by 
cocoa farmers were to be received by the Forestry Department of the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (Anonymous
5
 1985).  
The notice added that any claims for cocoa farms received after 9 July 1960 would 
not be admitted. Acting in this way reflected the government’s decision to recognise all 
hitherto illegal, unclaimed, and existing farms in forest reserves (Ibid.). Towards the end 
of the three-year grace period, large-scale clearing and farming took place in forest re-
serves. These illegal farms had to be recognised because they fell within the period of 
grace. This recognition of illegal farms on the orders of the government meant that ille-
gal farming de facto became legal in 1960. Farmers considered encroachment on re-
serves as a right since the illegal farms would eventually be given to them through the 
courts either after they had been sentenced to a fine or via a petition to the government. 
Considering the petty fines, illegal farming indeed became a lucrative investment. At-
tempts by the Forestry Department in 1969 to destroy illegal farms, especially in the 
Desiri forest reserve, were quickly stopped by order of the government and farmers 
gained the upper hand when it came to continuing illegal farming with vigour (England 
1993, Ohene-Gyan 2004). This indeed encouraged further encroachment into other re-
serves in the Western regions (England 1993). 
                                                 
4
  Hansards is the name of printed transcripts of parliamentary debates in the Westminster system of 
government that Ghana inherited from its colonial past. Cols. refers to Hansards reference, which are 
1874 and 1875.  
5
  The author is a former staff member of the Forestry Department, who preferred to remain anonymous.  
Box 5.1      Reasons underlying forest reservation conflicts 
  
 Since forestry was practised by technocrats and the policies vested the right 
to all timber trees in the State, the local people were alienated from natural 
resources. The technocratic policy flow did not allow for participation in for-
est management. In reality, timber tree tenure was exercised on the basis of 
strict protection which took land away from the people. 
 The cocoa frontier shifted from the Ashanti region to the Western region, 
turning cocoa into a prominent cash crop. As a consequence, land areas 
proposed for reservation were made subject to severe restrictions by the 
stool landowners who had an interest in cocoa cultivation.  
 The proposed period of reservation coincided with the nation’s struggle for 
independence and therefore contributed to the conflictive nature of the res-
ervation process.  
 When the colonial masters left, forest reservation was politicised among poli-
ticians who opposed to the reservation process. 
 
Source: K.K.F. Ghartey, retired forester, pers. comm, May 2009.  
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Amanor (2005: 20) recorded the genesis of off-reserve conflicts as being the expan-
sion of the concession system into farmlands. He reports on increasing conflicts be-
tween timber companies, chainsaw operators, farmers and the Forestry Department dur-
ing the 1980s and early 1990s, as the export timber companies encroached onto 
farmlands to fell timber trees, thereby causing extensive damage to farms and planta-
tions without being punished. Chainsaw operators who had been encouraged during the 
recession years
6
 now found their livelihoods threatened and their activities criminalised. 
Farmers deliberately destroyed timber trees on their land and prevented them from re-
generating to prevent concessionaires entering their farms. Those who maintained the 
trees were sometimes poorly compensated or not compensated at all for crops that were 
destroyed during the harvesting operations (Inkoom 1999, Marfo 2006). As conflicts 
and hostility mounted, especially towards the Forestry Department, the Collaborative 
Forest Management Unit (CFMU) was established in 1992 with the aim being to de-
velop a better relationship with local people. Despite the reform, the central issues of 
access and rights to timber on farmland were not addressed and are still not being ad-
dressed, with farmland conflicts between farmers and timber operators therefore con-
tinuing unabated (Marfo 2009, Agyeman et al. 2010).  
Another kind of forest conflict based on a recent law is linked to the illegal felling of 
timber as either logs or sawnwood. Illegal chainsaw operations have increased in Ghana 
despite the ban in 1998 as most people involved in these operations consider it as their 
main source of livelihood. In addition, chainsaw logging is the primary source of timber 
for the domestic market (Odoom 2005, Adam et al. 2007, Marfo & Acheampong 2011). 
Missed benefits from royalties, stumpage fees and social responsibility agreements be-
tween the timber companies and local communities, competing claims for timber and 
tree resources and the extraction of NTFP resources are all sources of conflicts associ-
ated with illegal logging (Chapter 8).  
Features of the current governing system 
This section addresses the question regarding the features that prevail in the forest gov-
ernance process in terms of diversity, complexity, scale and dynamics.  
Diversity in institutional structures: The governing actors 
Kooiman & Bavinck (2005) place actors into three categories, i.e. the state, market and 
civil society. Lemos & Agrawal (2006: 310) distinguish three social mechanisms 
through which interactions between these actors take place, i.e. public-private partner-
ships, co-management and private-social partnerships. Ros-Tonen et al. (2008) add civil 
society coalitions and NGO community partnerships to take account of civil society 
actors at levels of scale higher than the community. Considering the transitional nature 
of the Ghanaian governance process, a number of actors do not fit neatly into one
                                                 
6
  The timber industry in Ghana collapsed in the early 1980s, mainly due to the global recession in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The IMF intervened through a Structural Adjustment Plan, thereby pro-
moting the expansion of Ghana’s exports as a way to generate foreign exchange. The World Bank’s 
Export Rehabilitation Project of 1983-86 focused special attention on Ghana’s timber sector by re-
newing sawmills, modernising logging operations, rebuilding harbours and increasing timber exports 
(Glastra 1999). Based on this review, Glastra concludes: ‘The economy improved, but at the expense 
of Ghana’s forests’ (Ibid.: 59). 
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The arrow indicates a flow of interactions which may complement or conflict within and between governing 
structures  
* Exists among the Ashanti tribes in Ghana only. 
Acronyms in alphabetical order: AfDB = African Development Bank; AFD = French Development Agency; CBAGs = 
Community Biodiversity Advisory Groups, CFCs = Community Forest Committees, DANIDA = Danish International  
Development Agency; DfID = Department for International Development (UK), FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, FORIG = Forest Research Institute of Ghana, FRNR-KNUST = Faculty of Renewable Natural  
Resources of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, FSC = Forestry Stewardship Council, FSD = Forest 
Services Division, GTZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit; HIPC = Highly Indebted Poor  
Countries; ITTO = International Tropical Timber Organization; IUCN = International Union for the Conservation of Nature; 
JICA = Japan International cooperation Agency; MTS = Modified Taungya System, NGOs = Non-governmental  
organisations, NTFP = Non-timber forest products, SP = Salvage Permit, TBI = Tropenbos International; TIDD = Timber 
Industry Development Department, TUC = Timber Utilisation Contract, WD = Wildlife Division; UNFF = United Nations 
Forum on Forests; WUR = Wageningen University and Research Centre  
TRANSNATIONAL FOR-
MAL SUPPORTIVE 
STRUCTURE 
FAO, Royal Netherlands  
Embassy, World Bank, GTZ, 
ITTO, DfID, European  
Commission, UNFF, AFD, 
JICA, DANIDA AfDB,  
academic and research  
institutions (e.g. TBI, WUR, 
University of Amsterdam, 
Aberdeen university etc.) 
 KEY ACTORS IN FOREST GOVERNANCE, FOREST-RELATED LIVELIHOODS, CONFLICTS & 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT  
 
CUSTOMARY STRUCTURE 
 King (Ashantehene)* 
 Paramount Chief  
     (Omanhene/Obirempon ) 
 Divisional Chief (Ohene) 
 Sub divisional Chief  
     (Apakanhene) 
 Village Chief (Odikro) 
 Clan Head (Abusaupanyim) 
 Council of Elders  
     (Besuanfo) 
 Local communities  
 Households 
 
 
 
NATIONAL FORMAL  
SUPPORTIVE STRUC-
TURE  
 Academic (e.g. FRNR- 
      KNUST) 
 Research (e.g. FORIG) 
STATUTORY CATEGORY 
Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources 
 Forestry Commission  
        (FSD, WD, TIDD) 
 Administrator of Stool  
        Lands 
 District Assemblies 
 Police and Military 
 Judiciary 
 MoFEP 
 
 
HYBRID STRUCTURE 
 MTS Committees  
 CFCs 
 CBAGs 
 Fire Volunteer Squads 
 Unit Committees 
 Forest Forum 
 FSC  
CIVIL SOCIETY  
 National NGOs  
- Ghana Forest Watch 
- Rural Youth Organization 
-TBI Ghana etc. 
 International  
        NGOs/Brokers 
- IUCN 
- Care International  
- Tropenbos International  
   etc. 
 
MARKET  
 Legal timber operators  
- TUC or concession  
     holders 
- SP holders 
 Millers (legal) 
 Chainsaw millers /  
        loggers  
 Wood processors 
 Lumber sellers 
 Investors in commer- 
        cial timber plantations 
 Individual tree growers 
 NTFP traders (plant  
        related) 
 Bushmeat traders 
 
 
Figure 5.1     The governing structures in forest governance process in Ghana forestry sector 
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specific category. Most previous studies on actors in the Ghanaian forest sector have 
placed actors under either the state, civil society or the private sector or have catego-
rised them under primary, secondary and tertiary levels (Owusu 2009, Mayers & Kotey 
1996, Kotey et al. 1998). This study introduces a new governing structure termed the 
hybrid-governing mode. In this mode, actor constellations are mostly formed through 
the integration of two or more of the governing structures (see Figure 5.1). It is essential 
to delineate this mode from the other five categories because actors ‘are often con-
strained or enabled in their actions by structures’ (Bavinck et al. 2005: 29). 
The hybrid mode facilitates their continuous changing from one governing mode to 
another
7
and their ability to operate at different levels of scale while being positioned at 
one geopolitical level. The proposal is therefore to arrange actors into six main catego-
ries: (i) actors in the formal/statutory governing structure (ii) actors in the traditional or 
customary category, (iii) actors in the market category, (iv) actors in the civil society 
category, (v) actors in the international community, and (vi) actors in the hybrid cate-
gory. The local communities under the traditional governing structure and the various 
actor groups under the market governing structure in Figure 5.1 were discussed in Chap-
ter 4 as they were considered to be direct forest users. The actor categorisation pre-
sented in Chapter 2, guided the choices regarding the actor constellations in the various 
categories based on their roles and interests.  
– Actors in the statutory governing structure 
In this study, actors that are legally mandated to manage the forest and tree resources 
are termed ‘forest governors’. These include the Ministry of Lands and Natural Re-
                                                 
7
  In this respect the concept of hybrid governing structure is more dynamic than the notion of neo-
African governance proposed by Siloma & Zaal (2005) which refers to hybrid governance forms in 
which formal governing bodies, traditional leadership structures and non-governmental and commu-
nity-based organisations amalgamate. 
 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) 
Timber Industry  
Development Division 
Wood Industry 
Training Centre 
(WITC) 
Forestry Commission 
(FC) 
Forest Services Division 
(FSD) 
Resource Management 
Support Centre 
(RMSC) – Technical 
and Research Wing of 
the FC 
Wildlife Division (WD) 
Regional level FSD 
District level FSD 
Figure 5.2     Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and Forestry Commission 
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sources (MLNR), which is responsible for designing appropriate governance principles 
and guidelines enshrined in policy and laws, as well as for monitoring and directing the 
policies. Under the MLNR the two most important institutions with regard to forest and 
tree-related resources are the Forestry Commission (FC) and the Administrator of Stool 
Lands (Figure 5.1). The FC has three key divisions, namely the Forest Services Division 
(FSD), the Wildlife Division (WD) and the Timber Industry Development Division 
(TIDD), and a technical and research wing known as the Resource Management Sup-
port Centre (RMSC). The FC’s responsibilities include ensuring effective implementa-
tion of the policies, laws and effecting management goals related to sustainable forest 
and wildlife management and development of the timber industry (see Figure 5.2 for the 
structure of the mandated institutions indicating the study respondents in shades). 
The Administrator of Stool Lands – established by the 1992 Constitution and 1994 
Stool Lands Act (Act 481) – is in charge of the management of stool lands on behalf of 
the communal landowners
8
 as well as the disbursement of royalties to the respective 
beneficiaries. In addition to the forest governors, other relevant actors in the statutory 
category are those in charge of forest law enforcement, being the District Assemblies, 
the Ghana Police Service, Military and the Judiciary. The District Assemblies form the 
local arm of the government at the district levels. Although not directly law enforcement 
bodies, they have the mandate to enact byelaws that govern against environmental de-
struction. As stated in the Ghana Police Service Act of 1970 [Act 350] the functions of 
the Ghana Police Service are: (i) crime detection and prevention, (ii) apprehension (ar-
rest) and prosecution of offenders, (iii) maintenance of law and order, and (iv) due en-
forcement of the law. With respect to the prevalence of illegal forest activities, the mili-
tary have been involved in the monitoring of illegal timber operations in Ghana and 
therefore in collaborating with the police and the FC to form a task force. The judiciary 
is the third arm of government (the other two are the executive and the legislature), 
autonomous and vested with the judicial power of the nation. It has the sole responsibil-
ity for interpreting the constitution and laws, administering justice and providing other 
related services (see Chapter 11 for a more detailed discussion of the three key forest 
law enforcement agencies – the police, FC and the judiciary). 
The Natural Resources and Environmental Governance programme (NREG) has fo-
cused attention on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) as an im-
portant actor in terms of control and management of finances in the forest sector (World 
Bank 2006). There are other actors which are closely related to the formal/statutory 
structure but which are not officially part of it. At national level these include organisa-
tions supporting forestry development, research and capacity building, such as academic 
institutions (e.g. the Faculty of Renewable Natural Resources (FRNR) at Kwame 
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology – KNUST) and research institutions 
(e.g. the Forestry Research Institute of Ghana – FORIG).  
– Actors in the traditional or customary governing structure 
The traditional or customary governing structure consists of communities and custom-
ary institutions. The customary governing structure has different levels of hierarchy. 
The village chief (locally called Odikro, which literally means ‘caretaker of the village’) 
resides near the forest resources, even though he is not the landowner. The Odikro is 
normally appointed caretaker chief at village level by the divisional chief (Ohene) under 
                                                 
8
  URL: http://www.ghanalap.gov.gh/index1.php?linkid=88 accessed on 23 January 2010. 
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whose jurisdiction a number of Odikros serve. In turn, the Ohene serves under the head 
of the traditional state (oman), the paramount chief (Omanhene or Obirempon)
9
 (May-
ers & Kotey 1996, Kasanga 2003, Kendie & Guri 2006). Prevailing only among the 
Ashanti tribes is a king who rules over a kingdom called the Ashantehene who resides 
over the Golden stool and is therefore the owner of the stool lands within the Kingdom.  
Traditional councils are bodies created around a paramount chief and consist of 
stools and chiefs. The traditional councils, based on a combination of statutory and cus-
tomary law, often hold the landholding authority in the High Forest Zone (Mayers & 
Kotey 1996). In Ghana, 78% of the land is in the hands of customary landholders (Sasu 
2004). An important traditional authority in this respect is the stool. The stool (or in 
Northern Ghana, the skin) is the symbol of chieftaincy at all levels. In statutory law, a 
stool (or skin) is defined as any person or body of persons having control over commu-
nity land, including family land, as a representative of a particular community (Kasanga 
2003). The stool can only hold land in trust for communal landowners but has no say in 
the management of forest resources, which fall under the jurisdiction of the FC. The 
management of stool lands is in the hands of the Administrators of Stool Lands, which 
body is part of the formal/statutory governing structure.  
– Actors in the civil society governing structure  
The civil society governing structure in the forestry sector consists of national and in-
ternational environmental organisations as well as NGOs that contribute to capacity 
building, forest restoration, ensuring legality and advocate for policy reforms. Examples 
of national organisations engaged in advocacy include Forest Watch Ghana (FWG) and 
the Rural Youth Development Association (RUDEYA) for grassroots community de-
velopment. The international NGOs in this arena include Tropenbos International 
Ghana for research and capacity development, Care International for humanitarian aid 
and the International Union of Conservation and Nature (IUCN), which often serves as 
a ‘broker’. Tropenbos International (Ghana) plays a dual role in both academic research 
and influencing policy reforms in the civil society arena and was therefore placed both 
under the international supportive structure and under civil society in Figure 5.1. 
– Actors in the hybrid governing structure  
This study identifies three actor groups in the hybrid governing structure. The first one 
can be found at community level and is a blend of statutory and customary influences. 
The reason for this is that the formal sector (notably the FC) engages people from the 
traditional/local governing structure in its own governing structures. Specific examples 
are (i) the Modified Taungya System (MTS) farmers, (ii) Community Forest Commit-
tees (CFCs), (iii) Community Biodiversity Advisory Groups (CBAGs), (iv) Fire Volun-
teers Squads and (v) Unit Committees. Mayers and Kotey (1996), Kasanga (2003) and 
the World Bank (2006) clearly spell out the different mandates these local governing 
structures play. The MTS farmers are engaged in a co-management arrangement with 
the FC, under which they are allocated rights to plant crops in reforestation schemes in 
return for tending the tree seedlings and saplings and a share in the proceeds. Communi-
ties are empowered to participate in forest resource management by acting as social 
fences in the protection of Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas within forest re-
                                                 
9
  The female counterparts of the Omanhene and Ohene are referred to as Ohemaa (queen mother) 
whereas the female counterpart of the Odikro is the Obaapanyin. The latter can be the chief’s mother, 
his mother’s sister, sister, a mother’s sister’s daughter or a sister’s daughter (Kendie & Guri 2006). 
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serves through their participation in CBAGs. They also engage in preventing and com-
bating wild fires through their participation in Volunteers Squads and by stimulating 
local development based on communal labour and village fundraising to build schools, 
clinics, wells and latrines through their participation in Unit Committees.  
The second group is the Forestry Forum.
10
 Within the context of Ghana, the forestry 
forums have been established to engage different actors (i.e. state agencies such as the 
FSD, local government, MOFA, etc.), the private sector (i.e. timber loggers, millers, 
timber traders, chainsaw operators etc.) and civil society (i.e. communities, traditional 
leaders, NGOs, CBOs etc.) in dialogue on forestry issues on a common platform. Cur-
rently, there are district, regional and national forums with a national secretariat in Ku-
masi. When together, these actor groups try to find common ground and share a com-
mon vision, but each has its own objectives that it wishes to achieve. As a consequence, 
depending on the platform, they may have different ways of expressing themselves ei-
ther for their individual group or as a collective body with a common ‘voice’ to pursue 
an agenda.  
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is the third group and could also be consid-
ered part of the hybrid sector in the sense that it consists of representatives of both the 
market governing structure (representatives of the timber industry) and the civil society 
governing structure (environmental and social organisations). The literature is not clear 
about this. Some consider FSC as a form of private governance (e.g. Pattberg 2005), 
whereas others indeed classify it as hybrid governance (e.g. Gulbrandsen 2004.). How-
ever, the blend of market and civil society elements means these are regarded here as 
being hybrid.  
– Actors from the transnational arena 
Actors that are closely related to almost all the five national governing structures men-
tioned above ‒ the formal/statutory, customary, civil society, market governing, and the 
hybrid governing structures – are those from the international arena that sponsor and 
support forestry development through institutional strengthening and policy planning, 
research and capacity development (i.e. both human and logistics). As shown under the 
International formal supportive structure in Figure 5.1, some of these foreign govern-
mental, inter-governmental, development, and multilateral partners include the UK De-
partment for International Development (DFID), the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), the Royal Netherlands Embassy, the African Develop-
ment Bank, and the World Bank. International academic and research organisations 
(e.g. Waginingen University, the University of Aberdeen, the University of Amsterdam 
and Tropenbos International etc.) also fall into this category. 
Complexity 
The diversity of actors outlined in the previous section and their conflicting roles con-
tribute to forest conflicts. Most of their interactions are discussed in later chapters in 
which the case studies are presented. This section discusses the forest governors’ and 
experts’ views of the complexity of the relations between the actors in the governing 
system. In order to know whether actors’ actions or inactions contribute to forest con-
flicts, the forest governors and experts involved in the survey and interviews were asked 
                                                 
10
  The forum concept was initiated by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) under 
the second Forest Sector Development Project (FSDP II) and expanded by the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) under the FAO/NFP facility. 
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about forest actor’s roles that undermine the governing system. Their responses are pre-
sented in Box 5.2 and clearly illustrate the challenges that forest management and the 
governance process are facing. Each actor’s actions or inactions while performingtheir 
roles and duties could be a source of conflicts ranging from policy implementation to 
inequity in resource access.  
Scale  
On paper Ghana is one of the most decentralised countries in West Africa. The political 
and administrative decentralisation came into full operation during the enactment of the 
nation’s constitution in 1992 (Constitution of Ghana 1992, Kpessa 2011). Similarly, the 
forestry sector has a decentralised structure since it has forty-six (46) forest districts 
across the ten regions of Ghana. However, re-echoing Sasu (2004) in practice decen-
tralisation may not exist or may be in its ‘infant’ stage. Although forest decentralisation 
policies are well developed in Ghana, the decentralisation process has suffered because 
of the central government’s reluctance to decentralise key revenue-generating sectors 
such as forestry and mining (Sasu 2004). 
The weakness of the forestry decentralisation process was that it was driven by the 
Forestry Commission, which has its own centralisation agenda. According to Amanor 
(2005), the Forestry Commission’s resistance to decentralisation resulted in it establish-
ing its own form of collaborative forest management
11
 as a form of ‘centralised’ decen-
tralisation. However, this only allows rural people to participate in the Forestry Com-
mission’s agenda, rather than to set their own agendas (Ibid.: 21).  
Until the late 1990s, local communities and other stakeholders were barely involved 
in forest management. Although the decentralisation policies devolved a number of key 
functions and decision-making processes to the District Forestry Office, implementation 
of the decentralisation process in terms of involvement of civil society, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) has been 
slow (Sasu 2004). There is therefore a clear indication that the implementation of decen-
tralisation as a governance reform is a challenge. The forest sector’s ‘incapacity to im-
plement’ was also identified as a problem by the World Bank (2006).  
In spite of the lack of a clear decentralisation pathway in the forest sector and legisla-
tive backing for collaborative resource management, some of the community forest 
management programmes have created avenues for participation and opened up oppor-
tunities to consider community grievances in policy formulation. Some of these collabo-
rations and partnerships between local communities and other stakeholders are compiled 
in Box 5.3. As was noted earlier in this chapter, several of these collaborations belong to 
the hybrid governing structure, which allows the actors to operate across different levels 
of scale. 
 
                                                 
11
  Here the author referred to the establishment of Community Forestry Committees (CFCs) and Cus-
tomer Services Centres. The customer services centres were piloted in some forest districts across the 
country under the second Forest Sector Development Project (FSDP II). The customer services offi-
cers are responsible for educating the local communities and implementing community level projects. 
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Box 5.2   Actions and inactions of forest actors that hamper the governing 
 system as perceived by forest governors and experts 
 
Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources  
 Formulates policies that do not take the interests of some of the actors into 
consideration. 
 Interferes with forest implementation activities. 
 Formulates policies that enmesh with ambiguous tenure systems.  
 Is unclear as regards policy implementation. 
Forestry Commission 
 Circumvents policy on tenure systems. 
 Implements policies that are not in balance with stakeholders’ interests. 
 Implements policies and regulations in a non-transparent way. 
 Interferes with operations instead of decentralising authorities to the Divisions 
with a clear chain of command. 
Forest Services Division 
 Some compromise their integrity by conniving with forest operators on illegal 
activities. 
 Fail to enforce existing laws. 
 Engage in poor forest management planning and implementation through igno-
rance of legislative rights of stakeholders, which results in conflicts. 
 Have a more timber-oriented focus  
Judiciary  
 Biased adjudication of justice in forest-related cases (corruption, poor interpreta-
tion of the law). 
 A lack of interest in forest and tree cases. 
Police /Military 
 Some compromise their integrity. 
 Only partially enforce laws. 
 Tend to overuse force to implement regulations.  
 Are biased against some actors. 
 Collect bribes and take sides in forest offence cases  
Forest fringe communities and the various community-based organisations 
 Competing interests in forest/tree resource use and forestlands. 
 Connive with some forest offenders with a view to engaging in illegal harvesting 
and farming. 
 Often take the law into their own hands when they disagree with one or more 
actors. 
  
(continues) 
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(cont’d) 
 
Formal timber operators (on and off-reserve TUC holders) 
 Destroy farms and disregard local norms and cultures. 
 Obtain their source of raw materials from legal sources but do not sell the 
obligatory 20% on the local market. 
 Disregard the terms and conditions of contracts and do not comply to the log-
ging standards. 
 Sometimes refuse to comply with social responsibility agreements (SRAs). 
 Fell more trees than officially allocated. 
Lumber sellers  
 Finance illegal chainsaw operators and instigate people against FC staff or 
police. 
 Obtain lumber from illegal sources and refuse to disclose sources and suppli-
ers.  
Chainsaw millers  
 Connive with farmers, the FSD and the police to harvest and transport prod-
ucts to clients. 
 Destroy trees and farms with crops without compensation.  
 Employ some members of the community to carry the lumber and give money 
to some leaders in the community. 
Traditional leaders  
 Some leaders at community level connive with illegal operators/millers.  
 Most stool land chiefs keep royalties or funds from forest resources for them-
selves.  
NGOs (national and international) 
 Lobby for resource benefits outside prevailing laws. 
 Fail to educate stakeholders on forest-related laws. 
 Instigate confrontation between resource managers and communities. 
District Assemblies  
 Fail to use some of the royalties for social development at the site where log-
ging takes place. 
 Are not transparent in managing funds from forest resources. 
Academic institution (Faculty of Renewable Natural Resources) 
 Do not incorporate conflict management techniques in conventional training of 
resource managers. 
Transnational community 
 Short-term interventions which do not often results in achieving interventions 
goals.  
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Dynamics: new trends in forest governance  
Forest governance has become one of the pivot points in sustainable forest management 
efforts in developing countries and Ghana is no exception. In the face of overlapping 
drivers which undermine sustainable forest management, and taking into consideration 
the benefits of forests to the Ghanaian economy and the world at large, the Ghana gov-
ernment puts forest governance high on its development agenda. International donors, 
civil society and the private sector have been supportive of this move. Several initiatives 
have been and are being taken by both state and non-state institutions to mitigate the 
menace by the turn of the millennium (Box 5.4).  
Box 5.3 Several collaboration initiatives between local communities  
 and other stakeholders 
 
 
The Modified Taungya System (MTS). The MTS is an agroforestry system that was 
introduced in Ghana in 2002 in a bid to support both rural livelihoods and address 
Ghana’s deforestation problem. It is an adapted version of the old taungya system, 
which was suspended in 1984 partly due to a lack of farmers’ support for it. Under the 
MTS, farmers receive land to grow food crops alongside the planted timber trees 
during the early years of plantation development (Ledger et al., 2010). This form of 
co-management is a major source of both cash and non-cash income to some forest 
fringe communities (see Insaidoo et al., submitted). However, there are several chal-
lenges such as uncertainty about the continuity of the scheme (see Chapter 8). 
 
Boundary cleaning. This is an agreement between the FSD and members of the 
Community Forestry Committees and Community Biodiversity Advisory Groups) for 
cleaning forest reserve boundaries in exchange for wages.  
 
The National Forestry Forum (NFF). The forestry forums have been established to 
engage different stakeholders from the actor groups in forest governance (i.e. the 
state (FSD, local government, MOFA, etc.), the private sector (i.e. timber loggers, 
millers, timber traders, chainsaw operators etc.), and civil society (i.e. communities, 
traditional leaders, NGOs, CBOs, etc.) in dialogue on forestry issues on a common 
platform. Currently, there are district, regional and national forums with a national 
secretariat based in Kumasi.  
 
Community Biodiversity Advisory Groups. The Forestry Commission created the 
CBAG during the creation of the Globally Significant Biodiversity Areas (GBSAs) with 
a view to getting community assistance in the management of the protected area. It is 
composed of representatives of several stakeholder groupings at village level (i.e. the 
Unit Committee, youth, women, traditional leaders, etc.). The CBAGs assist in clear-
ing the GSBA boundaries and serve as a mouthpiece for the community in GSBA 
matters. 
 
Community Forestry Committees (CFCs). Like the CBAGs, the CFCs were estab-
lished to serve as a channel through which the FSD could implement its collaborative 
forest management activities.  
 
Commercial timber plantations: Large-scale plantation development within degrad-
ed forest reserves with a land lease between the FC, a private investor and the stool 
landowners signed before plantation establishment. Associated with this partnership 
is the benefit sharing agreement as discussed in Box 5.5.  
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The Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) initiatives initiated as part of the EU’s 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) process aim to tackle the 
global problem of illegal logging and the associated trade in illegally produced timber 
products as well as providing social safeguards for affected persons (see Insaidoo et al. 
forthcoming, for an elaboration on social safeguards in the Ghana-EU VPA process). 
Ghana signed and ratified the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the Euro-
pean Union in 2009 in a quest to increase the commitment of timber- producing coun-
tries to sustainable forest management by supporting forest law enforcement and gov-
ernance (Bodegom 2009, Beeko & Arts 2010, Owusu et al. 2010, Ramcilovic-
Suominen et al. 2010). Article 17 of the agreement on social safeguards states that ‘in 
order to minimize possible adverse impacts, the parties agree to develop a better under-
standing of the livelihoods of potentially affected indigenous and local communities as 
well as the timber industry, including those engaged in illegal logging’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AC-FLEGT = EU = European Union; FAO-nfp = UN Food and Agricultural 
Organization-national forest programme; FC = Forestry Commission; FIP = 
Forest Investment Programme; FLEGT = Forest Law Enforcement, Govern-
ance and Trade; FORIG = Forestry Institute of Ghana; GIRAF = Governance 
Initiative for Rights and Accountability in Forest Management; IUCN = Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Nature; KASA = civil society sector 
support mechanism in the natural resource and environment sector; NFDP = 
National Forest Development Plan; NLBI = Non-Legally Binding Instrument; 
NREG = ; REDD+ = Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degrada-
tion plus; VPA = Voluntary Partnership Agreement; WD = Wildlife Division of 
the FC 
 
* Is an NGO collaborating with the WD to improve the livelihoods of inhabit-
ants around protected forest areas using microcredit as a tool to reduce pov-
erty.  
 
Source: Adapted from FC website, Terry Green cited in Rozemeijer & 
Wiersum 2009. 
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Box 5.4 The myriad of ongoing forest governance initiatives  
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The VPA clearly envisages that the implementation process is likely to affect actors 
who depend on forest resources for their livelihoods through illegal means, but it is not 
clear about how it interprets social safeguards. An international workshop was therefore 
held in 2010 as part of the ‘Illegal or incompatible?’ project12 to address this gap. Six 
mechanisms were identified during this workshop, namely: (i) legal security for forest 
users; (ii) soft law enforcement (meaning creating incentives for people to adapt in the 
long term); (iii) benefit sharing and compensation; (iv) capacity building; (v) alternative 
livelihoods and employment; and (vi) expansion of the forest resource base (IOI Project 
team, 2010). These mechanisms are the outcome of two interpretations of the VPA. One 
prevails among the state and the formal timber industry and can be qualified as ‘com-
mand-and-control’ law enforcement. The other prevails among civil society organisa-
tions and the small-scale timber industry, which prefer to see the VPA as a multi-
stakeholder process based on equitable access and control over forests and benefits 
(Ibid.). 
The multi-donor sector budget support through the Natural Resources and Environ-
mental Governance (NREG) programme aims to increase the contribution by the natural 
resource sectors (particularly forestry, wildlife, and mining) and the environmental sec-
tors (such as the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA) to Ghana’s socio-economic 
development. The NREG programme ensures that all stakeholders share responsibilities 
for sustainable natural resource management and environmental protection and en-
hancement. The NREG programme provides annual budget support to sustain the im-
plementation of the reforms planned by the government in the areas of natural resource 
and environmental governance (FC 2008).  
Another remarkable initiative is the United Nations Forum on Forests’ (UNFF) non-
legally binding instrument (NLBI) that Ghana adopted in 2008. The NLBI is intended to 
promote sustainable forest management and thereby maintain and enhance the eco-
nomic, social and environmental values of forests. One of the expected outcomes of the 
Ghana NLBI project is to ensure that ‘progress in the implementation is monitored and 
lessons learned, documented and shared’ (FORIG 2010). Of the 24 NLBI national pol-
icy measures, stakeholders in Ghana prioritised four key issues for the achievement of 
sustainable forest management in the country. These are (i) to promote cross-sectoral 
coordination for sustainable forest management, (ii) to strengthen law enforcement, (iii) 
to develop effective financial strategies for sustainable forest management, and (iv) to 
develop and implement the National Forest Programme and ensure its integration into 
the national development programmes (e.g. Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy – GPRS) 
(Ibid.).  
Another initiative includes the partnership between Ghana and the national forest 
programme (NFP) facility of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) in Rome, Italy. This partnership is in favour of (i) developing the National Forest 
Forum and making it operational at national and regional levels, (ii) removing block-
ages to, and support the effective operation of, Collaborative Forest Management, and 
(iii) promoting the implementation of the modified taungya system to reforest degraded 
forest reserves (see http://www.nfp-facility.org). 
                                                 
12
  The ‘Illegal or Incompatible?’ research project was funded by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) and is a partnership between Wage-
ningen University and Research Centre, Tropenbos International and research organisations in Ghana 
and Indonesia. 
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With a view to promoting the sustainable management of Ghana’s forests, the FC has 
engaged itself internationally with the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Deg-
radation Plus (REDD+)
13
 and the Forest Investment Project (FIP) initiatives designed to 
use market incentives to encourage forest conservation and mitigate climate change. In 
addition, there is the National Forest Plantation Development Programme (NFDP). 
Some key projects initiated by non-state institutions to improve the forest governance 
process include ‘the strengthening voices for better choices (SVBC) in Ghana initiated 
by the International Union for conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the Tropen-
bos/FORIG/FC Chainsaw milling project by Tropenbos International Ghana.
14
 From the 
research arena, the Forestry Research Institute of Ghana (FORIG) is also involved in 
climate change mitigation projects, which are all oriented around sustainable forest 
management.  
Third order governance 
Third order governance, or meta-governance, encompasses the principles underlying 
forest governance (Kooiman et al. 2005). In the following sub-sections, the principles 
underlying Ghana’s forest governance and conflict management are first analysed, inso-
far as they are based on international agreements. Next, the analysis shifts to the percep-
tions of forest governors and experts regarding the underlying principles, which 
emerged from the survey and validation workshop. 
Principles underlying Ghana’s forest governance and conflict management  
For the past six decades, global concerns about tropical forests have brought forest 
management issues to the forefront of many environmental debates, especially after the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 
1992, which led to the concept of sustainability featuring prominently on the interna-
tional agenda (Adams 2009).  
The concept of sustainability in forestry received international attention in the ‘Forest 
Principles’15 and in Chapter 11 on combating deforestation in Agenda 21, both adopted 
at UNCED (Ros-Tonen et al. 2005). Although the Forest Principles were not a legally 
binding contract, they reflect a global commitment to forest conservation, reforestation, 
and sustainable forest management, acknowledging the social, economic, ecological, 
cultural and spiritual needs of present and future generations (UN 1992). One of the first 
‘post-Rio’ moves was to promote the development and use of criteria and indicators for 
sustainable forest management, for which the International Tropical Timber Organisa-
tion (ITTO) had laid the foundation by developing the first set of criteria and indicators 
                                                 
13
  REDD-plus is an initiative to create a set of financial mechanisms to reduce carbon gas emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation with the plus referring to additional benefits, including the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (see 
http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/Default.aspx, accessed on 14 September 2011). 
14
  According to the TBI website, ‘The chainsaw milling project is using multi-stakeholder dialogue 
(MSD) as the key mechanism for developing a consensus based action plan to address the problems 
associated with chainsaw milling. This MSD is fuelled with sound information to facilitate good deci-
sion making. Outcomes from this multi-stakeholder process are piloted in ten communities in Ghana.’ 
  (http://www.tropenbos.org/projects/securing+legal+domestic+lumber+supply+through+multi-
stakeholder+dialogue+in+ghana, accessed on 14 September 2011). 
15
  The Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Man-
agement, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Forest Types. 
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for the sustainable management of natural tropical forest just before the summit. A spe-
cific set of criteria and indicators was developed for Africa by the African Timber Or-
ganisation in 2003 (ATO/ITTO 2003). 
Table 5.2 summarises several international forest management initiatives before and 
after the Rio Earth Summit which were all intended to improve forest governance at 
global and national levels in order to ensure sustainable forest management and which 
have influenced the principles underlying Ghana’s forest policies. Some of the princi-
ples that come to the fore include sustainable management, biodiversity conservation, 
the recognition of customary rights, and stakeholder involvement. As Braatz (2003)  
 
Table 5.2 Timeline of major events in the global forest policy dialogue  
Date Pre-Rio Earth Summit 
1948 IUCN is formed to promote international cooperation for nature conservation. 
1972 The UN Stockholm Conference highlights threats to the biosphere, including stratospheric 
ozone depletion, deforestation, desertification, and biodiversity loss. 
1982 The Brundtland Commission Report requires sustainable development to meet the needs of 
current generations without compromising the needs of future generations. 
1985 The Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP) process was initiated by FAO/UNDP, the World 
Bank, and the World Resources Institute (WRI) in an effort to establish national programmes 
for sustainable forest utilisation. 
1986 The International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) is established. In 1994 ITTO agrees to 
ensure that all tropical timber exports would come emanate from sustainably managed forests 
by 2000. 
1991 The World Bank issued the Forest Policy Paper which stresses the need for sustainable conser-
vation-oriented forestry responsive to local communities. 
Date The Earth Summit  
1992 The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro addresses 
global environmental problems. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was 
created to implement Agenda 21, including the Forest Principles in Chapter 26 which address 
the role of local communities, indigenous people and other stakeholders.  
Date Post-Rio 
1993 The ITTO adopts the Guidelines on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical Pro-
duction Forests which call for biodiversity conservation in production forests while acknowl-
edging the need for consultation with local people and the need to respect their tenure rights 
and rights to benefits from biodiversity.  
1993 The Forest Stewardship Council (FCS) is established. FSC Principles and Criteria are adopted 
in 1994 and recognise the legal and customary rights to indigenous people to own and manage 
their forests. 
1994 Launching of the World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development (WCFSD) to 
develop a global vision for forests in the twenty-first century. The WCFSD seeks to achieve 
policy reforms by reconciling economic and environmental objectives for sustainable manage-
ment of global forests. 
1995 The Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) is initiated by the CSD to seek a global consen-
sus for action supportive of participation and sustainable forest management. 
2003 ATO
16
/ITTO initiates national level principles, criteria and indicators and three forest manage-
ment unit level principles with criteria and indicators, with all these being intended to ensure 
sustainable forest utilisation and the maintenance of multiple functions of forests: ecological, 
economic and social wellbeing of society. 
2007 The United Nations Forum on Forests’ (UNFF) non legally binding instrument is launched to 
reduce deforestation and degradation, to enhance sustainable forest management in member 
countries and to maintain and enhance economic, social and environmental values of all types 
of forests for the benefit of present and future generations.  
Source: World Conservation Union (IUCN, 1996), ATO/ITTO (2003), FORIG (2010). 
                                                 
16
  ATO = African Timber Organisation. 
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noted, the complexities resulting from the proliferation of international agreements, in-
struments and conventions, as well as the bodies that deal with various aspects of forests 
pose a challenge, namely how to set coherent policies and coordinate action effectively. 
Efforts to find synergies among international forest-related instruments are being hin-
dered as it is still unclear (i) what legal, financial, and institutional modalities for forest 
governance would best facilitate progress toward sustainable forest management and 
help achieve national and international sustainable development priorities, (ii) where 
and how the necessary resources (financial, human, and technological) can be secured, 
and (iii) how governance structures and processes can be strengthened in countries so 
that they can effectively support sustainable forest management (Ibid. 2003).  
Since Ghana is a signatory to all of these conventions and a member of several inter-
national organisations, the nation is obliged to fulfil the objectives of these bodies. Sev-
eral international principles have therefore shaped most of the governing instruments 
that guide Ghana’s forest sector, such as the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy, opera-
tional strategies (i.e. the manual of procedures in timber harvesting and guidelines to 
distribute forest resource benefits) and governance initiatives such as Non-Legally 
Binding Instrument (NLBI) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degrada-
tion Plus (REDD+) (FC-FAO n.d.). The Forest and Wildlife Policy (FWP) of 1994, 
which represented an attempt to project the general societal concerns about the coun-
try’s forests, specifies the principles on rights of local access to basic natural resources, 
local democracy, participatory management and protection of forest and wildlife re-
sources. 
Governors’ and experts’ perceptions of principles at the national level 
The focus of the survey, interviews and the workshop was on guiding principles such as 
effectiveness, legitimacy and moral responsibility (c.f. Kooiman & Bavinck 2005). In 
terms of substantial values, the respondents highlighted the following issues as being 
relevant:
17
 
 
 The protection of community rights and norms; 
 Transparency; 
 Accountability;  
 Effective dialogue;  
 The inclusion of actors in decision making;  
 Conciliatory negotiations;  
 Respect for legal pluralism by institutionalising and strengthening traditional laws as 
a part of forest management; 
 Adherence to the rule of law. 
                                                 
17
  In addition to the principles listed here, some respondents also referred to adherence to policy docu-
ments such as the Ghana FC’s logging manual of procedures and the VPA between Ghana and the EU 
to combat illegal logging. These answers have been summarised under the heading ‘adherence to the 
rule of law’. 
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Figure 5.3 arranges the principles mentioned by the respondents and workshop partici-
pants in accordance with the features of good governance as proposed by UNESCAP.
18
 
 
Second order governance: Institutional arrangements 
This section first reviews the current forest policies and regulations under statutory law 
that determine existing institutional arrangements and then reviews the institutional ar-
rangements under customary law.  
Statutory law: current policies and legislations and tree tenure arrangements 
International forest policy processes such as the Rio declaration, Agenda 21 and other 
conventions had a direct influence on the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy of Ghana 
(FWP 1994) aimed at ‘conservation and sustainable development of forest and wildlife 
resources for the maintenance of environmental quality and the perpetual flow of opti-
mum benefits to all segment of society’ (FC website). Based on the general prin- 
  
                                                 
18
  URL: http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp, accessed on 
April 2010. 
Figure 5.3     Principles underlying interactive forest governance in Ghana  
 
Effective and efficient 
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District, Regional and National 
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Effective dialogue; easy access 
to information for all 
Transparent 
Actors’ roles, rights, re-
sponsibilities and benefits 
clearly known 
 
Equitable and inclu-
sive Empowerment of 
marginalised actors 
Follows the rule of law 
Constitute a legally recognised 
interactive governance commit-
tee/body; strengthen institutions 
responsible for law enforcement 
 
Participatory 
Inclusion of all actors in 
decision making 
 
 
Responsive 
 Adopt new forest 
policies to meet 
contemporary chal-
lenges 
 
 
Consensus-oriented 
Open attitude by the FC to public 
criticism and other actors; conciliato-
ry negotiations 
 
INTERACTIVE 
FOREST 
GOVERNANCE 
Source: Survey data and workshop outcomes in 2010, arranged according to the features of good 
governance (adapted from UNESCAP, retrieved on 14 September 2011 from 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp,).  
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Box 5.5 On and off-reserve rights to ownership, use, revenues and benefit 
 sharing 
   
Admitted farms: these are the rights of farmers who had farms prior to reservation 
to continue to farm in designated areas. 
 
Admitted rights: customary rights held by individuals or communities to the forest 
reserve land at the time of reservation, especially when not harmful (i.e. cultural or 
religious uses), were upheld and documented. 
 
Domestic use rights/communal rights: the right of forest fringe communities to 
access forest resources in forest reserves for domestic purposes. 
 
Royalties: The concept of royalties in Ghana forest management could be traced 
back to the 1927 Forest Ordinance Act, in which stool landowners were given a role 
in forest management under colonial rule in return for a percentage of the revenue 
generated. The current benefit-sharing arrangement is enshrined in Article 267 (6) of 
the constitution of Ghana, complemented by the Timber Resource Management Act 
(TRMA 547). As stipulated in the constitution, this benefit-sharing scheme still holds 
for the on-reserve forest areas, whereas the percentage was modified for off-reserve 
areas through a forest policy reform in 2002. The distribution among beneficiary 
stakeholders occurs when FC has taken its share of 50% management fees from 
the royalties. The administrator of stool lands also retains 10% to cover its adminis-
trative costs, and then allocates the remaining revenues to ‘stakeholders’ according 
to the following constitutional formula. 
 
 25 % to the stool ‘for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status’ 
 20 % to the traditional authority (generally the paramount chief and his council) and 
55 % to the District Assembly. 
  
Social Responsibility Agreement: is a right governed by the Timber Resource 
Management Act 1997 (Act 547) with a fixed amount of 5 per cent of stumpage val-
ues in L.I.1721 between TUC holders and communities, often in the form of public 
services such as schools etc. 
 
Crop damage compensation: A timber utilisation contract (TUC) or concession 
holder gives compensation to a farmer when food crops on farmlands are damaged 
in the course of felling and is backed by Act 547. The farmer has the right to negoti-
ate with the TUC holder for ‘fair compensation for crop damage’ 
 
Timber utilisation permit (TUP): The District Assemblies, town committees, rural 
community groups or NGOs, may apply for the grant of a timber utilisation permit to 
harvest timber in a land not subject to a TUC, which shall be used solely for social, 
or community purpose. 
 
MTS benefit sharing: The FC receives 40% of all proceeds obtained from the plan-
tation, excluding non-permanent food crop proceeds unless mutually agreed with 
the farmer. The farmers receive 40% of all the proceeds obtained from the tree plan-
tations and all the non-permanent food crops unless agreed otherwise. The land-
owner and the local community receive 15% and 5% respectively of all proceeds 
obtained from the tree plantations excluding non-permanent food crop proceeds. 
 
(continues) 
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ciples underlying the FWP, the then Ministry of Lands and Forestry launched the Mas-
ter Plan 1996-2020 to provide a firm foundation for implementing the aims of the 1994 
Forest and Wildlife Policy. Several legislative instruments were enacted (see Table 5.1) 
to support the policy in fulfilling its objectives but, to date, no single clear piece of leg-
islation has been passed to support collaborative ideas or community rights to natural 
timber resources. Several benefit-sharing strategies, such as ownership rights to planted 
timber trees on farmland, timber utilisation permits for community development pro-
jects, social responsibility agreements and compensation payments are dispersed over 
several laws such as Act 574 and Act 617. 
The enactment of some of the pieces of legislation came with some tree tenure ar-
rangements (e.g. rights, ownership benefits and revenue sharing) as elaborated in Box 
5.5. The creation of forest reserves meant that local communities still maintained some 
(cont’d) 
 
 
Commercial plantations benefit sharing: The benefit sharing agreement applicable 
to the private developers stipulates that 90% of the revenue is for the private investor, 
while the landowner, FC and community obtain 6%, 2% and 2%, respectively.  
 
Sources: 1992 Constitution of Ghana; World Bank, 2006; Agyeman et al., 2010; Hoogenbosch, 
2010; FC, 2005 (MTS and Commercial Plantations Development benefit sharing arrangement). 
Box 5.6 The Forest and Wildlife policy of 1994 is a move in the right  
 direction but…… 
 
‘The policy is a move in the right direction but the major challenge is that, to date, most 
technocrats do not believe that forest management should be shared’. I suggest that 
the technocrats take the following into consideration:  
 
 Forestry education must be a ‘constant friend’ of the technocrat. 
 
 Management prescriptions and legislations must be different for forest reserves and 
off-reserve areas, with more participatory legislation for the off-reserve areas.’ 
 
 The agriculture-forest interface (i.e. reforestation efforts) must be strengthened in 
order to increase timber supply for both the domestic market and export. 
 
 Timber trees outside forests need to be properly documented with a view to ensur-
ing proper ownership rights and farmers should be well educated to this end. 
 
 Administrative guidelines to manage conflicts should be institutionalised with a fo-
cus on constructive instruments such as mediation, dialogue and education that 
demand a partnership between the Forestry Commission and other actors.  
 
(K.K.F. Ghartey, pers. comm., May 2009). 
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usufructuary rights in the form of admitted farms, admitted rights, and domestic rights 
of use. In addition, communities were entitled to a revenue sharing arrangement (royal-
ties). The enactment of the Act 547 of 1997 (amended Act 617, 2002) also created some 
benefit rights such as the social responsibility agreement (SRA), crop damagecompen-
sation, timber utilisation permit, and the right to own planted trees on individual farm-
lands. Similarly, there are the MTS and commercial plantations development benefit 
sharing schemes which were launched under the National Forest Plantation Develop-
ment Programme (NFPDP) in 2001. These benefit-sharing arrangements indicate a shift 
from authoritarian control and state management of natural resources to collaborative 
stakeholder management of resources (Agyeman et al. 2010). However, in practice, the 
tenure challenges regarding individual access and rights to naturally grown and nurtured 
timber trees on farmlands hinder a pro-poor policy. Box 5.6 is the view of a retired for-
est governor of what is needed to ensure that the 1994 FWP does not trigger conflict 
incidences in Ghana. 
The Ghana Forest and Wildlife policy of 1994 has been under review since 2008 in a 
process of multi-stakeholder consultations. The review of the policy was needed in or-
der to address the negative issues and trends
19
 in the sector and to integrate contempo-
rary global governance issues. 
Customary laws and practices governing forest management 
The customary laws and practices that are used to govern forest management in Ghana 
are based on cultural norms, traditions and beliefs that together ensure that trees and 
animals are protected. An analysis of the system was described by the FC through FO-
RUM
20
 experiences (n.d: 15-19). According to FORUM, the landowners were effi-
ciently managing the forests on the basis of the principles that statutory law presently 
seeks to achieve. In the past, customary norms, taboos and sanctions were used to con-
serve and preserve endangered species through hunting restrictions and control of fell-
ing of economic tree species. Although some of these restrictions are still in use (see, 
for instance, Bokhorst 2011), other practices had to be rejected due to the importation 
and adoption of foreign cultures, indiscipline and the lack of respect for customs (FC-
Forum experiences undated). Population explosion, land shortage and cultural changes 
have further reduced the effectiveness of customary systems (Agyeman 1994). Never-
theless, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana clearly recognises customary law and practices 
(see Box 5.7 for an overview). Kasanga (2002) calls for the ‘rationalisation’ of the plu-
rality of the rules and sources of authority (both customary and statutory) with a view to 
identifying clear issues and problem areas that need to be addressed to encourage secu-
rity of tenure among all people and resource conservation. 
According to this author, this will help fulfil the legitimate quest for land by local 
communities and migrant farmers who want to meet their basic needs in the face of lim-
ited land supplies brought about by the arbitrary creation of forest reserves, and which 
                                                 
19
  Such negative issues include absence of an institutional and legal framework to support local people’s 
livelihoods, illegal logging and chainsaw milling, inequitable access and benefit rights, and an over-
emphasis on timber production. 
20
  The Forest Resources Management Project (FORUM) was funded by the German GTZ and KfW, 
with an original budget of DM 25.0 million. The project aimed to reduce degradation of forest re-
sources in the Volta Region and it ended in February 2008. However, there are a few activities to be 
finalised with the DM 0.45 million funds that remained at the end of the project 
(http://76.12.220.51/index.php accessed on 16 September 2011). The project generated useful educa-
tional material on their experiences in the forest sector in the Volta region. 
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underlie many current tenurial and land-use conflicts (Ibid.). Another issue worth ad-
dressing is that of guaranteeing an equitable distribution of customary beneficiary rights 
to natural resources that are currently held by the chief in trust for the local communities 
(Agyeman et al. 2010).  
First order governance: Day-to-day conflict management 
The day-to-day management of conflicts in the forest sector in the past and present re-
gime can be categorised into preventive and mitigation measures. The daily manage-
ment of forest resources at district level falls under the supervision of the District Forest 
Manager and the team made up of assistant managers, range supervisors, cartographers, 
forest guards, customer service officers (not present in all districts), and other adminis-
trative staff. Their core role in forest management is to monitor and control harvesting 
operations, and they are therefore faced with the need to deal with the day-to-day man-
agement of conflicts that arise from their activities or those of other forest stakeholders.  
Box 5.7  Customary laws and practices within the 1992 Constitution 
 of Ghana  
 
Article 11: (2) common law comprises the common law, doctrines of equity and 
the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court of 
Judicature; (3) customary law is the rules of law which by custom are applicable 
to particular communities.  
Article 26: (1) gives entitlement to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and pro-
mote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the Constitution; (2) 
customary practices which dehumanise or are injurious to the physical and men-
tal well-being of a person are prohibited.  
Article 125: (2) citizens may exercise participation in administration of justice 
through public and customary tribunals and the jury and assessor systems. 
Article 267: all stool lands in Ghana shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf 
of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and 
usage.  
 
Establishment of Office of Administrator of Stool Lands: Article 270: (1) guaran-
tee of institution of chieftaincy, together with traditional council as established by 
customary law and usage; (3) law making provision for (a) determination, in ac-
cordance with appropriate customary law and usage, by a traditional council, 
Regional House of Chiefs, or Chieftaincy Committee, of the validity of the nomi-
nation, election etc. of a person as chief. 
Article 272: states that the National House of Chiefs shall (b) undertake study, 
interpretation and codification of customary law with a view to evolving a unified 
system of rules of customary law and to compiling the customary laws and lines 
of succession applicable to each stool or skin; (c) undertake evaluation of tradi-
tional customs and usages with a view to eliminating those that are outmoded 
and socially harmful. 
Article 274: (3) Regional House of Chiefs shall ... (f) compile customary law and 
lines of succession applicable to each stool or skin. 
 
Source: 1992 Constitution of Ghana (currently under review). 
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The patrolling by forest guards has been one means to prevent illegal encroachment 
that may result in conflicts. During the 1990s, an institutional reform resulted in major 
retrenchment of most of the guards. It was also the era in which collaborative forest 
management was initiated and community institutions such as the CFCs were tasked to 
play the role of forest guards and to maintain the integrity of forest reserves by policing 
the boundaries to prevent illegal use of the reserve (Amanor 2005). Nevertheless, in the 
absence of clearly defined tenure and benefits rights, the collaborative approach was not 
positively reflected at the district levels at which policy strategies are operationalised. 
In terms of mitigation, there are numerous different means and methods for resolving 
disputes and these include judicial mechanisms (courts, tribunals, arbitral panels), extra-
judicial means (such as committees) and administrative means within the sector. An 
attempt will be made to analyse these conflict or dispute management approaches based 
on the scanty documentation available in the form of laws reviews and official docu-
ments and discuss some challenges identified through the survey and interviews held 
with forest governors and experts. 
From the judicial perspective, legislation is used to govern conflict management in a 
more procedural orientation. A review of the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy shows 
that some of the guiding principles of the policy promote collaboration among different 
stakeholders in order to foster good governance, whereas several regulations clearly 
state how disputes or conflicts must be resolved. Notably among them, are the follow-
ing:  
 
a. The Timber Resource Management Act 617 (Amendment) Act 2002 outlines the 
following steps in resolving disputes and punishing forest offenders: 
- Section (6b): ‘Where a holder of timber rights who seeks to be granted further 
timber rights has been convicted of, or admits to, two illegal transactions or opera-
tion in the industry, in the two years immediately preceding the application, the 
application shall not be granted.’ 
- Section 14f: ‘(1) where a dispute arises between an investor and government all 
efforts shall be made through mutual discussions to reach an amicable settlement. 
If the conflicts cannot be amicably resolved then the option of arbitration must be 
selected.’  
b. The Benefit Sharing Agreement for Modified Taungya Forest Plantation in-
cludes the following conflict management mechanisms: 
- Section 13.1: ‘Any disputes arising out of, or in connection with, this agreement, 
which cannot be settled amicably among the parties shall be settled definitely and 
conclusively in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1961(Act 
38) by a panel of 4 arbitrators and the decision of the arbitrators will be final.’ 
c. The Partnership agreement between FC and Investor under commercial planta-
tion investments:  
- Section 10: ‘Any disputes arising out of, or in connection with, this agreement 
which cannot be settled amicably among the parties shall be settled definitely and 
conclusively in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1961(Act 
38) by a panel of three arbitrators.’  
d. LI.1649-Timber Resources Management Regulation, 1998. 
- Part 1(8): ‘Where any public identified as suitable for the grant of timber rights 
and endorsed by the Chief Conservator of Forests is also identified by any other 
state institution to be suitable for some other national purpose, the matter shall be 
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resolved by the Minister and any other Minister concerned.’  
e. The Forest Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002: oriented towards forest offences  
- Section 1 (for details see Chapter 7). ‘Any person who (…) commits an offence 
and is on summary conviction liable to a fine not exceeding 500 penalty units or 
to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or to both, except that for a second or sub-
sequent offence under this section the offender shall be liable on summary convic-
tion to a fine of not less than 250 penalty units or to imprisonment not exceeding 3 
years or to both.’  
f.  Social Responsibility Agreement (SRA): Under this agreement, the modes of re-
solving disputes are through negotiation between the timber contractor and fringing 
communities. The presence of a District Chief Executive and the Forest Manager as 
witnesses may bring the mediation mode into play when the need arises (see Chapter 
2 for the different conflict management modes).  
 
This analysis clearly indicates that the current legislation is ‘timber-friendly’ in the 
sense of promoting negotiation in the case of confrontations between the FC and timber 
operators, whereas community members who access trees illegally, according to the 
Forest Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002, are immediately subject to court action 
(fines or imprisonment).  
Another conflict mitigation measure is the establishment of a committee of inquiry 
which assesses conflict cases such as illegal farming and logging (especially when no 
offender is arrested) in forest reserves, and presents recommendations for action to the 
Forestry Commission. This mode was used frequently soon after Ghana’s independency 
when there were widespread admitted farm conflicts. The challenge of this approach is 
in the implementation of recommendations and the counter interferences by some elites. 
One such committee was the Nyinaku Committee set up to examine the circumstances 
surrounding the illegal alienation of land in forest reserves in the Western Region. The 
report and its recommendations were incorporated into a government white paper in 
1976. However, just as preparations were being made to implement these recommenda-
tions, the government (through the then secretary of the Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources, MLNR) issued counter-instructions
21
 to the then Chief Conservator of Forest 
(England 1993).  
The FSD sometimes uses an administrative approach to fine offenders when the of-
fender is made to sign affidavits to pledge to desist from committing such offences 
again and pay for the stolen forest products. This is a common practice in relation to 
illegal logging by legal timber contractors or sometimes chainsaw millers. The reasons 
for applying this approach are twofold. First there are the frustrations of the officials 
involved in the court system due to constant delays as regards pronouncing a judgement, 
as a result of constant adjournments which lead to extra working hours. The second rea-
son is the lenient penalties imposed on the offender by the judiciary which fail to deter 
the culprit.  
Another mitigation measure is coercion. Assistance from the military or the police 
help to arrest illegal chainsaw millers or destroy illegal farms in the reserves. Some-
                                                 
21
  Letter Reference No. SCR/G 1-SF.2 of May 23 1977 and SCR/G.1-ST.2 of 18 July 1977, issued the 
following administrative instructions which were said to have superseded the white paper on the Nyi-
naku Committee report: 
These farms should under no circumstances be destroyed;  
The farmers should be allowed to continue farming the land in the forest reserves already cultivated.  
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times this approach culminates in violent or non-violent direct action. Managing con-
flicts relating to SRAs and crop damage compensation results in mediation by the Dis-
trict Chief Executive or the District Forest officer when negotiation fails.  
The mitigation of conflicts related to intruding into a concession area and exploiting 
timber resources to which someone else has the rights are often mediated or arbitrated 
by the FSD at district level, or solved by the companies themselves (company-company 
conflict mitigation). When mediated by the FSD, the claimant (the timber company 
making a case of trespassing) reports the matter to the FSD district manager, who (often 
in company of other officers) organises a meeting with the two companies to seek a 
mutual resolution to the conflicts. The accused timber company is made to pay the 
stumpage fee and other expenses incurred by the claimant depending on the outcome of 
the negotiation process. According to a forest manager, such cases are often not re-
solved in court because the FSD ensures that the matter is amicably resolved as agreed 
by the parties to the conflict (Boakye Kwabena Akyeampong, pers.comm. January 
2012).  
Modes of governance 
Ghana’s formal forest sector has a blend of hierarchical and co-governance modes of 
governance (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of the different governance modes). The 
hierarchical mode of governance is widespread, with the Forestry Commission being the 
main responsible agency for forest management. This mode of governance is a legacy of 
British colonial rule and is governed by strict policies and laws with strings of a ‘com-
mand-and-control-system’. Even though hierarchical governance is essential to govern a 
complex common pool resource like a forest, a balance is needed with co-governance 
modes. When hierarchical governance overshadows the co-governance process it weak-
ens governability and this has been identified by forest governors and experts as one of 
the weaknesses in Ghana’s forest governance process (see next section).  
The co-governance arrangements are rooted in the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy 
and its legislative instruments, especially the provisions and guiding principles relating 
to community forestry and collaborative resource management. Such arrangements are 
also being influenced by changes in the international community. The operationalisation 
of the collaborative resource management in the early 1990s has ensured that stake-
holders have a better understanding of the activities of the FC in forest resource man-
agement. Furthermore, the collaborative resource management programmes have been 
creating avenues for participation and consensus building and opened opportunities to 
incorporate community and other stakeholders concerns into policy formulation. Over 
the years such trends have been promoted through forestry programmes (see Box 5.5) 
that have resulted in different hybrid governing actor structures as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. In this mode of governance, forests are managed jointly by government 
agencies and communities and conflict management issues are also resolved on a joint 
basis. An example is given in Chapter 9 in the form of a description of how forestry 
frontline staff together with MTS farmers and local traditional leaders manages conflicts 
that emerge from the MTS scheme despite weak participation of the MTS farmers in 
decision making. 
Co-governance is also promoted through the forestry forum concept where different 
stakeholders come together for dialogue, with decisions being taken from a collective 
perspective. Equally important in this respect are the multi-stakeholder approaches em-
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ployed in the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement (VPA) and the Natural Resources and Environmental Govern-
ance Programme (NREG). A sector study revealed that donors’ financial and technical 
contributions to the forest sector in the past had not resulted in sustainable forest man-
agement (World Bank 2006). This therefore necessitated a shift from direct sector sup-
port to inter-sectoral support, which gave ‘birth’ to the NREG programme.22 The NREG 
programme not only aims to bring about inter-sectoral collaboration, but also promotes 
donor harmonisation and effectiveness, which are key elements of sectoral coordination 
and governance. Besides general support for government institutions, there is parallel 
individual donor support for civil society, industries and research institutions in their 
efforts to stimulate sustainable forest management through advocacy, efficient timber 
productivity, and scientific research respectively (see Box 5.4).  
Kooiman et al. (2008) refer to self-governance as situations in which actors take care 
of themselves, outside the purview of the government. This governance mode prevailed 
prior to the introduction of scientific forestry. The case study in Chapter 7 shows how a 
local traditional council without government influence or mediation by government of-
ficials manages civil conflicts and imposes sanctions on offenders. This can be seen as 
an example of self-governance.  
From images to action: Forest governors’ perspectives of ‘interactive forest 
governance elements’  
The final part of the governing system to be analysed concerns the elements, i.e. the 
images, instruments and actions developed by the governance actors. This analysis is 
based on the outcomes of workshop discussions with forest governors and experts dur-
ing which the survey outcomes and other forest governance issues were discussed. The 
analysis of the participants’ perceptions is structured in line with elements of interactive 
governance theory (i.e. images, instruments and actions). 
Images  
Despite intentions to move towards co-governance and to ensure sustainable forest 
management, the forest governors and experts at the workshop identified some chal-
lenges with regard to dealing with forest conflicts and their driving forces. One of the 
key challenges in this respect includes the pervasiveness of conflicts over forest and tree 
resources, which the existing conflict management mechanisms were unable to mini-
mise successfully. Second, there are the weak institutional structures in the Forestry 
Commission, especially in the Forest Services Division, in terms of inadequate field 
staff and poor logistics to fulfil its statutory mandates. In addition, there is weak col-
                                                 
22
  In the interests of donor harmonisation and effectiveness, four donors are augmenting Official Devel-
opment Assistance under a common Framework Agreement and Policy Assessment Framework. Do-
nor contributions include those of the Royal Netherlands Embassy amounting to approximately €7 
million per year over five years (2008-2012), the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) with approximately £2.1 million per year for three years (2009-2011), the Agence Française 
de Développement (AFD) with approximately €1 million per year over five years (2008-2012), and 
the European Commission (EC) contributing approximately €4 million per year over three years 
(2010-2012). Total donor contributions will be approximately US$ 77 million. URL: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22701
705~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:258644,00.html?cid=3001_2  
Accessed on 9 September 2011. 
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laboration between FC, the judiciary and the police and this leads to weaknesses in law 
enforcement and sanctions. Workshop participants also mentioned challenges related to 
the supremacy of the top-down governance style in the formal sector, which overshad-
ows the co-governance style inherent in the decentralised structures in the various dis-
tricts and the participatory initiatives based on the 1994 FWP. An equally important 
challenge is resource ownership and management among separate actors (i.e. traditional 
authorities and governments respectively) with the former having no role in supporting 
forest management. This makes it difficult to reconcile statutory and customary systems 
to manage conflicts constructively. Inadequate political and administrative will address 
societal problems emanating from natural resource management because of the influ-
ence of politicians and powerful loggers which was also stated as being a hindrance to 
the forest governance process. Insofar as the sector promotes collaboration among key 
forest stakeholders, some of the workshop participants emphasised the fact that the im-
plementation of co-management is often difficult as none of the actors has the sole 
power to decide in certain cases. Lastly, they revealed that forest laws insufficiently 
differentiate between forest reserves and off-reserve areas, despite the differences in 
contexts and actors.  
In the opinion of the workshop participants, the aforementioned challenges can be 
overcome by using a combination of strategies. These include (i) a decentralised and 
interactive approach to forest governance with feedback loops during implementation, 
(ii) differentiated laws and regulations adapted to the specific conditions both on and off 
reserve, and (iii) the FC sharing responsibilities, equitable benefits, power and ensuring 
cooperation with key actors in communities and the private sector, in order to facilitate 
the smooth operationalisation of its activities. Furthermore, they identified the need to 
pay due attention to conflict management skills for forest practitioners in natural re-
source management academic curricula. In this respect they called for a clearly defined 
position of customary laws within the statutory forest laws, with defined roles for tradi-
tional authorities. According to the workshop participants, the above-mentioned strate-
gies call for the commitment of the FC in addition to its ability to mobilise internally 
generated funds. The FC should also mobilise international donor funds to support these 
improvements, either alone or in collaboration with research and civil society organisa-
tions.  
Instruments  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, there are serious constraints that forest governors 
are facing in their day-to-day management of conflicts over natural resources. In order 
to improve the way they deal with the various stakeholders, the forest governors and 
experts made several suggestions during the workshop, based on soft instruments that 
could complement the existing legislation. They hope that this will create new opportu-
nities favourable for the accommodation of the multiplicity of actors and for promoting 
effective interactive forest governance. For such implementation to be effective, they 
suggested the following joint actions and strategies: 
 
 Provide the FSD district offices with adequate human, financial, technical and logis-
tic resources for the implementation of policy strategies, laws and regulations at the 
district level. 
 Strengthen capacity development of the FSD frontline staff, such as forest guards, 
range supervisors, customer service officers (where applicable) and district manag-
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ers, particularly in conflict management. This will enable them to strengthen existing 
community-based organisations such as CBAGS and CFCs in terms of education and 
other provisions such as Wellington boots and identity cards to perform their duties.  
 Create a common platform that occasionally redresses grievances and addresses con-
flicts through cross diffusion and fertilisation of ideas. 
 Ensure participatory formulation and implementation of management plans with 
relevant stakeholders. 
 Strengthen the forestry forum at all levels so that it can play a ‘broker’ role between 
the resource managers and forest users. 
 Create spaces for people’s empowerment through participation in decision making. 
Action  
In order to ensure that constructive conflict management becomes an integral compo-
nent of the forest governance process, workshop participants proposed strategies which 
could be embedded in the governing system with a view to strengthening both second 
and third order governance (i.e. respectively institutions and underlying principles). The 
principles were discussed in the section on third order governance. The respondents’ 
and workshop participants’ suggestions to strengthen institutional arrangements and 
instruments were as follows: 
 
1. Mobilise funds from the government and the donor community in order to strengthen 
the governing system and its institutions. 
2. Explore international best practices in managing forest conflicts.  
3. Institutionalise constructive conflict management options in the forestry sector.  
 
With respect to the latter, the workshop participants advocated a unit within the sec-
tor which is specifically designed to manage conflicts and enforce laws, to arbitrate, to 
engage in adjudication, to mediate, educate and remain in constant dialogue with its 
stakeholders, clients and other sectors. They judged a periodic assessment of the per-
formance of such a unit to be essential in order to identify weaknesses and apply the 
necessary remedy on time. In addition, the workshop participants argued in favour of 
legal recognition of social forestry within the policy framework and inter-sectoral plan-
ning and a strengthening of collaboration among land-use sectors. They also considered 
it important to define roles and responsibilities of the various actors and to create 
schemes for equitable benefit sharing among stakeholders in forest management. Ac-
cording to the workshop participants, these suggestions could be realised as part of the 
critical review of existing policies and procedures and ongoing institutional reforms. 
Discussion 
This section addresses the research question on which this chapter was based, i.e. what 
the characteristics are in terms of features, orders, modes and elements of the governing 
system that contribute to the governability of Ghana’s forest sector and how does it deal 
with forest and tree-related conflicts? It starts with a discussion of the implications for 
forest governance and conflicts of the policy instruments inherited from colonial rule. 
This is followed by a discussion of the four components of governance systems distin-
guished in interactive governance theory, via an examination of the features, orders, 
modes and elements of the forest governing system and their implications for conflict 
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management mechanisms.  
Implications of colonial policy instruments for current forest governance  
Two main forest policies have been enacted since the introduction of scientific forestry 
in the colonial period, with very different policy directions. While the 1908 policy rec-
ognised protection as being important, the 1948 policy gave priority to production for-
estry. It resulted in an era mostly referred to as the ‘timberisation’ era, during which the 
timber industry became a powerful actor in the forest sector (Kotey et al. 2005). Each of 
these phases had different legislations to ensure the achievement of the policy objectives 
(see Table 5.1). The findings reflect the fact that the forest reservation process was 
fiercely opposed by local people who were supported by the Aborigines Rights Protec-
tion Society. Francois (1987) attributed this to poor consultation by the colonial gov-
ernment with the local people and their chiefs. To some authors, it was an act of using 
policy to disempower rural farmers while empowering chiefs to expropriate land by 
creating a customary system that vested land in paramount chiefs, which had hitherto 
not been their prerogative (Rathbone 1993, Adoo-Fenning 1997, Amanor 2005). Policy 
and legislative lapses and institutional failures, perceived goal incompatibility and per-
ceived opportunities for deliberate interference with the other’s goals resulting in block-
ing behaviour can be seen as the underlying causes of conflict in the era of reservation 
(Schmidt & Kochan 1972, Tyler 1999, see also Chapter 2). 
The struggles in the era of reservation were accompanied by a series of conflicts 
ranging from disputes over land ownership, claims on admitted farms, the emergence of 
illegal farming in the forest reserves for cocoa cultivation to the introduction of the con-
cession system in off-reserve areas. This supports the assertion about the complexities 
resulting from such diversity of claims on natural resources and a lack of say in decision 
making (Dietz 1996, FAO 1996). The nature of conflicts inherited from Ghana’s colo-
nial past also reveal that these are often triggered by a conflict of interests between live-
lihood needs and other interests in declining resources, whether economic or related to 
biodiversity conservation (Glasl 1999, Ros-Tonen & Dietz 2005).  
Elements of the governing system: Diversity, complexity, scale and dynamics 
One of the key challenges hindering the governance process is the multiplicity of actors 
in the forest governing system (Derkyi et al. 2010). The shift from government to gov-
ernance increased the diversity of actors involved and has had tremendous implications 
for the role of the state, the relation between state and society and the role of the state 
versus other actors involved in the governing process, especially in Africa (Büscher & 
Dietz 2005). Although this has increased the complexity, from an interactive govern-
ance perspective it has also created an opportunity. In the words of Bavinck et al. (2005: 
30): ‘if the interests, agendas and capacities of these stakeholders can be harnessed and 
guided, then there is a possibility of creating synergy that could benefit governance’. 
The hybrid-governing mode introduced in this chapter presents an actor constellation 
involving two or more of the five categories (i.e. statutory, market, civil society, cus-
tomary and transnational governing structures) identified. It is essential to delineate this 
mode from the five categories because actors are often constrained or enabled in their 
actions by structures (Bavinck et al. 2005: 29). The hybrid mode facilitates their con-
tinuous changing from one governing mode to another as well as to ‘scale-jumping’ 
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across different levels.
23
 The emerging governance initiatives mean multi-stakeholder 
platforms are required for policy dialogue and the formulation and implementation of 
conflicts management strategies, which in itself are positive indicators of good govern-
ance. However, an insufficient focus on actors’ interests can lead to a weak governance 
process. Actors may grab the opportunity to seek self and/or institutional benefits in-
stead of achieving a common goal and this could create grounds for conflicts due to 
competing interests and claims.  
Different levels of governance orders in the sector: Opportunities and challenges  
According to Kooiman et al. (2005, 2008), the governing system is characterised by 
three orders of governance. This section begins the discussion on the third order (the 
underlying principles), which will be followed by a discussion on the second order (the 
institutions) and the first (day-to-day management) respectively. 
– Third order governance: Principles underlying forest governance and conflict  
   management  
The analysis in this chapter revealed that principles underlying Ghana’s forest govern-
ance can, to a large extent, be traced back to a series of dialogues at global level on how 
to improve forest governance and ensure sustainable forest management (see Table 5.2). 
The decisions taken at global level influence the management of natural resources at 
national level. A key source of these principles is Agenda 21 and the Forest Principles 
adopted at UNCED in 1992 that contributed to a shift in policy focus from timber pro-
duction to a collaborative management-oriented policy framework that led to the estab-
lishment of the nation’s Forest and Wildlife policy of 1994. Underlying principles ema-
nating from UNCED include sustainable forest management, stakeholder participation 
and biodiversity conservation. New principles have been generated by more recent gov-
ernance initiatives, such as the VPA process (principles relating to the rule of law) and 
REDD+ initiatives (principles relating to civil society participation, transparency and 
accountability, as well as the use of market mechanisms in forest conservation). The 
integration of these principles into the national agenda was, however, disputed at im-
plementation level. The country is still struggling to translate them effectively into prac-
tice, while also having to tackle issues of unclear tenure, inequitable benefit sharing and 
illegal activities intertwined with conflict incidences (Marfo 2009, FC 2010, Marfo & 
Acheampong 2011).  
In view of these challenges, the workshop participants suggested some substantial 
guiding principles and values as being relevant to Ghana’s forest governance process. 
Many of these suggestions emanate from the good governance debate, principally the 
five building blocks for good forest governance and their components proposed by the 
World Bank (2009). These include (i) transparency, accountability and public participa-
tion, (ii) stability of forest institutions and conflict management, (iii) quality of forest 
administration, (iv) coherence of forest legislation and rule of law, and (v) economic 
efficiency, equity and incentives.  
The congruence of the workshop participants’ suggestions with the World Bank’s 
ideology of good forest governance is a coincidence since the document had not yet 
been published at the time of conducting the survey and workshop. Even though some 
                                                 
23
  The term ‘scale-jumping’ was coined by Neil Smith (1992) and refers to the nation-state operating 
beyond its jurisdictional boundaries. It was extended later into a metaphor that denotes the joining of 
power and political claims across geographical scales (Marston et al. 2005).  
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of the survey and workshop outcomes might have been steered by closed questions and 
the researcher’s explanation of the concepts underlying the interactive governance ap-
proach, it is also illustrative of the participants’ exposure to, and familiarity with, the 
international governance debate. For that reason, the respondents’ and workshop par-
ticipants’ suggestions for strengthening interactive governance in Ghana were ordered 
according to the eight features (principles) of good governance in Figure 5.3.  
– Second order governance: Institutional arrangements  
In order to understand the institutions within Ghana’s forest sector, this study follows 
the meaning given by Kooiman and Bavinck (2005), i.e. systems of agreements, rules, 
rights, laws and roles for decision making. The rules and norms guiding statutory and 
customary governing systems are addressed below. 
As discussed earlier, Ghana’s forest sector has undergone different policy reforms 
with the current Forest and Wildlife Policy of 1994 being considered one of the best in 
view of principles like collaborative management and equitable share of benefits 
(Agyeman et al. 2010). Several legislations emerged from this policy, which provide for 
rights and benefit sharing arrangements for different stakeholder groups. The benefit 
sharing arrangement observed in this study covers social responsibility agreements 
(SRAs) and the modified taungya system (MTS). However, despite the pro-poor nature 
of the current policy several challenges exist with regard to their implementation (Wig-
gins et al. 2004, Opoku 2006, World Bank 2006, Ayine 2008). The colonial legacy of 
poor recognition of customary laws and practices is seen as an underlying problem for 
the current regime.  
Customary laws and practices differ among different ethnic groups of Ghana and the 
1992 Constitution of Ghana (Article 272) allocates the task of codification of customary 
laws to the National House of Chiefs. Kasanga (2002) advocates a rationalisation of the 
plurality of the rules and sources of authority (both customary and statutory) to syn-
chronise the two governing systems and increase the consistency between them. This 
could be achieved by following the recommendation made by Engel & Korf (2005: 57) 
that ‘customary practices institutionalised within broader national legal frameworks 
may provide a good starting point to enhance traditional authorities’ ability to deal with 
the challenges of contemporary natural resource management.’ 
– First order governance: Day-to-day conflict management  
Both preventive and mitigation measures for managing conflicts in the forest sector are 
in place in Ghana. The patrolling of reserve boundaries by forest guards has not been 
very effective due to a lack of personnel. Support through hybrid governing structures 
like the CFCs and CBAGs has not led to many improvements due to a lack of long-term 
motivational incentives (World Bank 2006, Kendie & Guri 2007). Mitigation mecha-
nisms involve different strategies which range from judicial to administrative ap-
proaches of fines and coercion. However, negotiation and mediation strategies for solv-
ing conflicts are also applied, particularly in relation to crop damage compensation and 
SRAs. The variety of conflict incidences (see Chapter 6) indeed mean that different 
resolution approaches are required, as advocated by Yasmi & Schanz (2007).  
Despite the different approaches, conflict incidences in Ghana’s high forest zone are 
still prevalent, especially in relation to illegal logging (see Chapter 8). The recommen-
dation made by Castro & Nielsen (2003) that conflict management should be an intrin-
sic part of natural resource management has not yet received much or even any attention 
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in Ghana’s forest sector. Some of the forest governors and experts involved in this study 
pointed out that foresters and resource managers are not trained in conflict management, 
which is considered to be the domain of the judiciary. This resulted in the recommenda-
tion to integrate conflict management in the academic curriculum (see Chapter 6). 
Emerging issues relating to modes of forest governance 
All the three modes of governance distinguished in interactive governance theory co-
exist in Ghana. However, a blend of hierarchical and co-governance modes commonly 
prevails in the formal (statutory) forestry sector, whereas self–governance combined 
with the other two modes prevail within the customary governing structure.
24
 Despite 
efforts to create co-governance arrangements, the hierarchical mode of governance 
characterised by command-and-control and centrist approaches still prevails over co-
governance. This corresponds with the findings of Bavinck et al. (2005) for the fisheries 
sector. The integration of co-governance arrangements in the forest sector has been con-
siderably improved with respect to joint decision making and benefit sharing between 
(and within) government, non-government actors and the donor community. These 
achievements have been possible through a series of governance initiatives such as the 
NREG programme and the REDD plus and VPA processes. 
Both civil society and state-initiated co-management and participatory governance 
arrangements led to an increasing number of actors in the forest governance arena, all 
with competing claims and interests. This increases the complexity and dynamics of the 
governance system and the potential for conflicts. Nonetheless, the issue of conflict 
management is not given a lot of attention in most of the recent governance initiatives, 
except for the REDD plus process. A review of Ghana’s REDD Readiness Preparation 
Proposal (R-PP) in January 2010 by the World Research Institute (Williams et al. 2011, 
WRI-Ghana, R-PP 2010: 3) reported the following issues related to conflict resolution:  
‘Ghana’s R-PP provides a useful synopsis of the land tenure conflict dynamics in Annex 7, 
but fails to articulate sufficiently the significance of land tenure conflicts for the develop-
ment of REDD+. However, it emphasizes the importance of effective conflict resolution and 
access to redress in the context of REDD+ (p19). The R-PP does not assess to what extent 
existing conflicts are effectively resolved by the judiciary and alternative systems of justice. 
However it proposes to establish conflict resolution structures that will operate at the most 
localized level as appropriate, including REDD+ specific training for lawyers, judges, etc. 
(p19, 63). At this stage, it is unclear how these conflict resolution structures for REDD+ will 
relate to existing judicial and other conflict resolution structures, or whether they will ad-
dress wider underlying land and forest tenure-related conflicts.’  
This reflects a positive signal of conflict management becoming a feature of forestry 
programmes with REDD plus taking the lead. Initiatives like the VPA process, which 
touches on the implementation of legality standards, must consider complementing the 
proposed hard enforcement measures with soft enforcement mechanisms (see Chapter 8 
and Arts et al. 2010).  
Strengthening conflict management systems within the governance process:  
From images to action 
The forest governors and experts highlighted the pervasiveness of forest conflicts, insti-
tutional lapses and poor recognition of traditional governing system in forest manage-
                                                 
24
  Chapter 7 of this thesis shows how the three modes of governance amalgamate in the customary insti-
tutions in the study area. 
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ment. Some recommendations were given based on specific challenges. As conflict 
management is not given a lot of recognition in Ghana’s forest sector they recom-
mended specific strategies to strengthen each of the three orders of element in the gov-
erning system.  
Conclusion  
This chapter explored and assessed the status of the governing system in Ghana’s forest 
sector with a focus on conflict management. The historical overview clearly indicated 
the underlying factors of past forest conflicts and their linkages with the present. The 
analysis of the features of the governing system brought the diversity and complexity of 
the system to the fore, as well as its multi-scalar and dynamic nature. The analysis of the 
governance orders highlighted the various principles and institutional instruments that 
guide the sector as regards achieving sustainable forest management as the core princi-
ple of its policy. However, the combination of colonial legacy of unresolved tenure and 
access rights issues, implementation challenges and dynamics associated with popula-
tion growth have resulted in illegal land and resource use, characterised by conflicts.  
Since conflicts are inherent in any natural resource to which multiple claims exist, 
they should be regarded as challenges which need to be addressed by setting up suitable 
institutions, structures and mechanisms for their non-violent management. This can be 
seen as an opportunity potential to strengthen governance if the process of problem 
solving is done in a transparent and fair manner, ensuring the equitable sharing of bene-
fits and access rights and promoting conditions that can help to create cooperative rela-
tionships.  
Considering these challenges, the forest governors and experts involved in this study 
have expressed their views on what actions they see as a point of entry for the estab-
lishment of constructive conflict management in the forest sector. Such actions are to be 
integrated into the myriad of ongoing governance initiatives in the sector, of which the 
REDD plus framework acknowledges conflict resolution to the greatest extent. Conflict 
management should be an integral component of the forest governance process in 
Ghana. How the forest governors and experts perceive the nature of conflicts and con-
flict management and the options for improvement is addressed in the next chapter.
  
 
 
6 
Forest governors and experts’ perceptions of 
forest and tree-related conflicts and management 
strategies - from images to actions1 
Introduction  
Forest resources contribute immensely to people’s livelihoods and particularly those of 
the world’s poor (Falconer 1990, World Bank 2001, Sunderlin 2005). However, wide-
spread conflicts over forest and tree resources and the absence of constructive conflict 
management mechanisms undermine people’s livelihood sources and pose challenges to 
forest governance and sustainable forest management (Ostrom 1999, Marfo 2006, 
Yasmi 2007). This also applies to Ghana, where literature on forest conflicts and failing 
conflict management strategies has hitherto focused mainly on legality and other issues 
around logging, such as compensation payments and social responsibility agreement 
(SRA) negotiations
2
 (Kotey et al. 1998, Amanor 2000, Marfo 2004a & 2004b). As 
noted in the previous chapter, even less attention has been paid to conflict management 
strategies. The analysis in this chapter goes beyond the timber sector and aims to cover 
the full range of forest-related livelihood activities around which conflicts occur in 
Ghana. The chapter also adds to the literature on the nature and causes of natural re-
source conflicts by making them explicit for forest and tree resources in Ghana. It does 
so based on a joint analysis with policymakers and forest resource managers (gover-
nors)
3
 and experts
4
 in Ghana. 
                                                 
1
  Part of this chapter is under review for publication in Society and Natural Resources
a
 and another part 
for the Ghana Journal of Forestry
b 
as: 
a 
Mercy Derkyi, Mirjam A.F. Ros-Tonen, Ton Dietz
 
& Boateng Kyereh (submitted b), Fighting over 
Forest: Livelihood Conflicts and Conflict Management in Ghana’s High Forest Zone 
b
  Mercy Derkyi (submitted c), Managing Livelihood Conflicts in Ghana’s High Forest Zone. 
2
  Social responsibility agreements (SRAs) refer to the legal obligation of timber operators to pay 5% of 
the value of stumpage fees (i.e. an amount to be paid by the timber operator on total felled trees) in 
cash or kind to adjacent communities. 
3
  Forest governors are taken to mean actors in the formal forest sector mandated to formulate policies 
and implementation of policy strategies in Ghana.  
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In addition, this chapter contributes to conflict management debates (see Glasl 1999, 
Moore 2003, Engel & Korf 2005, Wehrmann 2008, Chapter 2) by clarifying how con-
flict management strategies in Ghana fit into existing classifications, and what alterna-
tives are desirable from the governors and experts point of view. The methodology em-
ployed facilitated a shared problem analysis among those mandated to formulate and 
implement forest policies. Effective policies that deal with conflicts require shared prob-
lem definition and an in-depth understanding of conflicts over common pool resources 
(Adams et al. 2003).  
 The overall question addressed in this chapter is ‘what are the perspectives of forest 
governors and experts in the forest sector regarding the nature of forest and tree-related 
livelihood conflicts and conflict management options in Ghana’s high forest zone?’ The 
central question has been divided into three sub-questions: 
 
1.  What are respondents’ images regarding forest and tree-based livelihood options and 
associated conflicts?  
2.  What are respondents’ perceptions regarding the instruments available to manage 
these conflicts?  
3.  What actions do forest governors and experts propose to improve conflict manage-
ment?  
  
This question will be answered against the background of the system-to-be-governed 
outlined in Chapter 4 and the governing system analysed in Chapter 5, based on data 
collected with the four-step methodology (desk study, self-completed questionnaires, 
dissemination and consensus workshop and additional face-to-face interviews) de-
scribed in Chapter 3. The respondents’ views on the subject matter are analysed using 
the interactive governance approach developed by Kooiman et al. (2005, 2008), with 
particular attention being paid to actors’ perceptions of the system-to-be governed and 
their images, instruments and actions.  
The next sections present the results regarding respondents’ perceptions of forest and 
tree-based livelihood options and associated conflicts, and the options to manage these 
conflicts. Then the findings are discussed against the context of scholarly literature on 
the subject matter and ongoing forest policy reforms in Ghana. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion. 
Respondents’ views of the system-to-be-governed:  
Forest and tree products and services in Ghana’s high forest zone 
Ghana’s high forest zone provides both direct and indirect livelihood services and prod-
ucts to numerous actors in Ghana. This applies to both on-reserves and off-reserve for-
est areas. Respondents were generally aware of the different livelihood options in the 
two types of forest management areas and the benefits thereof. Those in the on-reserve 
areas encompass the modified taungya system (MTS), commercial plantations, Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)-funded plantations, admitted and illegal farming, and 
NTFP extraction for both domestic and commercial purposes. Livelihood options in off-  
                                                 
 
4
  Experts are representatives of governmental, non-governmental institutions and individuals who have 
a role or stake in forest and tree management in Ghana. 
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Table 6.1 Forest and tree-based livelihood components and key beneficiaries within forest context  
 in Ghana  
Forest context  Livelihood components  Benefits involved Main actors involved 
On-reserve forest 
area  
 Modified taungya 
system in degraded 
forest reserves 
 Cash and non-cash 
income from crops 
 Revenues from 
harvestable timber 
 Forest fringe  
communities 
 FC 
 Stool land owners 
 Individual taungya 
farmers 
 Commercial planta-
tions in forest reserves 
 Employment 
 Share in timber 
revenues 
 Local and expatriate 
investors 
 FC 
 Adjacent communities 
 Stool land owners 
 Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC)
5 
plantations initiative 
 Employment
6
 
 Daily labour
7
 
 Timber revenues 
 Villagers 
 FC/FSD 
 Plantation supervisors 
 NTFP extraction (flora 
and fauna) 
 Cash and non-cash 
income from 
NTFPs 
 Hunters 
 Individuals in local 
communities 
 Individual NTFP traders 
 FC/WD and FSD 
 Illegal farming  Cash and non-cash 
income from crops 
 Farmers near reserves 
 Admitted farming  Cash and non-cash 
income from crops 
 Admitted farmers 
Off-reserve area  Planted timber trees on 
farmlands 
 
 Revenues from 
timber 
 Farmers (tenants or 
landowners) 
  Payment received from 
crop destruction on 
farmland during  
logging (crop damage 
compensation rate) 
 Cash from damage 
compensation 
 Farmers (tenants or 
landowners) 
 
 
 
Both on-reserve 
and off-reserve 
areas 
 Cash or kind benefits 
from SRAs with timber 
operators 
 Cash and benefits 
in kind (e.g. ce-
ment for school 
projects or a com-
munity centre hall, 
construction of a 
bridge or subsis-
tence products).                         
 Communities adjacent 
to TUC/ concession  
areas. 
 Legal timber logging   Timber revenues 
 Employment 
 Provision of SRA 
benefits 
 TUC holders and  
concessionaires 
 Forestry Commission 
 Workers at the timber 
companies 
 Stool landowners, 
 Communities adjacent 
to TUC/concession  
areas.  
(continues) 
                                                 
5
  The Highly Indebted Poor Countries fund in Ghana is partly used to finance forest plantations. 
6
  Employment refers to labour for a monthly or weekly salary. 
7
  Daily labour to work for daily wages commonly referred to in Ghana as ‘by day’. 
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(cont’d) 
 
 Illegal timber logging   Timber revenues  Individual illegal  
loggers 
 Legal timber operators 
 Chainsaw lumbering  Timber revenues  Villagers 
 Lumber sellers for  
domestic market 
 Chainsaw operators  
 Timber tree nursery 
establishment  
 Employment 
 Trees for  
reforestation 
 Timber /seedlings 
revenues 
 Labour force 
 FSD 
 Timber companies, 
FORIG 
 
Key: FC = Forestry Commission; FORIG = Forest Research Institute Ghana; FSD = Forest Services Division of the 
FC; HIPC = Highly Indebted Poor Countries; NTFPs = Non-timber forest products; SRA = Social responsibility 
agreement; TUC = Timber utilisation contract; WD = Wildlife Division of the FC. 
Source: Field survey 2009-2010. 
 
reserve areas include planting trees on farmlands and crop damage compensation re-
ceived from crop destruction on farmland during logging. Livelihood options occurring 
in both and off-reserve areas include legal and illegal logging (or chainsaw milling), 
social responsibility agreement (SRA) payments by legal timber operators, and timber 
nursery establishment. Beneficiaries include the inhabitants of forest-adjacent commu-
nities, timber operators, plantation developers and the government (see Table 6.1 for a 
further specification). The latter three operate at multiple levels of scale (community, 
district, regional and national levels).  
Images 
Below, the perceptions of forest governors and experts are analysed with respect to the 
meaning of conflict and the kind of conflicts in Ghana’s high forest zone. 
Views on the meaning of ‘conflict’ and ‘conflict over forest and tree resources’ 
Conflicts and disputes are terms which respondents used interchangeably when assess-
ing certain types of conflicts based on different livelihood components. In the local lan-
guage, Twi, a distinction is made between (i) ntawatawa, which indicates a difference 
of opinion or misunderstanding, and (ii) ntokwa, which is a more severe conflict, or 
which indicates a violent dispute.  
Respondents (n=15) used slightly diverging interpretations of the word ‘conflict’ and 
the phrase ‘conflict over forest and tree resources’. Some of the proposed definitions8 
included:  
 ‘A situation of open discontent between two people or institutions’. 
 ‘Actual or perceived opposing needs, values and interests’.  
 ‘A clash of interests between stakeholders over access, allocation, utilisation and/or man-
agement of a resource’. 
 ‘A process that occurs between two or more persons when they have different points of 
view or different goals and values and they fight over limited resources to address them’. 
                                                 
8
  See Appendix 3 for the full range of definitions of ‘conflicts’ and ‘conflict over forest and tree re-
sources’ that were generated by the survey. 
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 ‘A process in which two or more people disagree on issue(s) and take it to a level which 
leads to intolerance of one another’. 
Respondents gave the following definitions for the phrase ‘conflict over forest and 
tree resources’: 
 ‘Dispute over natural resources by two or more parties in terms of uses, ownership, bene-
fits and management’.  
 ‘Unresolved differences over access to resources’. 
 ‘Groups of people having different or similar uses for the same resources’.  
 A lack of equal access to resources’.  
 ‘Disputes due to a lack of flow of information and benefits to stakeholders’.  
Underlying these divergent views is a common understanding of ‘conflict’ as either 
‘perceived’ or ‘actually’ opposing or competing needs, values and interests between two 
or more people. Respondents also agreed that these competing needs and interests refer 
to the access, allocation or utilisation of the resource in question. Finally, they shared 
the view that conflicts only arise if one of the parties does not meet his/her perceived or 
actual expectations. Hence, the integrated definition of conflict adopted at the workshop 
was ‘perceived or actual opposing or competing needs, values and interests between two 
or more parties related to the allocation, access, ownership or utilisation of a resource.’ 
Perceptions of conflicts associated with forest and tree resources  
This section presents the results according to the six dimensions of the conflict wheel 
that were presented in Chapter 2 as an analytical tool (see Figure 2.2). 
– Context 
Generally, the survey and interview respondents classified conflicts according to the 
context in which they occur, i.e. on-reserve, off-reserve, or both. Each of these contexts 
has its own unique conflict type(s) within which multiple actors with conflicting claims 
aim to achieve their expectations (see Table 6.2).  
– Issues and actors in different contexts 
Conflicts in Ghana’s on-reserve forests usually evolve around (i) illegality issues (ille-
gal farming, expansion of admitted farms and illegal extraction of NTFPs); (ii) the allo-
cation and use of modified taungya system (MTS) land,
9
 and (iii) competing land uses 
(e.g. conservation versus productive uses, forestry vs. farming, and mining vs. forestry).  
Issues that trigger conflicts in the off-reserve areas include (i) inadequate com-
pensation for crops damaged by timber operators during felling, (ii) administrative 
lapses in obtaining permits to harvest trees planted on farm, (iii) felling of nurtured trees 
on farms, and (iv) (compensation for) crop destruction by pastoralists. The farmers are  
 
                                                 
9
  The modified taungya system (MTS) is a co-management reforestation scheme between the FC and 
local communities that allows farmers to grow food crops between the planted trees and share in the 
timber revenues (see Chapter 9). 
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Table 6.2  Contexts and types of forest and tree-related conflicts and main actors involved 
Context Conflict type  Main actors involved  
Forest reserve 
management 
area 
Conflicts about illegal farming.  Illegal farmers and the FSD; illegal 
farmers among themselves. 
 Conflicts arising from the extension of  
admitted farm boundaries.  
Admitted farmers and the FSD. 
 Conflicts arising from the illegal extraction 
collection and harvesting of NTFPs for 
commercial purposes. 
NTFP collectors and the FC (both the 
FSD and WD) officials.  
 Conflicts arising from the allocation and use 
of MTS farms. 
Among taungya farmers; taungya 
farmers and taungya leaders; illegal 
farmers and taungya farmers; taungya 
farmers and the FSD. 
 Conflicts arising from conservation  
objectives versus livelihood needs in  
protected forest areas. 
Forest fringe communities and the FC. 
Off-reserve 
forest man-
agement area 
Crop damage compensation conflict. Farmers and timber operators (both 
legal and illegal). 
Conflict about harvesting of plantations. The FSD and tree growers. 
Conflict over felling of nurtured trees. Farmers and timber operators (both 
legal and illegal); farmers and FSD. 
Conflict arising from crop destruction by 
pastoralists. 
Fulani herdsmen and farmers. 
Both forest 
reserves and 
off-reserve 
management 
areas  
Conflict arising during SRA negotiation.  Beneficiary communities and 
chiefs/community elites; communities 
vs. timber operators. 
Conflicts relating to illegal logging.  Timber operators (permit and non-
permit holders vs. TIDD/FSD; farmers 
vs. timber operators (permit and non-
permit holders). 
Conflicts relating to illegal chainsaw millers.  
About crop damage. 
About illegality.  
About competing claims to timber. 
 
 
 
Chainsaw millers vs. farmers. 
Chainsaw millers vs. FSD. 
Chainsaw millers from different  
financial support groups. 
Key: FC = Forestry Commission; FSD = Forest Services Division of the FC; MTS = Modified taungya system; 
NTFPs = Non-timber forest products; SRA = Social responsibility agreement; TIDD = Timber Industry Development 
Department; WD = Wildlife Department of the FC. 
Source: Field survey, 2009-2010. 
 
interested in gaining benefits from timber trees. In relation to this, Ghanaian law distin-
guishes between naturally regenerated trees and planted trees on farms. Naturally gener-
ated trees fall under the custody of the State, which allocates felling rights to timber 
operators and not to farmers on whose land these trees grow. When farmers tend the 
trees, they perceive this arrangement as unjust. However, felling and selling the tended 
trees is illegal according to Ghanaian law and results in conflicts with the FSD. The 
FSD is interested in benefiting from revenues generated from the timber trees sold to 
timber operators with legal documents. Farmers, however, do have the right to sell trees 
that they planted themselves according to Act 617 (see Chapter 5) but need to go 
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through administrative and negotiation arrangements
10
 with the FSD as well as with a 
legal timber operator who wants to fell the trees. In this instance, conflicts can arise 
when farmers’ fail to adhere to the procedure. Conflicts also occur in relation to com-
pensation for crops damaged by timber operators during tree felling and by pastoralists 
when they graze their animals on the farmer’s land.  
Issues prevailing in both on and off-reserve contexts include conflicts over SRA ne-
gotiations, illegal logging and illegal chainsaw milling in addition to crop damage and 
competing claims on timber (Table 6.2).  
The actors involved in conflicts in forest reserves include FC officials, farmers 
(taungya farmers, illegal farmers, admitted farmers) and NTFP collectors (Table 6.2). 
The FSD officials are the most common actors in these conflicts because they are the 
ones who are confronted with the aforementioned actors in their efforts to ensure that 
people do not access forest resources illegally in order to meet forest conservation and 
management objectives.  
Within the off-reserve areas, farmers are considered to be the main actors in the iden-
tified conflicts. They could be in conflict among themselves or with other actors such as 
the FSD, timber operators (i.e. both legal and illegal) or pastoralists (Fulani herdsmen).  
Actors involved in the conflict types that occur in both on and off-reserve forest 
management areas are members of the beneficiary communities in conflict with the lo-
cal chiefs or elites, or with timber operators in the case of conflicts during SRA negotia-
tions. In conflicts relating to illegal logging, the actors are timber operators (both permit 
holders and non-holders) who may become involved in a conflict with either the FC 
officials or the farmers. Actors involved in conflicts relating to illegal chainsaw milling 
are mostly chainsaw millers in conflict with each other, or with other actors such as 
farmers and the FSD.  
Each of these actors has different interests ranging from the need to access forest re-
sources to build a livelihood, to a greedy desire for financial benefits, or a desire to fulfil 
management objectives to sustain the resources for now and the future. If these interests 
or expectations are not met, these actors exercise their powers to get what they want and 
that often leads to conflicts.  
 
– Underlying causes  
Results of the survey and interviews with forest governors and experts revealed that, in 
their opinion, several underlying factors trigger conflicts in the high forest zone. The 
conflict sources mentioned in the survey and interviews in Box 6.1 were categorised 
using the categories identified in the literature (Schmidt & Kochan 1972, Homer-Dixon 
1994, Tyler 1999, see Chapter 2 and the discussion section).  
 
                                                 
10
  In his ongoing PhD research, Insaidoo (forthcoming ) observed that a farmer who intends to harvest 
his/her planted timber trees first has to contact a registered contractor or timber dealer willing to buy 
the mature timber trees. When the contractor inspects the trees and shows interest in buying the tim-
ber, he negotiates the price of the trees with the farmer and eventually purchases the number of trees 
the farmer wants to sell at the agreed price. The contractor then collects a letter of consent from the 
farmer for the district FDS office. The district FSD then sends officers with the contractor to the 
farmer’s village, to inquire about the true owner of the timber tree farm in question. When the 
farmer’s ownership of the tree farm in question is confirmed, the district FSD manager allows the 
farmer to harvest his timber trees for the contractor. The contractor then applies to the district FSD for 
a conveyance certificate in order to be able to transport the harvested timber legally. 
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Box 6.1  Forest governors and experts´ opinions of sources of offence 
 and conflicts related to forest and tree livelihoods in Ghana’s 
 high forest zone  
 
POLICY AND LEGISLATION LAPSES (based on Tyler 1999)  
 The absence of a sectoral policy on timber benefits sharing with farmers who 
nurture timber trees on farmlands. 
 Poor enforcement of forest laws. 
 Poor implementation of policy strategies and actions.  
 A lack of political will among technocrats and government officials to imple-
ment stringent sustainable forest management systems.  
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES (based on Tyler 1999) 
 Inadequate forestry education (laws, policies, strategies, etc.) for both farmers 
and timber operators.  
 The absence of guidelines on crop compensation payments.  
 Procedural difficulties obtaining permits to harvest planted trees on farmlands.  
 The absence of internal forest boundary markers or pillars. 
 Poor participation of communities in forest resource management in terms of 
monitoring and benefit sharing.  
 The absence of FC officials in mediation in SRA negotiations between timber 
operators and communities. 
 Systems for managing conflict weakly developed.  
 Minimal supervision of timber harvesting by the FSD. 
 Inadequate FC frontline staff and logistics to monitor activities at the resource 
base. 
 Inadequate supervision by the FSD and taungya heads under the modified 
taungya system. 
PERCEIVED GOAL INCOMPATIBILITY (MOTIVATIONAL FORCES) (based on 
Schmidt and Kochan 1972)  
 Boundary disputes.  
 Diverging interests in forest resources by local communities, general public 
and forest managers. 
 Irritation among farmers not involved in timber harvesting benefits especially in 
off-reserve areas.  
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITIES FOR DELIBERATE INTERFERENCE WITH THE 
OTHER’S GOALS (based on Schmidt and Kochan 1972)  
 Actors benefiting from the difficulty of controlling off-reserve resources be-
cause of the varied nature of the land-use system and the many actors in-
volved in their different interests and needs.  
 The hijacking of the SRA negotiation processes by community elites at local 
level. 
 The support pastoralists receive from traditional leaders as regards grazing 
their animals anywhere, resulting in crop destruction. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY (INCLUDING STRUCTURAL SCARCITY BASED ON 
UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION) (based on Homer-Dixon 1994) 
 Population increase.  
 Farming land scarcity. 
 Poor fertility of farmlands. 
 Limited pasture land for animal grazing.  
 Financial greed resulting in illegal exploitation of forest resources especially 
timber. 
 Rent seeking by officials from timber operators.  
Key: FC = Forestry Commission; FSD = Forest Services Division of the FC; SRA = Social 
responsibility agreement 
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– Conflict dynamics  
Respondents perceived differences in intensity and scale of conflicts. For example, con-
flicts related to illegal chainsaw logging and milling or forestland use for farming may 
be latent (the potential for conflict exists, but has not yet developed), emerging (when it 
becomes obvious or may exhibit signs of crises) or escalating (leading to injury or vio-
lence when the conflict results in physical clashes between the parties) (c.f. Engel & 
Korf 2005). A conflict does not necessarily need to escalate into stalemate. For instance, 
a latent conflict relating to crop damage during logging can be prevented from escalat-
ing when the timber operator negotiates peacefully with the farmer, reaches an agree-
ment on the amount to be paid, and fulfils the agreement. However, when negotiation 
fails, mediation becomes the next option. Failure of such an approach may result in 
emergence or injury, with the last resort being violent clashes between the contractor 
and the farmer and the involvement of their supporters. Usually such escalations include 
the setting up of road blockades to prevent the operator from transporting timber logs.  
According to the survey and interview results, most of these incidents start at the re-
source base but shift from localised to national issues because of media coverage, 
thereby bringing in more actors who were not involved during the initial stages of the 
conflicts. The respondents were of the opinion that resource conflicts arise because of 
triggering events such as multiple claims on forest resources and forestland for farming 
and weak enforcement or compliance of laws. Others include rent-seeking behaviour by 
elite groups with regard to timber resources and legislative lapses as regards timber 
revenue-sharing mechanisms in off-reserve areas, which exclude farmers.  
Instruments: Conflict management strategies and challenges  
The respondents mentioned several case-by-case approaches of conflict management, 
which were categorised on the basis of the continuum of conflict management ap-
proaches adapted from Glasl (1999), Moore (2003), Engel & Korf (2005) and Wehr-
mann (2008) (see Chapter 2).  
Among the informal decision-making approaches, conflict avoidance appeared to 
prevail mostly in chainsaw milling. Upon hearing of the presence of the FSD/Military 
patrol team
11
 in the area, the offenders try to escape, leaving behind the lumber and their 
work tools.  
Negotiation and mediation mechanisms are employed by timber contractors involved 
in conflicts about SRA and crop damage compensation. The SRA negotiation process 
occurs between beneficiary communities and the timber operators in the presence or 
absence of the District FSD or the local government representative. These officials often 
mediate when negotiations are unsuccessful. In the event of crop damage, contractors 
first try to negotiate with the farmer directly. Only if the process fails does either the 
contractor or the farmer call upon the district FSD officials to mediate or take action. 
Arbitration, which falls under informal third-party decision-making, takes the form of 
                                                 
11
  In Ghana, both the military and police collaborate with the FSD to form a task force that monitors 
illegal forest activities, particularly chainsaw milling and illegal timber logging. The presence of ei-
ther the military or the police is location-specific and depends on the availability of the enforcement 
agency in that location. In the Ashanti region, where the study was conducted, the FSD has estab-
lished a standing task force in collaboration with the military instead of the police. However, in some 
parts of the country the police also team up with the FSD to form a task force.  
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committees of inquiry which assess conflict cases such as illegal farming and logging in 
forest reserves, and present recommendations for action.  
Legal authoritative third-party decisions in the form of adjudication are taken by 
signing affidavits by offenders in which they pledge to desist from committing such 
offences again and pay for the forest products stolen (fines). This is a common practice 
in relation to illegal logging by legal timber contractors, although prosecution leading to 
a prison sentence of a number of years is also an option. Such legal action can be based 
on the legislative framework that stipulates how disputes should be settled between the 
FC and timber operators (LI 1649) and other forest offenders (Act 624) (see Chapter 5). 
The last approach, coerced decision making, is used when the FSD military / police 
team arrests illegal chainsaw operators (non-violent direct action) or destroys illegal 
farms in the reserves (violence). Violent clashes occur mostly in relation to illegal 
chainsaw milling, because of the use of force in clashes between chainsaw millers and a 
team of FSD officials and the military, or among chainsaw millers themselves in the 
case of conflicts over money or log theft. 
According to the respondents, there are challenges inherent in some of these ap-
proaches. First, the prevalence of coercion in the administrative system has resulted in 
hostility between FSD officials and actors engaging in forest offences. This has resulted, 
in turn, in apathy among the stakeholders as regards providing support for forest man-
agement or, worse still, fighting and injuries. Second, although the SRA guidelines 
mandate the District Forest Manager or his/her representative to be a witness during the 
negotiation process and mediate when the need arises, the officials are often absent dur-
ing negotiation processes. This often results in a disagreement between community 
members and the timber contractor or within the community, leading, in turn, to dis-
putes that may escalate if not resolved on time. For instance, in some cases, the property 
of timber contractors will have been destroyed or the offended community members 
will have barricaded the road, thereby denying the contractor access and preventing him 
to transport logged timber from the forest. A third challenge involves interference by 
politicians and elites during conflict resolution processes. In some instances, these elites 
plead on behalf of the offenders, thereby preventing them from receiving the necessary 
punishment in the form of fines or imprisonment. Finally, respondents noted the overall 
problem that it is often difficult to arrive at trade-offs that are acceptable to all conflict 
parties involved, and that an efficient mechanism capable of minimising conflict inci-
dences would be an important means towards achieving sustainable resource manage-
ment. 
Action: Propositions to minimise forest and tree resources conflicts  
With a view to identifying options for minimising the challenges with regard to the ex-
isting conflict management mechanisms, the forest governors and experts involved in 
the survey and interviews were asked to mention scale-specific but inter-linked recom-
mendations. The rationale behind asking them for scale-specific recommendations was 
that forest and tree-related conflicts occur at different levels of forest management scale 
(national, regional, district and reserve). However, the actors involved may operate on 
multiple scales. Hence, effective conflict management at one level contributes to a re-
duction in conflicts at another level, if proper mechanisms are in place. In order to com-
plement the recommendations resulting from the survey and interviews, the workshop 
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participants selected priority issues and proposed action plans that may reduce forest 
conflicts for consideration by policymakers of Ghana’s forest sector. 
Scale-specific but inter-linked recommendations  
The recommendations resulting from the survey and interviews synthesized and adopted 
during the workshop are the following (see Appendix 4 for the full range of recommen-
dations that were generated by the survey and interviews). 
 
At national level 
 
1. The Forestry Commission and Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, with sup-
port from other actors within the forest governance system, must make use of the on-
going forest and wildlife policy review
12
 to integrate conflict management strategies 
that blend statutory and customary systems to meet the conditions of contemporary 
forest governance processes.  
 
2. The Forestry Commission should seek internal and external funding sources to 
strengthen forums and platforms at all levels of scale. This will help discussions and 
the finding of solutions to forest-related problems and will facilitate information 
flows and education. Furthermore, additional funds would help ensure that frontline 
staff at the Forest Districts and Reserve levels has adequate resources via the regional 
level, thereby allowing the effective implementation of the policy strategies.  
 
At regional level  
 
The Regional FSD managers should make an effort to: 
 
1. Adopt effective coordination measures to address and monitor problems promptly at 
forest district level. 
2. Promote interactions between actors at regional and forest district levels through the 
strengthening of the existing regional and district forestry forums (see Chapter 5) that 
have the potential to remove false suspicions and perceptions. For instance, local 
communities usually perceive the FSD as an ally to timber contractors, while the 
FSD perceives farmers and local communities as conniving with chainsaw millers. 
3. Facilitate training in conflict management techniques and the enforcement of forest 
laws for all district frontline staff (District Managers, Range Supervisors and Forest 
Guards) with a view to providing them with the necessary skills to manage potential 
and ongoing forest conflicts. 
 
At forest district level 
 
The District FSD managers should make an effort to: 
 
                                                 
12
  With sector support via the Natural Resources and Environmental Governance (NREG) programme, 
the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources and the Ghana Forestry Commission, in collaboration 
with other stakeholders, are reviewing the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy and accompanying legisla-
tions in order to accommodate contemporary global issues such as climate change, forest law en-
forcement and governance processes (see Chapter 5). 
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1. Use the resources (financial, human, logistics etc.) provided by law and/or access 
funds from external sources (e.g. national and international donors) in order to ensure 
effective implementation of policies and strategies.  
2. Intensify forestry education not only for local communities but also for the timber 
contractors to make them aware of their roles and responsibilities, especially regard-
ing the management of non-violent forest conflicts.  
3. Delegate some responsibilities to subordinates such as Customer Service Officers 
(where applicable) or Assistant District Managers, thereby allowing them to mediate 
or arbitrate in forest conflicts. 
 
At community level  
 
The District Forest Services Division should, in collaboration with representatives of 
communities and other stakeholders: 
 
1. Institutionalise a local conflict management structure. A committee composed of 
representatives of the different groups in the community (including the resident for-
est guards) should be established to settle non-violent forest conflicts after having re-
ceived adequate training in conflict management skills.  
2. Institutionalise annual stakeholder dialogues between District Forest Services offi-
cials, local people and timber operators to bridge gaps between these actors. 
3. Enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with forest communities through institu-
tions like Community Forestry Committees (CFCs) and Community Biodiversity 
Advisory Groups (CBAGs) which can support the Forest District Office in creating 
awareness of forestry issues after capacity building of the leaders in these directions. 
4. The Forestry Commission and its key stakeholders (e.g. the timber industry and 
commercial plantations investors) should create economic opportunities that are 
compatible with forest conservation objectives to improve wellbeing in forest fringe 
communities, especially those located at the borders or within protected forest areas 
where access to forest resources has been denied or restricted. 
Action Plans proposed by the workshop participants 
Based on the recommendations outlined above, the workshop participants formulated 
two action plans as shown in Boxes 6.2 and 6.3 respectively. 
 
Conflict type (CT) 1: Compensation and land use-related conflicts  
 
Recommended steps:  
1. A priority step towards resolution should be a negotiation process among conflict 
parties (i.e. timber operators, farmers, FC staff, landowners, etc.) from which a win-
win situation must be achieved.  
2. In the event that this does not work, an alternative could be 3rd party mediation (e.g. 
FSD official, traditional leaders, a District Chief Executive, or any other person with 
up-to-date mediation skills). 
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3. If the conflict remains unresolved, the Land Valuation Division under the Lands 
Commission must be called in to intervene to assess the cost of the damage.  
4. If all these attempts fail, the parties could resort to legal proceedings although these 
often lead to a win-lose outcome (see Figure 6.2). The flow chart in Fig. 6.2 indicates 
the four conflict management pathways. 
 
 
 
Box 6.3 Action Plan 2 - Assessment of the feasibility of re-introducing 
 the forest prosecution system into the forest sector with a 
 prosecuting mandate for the FC and of adapting the curriculum 
 of natural resource academic institutions accordingly 
 
The workshop participants highlighted the fact that the current law to prosecute 
forest offences in Ghana gives the mandates to the Attorney General (AG) through 
the Ghana Police Service (GPS). In the past, FC officials were trained and man-
dated as prosecutors but the FC lost this mandate to the Ghana Police Services 
due to a change in national policy. The rationale behind calling for a re-introduction 
of the prosecution system into the forest sector is twofold. First, the Ghana Police 
Service officials are not very conversant with the forest laws, and that is the reason 
why the FC often loses forest-related lawsuits. Second, with the emerging perspec-
tive of governance as multi-actor and multi-sector steering, it is necessary for pro-
spective natural resource managers to have a more interdisciplinary focus. It was 
revealed that the Forestry Commission has sent a proposal to the Attorney General 
to reacquire the legal mandate to prosecute forest criminal cases in court, but the 
sector is still awaiting approval. Within the educational sector, the Faculty of Re-
newable Natural Resources (FRNR) of Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and 
Technology (KNUST) arranges courses in forest policy and law, but not in legal 
proceedings.  
 
Source: Workshop organised by the researcher with forest governors and experts. 
 
 
Box 6.2 Action Plan 1 - Effective strategies to achieve an integrated 
 conflict management (ICM) model that reconciles statutory and 
 customary mechanisms 
 
Existing conflict management options are subject to several challenges. The workshop 
participants therefore designed what they called an integrated conflict management 
(ICM) model to deal with these challenges (Figure 6.1). This model revolves around 
three key sources of forest and tree conflicts that are very prevalent in the sector, i.e. 
conflicts relating to (i) compensation and land use (e.g. illegal farming in forest re-
serves and crop damage compensation payments), (ii) forest boundary conflicts, and 
(iii) illegal chainsaw operations and logging. As seen in Figure 6.1, each of these con-
flict types is associated with specific conflict management strategies. In the proposed 
model, the Forestry Commission is the mediating actor (provided it maintains close 
linkages with traditional authorities) who indicates the steps to achieve each solution. 
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Conflict type (CT) 2: Forest boundary conflict (e.g. admitted farms, modified taungya 
system (MTS), etc.) 
 
Recommended steps:  
1. The starting point is that the conflict management strategy must take the form of ei-
ther an agreement or a memorandum of understanding and should therefore begin 
Key: CT = Conflict type; MoU = Memorandum of understanding; LIs = Legislations; ACM = Alternative Conflict 
Management  
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Figure 6.1 Integrated conflict management system (ICM) model designed by forest governors 
and experts during the dissemination and consensus workshop on ‘Forest and tree 
governance arrangements and forest and tree conflict management in Ghana’s high 
forest zone’ held in Kumasi, Ghana, on 12 February, 2010 
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with negotiations between the conflict parties (FSD, admitted farmers, taungya farm-
ers etc.). 
2. In the event that this does not work, 3rd party mediation (i.e. FSD, taungya heads, and 
traditional leaders) must be explored. 
3. If the second stage fails, conflict parties can resort to forming an arbitration team, 
with representative arbitrators from each conflict party to facilitate the resolution 
process. 
4. As a final resort, legal proceedings can be started if these initial strategies fail.  
 
Conflict type (CT) 3: Illegal logging or chainsaw milling  
 
Recommended steps:  
1. This kind of conflict should be settled in court with an FC official as prosecutor. 
2. Arbitration could be used through administrative means by the FSD or through ‘par-
don with bond
13
 if the timber is intended for community development. 
 
This conflict management pathway starts with a legal battle with the offender in 
court, but the workshop participants acknowledged that either the FSD or the offender 
must have the option of settling the case out of court based on an affidavit. In such in-
stances, the FSD could fine the offender according to legislation and the fines could be 
paid into the coffers of the FC. 
The workshop participants concluded that the forest policymakers and governors 
must pilot the proposed ICM model in an integrated way and ascertain how effective it 
is as regards managing conflicts about forest and tree resource and strengthening ongo-
ing governance processes. In addition, natural resource governance could benefit greatly 
from the incorporation of the ICM perspectives into teaching curricula (not only the 
forestry professional but for primary and secondary school teachers) and research. 
In view of the failure to manage forest offences and conflicts amicably, the workshop 
participants used a SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity and threat) analysis and 
confrontation matrix tools to assess the potential of re-introducing the prosecution sys-
tem in the forest sector. This system would mandate forest resource managers to prose-
cute forest offences cases. These officials must receive judicial prosecution training to 
acquire the skills to prosecute offenders using existing legislations and laws. 
Five strengths and two weaknesses representing the internal factors and five oppor-
tunities and three threats making up the external factors were identified during the 
workshop brainstorming session (Table 6.3). The group then concentrated on a few is-
sues from each quadrant to develop the confrontational matrix based on the key issues 
shown in Table 6.4. This resulted in the following points of action: 
 
1. Facilitate collaboration between institutions – the FC, training institutions and the 
judiciary. 
2. Make the prosecution system part of the Natural Resources and Environmental Gov-
ernance (NREG) programme; a sectoral programme with the Ghana Forestry Com-
mission through the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources. Lobby the Attorney 
General and Parliament to endorse the proposed mandate and to create an Adminis-
trative Dispute Resolution Act that enables the Ghana Forestry Commission to exer-
                                                 
13
  Pardon with bond means that the community in question has to sign an affidavit not to fell trees for 
timber without a permit from the FSD for community development. 
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cise the right to use alternative dispute arrangements besides adjudication to manage 
the numerous conflict cases. 
3. Lobby the Attorney General and Parliament to endorse the proposed mandate and to 
create an Administrative Dispute Resolution Act that enables the Ghana Forestry 
Commission to exercise the right to use alternative dispute arrangements besides ad-
judication to manage the numerous conflict cases. 
4. Empower and motivate FC staff to take up the new challenge.  
5. Create awareness and sensitise institutions such as traditional authorities, judiciary 
and timber industries. 
6. Foster collaboration between the FC, police and judiciary for the common good.  
7. Solicit donor support through the Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the EU to 
improve governance and combat illegal logging and the NREG programme to cham-
pion the proposed plan. 
8. Enforce forest codes and ethics among FC officials, police and the judiciary.  
9. Teach forest law and prosecution procedures by training staff at the institutions and 
by posting students as interns at the Police and Judiciary institutions and by integrat-
ing these topics into all academic curricula related to natural resource management.  
 
 
Table 6.3  SWOT matrix of re-introduction of forest prosecution system in the forest sector and  
 curriculum of natural resource academic institutions 
Strengths  
 
S1: Well-established institutions  
S2: Human resources are abundant 
S3: Larger % of stakeholders likely to embrace FC 
prosecuting its cases and similarly, the univer-
sity training the professionals  
S4: Historical reference 
S5: Proposal has been sent to Attorney General by 
FC legal unit 
Weaknesses  
 
W1: Non-availability of funds 
W2: Lack of transparency among FC staff  
 
Opportunities  
 
O1. Universities have a desire to teach skills in 
addition to current curricula  
O2. Financial support can be tapped from donors – 
VPA, Africa Forest Legislation 
O3. Availability of training institutions – Law 
schools, Ghana Police Training School 
O4. Further lobbying of Attorney General and 
Parliament  
O5. Ongoing constitutional and forest policy re-
views 
Threats 
 
T1. Problems with the current prosecuting system 
especially with the Ghana Police Service 
T2. Traditional norms and customs 
T3. Interference from elites (e.g. politicians, chiefs, 
etc.).  
 
Key: VPA = Voluntary Partnership Agreement between Ghana and the EU to improve forest governance and combat 
illegal logging. 
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Table 6.4 Confrontation matrix 
 Strengths ( S1, S2, S4) Weaknesses (WI, W2) 
Opportunities 
O1, O2,03, 
04,05 
1. Facilitate collaboration between insti-
tutions – FC, training institutions, and 
the judiciary 
2.  Make the prosecution system part of 
the NREG programme 
3.  Lobby the Attorney General and Par-
liament 
4.  Empower FC staff  
 
1. Awareness creation, sensitisation of 
people (chiefs, politicians, etc.) 
2. Collaboration between FC, police 
and judiciary for the common good  
 
Threats  
T1, T3 
1. Solicit donor support – VPA, NREG 
2.  Enforce forest codes and ethics 
3. Teach ethics via training institutions  
1.  Motivation of FC officials  
 
Key: NREG = Natural Resources and Environmental Governance; FC = Forestry Commission; VPA= Voluntary 
Partnership Agreement. 
Discussion 
This section commences with a discussion of the nature of forest and tree livelihood 
conflicts from two perspectives. It first discusses respondents’ perspectives of forest and 
tree-related livelihoods conflicts and its contributions to conflict debates. Secondly, it 
examines conflict management strategies and ways of strengthening them as perceived 
by respondents. 
Images: Respondents’ perspectives of forest and tree related livelihoods conflicts and 
its contributions to conflict debates 
The respondents’ synthesised view of conflict definition is relevant to conflict theories, 
which have no commonly agreed definition of conflict (Fink 1968, Schmidt & Kochan 
1972, Wall & Callister 1995). Their common understanding of forest and tree-related 
livelihood conflict refers to a dispute over natural resources by two or more parties re-
garding the allocation, access, use, ownership and benefits of dwindling resources. This 
definition and other answers revealed that policymakers, resource managers and forest 
experts in Ghana use the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ interchangeably when discussing 
types of forest and tree-related conflicts prevailing in the high forest zone. This con-
firms the statement by Spangler & Burgess (2003) that it may, in fact, be difficult for 
most people to recognise the difference between the two. The definitions provided by 
the respondents were also evasive in respect of seeing conflict as violent incidences, 
which could result in destruction of properties and even death. However, the case stud-
ies in Chapters 7-9 confirm that local people perceive most of the forest conflict types 
as being non-violent rather than violent.  
The range of forest and tree-based livelihoods found in Ghana’s high forest zone and 
acknowledged by the respondents corresponds with assertions in literature (World Bank 
2001, Sunderlin et al. 2005) that hundreds of millions of people depend to varying de-
grees on forests for their livelihoods. The various livelihood and other economic inter-
ests in the forest and tree resources lead to conflicts around each of the identified liveli-
hoods types, confirming the need to look beyond the timber sector when analysing 
conflicts over forest and tree resources.  
The findings also confirm that the context in which conflicts occur is essential when 
defining the type of conflict, even though the actors can change from one conflict type 
to another (Wall & Callister 1995, Moore 2003). In trying to bring order to the variety 
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of conflict causes, the causes were categorised using the main categories identified in 
conflict literature: policy and legislative lapses and institutional failures (Tyler 1999), 
perceived goal incompatibility and perceived opportunities for deliberate interference 
with the other’s goals resulting in blocking behaviour (Schmidt & Kochan 1972), and 
environmental scarcity, including structural scarcity related to the unequal distribution 
of natural resources (Homer Dixon 1994). These categories cover most of the conflict 
causes mentioned by the respondents, but are not mutually exclusive. As can be seen in 
Box 6.1, most of the perceived opportunities for deliberate interference with the other’s 
goals are created by policy failures and institutional failures. Many of the conflict types 
identified by the respondents arise because of violations of key forest laws and regula-
tions
14
 in Ghana. These are the Forest Protection Amendment Act 2002, Act 624, which 
deals with offences in forest reserves, and the Trees and Timber (Amendment) Act, 
1994 together with the Timber Resources Management Regulations, 1998, L.I. 1649 
(see Chapter 5). This confirms the need for improved forest governance and law en-
forcement, as is currently being addressed under the ongoing Natural Resources and 
Environmental Governance (NREG) programme (a sectoral programme with the Ghana 
FC through the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources) and the Voluntary Partnership 
Agreement (VPA) agreement between Ghana and the EU (Beeko & Arts 2010). An-
other basic trigger is the conflict of interest between people (Glasl 1999), particularly 
between livelihood needs and other interests in declining resources, be they economic or 
in biodiversity conservation (Ros-Tonen & Dietz 2005). This divergence of interests, 
goals and needs often leads to either latent or violent conflicts, further limiting people’s 
livelihood base and causing institutional disintegration among the people. These con-
flicts can only be managed if underlying causes of these conflicts are addressed.  
Conflict incidences are dynamic because latent conflicts may escalate into violent 
ones depending on the people involved, the scale at which the conflict occurs and the 
conflict management approaches employed (see Chapter 2). The distinction between 
latent, emerging and escalating conflicts proved to be highly useful for the analysis of 
forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts in Ghana. 
Instruments: Integrated approaches of strengthening existing conflict management 
strategies 
There is a recognition that conflicts need to be managed in order to prevent them from 
escalating (Buckles & Rusnak 1999, Yasmi et al. 2006) and that conflict management 
should be an intrinsic part of natural resource management (Castro & Nielsen 2003). As 
indicated by Yasmi & Schanz (2007), conflict incidences require different resolution 
approaches. Currently, all conflict management mechanisms from scholars such as 
Moore’s (2003) and Wehrmann’s (2008) conflict management continuum (see Chapter 
2) are being applied in Ghana’s high forest zone. These conflict management strategies 
operate within the three different social systems distinguished by Engel & Korf (2005), 
i.e. the national legal system, the collaborative system and the customary system. It is 
often assumed that the latter does not play a functional role in the forest context of 
Ghana (e.g. Mayers & Kotey 1996). The reason is that customary authorities (particu-
larly the stool landowners) are owners of the resources and benefit from royalties, but 
have no legal role with respect to forest management and, for that matter, managing 
conflicts emanating from the same resources they own. According to Mayers & Kotey 
                                                 
14
  Both the forest law and the regulations can be accessed at  
http://www.fcghana.com/publications/index.htm. 
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(1996: 30), legislation has turned these traditional authorities in Ghana into passive and 
marginalised recipients of insignificant and irregular share of revenue, with no formal 
decision-making roles in any aspect of forest management despite their legal position as 
owners. However, in a study of conflicts about forest resources in Ghana’s protected 
area, Derkyi et al. (submitted b) found out that the role of customary institutions in for-
est conflict management at local level is greater than generally acknowledged – includ-
ing by the forest governors and experts involved in this study (see Chapter 7). 
Action  
According to the forest governors and experts involved in this study, what is needed to 
manage forest and tree-related conflicts is not only legislation and administrative con-
flict management strategies, but also integrated and practical conflict management sys-
tems with active involvement of forest actors in the formulation and implementation 
processes. The designed system in Figure 6.1 proposed as Action plan 1 is a closed loop 
with various options that policymakers and practitioners can use according to the appli-
cable situation and the preferred outcome. Such a systemic approach to forest and tree 
resources conflict management is badly needed. This means that the implementation of 
the integrated conflict management model proposed should be embedded within ‘inter-
active governance’ processes. Only then can a fostering and enabling environment be 
created in which integrated conflict management can thrive.  
This is also necessary for the implementation of the proposed Action Plan 2, which is 
feasible only if the principles of good governance are applied. From the interactive gov-
ernance theory point of view, such principles are referred to as third-order or meta-
governance (Kooiman et al. 2005). The related discussion with the forest governors and 
experts is examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Without such principles, the proposed 
FC prosecution system may be prone to corruption and a lack of transparency. The 
workshop participants considered the ongoing forest policy and legislation reviews as 
potentially positive triggers to consider these proposed strategies in order to minimise 
forest and tree-based conflicts once these strategies have been properly implemented. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that a methodology that combines a survey and interviews with 
a workshop to synthesise and discuss the findings with policymakers, resource manag-
ers and forest experts enables an overall picture to be acquired of forest and tree-related 
conflicts and conflict management strategies in a specific region. More importantly, 
such combined methodology also creates a consensus on desirable improvements 
among those who bear primary responsibility for forest governance. Ghana’s high forest 
zone is endowed with a broad array of forest and tree products and services that support 
the livelihoods of different categories of forest actors. Due to diverging interests and 
policy and institutional failures, it is also a contested ‘battlefield’. The solutions to these 
problems call for proactive initiatives and a practical conflict management system with 
active involvement of forest actors in the formulation and implementation processes.  
There is, therefore, an unequivocal call for the forest governors, some of whom were 
the respondents in this study, to initiate the revision of forest laws and regulations and 
the implementation of the recommended conflict management strategies with the sup-
port of the other actors. For actors to be properly integrated into effective conflict man-
agement, policymakers and practitioners alike should take into consideration the spe-
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cific but inter-linked recommendations proposed by the forest governors involved in 
this study, which were specified for the national, regional, forest district and community 
management levels. This requires adaptations in forestry and natural management cur-
ricula at universities that need additional reflection and elaboration. The author stresses, 
however, that the proposed ICM model and re-introduction of a prosecution mandate for 
the FC cannot be effectuated in isolation of ongoing efforts to improve forest govern-
ance in Ghana. Conflict management and law enforcement only thrive in an account-
able, transparent, responsive and inclusive governance context. In addition, such a con-
flict management system should encompass a stepwise approach in which negotiation is 
priority, legal proceedings are the last resort, and which involves close links between 
statutory and customary institutions. 
 
  
 
 
7 
Conflicts over forest resources  
in the Tano-Offin forest reserve1 
Introduction  
In the early 1990s, the Forestry Commission of Ghana identified thirty forest reserves as 
having exceptionally high levels of biological diversity and re-designated them as glob-
ally significant biodiversity areas (GSBAs) (see Chapter 4) through multi-donor sup-
port.
2
 This was in response to Ghana’s quest for biodiversity conservation that meets 
national and international aspirations in accordance with the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and related international agreements and treaties that Ghana had rati-
fied (Kyereh et al. 2006) (see Chapter 5). Such reserves or portions thereof were ex-
cluded from timber exploitation. One of these is the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve in the 
Ashanti Region of Ghana’s high forest zone, with about 45% of the area designated as 
GSBA. This reserve includes the admitted village
3
 of Kyekyewere where people’s live-
lihoods are linked to the forest. The management plans developed as an instrument to 
govern the GSBAs have a strong emphasis on forest protection. With the creation of the 
GSBA, the inhabitants of the admitted village experienced further loss of forest access 
and use rights, which resulted in informal access characterised by conflicts. With the 
emergence of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union 
                                                 
1
  Part of this chapter is under review for publication in a special issue of Forest Policy and Economics 
as: Mercy Derkyi, Mirjam A.F. Ros-Tonen, Ton Dietz
 
& Boateng Kyereh (submitted a), Conflicts 
over forest resources in the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve, Ghana: Implications for social safeguards in 
the Voluntary Partnership Agreement. 
2
  Funding came from the International Development Association (IDA of the World Bank Group), the 
European Union (EU), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Department for International De-
velopment (DFID), the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 
the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF). 
3
  Admitted villages refer to the rights of people who had their village in the reserve area before its des-
ignation as a reserve to continue inhabiting the designated areas. Similarly, the law recognises admit-
ted farms in forest reserves to preserve the right to farm. 
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(EU) to strengthen law enforcement and improve governance to combat illegal logging 
(see Chapter 5), it is likely that inhabitants’ access to forest resources for livelihoods 
will be further restricted.  
This chapter analyses the conflicts over forest resources in the Tano-Offin GBSA. It 
addresses the following sub-questions: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the Tano-Offin GSBA as a system-to-be-governed in 
terms of the natural and socio-economic sub-systems and the interactions between 
the two?  
2. What governing systems operate within the Tano-Offin GSBA?  
3. What are the perceptions of the inhabitants of Kyekyewere regarding the nature of 
forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts in Tano-Offin GSBA?  
4. What do the findings mean for ongoing trends in forest governance such as the VPA 
and REDD+ processes (see Chapter 5)?  
 
This chapter is based on documentary analysis, a semi-structured questionnaire survey 
among 119 inhabitants of Kyekyewere and focus group discussions in the admitted vil-
lage, as well as a validation meeting with representatives from the three case study 
communities (see Chapter 3).  
The secondary data and respondents’ views on the subject matters were analysed 
along the lines of interactive governance theory, i.e. in terms of the system-to-be gov-
erned, the governing system and governance interactions (Kooiman et al. 2005, 2008, 
see Chapter 2). Furthermore, the elements of day-to-day conflict management – images 
and instruments (Ibid. 2005) – were blended with the conflict wheel developed by Ma-
son & Rychard (2005) (Chapter 2) for a more in-depth understanding of the nature of 
Figure 7.1     Map of Kyekyewere village within the Tano-Offin GSBA 
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conflicts and conflict management prevailing in the study area from the perspective of 
the local people and governors involved. 
The next section presents the system-to-be governed (i.e. Tano-Offin GSBA) as a 
natural system and a socio-economic system with a focus on, respectively, the diversity, 
complexity and dynamics of the system and the interactions between them. Then, the 
governing systems are presented from both customary, statutory and hybrid perspec-
tives. Next, the respondents’ images and the instruments used in day-to-day conflict 
management are presented. The penultimate section links the findings from Tano-Offin 
GSBA with other GSBAs in the high forest zone of Ghana based on a situational analy-
sis study conducted by Tropenbos International Ghana (TBI 2010). The last part of the 
chapter discusses the findings and links it with the on-going social safeguards debate in 
the VPA in Ghana. The chapter ends with the conclusions.  
The system-to-be-governed (SG) 
This section looks at the system to be governed from the two perspectives. These are the 
natural system, which describes the Tano-Offin GSBA and its environs, and the human 
system that depicts the socio-economic characteristics of inhabitants of Kyekyewere and 
their dependency on forest resources. 
The natural system: The Tano-Offin GSBA 
The Tano-Offin GSBA forms part of the larger Tano-Offin Forest Reserve and lies be-
tween latitudes 6
054’ and 6035’ north and longitudes 1057’ and 2017’ West in the high 
forest zone of southern Ghana (Figure 7.1). It covers a gross area of 413.92 km
2
 that 
includes the admitted village land and farms covering a total of 6.27 km
2
 and the GSBA 
that covers an area of 178.34 km
2
. The GSBA portion is classified as an upland ever-
green (UE) forest (see Chapter 4, Hall & Swaine 1976) because of its location on iso-
lated hills within the area of the moist semi-deciduous (MS) forest type. Trees in this 
vegetation type attain an average maximum height of about 45 m. The floral richness 
and diversity of the Upland Evergreen forest in Ghana is botanically unique in terms of 
floral richness and diversity. Some common timber species include Mansonia altissima, 
Pterygota macrocarpa and Terminalia superba. 
According to Hall & Swaine (1981) cited in Kyereh et al. (2006), sample plots in up-
land evergreen forest generally provide a longer species list than those in the surround-
ing moist semi-deciduous forests. The area harbours a wide range of biological re-
sources. Three Black Star
4
 and 17 Gold Star
5
 species have been identified in the forest 
and a genetic heat index (GHI) value
6
 of 176.4 has been recorded. In addition, there is a 
                                                 
4
  Hawthorne & Abu-Juam (1995) designed a categorisation of conservation priority for each timber 
species in Ghana, based on ecological, chorological and taxonomic facts (with chorology referring to 
the geographical area occupied by a species). According to this categorisation, Black Star species are 
rare internationally and uncommon species in Ghana. 
5
  Gold Star species are fairly rare internationally and locally (Ghana) (Hawthorne & Abu-Juam 1995). 
6
  The genetic heat index (GHI) value is the relative value of each species in building up a standard spot 
conservation score. A high genetic heat index signifies that the area is relatively rich in rare species 
and that the loss or degradation of the area would represent a highly significant erosion of genetic re-
sources for the World as a whole and for Ghana in particular. The average GHI ranges from a mini-
mum of 59 in the dry semi-deciduous fire zone (DSFZ) to a maximum of 301 in the wet evergreen 
(WE) rain forest (Hawthorne & Abu-Juam 1995, see Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4 for the various vegetation 
zones). 
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rare tree fern Cyathea manniana, used for medicinal purposes (JSTOR Plant Science).
7
 
Important fauna includes birds like the yellow-throated green bulbul (Criniger oliva-
ceaus) and green-tailed bristle-bill (Bleda eximia) (Kyereh et al. 2006). 
The reserve has steep slopes and rugged deep gorges resulting from the undulating 
topography because of progressive erosion. The relatively high rainfall in the area 
means the removal of tree cover had led to degradation and loss of topsoil through ero-
sion (Kyereh et al. 2006). It also serves as a watershed for the Tano and Offin rivers that 
are sources of drinking water for surrounding communities. As such the area serves as a 
sponge that buffers the flow of water and avoids localised flooding and erosion. It there-
fore performs an all-important function by protecting the environment. Due to the na-
ture of the topography, removal of vegetation makes the area prone to erosion and flash 
flooding during rainfall (Kyereh et al. 2006). However, over the years, changes have 
been occurring in this special Upland evergreen forest through gradual deforestation. 
The actors involved in this deforestation process are diverse as will be seen later in this 
chapter. According to some young people in the three study areas involved in commu-
nity meetings (see Chapter 3), the area has become ‘No man’s Land’ that is a common 
pool resource provided one is not arrested by the FSD officials.  
The human system  
This section deals with the GSBA human system, addressing respectively the per-
ceptions of the inhabitants of its history, the socioeconomic characteristics of popu-
lation, their livelihoods and actor analyses for admitted and illegal farming. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
   URL: http://plants.jstor.org, accessed on 13 September 2011. 
Photo 7.1  Kyekyewere village located within the Tano-Offin reserve 
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– Myths on the origin of the ‘admitted’ village of Kyekyewere  
The historical migration events explained initially by one of the chiefs
8
 in Kyekyewere 
village – caretaker of the Nkawie-Panin – and clarified in more detail by his elders were 
that the ancestors of the village were Fantes
9
 from Mankesim in the Central Region of 
Ghana. The ancestors first settled at Nkawie-Panin in the Ashanti Region. During a per-
formance of traditional religious rituals at Nkawie-Panin, Okomfoba
10
, Nana Kofoa 
Gyemfua revealed that there was a stream of water deep in the forest, which could be a 
source of money (gold). This encouraged the first settlers – the hunters Kofi Asare and 
Kofi Baah and the fetish priestess to go into the forest and settle there as far back as 
1834. One day, whilst in the village, the fetish priestess went to fetch water from the 
nearby stream. When she fetched some to wash her bowl she noticed some dusts of gold 
which was an indication that the stream or land was full of gold. The first settlers there-
fore named the stream of water ‘Disere’, which literally means ‘we are going to con-
sume with laughter’. That same day, the two hunters brought home seven antelopes and 
two tortoises. They were so happy that day that they commented, ‘We are going to 
make fun with the antelopes (bushmeat) and use the tortoises as consolation (‘akyekyere 
hen were’)’. Hence, the name of the village: ‘Kyekyewere’. During the reign of Nana 
Asi, the third chief of the village, the Nyinahin
11
 group joined the Nkawie-Panin group 
that had settled there first. Since the land already used to belong to stools before forest 
reserves were created, both were therefore owners of the land. The respective stools 
relegated their powers to the respective Odikros (local chiefs) and their sub-sub-chiefs. 
The main purpose of settling in the village was to engage in gold mining in the 
stream and hunting in the forest in addition to the cultivation of food crops. The first 
settlers initially tried cocoa (Theobroma cacao)
12
 farming, but later realised that the 
yield was relatively low due to a high rate of damping (pod rotting) disease. Moreover, 
because they badly needed land for food crops, many of the people abandoned their 
cocoa farms to give way for food crop farming. The main food crops they produce in-
clude plantain, cocoyam, maize, cassava and local vegetables. Current inhabitants re-
vealed that in 1985 a ‘galamsay’ (small-scale illegal surface mining) operation was 
started in the forest reserve which resulted in a significant increase in the village’s popu-
lation. The ‘galamsay’ operation was abandoned in 1991.  
– Local people’s views of the reservation processes and aftermath challenges  
The community elders revealed that, according to tradition, in the early 1940s some 
‘white people’13 came to the village, when the population of the village totalled about  
 
                                                 
8
  The admitted village of Kyekyewere has two chiefs. The chiefs represent the Nkawie-Panin stool and 
the Nyinahin stool respectively. These two stools, in addition to the Hia and Kontri stools are the stool 
landowners of the reserve. 
9
  The Fante people, along with Asante, comprise two of the largest and best-known ethnic groups that 
make up the Akan. Akan is a generic term used to refer to a large number of linguistically related peo-
ples who live in southern Ghana and southeastern Côte d'Ivoire, 
  http://www.uiowa.edu/~africart/toc/people/Fante.html accessed on 15 September 2011. 
10
  Okomfoba is the Twi name for a fetish priestess in Ghana. 
11
  Nyinahin is the capital town of the Atwima Mpounua District and is located in the southern portion of 
the Tano-Offin forest reserve. 
12
  Cocoa is a major cash crop in Ghana produced by small farmers and contributed 2.6% to the agricul-
tural GDP in 2010 (GSS 2011).  
13
  Even though the local people could not explain who the white people were, the reserve’s management 
plan indicated that the forest was designated as a reserve in 1949 under the Kumasi Native Authority 
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62. The ‘white people’, together with some Ghanaians, measured the forest within the 
vicinity. They demarcated one portion within the forest as farmlands, whereas a larger 
portion was demarcated as forest reserve with pillars at the boundaries. According to the 
community elders the outcome of the reservation process over many centuries has re-
sulted in farming land becoming scarce and infertile because of high population growth 
and continuous cultivation of the same piece of land for many years. They claimed that 
the creation of the GSBA in the early 2000s covered part of their portion of the forest-
land previously allocated for farming. Nevertheless, all attempts to get forestry officials 
to resolve the boundary problem have proven to be futile. Some of the community 
members alleged that the workers of the contracted firm who demarcated the GSBA 
informed them to farm in the portion of forest that fell outside the GSBA. 
 
                                                 
 
Rules of 15 December 1949 (Kyereh et al. 2006). This period is also the colonial era, during which 
colonial government undertook forest reservation in Ghana (see Chapter 5). 
Legend:  
 
         = Indicated shift from admitted farmland to GSBA 
         = Boundary between admitted village farmlands and the GSBA 
          = Portion of forestland that farmers believe to be available for farming since the demarcation of GSBA 
         = Perceived border between admitted farmland and GSBA  
 
Figure 7.2a Status of Tano-Offin 
and admitted village before GSBA 
demarcation  
 
Figure 7.2b     Status of Tano-Offin and admitted 
village after GSBA creation, indicating the per-
ceived contested pieces of land  
 
    Source: Constructed by the author based on local people’s descriptions during the field survey in 2009. 
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Table 7.1 Socio-economic characteristics of respondents (n=119) 
Variables Frequency (n) Percentage (%) 
Gender    
  Male  83 70 
  Female  36 30 
Age range    
  18-35 42 35 
  36-53 62 52 
  53+ 13 11 
  No response  2 2 
Level of education    
  No education  13 11 
  Informal (evening school normally in the local  
  language) 
2 2 
   Primary level 9 7 
   Middle / Junior High School (9
th
 grade) 90 76 
   Senior High School  5 4 
Religion    
  Christianity  101 85 
  African tradition 1 1 
  Free thinkers  11 9 
  Islam  4 3 
  No response 2 2 
Origin
14
    
  Migrants 53 45 
  Indigenes  66 55 
Occupation    
  None 9 7 
  Single    
    Farming  63 53 
    Chainsaw milling  12 10 
    Trading  6 5 
    Handicraft 4 3 
    Teaching  2 2 
    Farm labour  3 3 
    Chainsaw rental  2 2 
Multiple    
   Crop farming and others*  10 8 
   Crop farming and chainsaw milling   8 7 
 * Others include tailor, hair plaiting, seamstress, driving, mechanics, trading, livestock, charcoal production and 
teaching.  
Source: Field survey, 2009. 
 
This situation generated misunderstanding and grievance among the community 
members on the use of the so-called ‘open access’ portion of the forest reserve that 
would be available for farming (Figure 7.2a & 7.2b). Community members who were 
aggrieved because portions of their admitted farms are now part of the GSBA extended 
their farms into the reserve ‘illegally’ (according to statutory law), with the risk of FSD 
officials arresting them or destroying their crops. Discussions with FSD officials about 
                                                 
14
  Migrants and indigenes live together peacefully in the community, which confirms the pronouncement 
of the chief of Nkawie-Panin during a community meeting in November 2008 that migrants help to 
build a community.  
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the ‘open access land’ as perceived by the community, revealed that such a situation 
would be impossible and that they were not aware of the problem since they had ‘never 
received any written complaints from the inhabitants of Kyekyewere’. Despite being 
made aware of the problem through this study, the FSD has not conducted any field 
verification thus far to dispute or agree on the assertion made by the local inhabitants.  
– The inhabitants’ socio-economic characteristics  
Kyekyewere currently has an estimated population of between 400-500 adults, of whom 
119 individuals were involved in the survey. Table 7.1 shows the gender distribution of 
the respondents as being 83 males (70%) and 36 females (30%). The majority of the 
respondents (53%) are in the age range of 35-53, followed by 18-34 (36%) with the rest 
being older than 53. Generally speaking, the literacy level among the respondents is 
high with 76% having completed middle and junior high school (9
th
 grade) and 4% hav-
ing completed senior high school.  
Most respondents (86%) are Christians and the indigenes (55%) slightly outnumber 
the migrants (45%). The number of years that migrants have resided in the village 
ranges from a minimum of one month to a maximum of 43 years with the average being 
6 years. The migrants originate from other parts of the Ashanti region and from the 
Western, Eastern, Volta Brong Ahafo and Central Regions (Figure 7.3). Photo 7.1 pro-
vides a pictorial view of the Kyekyewere village as situated in the forest reserve. 
Eighty-four per cent (84%) of the respondents are engaged in a single occupation while 
16% have multiple occupations. Food crop farming (commonly slash-and-burn agri-
culture, with cassava, plantain and vegetables as the main crops) is the lead occupation, 
with 57% practising it as a single occupation, 9% combining it with other activities such 
as tailoring, sewing, driving, trading, livestock raising and charcoal production and 7% 
combining it with chainsaw milling. Other occupations include chainsaw milling (11% 
*Three of the respondents did not indicate their geographical origin. 
 Source: Field survey, 2009. 
Figure 7.3    Geographical origin of the inhabitants of Kyekyewere according regions  
   (n = 116)  
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as the sole occupation), trading (5%), handicraft (4%), farm labour (3%), teaching (2%), 
and chainsaw rental (2%).  
– Contribution of forest resources to people’s livelihoods  
Resources from the forest reserve contribute to the livelihoods of the inhabitants of 
Kyekyewere in the form of chainsaw milling, NTFPs for domestic use or trade, farming 
land, or a combination of these (see Figure 7.4). 
Most respondents (74%) collect NTFPs for domestic use. For 61% this is the only 
way they make use of the forest reserve, and for 13% it is one of the ways in which re-
sources from the forest reserve contribute to their livelihoods. The NTFPs collected 
include mushrooms, pestles, game, snails, medicinal plants and chewing sticks. Sec-
ondly, the reserve contributes to people’s livelihood through illegal chainsaw milling 
(11%) followed by illegal farming (9%). Sixteen per cent of the respondents make use 
of forest resources in multiple ways. However, 27% of the respondents reported that the 
forest does not contribute to their livelihoods, with the reasons being as follows:  
‘I have a passion for farming in the off-reserve area’  
‘As a teacher, I am against illegal operations in the reserve’ 
‘I am afraid of being arrested for operating in the forest’ 
‘The forest is government property’ 
‘The nature of my occupation does not allow for extra time to engage in forest activities’ 
‘There are restrictions on entering the forest’  
‘I was cheated by someone who leased part of the forest to me’ 
‘I am too old to go into the forest’ 
‘I am new and access to the forest is restricted’  
Source: Field survey 2009. 
Figure 7.4     Use of the forest reserve by inhabitants of Kyekyewere 
(n=87)  
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During field data collection, some of the community members were carrying canes and 
wrapping leaves from the forest for commercial use as shown in Photos 7.2 and 7.3 re-
spectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 7.2     A man carrying a bundle of canes 
 Photo 7.3     A woman and child with head loads of wrapping leaves 
140 
 
– Problems associated with livelihood components based in the forest reserve  
Even though the local people in Kyekyewere village benefit from resources in the forest 
reserve, this is not without problems. The perceived problems can be grouped under 
several headings. 
First, there are problems related to physical assets. One of these is the damage to 
both internal and external forest boundary pillars, because of which admitted farms ex-
tend into the designated forest reserve. Another problem is that of rotten food crops due 
to a poor road network and difficult transportation between the village and the market 
centre of the district capital Nyinahin.  
Second, there are problems related to access to natural assets. Respondents m en-
tioned the lack of farming land due to a growing population and refusal by the FSD to 
extend the area of admitted farms. They also stressed that access to NTFPs is not easy, 
both physically (hilled terrain) and legally. Finally, respondents complained about the 
lack of a plantation scheme in the village like the modified taungya system (MTS) 
which provides access to farming land during the first 3-4 years of plantation estab-
lishment (see Chapter 8). A third problem relates to what the villagers perceive as social 
injustice, i.e. the lack of possibilities to farm and extract forest products on a legally 
acceptable basis. Fear and the lack of negotiation skills stop inhabitants from fighting or 
petitioning for legal use of the forest reserve.  
Fourth, there are several problems related to governance. In this context the re-
spondents mentioned the numerous rules and regulations governing the forest reserve. 
The villagers are of the opinion that they receive inadequate clarification from the FSD 
regarding their rights to enter the forest. Some of them mentioned the illegality of 
chainsaw lumbering as a problem, with confiscation of lumber and equipment being the 
result when caught. Others identified the payment of bribes to transport the lumber to 
the market as a problem. 
Fifth, the respondents mentioned the high population growth versus limited avail-
ability of farmlands. 
Finally, there are several conflict situations that pose a challenge to the respondents, 
such as the confiscation of NTFPSs by forest guards and the constant fear of being ar-
rested when entering the forest reserve without a permit. Boundary litigation and land 
ownership conflicts are also widespread. Finally, there are conflicts over tree ownership 
among chainsaw operators. More details on these conflicts can be found in the sections 
below.  
 
– Actor analysis by community representatives related to access use of admitted farming  
   and illegal farming in the reserve 
As discussed in Chapter 4, twenty-two representatives from the two case study areas 
(Chirayaso and Nyinahin) bordering the Tano-Offin reserve and the admitted village 
conducted an actor analysis for five forest-based livelihood components in a workshop. 
The results for the analysis of actors involved in NTFP extraction were presented in 
Chapter 4. This section presents the actor analyses for admitted and illegal farming. 
Those for the modified taungya system and chainsaw milling are discussed in Chapters 
8 and 9 respectively. The respondents’ actor analysis focused on actors inside and out-
side the community as can be seen in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.  
The respondents asserted that each of the five actor groups involved in admitted 
farming has its own main concern, interests, needs and power position (Table 7.2). 
These differences also illustrate the nature of interactions, which may be com-
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patible/complementing or conflicting. The actor analysis is also illustrative of the differ-
ent levels of scale at which the different actors operate, with three of them (i.e. land-
owners, neighbouring farmers and tenant farmers) mostly residing in the village, the 
FSD which is based in Nkawie but which has officials at the resource base and the 
chainsaw operators from either the village or towns in the region. In terms of power, the 
respondents assign a score of 3 to actors involved in chainsaw milling, indicating that 
these are less powerful when it comes to the right to access natural resources (e.g. tim-
ber from people’s admitted farms). 
Similarly, when it comes to illegal farming in the reserve (Table 7.3), the respon-
dents indicated that illegal farmers and food crop thieves are in the lower positions of 
power, with no access rights to the reserve to perform their tasks (i.e. farming or steal-
ing people’s food crops). Members of the Community Biodiversity Advisory Groups 
(CBAGs; see Chapter 5) and the FSD official (usually the forest guard) are considered 
to be in higher positions of power. In both analyses, the shaded portions of the tables 
indicate the actors that operate mostly at community level, whereas the other actors can 
come from within the community setting or from district, regional or national levels. 
 
Table 7.2 Actor analysis by community representatives relating to admitted farming in the forest  
 reserve  
 Actors  FSD Land owners  Neighbouring 
farmers  
Tenant 
farmers  
Chainsaw 
operator  
Main 
concern  
Sustainable forest 
management 
Lease lands to 
obtain money 
Land availability Protection of 
their share of 
farm produce 
Lumber 
production 
Interest  Rigid forest laws 
to deter en-
croachers 
More tenant 
farmers 
Food security Ensure 
his/her share 
of farm pro-
duce 
Trees to 
saw into 
lumber 
Needs Logistics to per-
form his/her 
duties  
Money and food A good social life 
(i.e. good contacts 
with neighbours) 
Money and 
food 
Permit 
Power 
position* 
1 1 1 2 3 
* Key: 1 = most powerful; 2 = powerful; 3 = less powerful. 
Source: Validation meeting with the three case study communities, February 2010. 
 
Table 7.3 Actor analysis by community representatives related to illegal farming in the forest reserve 
Actors  FSD CBAGS Illegal farm-
ers  
Food crop 
thieves  
Main con-
cern 
To prevent illegal farm-
ing 
To protect the forest To get food 
and income 
To obtain 
food crops 
Interest To protect trees and 
animals 
To ensure no one enters the 
forest to farm 
To get food 
and income 
Money, food 
Needs Logistics Logistics (Wellington boots, 
identity card etc.) 
Money, legal 
right to farm 
in the forest 
Jobs, em-
ployment 
Power 
position* 
1 2 3 3 
* Key: 1 = most powerful; 2 = powerful; 3 = less powerful. 
Source: Validation meeting with the three case study communities February 2010. 
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Box 7.1 The positions of sub-chiefs 
 
The positions of the sub-chiefs are derived from military ranks as follows:  
1. The Kurontihene and Akwamuhene are the chief No. 1 war generals. 
2. The Adontehene is the one who leads the army from the front. He is the head of the 
main army (foot soldiers). 
3. The Kyidomhene is the last to go. He collects the soldiers who are left behind and 
sends them back into the fray.  
4. The Gyasehene is the custodian of the chief’s palace regalia and paraphernalia. 
5. The Ankobeahene is the caretaker of the palace and stays at home when the others 
go to war. 
6. The Sanaahene is the caretaker of the chief’s money.  
7. The Nkosuohene is responsible for the development of the traditional area. This title 
was created to honour someone who does not have to be member of a royal family. 
Some foreigners have been honoured with this title. 
 
Source: Nana. S.A. Derkyi, personal communication, September 2011. 
The governing system (GS) 
This section first presents the customary and statutory systems that govern the Tano-
Offin GSBA, followed by a description of the institutional structure prevailing in this 
case. 
The customary system 
The traditional council (known locally as Nananom Atenankonwa) consists of the chief, 
the queen mother and elders. In addition to these are sub-chiefs, including the ‘Kuronti-
hene’, ‘Akwamuhene’, ‘Adontenhene’, ‘Kyidomhene’, ‘Gyaasehene, Ankobeahene, 
‘Sanaahene’ and ‘Nkosouhene’ as well as the Okyeame (i.e. the chief linguist) (See Box 
7.1). Their positions at the chief palace are hierarchical and derived from military ranks, 
which can be traced back to the history of the Ashanti Kingdom. 
Traditional authority is organised according to a hierarchical order, with the Ashanti 
King, the Asantehene, at the highest level. The powers and authority held by the tradi-
tional chief and his sub-chiefs at the village level are lesser than those with the same 
title at the divisional level which, in turn, are subordinate to these positions at the para-
mount level. Although the management of forest resources falls under the jurisdiction of 
the state, there is a legacy of customary institutions to conserve forest resources. The 
culture of the people in and around the reserve is intrinsically linked with the forest and 
the people perceive the forest as a cultural heritage left by their ancestors that has to be 
preserved for future generations.  
There is also the perception that the forest helps to stabilise the ecology of the area. 
For that reason, there are several so-called taboos, such as those prohibiting the hunting 
of some animals which are regarded as totems of some clans or taboos regarding farm-
ing and harvesting of forest products on certain days or by certain groups. For instance, 
porcupines are believed to be eaten by the Ashanti chiefs only. In addition, saplings of 
economically or culturally important trees or herbs tend to be preserved, protected from 
fire and nurtured into maturity on both food and tree crop farms.Examples of such trees 
include Esa (Celtis mildbreadi) and Odum (Milicia excelsa). Some plants, such as 
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‘Ahomakyem’ (Spiropetalum heterophyllum) and ‘odii’ (Okoubaka aubrevellei) are be-
lieved to have certain spiritual powers
15
 as well as important medicinal properties and 
people tend to conserve them for those reasons (c.f. Kyereh et al. 2006: 12-13). 
The community elders reported that there are various reasons for the institutionalisa-
tion of taboos by ancestors and that they differ from one locality to the other. In 
Kyekyewere village, one day (Tuesday) is set aside each week to ensure rest from con-
tinuous work in the previous days, to settle disputes, and for people to get to know 
themselves well. More importantly, such taboo or period of rest at home helps to protect 
and multiply the natural resources, including forests trees and wildlife.  
Other taboos do not allow menstruating women to cross certain water bodies (rivers 
and streams) in order to ensure hygiene, or to consume certain fishes in some rivers or 
streams, in order to ensure their multiplication.  
Locally, therefore, the institution of taboos used to contribute to the sustainable man-
agement of the forest and its resources. However, the elders revealed that, within the 
local setting, the institutions have weakened as a result of multiple factors such as popu-
lation increase and migration resulting in the influx of different cultures.  
– Traditional means of resolving conflicts at the local level  
Three modes of governance were observed in the village with regard to managing con-
flicts. The first is self-governance that is linked with the traditional council of the vil-
lage. The second is the hierarchical one, which is linked with both the local traditional 
council and the divisional traditional council. The third mode is co-governance, which is 
a blend of actors from different governing structures.  
In Kyekyewere, the chief, queen mother and elders form a dispute-settling group (lo-
cally called ‘Apamfo’) that includes the various sub-chiefs outlined in the previous sec-
tion. When dealing with a conflict, the resolution process unfolds as follows: First, the 
complainant files a complaint by paying a filing fee ranging from GH¢ 3.00 - GH¢ 7.00 
(US$ 2 - US$ 5) and the defendant also pays an equal amount as a challenging fee (lo-
cally called ‘mpeeso’) before the parties are summoned for the resolution process. The 
chief and his team come together on an agreed day, call the two parties involved in the 
case, hear them, and judge the case objectively. After settling the case, both parties are 
required to pay the ‘sisitodee’ (which literally means ‘sitting allowance’) for the chief 
and elders. However, if one of the parties is found to be guilty, s/he has to pay a charge 
to the innocent party as well as to pay back the part of the ‘sisitodee’ paid by the inno-
cent party. The chief or leader of the dispute-settling team usually receives the filing fee 
as a compensation for polishing his traditional footwear whereas the other members 
share the sitting allowance among themselves.  
Sometimes, the Unit Committee members (see Chapter 5) settle conflict cases inde-
pendently of the chief’s dispute-settling team, especially those that deal with non-
participation in communal activities, but only with permission from the chief. These two 
modalities can be labelled as self-governance. Hierarchical governance starts to play a  
 
 
                                                 
15
  Falconer revealed that ‘odii’ (Okoubaka aubrevellei), and ‘ahomakyem’ (Spiropetalum heterophyllum) 
are considered sacred and that there are taboos that protect them or rituals that have to be performed 
before they can be used. For example, an egg must be given to the 'ahomakyem' climber before a piece 
can be cut for use, and before any part of the 'odii' can be used, a libation must be poured (Falconer 
1992). 
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role when the traditional council cannot resolve an issue, and submits it to a higher chief 
to whom the village chief owes allegiance. This is often the case with land conflicts. In 
the Kyekyewere village, for instance, the two local chiefs present unresolved land dis-
putes to chiefs at the level of the Nkawie-Panin and Nyinahin stools to which the village 
belongs. 
In some cases a co-governance arrangement is in place, with dispute-settling groups 
comprising the traditional council, the Unit Committee members (statutory local gov-
ernment) and – depending on the issue – a representative of the Forestry Commission. 
Box 7.2  Forest Protection Decree 1974 NRCD 243 as amended by 
 the Protection Amendment Act 2002, Act 624 
 
1. ‘‘Any person who in a Forest Reserve without the written consent of the compe-
tent forest authority 
(a)  fells, uproots, lops, girdles, taps damages by fire or otherwise damages any 
tree or timber; 
(b)  makes or cultivates any farm or erects any building; 
(c)  causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree or cutting or removing 
any timber; 
(d)  sets fire to any grass or herbage, or kindles a fire without taking due precau-
tion to prevent its spread; 
(e)  makes or lights a fire contrary to any order of the Forestry Commission; 
(f)  in any way obstructs the channel of any river, stream, canal or creek; 
(g)  hunts, shoots, fishes, poison water or sets traps or snares; 
(h)  subjects any forest produce to any manufacturing process or collects, con-
veys or removes any forest produce; or 
(i)  pastures cattle or permits any cattle to trespass;  
commits an offence against the state and is liable to summary conviction to a fine 
not exceeding 500 penalty units or to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or to 
both, except that for a second or subsequent offence under this section the of-
fender shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than 250 penalty 
units or to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or to both. 
 
2. Any person who  
(a)  knowingly counterfeits or fraudulently uses upon timber or standing a mark or 
indicates that the timber or tree is the property of any person;  
(b)  without the written consent of a Forest Officer alters, defaces or obliterates a 
mark placed on any timber or tree; or  
(c)  alters, moves, destroys or defaces any boundary mark of any Forest Re-
serve;  
commits an offence and is on summary conviction liable to a fine not exceeding 
500 penalty units or to imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or to both, except 
that for a second or subsequent offence under this section the offender shall be 
liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than 250 penalty units or to im-
prisonment not exceeding 3 years or to both. 
A ‘competent forest authority’ means a forest officer with the rank not below As-
sistant District Manager who is able to take decisions on behalf of the Executive 
Director of the Forest Services Division or the Chief Executive of the Forestry 
Commission.’’ 
 
Source: Ghana Forestry Commission (undated) http://76.12.220.51/library.php?id=15 (ac-
cessed on 6 October 2011) 
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The latter is for instance the case, when the conflict is forestry-related, such as access of 
NTFPs on commercial basis without a permit. It is interesting to note that a member(s) 
of the Unit Committee may also hold a position as a sub-chief or vice-visa, which illus-
trates the fluidity of actor constellations at the community level.  
The inhabitants of Kyekyewere therefore have several mechanisms in place to ensure 
peace through the amalgamation of actors from customary and statutory structures. As 
also detailed later in this chapter, the traditional council plays an important role in re-
solving forest livelihood conflicts at village level. 
The statutory framework 
The enactment of the Forest Ordinance (Cap 157) of 1927 gave the then Forestry De-
partment the authority to select land suitable for reservation and declare them forest 
reserves. At the onset of the reservation process, some land and forest ownership rights 
remained unaltered in the form of admitted farms or villages and admitted or communal 
rights (see Chapter 5). Both rights are granted in the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve. Admit-
ted or communal rights encompass hunting rights, footpaths to water sources and the 
right to collect non-timber forest products (NTFPs) for communal use. Another law that 
restricted people’s access and use rights to forest resources was the Forest Protection 
Decree NRCD 243 of 1974 amended by the Forest Protection Amendment Act 2002 
(Act 624). This Act determines that all operations within forest reserves (with the ex-
ception of NTFP extraction for communal use) require written permission from the For-
estry Commission with punishments being imposed if permission is not sought with a 
FSD official higher than a technical officer or forest guards (see Box 7.2). The District 
Forest Services Division (FSD) of the Forestry Commission (FC) is formally responsi-
ble for the management of the reserves at the micro level. The range supervisors and 
forest guards are the frontline officials in contact with the local communities. Within the 
protected area, the mandates of the forest guards are to clean the forest boundary lines 
and to patrol the reserve in order to prevent forest crimes such as encroachment, poach-
ing, illegal logging and farming. The court and the police play a prominent role with 
respect to enforcement of these laws. The arrest and prosecution of an offender is done 
by the police, mandated to do so by the laws of Ghana (see Chapter 5). The court pro-
nounces judgement on offenders based on evidence presented by the prosecutor(s), ap-
plying offence laws such as Act 624 and Act 547 to fine the offender when guilty (see 
Chapter 11 for some of these judgements and the laws applied). 
Hybrid governance  
In addition to the customary and statutory governing system, two hybrid actors in the 
village’s local governance system were also identified. These are the Unit Committee 
(UC) and the Community Biodiversity Advisory Group (CBAG). Unit Committees 
form the basic structure of the local governance system. They are elective bodies with a 
legal basis in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and associated decentralisation laws 
(Ayce 2003). A unit is normally a settlement or a group of settlements with a population 
of between 500 and 1,000 people in rural areas and a higher population (1,500 or more) 
in urban areas. Unit Committees, consisting of representatives of stakeholder groupings 
(i.e. the youth, civil servants, women, etc.) in a community, are in close contact with the 
inhabitants and play roles in education, organisation of communal labour, revenue rais-
ing and ensuring environmental cleanliness, registration of births and deaths, and the 
implementation and monitoring of self-help projects. The CBAG was created by the 
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Forestry Commission during the creation of the GSBA in the designated forest reserves 
with a view to acquiring community assistance in the management of the protected area. 
It is composed of representatives of several stakeholder groupings at village level (i.e. 
the Unit Committee, youth, women, traditional leaders, etc.). The CBAG assists in 
cleaning the GSBA boundaries and serves as a mouthpiece for the community in GSBA 
matters. However, according to local community members, it is little incentive to par-
ticipate in the CBAG because of poor wages for cleaning the forest boundaries and a 
lack of proper identification means (e.g. badges with identity cards) through which 
CBAG members can be recognised as such. 
Governance interactions 
Three issues were observed with regard to the governance interactions in the area under 
study in this chapter. The first relates to the functioning of the CBAGs. The CBAGs 
were designed within the framework of a so-called co-management approach, which 
calls for the active partnership or involvement of the local people in the management of 
the forest resources. However, it was observed that in practice hierarchical ‘command-
and-control’ prevails, resulting in its opposition by many of the local people, mainly in 
the form of illegal resource use. The second issue is the operationalisation of the par-
ticipatory management plan of the GSBA formulated in 2007. The primary aim of the 
participatory plan is to ensure the continued existence and integrity of the Tano-Offin 
GSBA. In view of that, the FC consulted different stakeholder groups to assess how this 
aim could be fulfilled. The plan has six objectives that include: (i) the protection and 
conservation of the biological and socio-cultural resources within the GSBA, (ii) the 
development of its eco-tourism potential, (iii) ensuring optimum flow of benefits to the 
local people, (iv) encouraging and promoting education and research within the GSBA, 
(v) promoting revenue optimisation for the management of the GSBA, and (vi) enhanc-
ing the environmental services such as sink for carbon sequestration, protection of soils 
and water on a sustainable basis. However, since its formulation in 2007, the manage-
ment plan is not yet operational, as a result of which no progress has been made towards 
the achieving these objectives.  
The third issue refers to compensation strategies put in place to assist communities 
affected by the establishment of GSBAs. This followed the recognition that the creation 
of GSBAs could result in a loss of revenue and access to NTFPs for local communities 
in and around the reserve. Community investment funds (CIF) were established to help 
the affected communities to engage in alternative livelihood projects.
16
 Within this 
framework, training in alternative livelihood ventures such as grasscutter and small ru-
minant rearing has been given to ten people from the admitted village and a revolving 
fund was set up as micro-enterprise start-up capital. However, during data collection, it 
was observed that most of these ventures, especially grasscutter rearing, no longer ex-
isted. 
                                                 
16
  Another strategy employed in GSBA areas since 2002 is the involvement of local communities in 
reforestation schemes in degraded parts of the forest reserves using the modified taungya system 
(MTS; see Chapter 8 and Insaidoo et al. forthcoming). This does not apply to the case addressed in 
this chapter and people in the admitted village are not involved in the MTS scheme because of the 
GSBA. 
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Conflicts and conflict management in the Tano-Offin GBSA:  
Images, instruments and actions 
This section analyses conflicts and conflict management in the Tano-Offin GSBA using 
the conflict wheel developed by Mason & Rychard (2005) (see Chapter 2). The use of 
the conflict wheel enables an in-depth analysis of the various dimensions of conflicts
17
 
and the coming to grips with the three orders of day-to-day conflict management (im-
ages, instruments and actions). Based on the survey outcomes, the issues, actors, causes 
and dynamics reflect the respondents’ images that underlie the choice of instruments. 
The instruments and actions are addressed thereafter.  
Issues 
The survey revealed that two forest-related conflict types prevail in the study area: those 
related to forest resources and those related to forestland use. The first includes conflicts 
related to chainsaw milling, commercial NTFP extraction, the gathering of NTFPs for 
domestic use and hunting. Conflicts relating to forestland use evolve from illegal farm-
ing and the extension of admitted farms. Table 7.4 indicates the number of respondents 
who mentioned each conflict type when they were asked whether they are aware of any 
forest and tree-related conflict in the Tano-Offin GSBA. The most frequently mentioned 
conflicts are those relating to chainsaw milling (53%), extension of admitted farms 
(49%) and illegal farming (34%).  
 
Table 7.4 Livelihood components around which conflicts evolve 
Livelihood component  Respondents who mentioned the conflict types*
18
 
 (n) (%) 
Chainsaw milling 
NTFPs for domestic use (plants) 
NTFPs for commercial use (plants) 
Hunting 
Extension of admitted farms 
Illegal farming 
 63  (53%) 
 5  (4%) 
 18  (15%) 
 6   (5%) 
 58  (49%) 
 40   (34%) 
* N = 119; more than one conflict type could be mentioned. Source: Field survey 2009. 
Actors involved  
The actors involved in livelihood conflicts in the Tano-Offin GSBA operate at different 
levels of scale, namely at community, district, regional and national levels (Figure 7.5). 
In each conflict type, most of the actors belong to the community setting while the rest 
cut across the district, regional and national levels.  
The principal actors in chainsaw milling are the chainsaw operators. These include 
community members (either indigenes or migrants) and external operators who mi-
grated from elsewhere purposely to engage in the milling activity. Counterparts in the 
conflicts include the FSD and military or the FSD and police officials
19
, lumber buyers 
and carriers. In addition, traditional authorities, community members and farmers are 
involved in conflicts with chainsaw operators. There are also conflicts among the opera-
tors themselves. Most respondents (76%) perceive the chainsaw operators to be the lead 
actors in conflicts because their actions conflict with the prevailing statutory forest leg-
                                                 
17
  The context of the six dimensions was addressed earlier in this chapter. 
18
  Not all the questions on conflict dynamics and management strategies related to the different conflict 
types that are dealt with here were responded to by all the respondents. 
19
  See Chapter 6.  
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islations and because they steal and fight over stolen trees among themselves or with 
forestry officials or farmers. The FSD/military teams are also blamed (by 14% of the 
respondents) because of the coercive strategy they employ when arresting the culprits. 
In the midst of this blame game, some respondents (10%) accuse the national and local 
governments of taking inadequate steps to create employment, and this contributes to 
the prevalence of chainsaw operations within the reserve. Less visible to the respon-
dents, but behind the operators, are actors at district and national levels who finance the 
operations.  
 
Source: Field survey 2009. 
 
Actors involved in conflicts around NTFP collection for domestic use and hunting 
are mainly village inhabitants. Their counterparts in the conflicts are FSD officials. Ac-
tors involved in commercial NTFP trade are mainly outsiders, but also resident villag-
ers. As shown in Figure 7.2, actors involved in the extension of admitted farms include 
farmers in conflict with other farmers with whom they share a common boundary, or 
with FSD officials, chainsaw millers, food crop thieves, farm labourers or family mem-
bers. The survey data revealed that most instances of this conflict type (reported by 48% 
of the respondents) occur among farmers who share common boundaries.  
Figure 7.5   Multi-level analysis of actors involved in livelihood conflicts in Tano-Offin 
  GSBA (Kyekyewere village), Ghana  
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Finally, conflicts arising from illegal farming occur between illegal farmers (both na-
tives and migrants) on the one side, and FSD officials, the military taskforce, CBAGs, 
or chiefs and elders on the other. Conflicts also occur between illegal farmers and the 
native community members of Kyekyewere. Most of the respondents (80%) perceived 
the illegal farmers to be the ‘villains’ because they have no legal right to farm in the 
forest.  
Causes 
Multiple factors contribute to conflicts, including both antecedent conditions and mani-
fest (observable) behaviour, with incompatible claims to forest land and resources being 
the underlying cause of all of them (Table 7.5).  
 
 
Table 7.5 Antecedents and manifest behaviour leading to forest livelihoods conflicts in Tano-Offin  
 GSBA 
Kind of livelihood 
conflict  
Antecedents conditions Manifest behaviour  
Chainsaw milling  Hardship  
Scarcity of farmlands 
Inadequate job opportunities 
Mistrust between actors 
Greed 
Theft among chainsaw operators  
Felling trees without a permit  
Cheating other lumber operators or 
lumber carriers  
Application of force by FC/military 
officials during arrest 
NTFPs for domestic 
use  
Hardship and need for forest resources  
Competing claims among collectors 
Entering the reserve for NTFP 
collection without a permit or per-
mission from forest guards  
Excessive use relative to other 
collectors 
NTFPs for commercial 
use  
Hardship 
Need for income 
Entry into the reserve without a 
permit 
Hunting  Need for income Hunting during the closed season 
between August and December  
Admitted farming  Land scarcity because of population 
increase 
Absence or decay of border markers 
Extension of admitted farms into 
forest or neighbouring farms 
Illegal farming  Land scarcity 
FSD failure to provide extra farmlands 
Hardship 
Landownership/boundary disputes 
Entry into the forest reserve to farm 
Source: Field survey 2009. 
 
 
The manifest behaviour which leads to conflicts relating to illegal chainsaw milling 
is felling trees without a permit, theft and cheating among chainsaw operators, and the 
use of violence in confrontations with FSD and military officials. The antecedent condi-
tions at community level are mainly hardship, scarcity of farmland and a lack of job 
opportunities. At higher levels of scale, both need and greed (e.g. of timber traders, 
chainsaw millers) are underlying factors. 
Manifest behaviour resulting in conflicts relating to NTFP extraction and hunting in-
cludes entering the reserve without a permit, excessive NTFP use relative to other 
community members, and disregard for the legal ban on hunting (‘closed season’) from 
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August to December.
20
 The antecedent conditions that trigger these conflicts are hard-
ship, competing claims and the need for cash income. Extension of admitted farms into 
the GSBA and/or on land claimed by neighbouring farmers are the key immediate 
causes of admitted farm conflicts, with the antecedent conditions being land scarcity 
due to the village’s location in the middle of a forest reserve and unclear borders (due to 
absence or decay of border markers). The key immediate cause of illegal farming con-
flicts is entry into the forest reserve to farm (identified by 45% of the respondents). An-
tecedent conditions include land scarcity, FSD failure to provide extra farmlands, hard-
ship and landownership/boundary disputes.  
Conflicts dynamics 
The key effects of the conflicts described above are hatred, insults and fights between 
actors, the destruction of food crops, the evacuation of illegal farmers, the confiscation 
of chainsaws and/or lumber by forestry officials and the arrest or prosecution or impris-
onment of offenders. In some instances, the offenders receive beatings from the 
FSD/military patrolling team or vice-versa that sometimes lead to injuries and death. 
The conflicts appear to occur all year round.  
Chainsaw milling conflicts occur when chainsaw operators are confronted by either 
the FSD or the military officials when they enter the forest to fell trees, during transpor-
tation of the lumber to the market, or when they fight among themselves over money or 
logs. Respondents distinguished between two kinds of conflict stages namely non-
violent and violent. It was noted that these qualifications were subjective and not under-
pinned by explicit criteria. This means that a conflict type could be classified as violent 
by one respondent and non-violent by another, depending on how the respondents per-
ceived the incidence. The respondents’ perceptions of a conflict stage being non-violent 
or violent may be in line with how local people give meanings to the term ‘conflict’. In 
the local language, Twi, a distinction is made between either (i) ntawatawa, which indi-
cates a difference of opinion or misunderstanding, or (ii) ntokwa, which is a more severe 
conflict or indicates a violent clash. Table 7.6 presents the conflict stages reported as 
non-violent and violent by the respondents for each conflict type.  
 
 
Table 7.6  Respondents’ opinions about conflict severity  
Conflict types Conflict severity 
(no. of respondents indicating the respective per conflict type) 
Non-violent Violent 
Chainsaw milling (n=61) 54 7 
NTFPs for domestic use (n=5) 5 - 
NTFPs for commercial use 
(n=16) 
16 - 
Hunting (n=6) 6 - 
Extension of admitted farms 
(n=56) 
56 - 
Illegal farming (n=36) 29 7 
* N = 119; more than one issue could be mentioned. Source: Field survey 2009. 
 
                                                 
20
  The Wildlife Conservation Regulation of 1971 (LI 685) and its amendments (LI 1284, LI 1357 and LI 
1452) establishes a four-month period from 1 August to 1 December during which it is not allowed to 
hunt for any animal, except for grasscutters (Thryonomys swinderianus). This period coincides with 
the breeding season for most animals. 
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Seven respondents mentioned violent conflict incidences relating to chainsaw mill-
ing. Five of them referred to conflicts between operators and a team of FSD officials 
and the military because of the use of force by both parties. The other two respondents 
referred to conflicts between chainsaw operators due to money disputes and/or stealing 
of logs.  
Among the five respondents who responded to conflicts relating to NTFP extraction 
for domestic use, the conflict incidences witnessed were found to be non-violent. This 
type of conflict does not occur frequently, provided the inhabitants do not exceed the 
average communal use quantity (normally estimated as ‘head load’) and provided per-
mission has been asked from the forest guards. As shown in Table 7.6, conflicts relating 
to NTFP extraction for commercial use were also qualified as non-violent, as were hunt-
ing and the extension of admitted farms. Unlike other conflict types, which occur 
throughout the year, hunting conflicts mainly occur during the ‘closed season’ between 
August and December when hunting is prohibited. Conflicts relating to the extension of 
admitted farms also occur throughout the year, but are more frequent at the beginning of 
the farming season or during the harvesting season (when people steal food crops or 
when there is a misunderstanding between landowners and tenants or among family 
members about crop-sharing mechanisms or when admitted farms extend into the forest 
reserve.  
Illegal farming conflicts occur whenever a farmer enters and farms in the reserve and 
is confronted by either a forestry official or a community member who is a CBAG 
member or someone who claims the same piece of land. Conflicts also arise in cases of 
boundary disputes with neighbouring illegal farmers or food crop theft. The peak sea-
sons for such conflicts are the onset of the farming and the harvesting seasons. Similarly 
to chainsaw milling, only seven of the respondents classified this conflict type as vio-
lent.  
Instruments: Conflict management strategies  
Negotiation is generally used to resolve the conflicts relating to the six forest liveli-
hoods conflicts types (Figure 7.6; see Chapter 2 for the different conflict management 
strategies). The most frequently reported coping strategy in chainsaw milling is negotia-
tion (58% of the respondents) and includes (i) negotiating a fair deal among chainsaw 
operators, between chainsaw operators and farmers and sometimes between operators 
and forest guards and (ii) negotiation through bribery, which involves chainsaw opera-
tors and FSD/military personnel. Avoidance (i.e. escape because of fear) was found to 
be the second most important coping strategy represented by 27% of the respondents. 
Other strategies observed are arbitration, coercion and adjudication. A mixture of me-
diation and facilitation was found to be used by the chief and elders or the Unit Com-
mittees at village level to resolve conflicts among chainsaw operators, between chain-
saw operators and lumber buyers, or between chainsaw operators and lumber carriers.  
In the case of NTFP extraction for domestic use (n=5), the most common conflict 
management strategy is mediation, mentioned by 80% of the respondents with chief and 
elders acting as mediators. Only one person (20%) mentioned avoidance as being the 
prevailing coping strategy: the offenders abscond for fear of being arrested. Similarly, in 
conflicts relating to commercial NTFP extraction most respondents mentioned nego-
tiation between extractors and forest guards as the most commonly employed conflict 
resolution strategy. Other strategies included adjudication and avoidance. In hunting 
conflicts, two conflict management strategies prevail: arbitration through the district 
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court system and negotiation (mentioned by 80% and 20% of the respondents respec-
tively. Here the magistrate normally resolves such an offence using arbitration (giving a 
mild sanction to the offender) rather than the adjudication process by fining the culprit 
based on the level of offence. Alternatively, if the offender pleads with the official upon 
arrest, he receives a warning not to lay game traps again. The most common coping 
strategy reported in relation to admitted farm conflicts is a blend of mediation-
arbitration (54% of the respondents), followed by negotiation (19%), facilitation and 
moderation (16%) and avoidance (11%) (Figure 7.6). 
Actors involved in mediation–arbitration include the chief and elders, family elders, 
landowners, a joint team of chief and elders or Unit Committees. Negotiation occurs 
mainly in conflicts among farmers, between the FSD and the community, and between 
the FSD and farmers. Facilitation and moderation often involves the creation of a spe-
cial conflict resolution team made up of family elders or a joint team of chief and elders, 
forest guards and Unit Committee members.  
Just like coping strategies in chainsaw milling, illegal farming conflicts were ob-
served to employ four conflict management avoidance modes because of a prevailing 
feeling of fear (mentioned by 53% of the respondents). Other modes reported by the 
respondents included negotiation (23%), mediation (15%) and coercion (9%). Actors 
Figure 7.6   Proportion of respondents indicating which conflict management strategies 
   prevailed for each conflict type  
  Source: Field survey 2009. 
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involved in the conflict management processes were the chief and elders, Unit Commit-
tee members, assemblypersons, FSD officials and the police.  
Perceived effectiveness of managing livelihood conflicts in the forest reserve 
The survey in the village of Kyekyewere on how actors in conflict management suc-
ceeded in managing the conflicts effectively generated a range of different views. Of the 
99 respondents who responded to the question, 74% (n=73) were of the opinion that 
conflict management was effective, whilst 19% said this was not always the case and 
7% were unsure about the effectiveness of conflict management strategies. Factors re-
ported as having positively influenced conflict management outcomes are the culprit’s 
acceptance of faults and supremacy of the intervening actors. The first has often resulted 
in agreements being reached based on a common understanding and tolerance between 
the parties, strong family ties and the desire for peace. The supremacy of intervening 
actors such as the Unit Committees, chiefs and elders, family elders, FSD officials, po-
lice and court also contributed to successful conflict resolution. This supremacy is 
rooted in society’s respect and fear for these actors and on the fairness of the outcomes 
to the conflict parties. Some conflict cases have been minimised because of interven-
tions of the military, police and FSD officials that made offenders abscond due to fear 
and threats. 
Nevertheless, some factors were found to hinder conflict management processes in-
cluding (i) the lack of arbitrators to plead for community members (reference was made 
to a contested piece of admitted farmland in the GSBA), (ii) greed, and (iii) impatience 
and pride on the part of the parties leading to misunderstanding and disagreement. Other 
impeding factors include the illegality of operations in the forest reserve (especially in 
chainsaw lumbering and farming) and restricted access to permits which people need to 
enter the forest.  
Discussion  
Interactions between the system-to-governed and governing system 
The system-to-be-governed analysed in this chapter is the Tano-Offin Reserve in 
Ghana’s high forest zone. Its rich biodiversity and water bodies (Kyereh et al. 2006) led 
to the creation of the GSBA. In the midst of the GSBA are the inhabitants of the admit-
ted village of Kyekyewere, whose livelihoods are linked to forest resources despite rules 
and laws that restrict their access. The location of the village makes its inhabitants 
highly dependent on forest resources and farming activities, with growing pressure on 
forest and land resources due to the growth of the village’s population since the creation 
of the forest reserve
21
 and the GSBA. The local inhabitants of the admitted village of 
Kyekyewere have few legal forest livelihood options other than access to NTFPs for 
domestic use. Most forms of forest-based livelihood components – NTFP extraction for 
commercial use without a permit, chainsaw milling, extension of admitted farms and 
farming in the reserve – are illegal according to the prevailing laws. In 1998, Ghana 
banned the use of chainsaws to process lumber. Farming within forest reserves is illegal, 
except for admitted farms and farming under reforestation schemes such as the MTS 
                                                 
21
   According to the village chief, the admitted village of Kyekyewere had about 62 inhabitants when the 
reserve was created in 1949 and an adult (>18 years) population of 450-500 during the survey. 
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(Chapter 8). The illegality relating to forest resource and land use results in conflicts 
prejudicing local people’s wellbeing.22 
The governing system actually consists of three key governing systems, including the 
statutory or formal governing system (represented by the FSD), the customary or tradi-
tional governing system (i.e. chief and elders) and a hybrid system (with actors such as 
CBAGs and the Unit Committee (UC)).
 
Each of these actors has specific roles and re-
sponsibilities in relation to forest resources management. The main actor in the statutory 
governing system, the FSD, has inadequate frontline staff and logistics to ensure effec-
tive monitoring and extension services at community level. At the same time, the forest 
reservation process, coupled with the Forest Ordinance (Cap 157) of 1927 and the Con-
cession Act of 1962, took power from traditional leaders by transferring resource alloca-
tion and ownership to the central state.  
According to Mayers & Kotey (1996), legislation with regard to forests has turned 
traditional authorities in Ghana into passive and marginalised recipients of insignificant 
and irregular shares of revenue, with no formal decision-making roles in any aspect of 
forest management. According to formal laws, traditional leaders have no legal role 
with respect to managing forest resources and, for that matter, in conflict management 
processes. However, this study revealed that the local traditional council of Kyekyewere 
is actively involved in resolving forest-related livelihood conflicts and hence contradicts 
the interpretation by Mayers & Kotey (1996).  
The Forest Protection Decree NRCD 243 of 1974 amended by the Forest Protection 
Amendment Act 2002 (Act 624) restricted people’s access to, and use of, forest re-
sources, with the exception of communal rights to domestic use of NTFPs. Only with 
permission from officials higher than forest guards and technical officials can inhabi-
tants of forest-fringe communities use forest reserve resources for trade. This is para-
doxical because the officials closest to the local communities are the forest guards. Re-
quiring permission and permits from higher officials who are difficult to access is de 
facto the same as denying local people’s formal rights to access forest resources. It is 
therefore not surprising that the introduction of permits, levies and fines for accessing 
forest resources reduced responsible local attitudes towards forest protection and man-
agement. Forest reservation and its legislations have modified tenure systems and cre-
ated a disincentive for those nearest to the resource to take responsibility for it, as was 
rightly noted by Mayers & Kotey (1996).  
The creation of the GSBA initially raised the hopes of communities for national and 
even international attention that they believed could translate into better prospects for 
external assistance in developing their livelihoods. However, the GSBA concept only 
resulted in the further restriction of community rights and denied them access to forest 
resources, without viable alternative livelihood options. Projects to create alternative 
livelihood opportunities (such as grasscutter rearing) were not successful, the MTS as a 
possible alternative was not implemented in the study area, and a participatory man-
agement plan to manage the GSBA is not yet operational. These challenges and limita-
tions correspond with findings of other authors (e.g. Nygren 2004, Coad et al. 2008) 
regarding restricted access policies and their implications for local people’s livelihoods. 
Among these are the dislocation of local people without equitable compensation, denial 
                                                 
22
  Wellbeing is an emerging concept in development debates. It is a concept that embraces three ele-
ments namely: material (what people have or do not have), relation (what people do or cannot do with 
it) and subjective (what people think or feel about their wellbeing) (Chambers 2004, McGregor 2007, 
White 2009). 
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of access, severe punishments for people who could not adhere to existing rules and 
patrolling by national security. Such a top-down ‘fence and fine’ approach (Adams & 
Hulme 2001) or ‘ecototalitarian’ approach, as Dietz (1996) termed it, is opposed in 
practice by many actors, mainly in the form of illegal resource use. It is noted that the 
FC is still evolving out of a typical civil service command-and-control structure (Young 
2005) suggesting that improvement in governance may occur with time, but it looks as 
if it is taking the FC too long to develop in line with the principles of co-management.  
Governability implications 
The interaction between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system restricted 
local people’s access to forest resources. This has resulted in different kinds of conflicts. 
The respondents identified two conflict types: those related to forest resources (timber 
and NTFPs, including game) and those related to forest land use (illegal farming and 
extension of admitted farms). This reaffirms that conflicts are inherent in natural re-
source use due to the complexity, diversity and dynamics of their natural and socioeco-
nomic environments, in which actors operate at different levels of scale (Castro & Niel-
sen 2003, Buckles & Rusnak 1999, Kooiman 2008, Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009). In 
each conflict type analysed in this chapter, most of the actors belong to the community 
setting while the rest cut across the district, regional and national levels. Most conflicts 
occur among resource users and between resource users and FC officials. The multi-
level presentation of the actors involved in the conflicts (Figure 7.5) highlights the spa-
tial distinctions between actors involved in conflict situations (Bryant 1992, Dietz 
1996). The immediate causes of conflict are often related to manifest behaviour (such as 
entering the forest reserve without a permit or stealing crops or logs from others). Be-
hind these are underlying causes (termed ‘antecedent conditions’ by Pondy (1967)) such 
as land scarcity and poverty. In terms of dynamics, only conflicts involving actors at 
community level are perceived as being the least violent, with more violence occurring 
when conflicts escalate to district level or beyond. 
Results show that actors involved in conflict management and resolution processes 
use a combination of coping strategies (Glasl 1999, Moore 2003, Engel & Korf 2005, 
Wehrmann 2008). The traditional authorities play a more important role in conflict 
management than is often assumed. The literature suggests that they no longer have a 
say in forest resource allocation and management since forest resources fall under the 
custody of the central state (Mayers & Kotey 1996, Ghana Constitution of 1992). How-
ever, these findings revealed that traditional authorities at local level still play an impor-
tant role in the management and resolution of conflicts relating to these resources. 
Even though the inhabitants of Kyekyewere presented a positive image of the way 
conflicts are currently managed, the underlying problems of a lack of access rights cou-
pled with the absence of sustainable livelihoods still prevail. The local community in the 
middle of the forest will continue to demand their rights informally through illegal ac-
cess until the prevailing statutory governing system becomes favourable to communities 
living in and within protected areas. Kyereh et al. (2006) argue that the ‘forest type like 
Tano-Offin is so unique that there are enough reasons for the area to be conserved 
since these qualities cannot easily be replaced once they are destroyed’. The above 
statement, the study findings in the Tano-Offin and other GSBAs must serve as spring-
board for forest governors to reconsider the prevailing governing systems to ensure their 
efficient interactions with the system-to-be-governed. Some implications for forest gov-
ernance and recommendations are proposed in the next section. 
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Implications of new trends in forest governance: the need for social safeguards  
The VPA strategies to combat illegal logging and improve forest governance (see Chap-
ter 5) do not consider protected areas as a management regime to ensure legality of tim-
ber resources, and therefore do not seek social safeguards for the livelihoods of local 
people in protected areas. Nevertheless, law enforcement can affect all forest manage-
ment regimes, which means that the forest-related livelihoods of protected area inhabi-
tants like the villagers of Kyekyewere will be further restricted. If the VPA is imple-
mented, there will be serious implications for protected area management.  
First, laws on illegal chainsaw milling will be strictly enforced. For illegal operators 
in timber production forests there is hope for some of them that their operations will be 
converted into legal artisanal millers as a social safeguard to ensure the continuation of 
their business (Marfo 2010). For illegal chainsaw millers in the GSBAs, however, there 
will be no such opportunity and operators are simply expected to disappear. This is very 
unlikely to happen. This suggests that, whilst the VPA could reduce conflicts in timber-
producing forests, the opposite may be the case in the GSBAs. 
Second, VPA implementation without adequate social safeguards for the GSBAs 
may lead to a situation in which local people replace chainsaw milling with illegal farm-
ing when enforcement sanctions against chainsaw milling become severe. Such a sce-
nario may be a disaster since illegal farming, if done in the middle of the reserve where 
patrolling and monitoring is minimal, can only be detected once very serious damage 
has already been caused, leading to a drastic change in the forest land-use system.  
Third, in July 2009 the researcher presented preliminary findings from this study to a 
team of key officials of Tropenbos International (TBI-) Ghana. The team led by the Di-
rector of Tropenbos made two major decisions. The first was to visit Tano-Offin to ver-
ify the situation presented in my study and second was to let a team conduct research in 
other GSBAs to assess whether the situation in Tano-Offin is specific or representative 
for other GSBAs. In August 2010, a mission made up of representatives from the For-
estry Commission, Forest Services Division, Resource Management Support Centre, 
and international donors (The Netherlands Embassy) and the researcher, who repre-
sented Tropenbos International Ghana, visited the site. During the visit to the admitted 
village, the team interacted with the villagers to assess their wellbeing and the state of 
the GSBA. In the same month TBI-Ghana commissioned a two-member research team 
to conduct a situational analysis of four different forest reserves with a GSBA across the 
high forest zone. The areas were Krokosua Hills in the Western Region, Bandai Hills 
GSBA in the Ashanti Region and the Atewa Range and Apedwa GSBAs in the Eastern 
Region. The team interacted with the surrounding communities and officials of the FSD 
did a field verification to assess the situation. The outcomes of the research, though 
place-specific, revealed problems of encroachment and non-implementation of the man-
agement plans in all the study sites (see TBI Ghana 2010). Generally, the situation in 
these areas is not so different from that which prevails in the Tano-Offin forest reserve. 
The only difference is that Tano-Offin is unique because of the presence of an admitted 
village in the middle of the GSBA.  
Based on these assumptions, the following recommendations have been made. 
 
1. Rethinking the governance conditions of protected areas 
Building social safeguards in the VPA process therefore implies rethinking the govern-
ance conditions of protected areas, especially the status of admitted villages and farms 
where people have restricted access to forest resources and few legal options to build a 
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better livelihood. Bodegom (2010) cautions that, although the VPA process is participa-
tory, it is impossible to talk about its contribution to good forest and environmental 
governance if no measures are put in place to curtail resource depletion in protected 
areas. The recognition of protected areas in the VPA implementation process is there-
fore paramount for sustainable forest management. The new thinking and interpretation 
of social safeguards among forest stakeholders in Ghana as multi-stakeholder processes 
based on equitable access and control over forests, implies good prospects for address-
ing the concerns of communities living around and within protected areas. However, it 
should be noted that the stakeholders’ proposal on possible social safeguard mecha-
nisms put under the six categories in Chapter 5 is essentially ‘old issues’ that have not 
yet received adequate policy and implementation attention. It will therefore require a 
serious push from civil society to turn things around and ensure that the proposals are 
implemented in the interest of communities trapped inside protected areas. It is worth-
while to explore whether carbon or REDD+ payments could be a form of social safe-
guard in the GSBAs, together with the MTS reforestation scheme that the communities 
requested.  
 
2. Creating space for inhabitants in admitted village to ‘escape’ or ‘serving as nature 
caretakers’? 
The Forestry Commission needs to take into consideration that, during the creation of 
the reservation, the population size was sixty-two and the land size provided was fa-
vourable. For almost five decades now, the adult population has increased to between 
450-500, whereas the area assigned to the admitted village and farms remained the same 
and access to forest resources was further restricted by the creation of the GSBA. More-
over, the number of children in the village now exceeds that of the adult population. The 
educational status and socio-economic future of these children will become uncertain if 
they remain trapped in the reserve, as will the future status of the GSBA and entire re-
serve. There is therefore a need to consider strategies that will be favourable to both 
biodiversity conservation and development of the local people.  
 
 In this specific case and other similar cases where villages are located in the reserves, 
one option is to re-locate the village to a more conducive environment where support 
for viable alternative livelihoods is more feasible. The prospects for removing the 
trapped community will not only give them a real chance to improve their livelihood 
elsewhere but will enable the ecosystems of GSBAs to serve efficiently as a carbon 
storehouse with fewer human disturbances of deforestation and forest degradation. 
This may provide a permanent solution but it must be done with caution in order to 
prevent human rights conflicts. The World Bank’s involuntary resettlement safe-
guards (World Bank 2001) may serve as a guide for resource managers and other 
parties involved.  
 
 Alternatively, the inhabitants of the admitted village should be compensated for their 
role as ‘nature caretakers’ to an extent regarded as acceptable. This can be done with 
donor funding or through payments for environmental services (PES). In such a case, 
the inhabitants will obtain income that will enable them to provide better education 
for their children outside the village. In addition, such money could enable them to 
engage in sustainable livelihood enterprises that will keep them away from the re-
serve. The Ghana Forestry Commission’s engagement with the REDD+ initiative is 
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an open window to explore such funds. However, it remains to be seen whether this 
is an appropriate solution because, under this option, the inhabitants will still be in 
the forest to which access is further restricted because the government’s commitment 
to REDD+ implies increased efforts to prevent further deforestation and forest deg-
radation. 
 
3. Enhancing conflict management in forest management  
Finally, there is a need to enhance conflict management capacity with due regard for the 
role of chiefs and elders and integration of conflict management strategies in forest 
management policies and programmes of Ghana which currently receive less attention. 
Conclusion  
This chapter revealed that the inhabitants of the admitted village of Kyekyewere in the 
Tano-Offin Forest Reserve have few legal forest livelihoods options according to the 
prevailing laws. Whereas laws restricted access and use, people’s livelihoods are further 
challenged by conflicts involving actors beyond the community level. The VPA process 
to combat illegal logging as well as REDD+ may further aggravate this situation in this 
and other protected areas if no measures are taken to address the situation. Consequently 
there is a need to rethink governance conditions in protected areas, especially regarding 
the status of admitted villages and farms where people have already restricted access to 
forest resources and where there are few opportunities for building a livelihood, for cre-
ating social safeguards for the inhabitants of protected areas and for enhancing the con-
flict management capacities of the actors in the governing systems and acknowledging 
the role of actors in the customary and hybrid governing structure. 
 
  
 
 
8 
Conflicts and uncertainties in co-management:  
The case of the modified taungya system in Ghana 
Introduction  
The co-management concept has gained recognition in both theory and practice in natu-
ral resource management during the past three decades (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000, 
Ostrom et al. 2002, Carlsson & Berkes 2005). There are varied definitions of co-
management, but the central tenet is that it is a partnership between two or more differ-
ent actors, most often between state and non-state actors. In this partnership, the differ-
ent actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst themselves an equitable sharing of 
management functions, power, entitlements, decision making and benefits (McCay & 
Acheson 1987, Berkes et al. 1991, Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000, Castro & Nielsen 
2001).  
In Ghana’s forest sector, a co-management arrangement between the Forestry Com-
mission (FC) and forest fringe communities exists with the aim being to reforest de-
graded forest reserves with the ultimate objectives being sustainable forest management 
and poverty reduction. The scheme is known as the modified taungya system (MTS) 
and was introduced in 2001. Since the implementation of the MTS a decade ago, vari-
ous studies have been carried out to identify successes and shortfalls in the early stages 
as a means of avoiding similar problems inherent in the old taungya system. From a 
socio-economic perspective, the food crop component of the MTS was found to con-
tribute to local people’s livelihoods (Blay et al. 2008, Ledger et al. 2010, Insaidoo et al. 
forthcoming). Other studies have analysed its benefit sharing arrangements and the chal-
lenges associated with it (Marfo 2009, Agyeman et al. 2010), gender aspects (Abugre et 
al. 2010) and factors influencing the maintenance of trees until maturity (Westerlaan 
2010, Insaidoo et al. forthcoming).  
However, no research has yet been carried out to gain an understanding of the co-
management context of the MTS and the prevailing conflict issues. This chapter aims to 
explore whether the adaptive co-management approach provides a way to enable the 
system to overcome complexity and uncertainty and thus improve forest governance 
processes.  
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This chapter contributes to the debate about the performance of the MTS by analys-
ing conflicts in a plantation forest in the Tano-Offin forest reserve. The chapter is struc-
tured around four sub-questions: 
 
1.  What are the characteristics of the plantation forest (i.e. MTS scheme) in the Tano-
Offin forest reserve as a system-to-be-governed, particularly with regard to the inter-
action of local communities with the natural system in their efforts to secure their 
livelihoods?  
2.  What are the characteristics of the governing system (i.e. institutional arrangements) 
that steers the plantation regime?  
3.  What are the perspectives of the inhabitants of the communities at the forest planta-
tion fringe regarding the nature of forest and tree-related conflicts in the plantation 
regime?  
4.  What conflict outcomes arise and what are their effects on the governance arrange-
ments?  
 
The chapter is based on document analysis, a semi-structured questionnaire survey 
among 212 inhabitants of Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 villages bordering 
the plantation forest regime in the Tano-Offin forest reserve. Furthermore, community 
and validation meetings were organised during the fieldwork period. Finally, informal 
interviews were held with key FC officials to validate concerns raised by the local 
communities during the meetings (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the 
methodology). 
The data and respondents’ views on the subject matter are analysed from an interac-
tive governance perspective (Kooiman et al. 2005). Additionally, the elements of inter-
active governance theory (images, instruments and actions) are blended with the dimen-
sion of the conflict wheel developed by Mason & Rychard (2005) (Chapter 2) to 
understand the nature of conflicts and conflict management prevailing in the study area 
from the perspective of the local people. Subsequently, the conflict outcomes are ana-
lysed and their effects assessed against the governance arrangements of the MTS. 
The next section presents the natural system (i.e. Tano-Offin plantation regime) and 
the socio-economic system of the two communities and their dependence on the MTS. 
Then the governing system is presented, with a focus on the institutional arrangements 
of the MTS. The subsequent section presents the respondents’ images, instruments and 
actions concerning conflict and conflict management. After that, the conflicts outcomes 
and their effects on the governance arrangements are analysed. The discussion section 
links the findings with the adaptive co-management system and reflects on the question 
of whether the MTS co-management functions as an adaptive co-governance process or 
whether it is primarily a form of hierarchical governance (i.e. fixed state system) meant 
to satisfy the interests of the FC. The chapter concludes with recommendations. 
The system-to-be-governed  
This section looks at the natural and human sub-systems of the system-to-be-governed. 
The section on the natural system describes the Tano-Offin plantation regime and the 
one on the human system looks at the socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants 
of Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 and the benefits they derive from MTS.  
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Table 8.1  MTS beneficiary communities and planted areas under the Tano-Offin plantation regime  
 (2002-2007) 
MTS beneficiary  
communities  
      Forest area planted (ha) per year coupe
1
 Total area planted (ha) / 
years 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002-2007 
Chirayaso  - -   5 17 30 30 82 
Kunsu-Nyamebekyere 
No. 3  
10 10 10 - 30 10 70 
Asuntaa  - -   5   5 12 - 22 
Kramokrom - -   12.5 11 20 - 43.5 
Desireagya  - -    10 10 15 - 35 
Kwaswotire - -  5   8 11 - 24 
Akantansu   23* 26 20 22 24 15             130 
Boafaso - - - - - 10  
Awesasu - - - - 13 - 13 
Nyinahin - - - - 15 - 15 
Adiembra  10 3   4 11 16 - 44 
Mpasaaso 1   20* 5 15 - 25 - 65 
Mpasaaso 2   10* 10 10 20 38 - 88 
Oforikrom 10 3 - 10 10 - 33 
Koojourkrom - 2    10** 10 10 - 32 
Domeabra - - 32 - - - 32 
Awaduwa 10 10 - 10 10 12 52 
Nyinanfu 10 5 10 - - 10 35 
Bonkrom 10 10 10 10 17 21 78 
Dotiem Kunsu   10* 10*  10*   12* 30 20 82 
Enyehwee - - - - 30 - 30 
Saakrom - 10   10* 10 22 20 72 
Apenemadi  - 10 10 - - - 20 
Wioso 20 - - - - - 20 
Adadekrom 30 3 5 - - - 38 
Ofirikrom - 3 - - - -   3 
Oseikrom 10 2 - - - - 12 
* Indicates that a community did not meet the target; ** Indicates that a community exceeded the target. 
Key: A dash (-) in the table may imply that: 
1. A community did not join the MTS that year.  
2. The community performance in the previous year was not good enough, as a result of which it was not al-
lowed to take part again.  
3. The survival rates of the planted trees were low and the farmers had to undertake beating up (i.e. filling up 
gaps with new seedlings) in that year’s coupe before a new area was allocated to them to plant trees and 
food crops.  
4. There is no more degraded area within the range of a community.  
Sources: Agyapong, Nkawie FSD plantations unit, (pers. comm. 2008). 
The natural system: The Tano-Offin Reserve plantation regime 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve is located in the Nkawie Forest 
District and falls under two administrative districts: the Ahafo Ano South and Atwima 
Mponua in the Ashanti Region of Ghana. The reserve is surrounded by 41 villages 
whose inhabitants partly depend on the forestland and resources of the reserve for their 
livelihood. Since the MTS became operational in the reserve in 2002, twenty-seven vil-
lages have been involved in the scheme (see Table 8.1) of which two were selected for 
this study. They are Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 and Chirayaso (Figure 8.1). The crite-
ria for their selection are discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
                                                 
1
   Coupe is a term mostly used for plantation forest to denote the operational unit of about sixteen hec-
tares for either establishing plantations or annual harvesting in an area. 
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Figure 8.1    Map of Tano-Offin Forest Reserve showing the study communities  
 
 
The plantation regime within the forest reserve (mostly located in the production 
management area) consists of various compartments
2
 in the reserve. Each of the MTS 
beneficiary communities are given degraded areas in a specific compartment with the 
aim being to achieve a given target (see Appendix 5 for details). 
The official report of the Nkawie District indicates that the number MTS of farmers 
differs per year. For instance Chirayaso had 170 MTS farmers in 2006 and 100 in 2007 
(see Appendix 5). An analysis, based on the official records, of the MTS beneficiary 
communities around the Tano-Offin reserve and the area planted is presented in Table 
8.1. Figure 8.2 shows the trend of area planted (ha) in the two study sites over the years 
based on the data from Table 8.1.  
From Figure 8.2, it can be seen that land allocation to the farmers in Chirayaso in-
creased from five hectares in 2004 to thirty hectares in 2007, whereas the degraded for-
est area allocated to MTS farmers in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 has steadily increased 
since 2002. Personal communication with the FSD official revealed that allocation of a 
degraded land area depends on (i) the interest and willingness of the participating peo-
ple in a community; (ii) the availability of land within the range of the communities; 
and (iii) the performance of the MTS farmers in the previous year(s).  
In the case of the small area (five hectares) given to Chirayaso at the onset, the FSD 
official revealed that, when the MTS was introduced to the inhabitants, not many people 
showed any interest in participating. In view of that, a small area was given to the few 
people who were willing to form an MTS group. However, when the inhabitants real-
ised the food crop benefits the participated farmers are deriving, they also decided to 
join, which resulted in an increase in the land area over the years.  
 
                                                 
2
  Within the on reserve areas, the production areas are partitioned into numbered compartments (main 
units) of 128 ha each. 
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Figure 8.2   Trend in the area planted under the MTS by farmers in Chirayaso and Kunsu- 
   Nyamebekyere No. 3 from 2002-2007 
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Source: Nkawie FSD plantations unit (2008). 
 
As is shown later in this chapter, denying some people entry to the MTS scheme re-
sulted in a demonstration in Chirayaso in 2009 (see also Box 8.2).  
In the case of Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3, the FSD official revealed that the major-
ity of the inhabitants had shown an interest in the MTS from the beginning because they 
live very close to the reserve and have limited farmlands. The steady increase in forest 
land being allocated over the years corresponds to the adult population in the village. 
The significant increase in land allocated in 2006 can be attributed to the fact that more 
people living outside the community took part in the scheme and by the excellent per-
formance of the MTS farmers in the previous years, as a result of which farmers were 
allowed to work on more than the usual one acre plot (Agyapong, Nkawie FSD planta-
tions unit, pers. comm. 2008). 
The human system  
This section deals with the human system and addresses the socioeconomic characteris-
tics of the respondents and livelihood benefits of the MTS respectively. 
– Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents  
Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 have an estimated adult population of 770 
and 240 respectively of whom 103 and 109 individuals were involved in the study re-
spectively. Generally, the inhabitants of the study communities engage in crop farming 
as their major occupation. Cocoa, pineapple and oil palm are commonly grown as cash 
crops on family or individual farmlands, whereas short-rotation food crops are culti-
vated in the forest reserve under the MTS scheme or are integrated with cocoa and other 
perennial crops on farmlands. 
Table 8.2 shows that 54% of the respondents are men and 46% are women. The ma-
jority of the respondents (46%) in both villages were in the age range of 18-35, while 
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19% were in the age range of 53 years and above. In terms of religion and education, 
Christianity dominated with 91%, whilst more than half of the respondents (54%) had 
been educated to middle and junior high school level. Fifteen per cent of the respon-
dents in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 have no education, compared to 5% in Chirayaso. 
Generally speaking, migrants (59%) exceeded the proportion of indigenes with more 
migrants recorded in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 (69%) than in Chirayaso (31%). The 
period of stay in the villages by the migrants ranged from one to 58 years. Most of the 
respondents migrated across the districts of the ten regions of Ghana with the majority 
(79%) coming from the Ashanti Region. The respondents from Kunsu-Nyamebekyere 
No. 3 included two non-Ghanaians from Burkina Faso who were participating in the 
MTS. Thirty-four per cent of the respondents were engaged in a single occupation while 
the majority (63%) had multiple occupations, with 3% being not engaged in any occu-
pation at all. The MTS was the lead occupation (82%) of the total respondents in the 
two villages.  
Among the MTS respondents, 26% engage in it as a single occupation and 75% 
combined with other occupations such as off-reserve farming, trading, handicrafts and 
government employment (Table 8.2). In both communities, few respondents (2%) stated 
that they were engaged in chainsaw lumbering as their single occupation, while others 
combined it with the MTS. The common trees planted by the farmers under the MTS 
scheme (with food crops such as plantain, cocoyam, vegetables and maize) included the 
exotics Cedrella odorata (cedrella) and Tectona grandis (teak). The indigenous ones 
were Terminalia Superba (ofram) and Entandrophragma spp. (African mahogany).  
– Benefits derived from the MTS  
As the major occupation within the two villages, the MTS has contributed to the liveli-
hoods of the inhabitants, especially those who participate in the scheme. According to 
the respondents of Chirayaso, access to farmland to cultivate food crops was a problem 
prior to the introduction of the MTS. The available family lands are under cocoa culti-
vation, a major cash crop in Ghana, resulting in food crop scarcity especially once the 
canopy of the cocoa farm has closed. The inhabitants of the two villages reported food 
for consumption and sale to obtain cash income as the major benefits they derived from 
the MTS for almost a decade. Some key benefits that have improved the wellbeing of 
the MTS communities are: (i) employment in the form of farm labour and micro-
enterprises (notably petty trading) that could be established thanks to the revenues from 
the MTS plots; (ii) improvement in school attendance of their children; (iii) quality 
housing; and (iv) food security throughout the year. Without the MTS the respondents 
asserted that many hardships would have forced young people to migrate to urban areas 
where unemployment is high or would possibly have led them to engage in illicit farm-
ing in the forest reserve.  
Photos 8.1–8.3 show some of the MTS benefits that the farmers demonstrated to the 
research team, notably the food crops derived and building constructed with revenues 
from the food crops cultivated under the MTS. For a more detailed analysis of liveli-
hood benefits from the MTS see Insaidoo et al. (forthcoming). Some also referred to the 
benefits in conversations as presented in Box 8.1. 
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Table 8.2 Socio-economic characteristics of the respondents (N=212)
3
 
Variables  Frequency (n) and percentage (%) of respondents 
Chirayaso  
(n=103) 
Kunsu-
Nyamebekye 
No. 3 (n=109) 
Total (N) Percentage 
(%) 
Gender     
  Male  54 60 114 54 
  Female  49 49 98 46 
Age range      
  18-35 50 47 97 46 
  36-53 34 40 74 35 
  53+ 19 22 41 19 
Religion     
  Christianity  97 95 192 91 
  Islam 4 6 10 5 
  Traditionalist  1 2 3 1 
  Free thinker  1 6 7 3 
Education      
  Post-
Secondary/Secondary  
14 4 18 8 
Middle school/Junior High    
  School 
65 49 114 54 
  Primary  7 17 24 11 
  Informal  9 5 14 7 
  No education 11 31 42 20 
Origin      
  Indigenes  65 23 88 41 
  Migrants 38 86 124 59 
Occupation      
  Single occupation      
   Modified taungya system  
    (MTS) 
16 27 43 20* 
    Farming in off-reserve  10 10 20 9 
    Others
4
 4 2 6 3 
    Chainsaw milling  3 1 4 2 
  Multiple occupations      
    MTS and off-reserve f 
    farming  
48 47 95 45* 
    MTS and others
5
 17 19 36 17* 
    Off-reserve farming and  
    others 
6
 
2 - 2 1 
    No occupation  3 3 6 3 
* The calculation of the percentages of MTS farmers in the table was based on the total respondents (n=212).  
Source Field survey, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
  Of 212 respondents from Table 8.1, 137 responded to questions for Chapter 9 (see Chapter 3 on meth-
odology). 
4
  Included trading, farm labourer, hairdressing, pastoral job, worker of administrator of stool lands. 
5
  Included civil service employees (mainly teachers), pensioners, artisans (or handicraft workers) and 
chainsaw operators. 
6
  Included trading and masonry. 
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Photos 8.1 – 8.3   Tangible benefits local people derive from MTS in Chirayaso village 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 8.1  Food crops from MTS farms 
 provide local communities with 
 cash and non-cash income.  
 
Photo 8.2  Madame Beatrice, a proud 
 owner of this house that she  
 ould afford thanks to her 
 participation in the MTS in 
 Chirayaso from 2004-2010. 
 
Source: Field survey, 2010. 
 
 
Photo 8.3 Timber trees established in 
 the MTS represent future 
 income for the farmers who 
  are entitled to 40% of the 
 revenue. Five per cent of the 
 value will go to the village 
 where plantations were 
 established. 
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Box 8.1: Local peoples’ views on the contributions of the MTS to their  
 livelihoods  
 
Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 village  
 
‘I couldn’t get any land to grow crops and this caused me economic hardship. How-
ever, since joining the MTS I have been able to grow crops and get money to sup-
port my family.’ 
Opayin Kwame 
 
‘I used to be a ‘by-day’ (farm day labourer), couldn’t pay my children’s school fees, 
and was wallowing in poverty, but since I joined the MTS I have been able to pay the 
fees of my male son up to the senior secondary level. Things have changed for the 
better ever since.’   
 Kwasi Foso 
  
‘I come from Kumasi (Santase) and came into the community in 1994. I own 6 acres 
of land on which I have planted cocoa and intercropped it with food stuff. When the 
canopy closed it was difficult to grow food crops. I joined the MTS from 2002-2009 
and participated 5 times. I used money from the MTS to pay labourers to weed the 
cocoa farms, to attend funerals and to build a two-bedroom house.’ 
Maame Abena 
 
‘Before the inception of the MTS, the community members could not pay their contri-
butions to community projects but now they are doing well thanks to the MTS. Many 
of my people have been able to use money from the sale of food crops to erect ce-
ment block housing in the village. Furthermore, community members are able to take 
care of their children and are able to pay for the repairs of the community borehole.’ 
 
Chief of Nyamebekyere 
 
Chirayaso village  
 
‘As a woman, I have been able to build a house with the proceeds from the food crop 
component under the MTS and I have been able to educate my children to the sen-
ior secondary school level. If the MTS is going to be stopped, I will not know how to 
cater for my children and myself.’   
Madam Beatrice  
 
‘I used to be a ‘by-day’ (farm day labourer) and was unable to feed my children and 
myself. Since participating in the MTS, I have been able to feed the family and pro-
vide for my children’s needs. If the MTS were to be stopped, it would be difficult for 
me to survive since I have no farmland’ 
Sister Ama 
 
‘I am now able to enrol some of my children into apprenticeship and cater for their 
daily needs’.   
Nana C.K. 
Source: Field survey 2010. 
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The governing system  
This section presents a brief history of the MTS (see Chapter 4 for details) and exam-
ines the institutional arrangements that govern the system.  
Brief historical perspective of the modified taungya system  
The colonial government introduced the taungya system in Ghana in the early 1920s 
with the primary aim being to obtain a mature crop of plantation timber with a relatively 
short rotation period (Agyeman et al. 2010). The then Forestry Department gave it a 
boost in the early 1970s by giving farmers access to parcels of degraded forest reserves 
to plant food crops and establish timber trees. The system became important in Ghana 
as communities fringing forest reserves were faced with a lack of farming lands whereas 
the forest reserves were degraded in terms of commercial timber species that needed to 
be restocked. The system enabled participating farmers to improve household food se-
curity. However, in the early 1980s the system exhibited some flaws, including the fact 
that access to forestland was limited to three years and that farmers had no direct share 
in the revenues from the harvestable trees they helped to establish. 
As a result farmers did not regard it as a priority to pay attention to the trees and in 
many instances did not plant them at all (Mayers & Kotey 1996, Marfo 2009, Agyeman 
et al. 2010). The old system was classified as a failure, leading to its decline and subse-
quent abandonment in the late 1980s (Owusu et al. 1989). In spite of the above chal-
lenges, the forest fringe communities viewed the taungya system as a favourable means 
of getting access to farmland with no implications of crop sharing or land rent payment.  
Thus, repeated requests were made to the government for its re-introduction after 
which the Forest Services Division (FSD) in the mid-1990s piloted the modified taun-
gya system (MTS) and carried out studies to identify the weaknesses and strengths of 
the old system (Agyeman et al. 2010). Ironically, the taungya system produced better 
results in terms of forest land restoration than plantations established by the FSD with 
hired labourers (Affum-Baffoe 2008). In early 2002, the Forestry Commission (FC) of 
Ghana, through the FSD, initiated the MTS as a co-management approach. The partner-
ship is between the FSD and the forest fringe communities to establish forest plantations 
in degraded forest reserves for shared benefits. It is a reforestation strategy aimed at 
restoring the forest cover and creating livelihood opportunities for forest fringe commu-
nities through the provision of land to cultivate timber trees and food crops in return for 
which farmers share in the harvestable timber (see next subsection for more details). 
The key improvements vis-à-vis the old taungya system are increased tenure security 
and benefit sharing arrangements for the timber revenues that were absent in the old 
taungya system (Marfo 2009, FC-NPDP 2003). 
Institutional arrangements 
In 2001 the government of Ghana launched the MTS as one of the key poverty reduc-
tion strategies for the forest fringe communities in the country. The objectives of the 
plantation development programme under the MTS are in line with the overall objec-
tives of the National Forest Plantation Development Programme (NFPDP) (see Chap-
ters 4 and 5). Thus, the MTS became functional mostly in the high forest zone in 2002 
and has its basis in some provisions of the Forest and Wildlife Policy of 1994 related to 
community forestry that encourages reforestation programmes.  
Complementing the policy framework is the pursuit of the Forestry and Wildlife 
Master Plan to reverse deforestation with an annual target of establishing 10,000 ha of 
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plantations over a twenty-year period (Agyeman et al. 2010). From the legal perspec-
tive, the MTS is governed by land lease and benefit sharing agreements that clearly state 
the tenurial arrangements, responsibilities as well as the benefits of each of the parties 
involved in the scheme.  
Within the land lease agreement, the FC is the ‘Lessor’ as the party in charge of the 
management of the country’s forest reserves and protected areas and their development. 
The mandate of the FC as the land leaseholder is based in Sections 16(1) and (2) of the 
Concessions Act 1962 (Act 124) which establish that lands that have been constituted as 
forest reserves are vested in the President of Ghana’s trust for the stool. The ‘Lessee’ is 
the group of MTS farmers who participate in the plantations development scheme in the 
degraded reserves. The farmer is to use the land for the purpose stipulated in the agree-
ment, which is for the planting of trees, being inter-planted with food crops (not cash 
crops). Within the lease agreement, the purpose of the lease, as well as the obligations 
and responsibilities of the ‘Lessor’ and ‘Lessee’ and the general stipulations such as 
ownership rights, benefit sharing, and dispute resolution mechanism are clearly stated 
(FC 2005). In the interest of this study, Section (8) of the lease agreement states the 
mechanisms of managing disputes or conflicts as follows:  
‘In case of any dispute, difference or controversy arising out of, or in connection with this 
lease, that cannot be settled amicably between the parties, it shall be settled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1961 (Act 38) and any subsequent amendments by 
a panel of three arbitrators. Each party shall appoint one arbitrator and the two arbitrators 
shall appoint the arbitrators who shall be the umpire. The place of arbitration shall be at the 
arbitration centre, Accra, Ghana, or any other places as the arbitrators and the parties may 
agree. The language of the arbitration shall be English. The decision of the arbitrators shall 
be final (FC 2005)’. 
The benefit sharing agreement of 2005 outlines four key actors that form the institu-
tional body of the MTS. These are the FC, the farmers involved in the plantations, the 
stool landowners and the community. The FC, referred to as the ‘investor’, is responsi-
ble for the financial management, marketing and technical inputs of the plantation in-
vestment. The taungya farmer, referred to as the ‘farmer’, is responsible for the provi-
sion of labour and maintenance of the modified taungya plantation. The third party is 
the ‘landowner’ – generally the stool (see Chapter 5) responsible for guaranteeing ac-
cess to the land and security of tenure for all parties concerned. The fourth party to the 
agreement is the ‘local community’ responsible for assisting in the prevention of wild-
fire and illegal activities within the plantation. Section (7) of the agreement document 
outlines how the benefits from the harvested timber trees are to be shared among the 
key parties. The FC receives 40% of all proceeds obtained from the plantation (i.e. the 
timber revenues), excluding those from non-permanent food crops unless by mutual 
agreement with the farmer. The farmers receive 40% of all the proceeds obtained from 
the tree plantations and all the non-permanent food crops except when agreed otherwise. 
The landowner and the local community receive 15% and 5% respectively of all pro-
ceeds obtained from the tree plantations, excluding proceeds from non-permanent food 
crops. The MTS scheme across the country has a mixture of both indigenous timber tree 
species (e.g. Mansonia altissima (oprono), Terminalia superba (oftam) and exotic tim-
ber species (e.g. Tectona grandis (teak) and Cedrella odorata (cedrella). Timber tree 
species for a specific forest reserve are selected by the Forest Services Division. Tree 
seedlings are sometimes supplied by the FSD, while at some plantation sites farmers are 
allowed to grow seedlings in nurseries, for which they are paid by the government. 
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Generally, no cash crops such as cocoa are allowed to be integrated with the timber 
trees, only food crops can be inter-planted, with the exception of cassava. According to 
Insaidoo et al. (submitted) the ban on planting cassava in MTS farms is motivated by 
the fear that it will compete with timber seedlings. Such a ban does, however, prejudice 
farmers’ livelihood portfolio, as cassava is their staple crop. 
In order to strengthen the MTS groups, the FC, in consultation with some key forest 
stakeholders from the local communities, university, civil society and other government 
institutions, drafted a constitution that must be adopted by each MTS group to guide the 
governing of the groups. The constitution includes sections that outline: (i) the name of 
the MTS group, (ii) objectives, (iii) members, (iv) structure, (v) details about the dis-
bursement of the 40% benefit share, (vi) sanctions, and (vii) transfer of ownership of 
benefits, dissolutions and amendment of the constitution. 
The transfer of ownership of benefits, which is meant to minimise potential inheri-
tance conflicts states that:  
‘A group member may transfer his/her share of right, after the entire group agrees to it, 
when: 
1. Any member may bequeath his/her right at any time if s/he so desires and s/he should be 
of clear and sound mind. 
2. Any group member in his own free will wants to transfer the plantation to his next of kin. 
If any member dies, the executives shall in consultation with the deceased family, accept 
the next of kin to replace the deceased and to collect his part of the benefits’ (FC 2010). 
Article (8) of the drafted MTS constitution also states that: 
‘A collective agreement shall be signed between each community MTS group and the FC. 
The group will be represented by the Chairman and an ordinary member elected by the group 
member who will be a witness’. 
The constitution refers to a disbursement procedure of the 40% benefits among the 
farmers and their involvement in the negotiation of price and sale of the trees at final 
harvest (FC 2010).  
Based on the institutional arrangement outlined above and in Figure 8.3, rather than a 
co-management arrangement in the narrow sense (i.e. between the FC and local com-
munities), the MTS is a partnership involving both state and non-state actors as well as 
the international community (i.e. development partners). In practice, the district FSD 
allocates degraded portions of the forest to interested farmer groups in the communities. 
Prior to that, the taungya leader and the taungya committee members are elected. This 
local management committee is responsible for the further allocation of the MTS plots 
to the farmers, who are commonly known as the ‘taungya farmers’. These farmers are 
those who actually establish the plantations with supervisory and technical assistance 
from the FSD.  
At national level, the FC is responsible for the generation and management of the op-
erational funds, which come from its own budget as well as the Forest Plantation De-
velopment Fund established in 2000 under Act 583 (amended Act 623 of 2002). Simi-
larly, some key international institutions have supported the scheme, such as the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) (through the Community Forestry 
Management Project. In 2009 and 2010, a local non-governmental organisation, the 
Rural Development Youth Association (RUDEYA), in partnership with the Interna-
tional Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which also supported the registration 
of about 600 modified taungya farmers who are holders of about 50 ha of timber planta-
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tions in the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve. In order to make the arrangement more robust, 
the National Forestry Facility (NFF) of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or-
ganisation (FAO) provided funds in 2010 through the Resource Management Support 
Centre (RMSC) of the FC to support the registration process which givers legal recogni-
tion to the farmers in the partnership (see Figure 8.3). 
From images to action: Forest fringe communities’ perceptions of conflicts 
and conflict management  
This section examines the elements of first order management of conflicts relating to the 
MTS (i.e. the images, instruments and actions). The study identified different conflict 
issues within the arrangement, which were grouped into three main categories. These 
are conflicts related to institutional and operational arrangements, conflicts resulting 
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Key: AfDB-CFMP = African Development Bank-Community Forestry Management Project; FAO-NFF= 
National Forestry Facility of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); FSD = Forest 
Services Division; IUCN-Netherlands = International Union for Conservation of Nature; MTS = Modified 
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Figure 8.3   The partnership arrangement within the modified taungya system (MTS) in 
  Ghana 
 indicating the heterogeneity of actors involved 
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from competing claims, and anticipated conflicts resulting from uncertainty about the 
future. Respondents indicated that each category represents a number of issues as well 
as different actors involved in the conflicts (Figure 8.4). The next subsections present 
the nature of each conflict category and highlight the images (type of conflict, issues, 
actors, causes and dynamics) as well as the instrument or strategies these conflict actors 
and their external actors employ to address these challenges. Subsequently, the actions 
proposed by the study respondents are discussed based on the three conflict categories. 
 
Table 8.3 Respondents’ perceptions of conflict issues related to institutional/operational arrangements  
 (N=192) 
Conflict type Conflict issues 
        Chirayaso 
Kunsu-  
Nyamebekyere 
No. 3 
Total 
% 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Intra-group  Boundary-related issues 35 18 79 41 59 
 Disproportionate alloca-
tion of forestland 
52 27 10   5 32 
 High fee payment for land 
preparation 
  4   2   2   1   3 
Inter-group  Farmers failing to plant 
timber trees 
  3   2   7   4   6 
Source: Field survey, 2010. 
Conflicts related to institutional and operational arrangements  
The study identified three intra-group and one inter-group institutional and operational 
conflict issues (Table 8.3). These were mentioned by the majority of the respondents 
(N=192) representing 91% of the total respondents. The intra–group conflict types are 
boundary-related issues, the disproportionate allocation of forestland and high fees for 
land preparation incurred by farmers and between farmers and their leaders. The inter-
group conflict type is crop destruction by the FSD due to the unwillingness of farmers 
to plant trees on their plots. Generally speaking, conflicts in Chirayaso with regard to 
the disproportionate allocation of forestland were referred to relatively more often (27% 
of the respondents), whereas in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 the majority of the respon-
dents (41%) reported boundary-related conflicts. Both antecedent and manifest causes 
of conflicts were identified in this conflict category. Three key drivers trigger the 
boundary-related conflicts. First, such conflicts occur when a person trespasses onto 
another person’s plot, as often occurs in the case of farmers who share a common 
boundary, partly because the initial boundary lines
7
 marking the demarcation of indi-
vidual plots are distorted by weeding and burning. Secondly, the nature of the forest 
terrain contributes to unclear boundary lines between the plots. The third driver of such 
conflicts is greed and selfishness, which result in intentional trespassing by a neighbour 
and contribute to an atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding among the farmers. 
                                                 
7
  During the allocation of the degraded portion of forest lands, the range supervisor and forest guards, 
together with the taungya committee leaders, demarcate the allocated coupe for a year. Large trees are 
often removed by hired labourers with contributions from the group before the plots are divided 
among the members. Depending on the area assigned, each member receives at least a one acre plot. 
Boundaries between plots are often, but not always, marked by a stump, pegs or trench. Since bound-
ary markers are not permanent, they easily burn and are covered up by the soil, which potentially 
leads to boundary disputes in the future.  
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With regard to the disproportionate allocation of forestland, 32% of the respondents 
accused the MTS leaders of greed, selfishness and favouritism during land distribution 
which had resulted in some people being denied land and allowing others to take more 
plots and occupy the most fertile portions of forestland. Such incidences were reported 
more frequently in Chirayaso (by 27% of the respondents), where most of the young-
sters in the village were denied access to taungya plots (see Box 8.2). Another intra-
group conflict type is related to the alleged high fees collected by the taungya leaders 
from the MTS members for land preparation. Moreover, in the process of collecting 
money, conflicts arise due to: (i) taungya leaders not paying and yet allocating extra 
plots to themselves and (ii) the denial of farmer access to a plot because of a failure pay 
the required contribution. In relation to the latter, some farmers believe the fees are ex-
orbitant and deprive poor farmers of access to plots, whereas farmers who are finan-
cially better off are capable of accessing extra plots for farming. 
 Disproportionate 
allocation of forest-
land 
 Unclear boundaries  
 Farmers failure to 
plant timber trees 
 High fees for land 
preparation  
 
Figure 8.4    Conflict categories displaying the issues and actors 
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A farmer’s failure to plant trees despite several warnings by either taungya leaders or 
the FSD results in crop destruction by the FSD. The respondents were of the opinion 
that both the farmers and the FSD should share the blame because some farmers delib-
erately refuse to plant trees based on their belief that trees impede the development of 
the food crops if they are planted first. On the other hand, delays in the supply of seed-
lings by the FSD also affect the survival and growth success of the seedlings. 
Boundary-related conflicts were mentioned more frequently in Kunsu-Nyamebe-
kyere No. 3 (41%) than in Chirayaso (18%). They triggered multiple effects in the vil-
lages, including arguments, fighting, misunderstanding, quarrels, hatred, summons from 
the authorities (chiefs, elders and taungya leaders), illegal farming, a loss of interest in 
engaging in the plantation scheme, the destruction of crops, disagreements and threats. 
Boundary-related conflicts occur during land preparation when the vegetation is 
burnt and boundary lines become blurred, and also occur during plot distribution in the 
planting season, when people encroach on each other’s plots. The study revealed that 
most respondents (53%) classify boundary-related conflicts as non-violent, with only 
8% reporting them as being violent (Table 8.4). 
 
Table 8.4  Respondents opinions about conflicts severity  
Conflict issues Frequency (n) and percentage (%) in the two communities(N*=185) 
Chirayaso Kunsu-Nyamebekyere 
No. 3 
Total 
Non-
violent 
Violent Non-
violent 
Violent Non-
violent 
Violent 
Boundary-related is-
sues  
30 (16%) 
 
5 (3%) 68 (37%) 
 
10 (5%) 
 
98 (53%) 15 (8%) 
Disproportionate allo-
cation of forestland  
41 (22%) 
 
9 (5%)   7 (4%) 
 
- 
 
48 (26%)   9 (5%) 
Destruction of food 
crops by FSD officials  
  3 (1%) - 
 
  6 (3%) - 
 
  9 (4%) - 
 
Payment of fees for 
land preparation 
  4 (2%) -   2 (1%) -   6 (3%) - 
* Seven respondents who reported conflicts of this category did not respond to this question.  
 
Conflicts arising because of the disproportionate allocation of forestland cause griev-
ances and protest, which almost resulted in violent clashes, especially in Chirayaso vil-
lage. However, prompt intervention by the FSD official in charge of the area and the 
chief and elders of the village helped to ensure a peaceful end to the demonstration. 
Other effects mentioned were quarrels among disputants, which often involved the 
invoking of ‘gods’ (curses8), and fighting that occasionally resulted in injuries. This 
type of conflict is seasonal and occurs during plot allocation and is perceived as non-
violent.  
Similarly, according to the respondents, the destruction of crops by the FSD results 
in feelings of hatred, fighting, misunderstandings and land confiscation by FC officials. 
 
                                                 
8
  Invoking of ‘gods’ (curses) is a local way of dealing with problems, and employed especially when a 
person is falsely accused. The accused person calls on the ‘gods’ to be a mediator or judge in the con-
flict situation. It has spiritual implications. If the accused person is indeed innocent, then the accusing 
person gets sick until some rituals are performed to help him or her to recover or to die peacefully.  
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Box 8.2 Conflict scenario and conflict management processes in the 
 Chirayaso community 
 
Conflict type: Conflicts arising from disproportionate allocation of MTS plots among 
MTS farmers. 
 
Conflict issue: Some of the people in Chirayaso did not gain access to forestland 
under the MTS during the 2009 allocation season. 
 
Conflict actors: This conflict involved the executives of the MTS and some citizens 
of Chirayaso who were denied access to an MTS plot for farming.  
 
Causes and effects of the conflict: The disproportionate allocation of plots by the 
executives resulted in about 58 community members not having access to MTS 
land to farm. The people who did not gain access to the land demonstrated in the 
community with red clothes tied around their wrist and head to indicate the serious-
ness of the problem. The matter was then reported to the chief and elders as well as 
to the FSD official in charge of the area. Some days were set for resolution proc-
esses to take place. 
 
Mode of conflict management: facilitation, mediation and field verification  
The conflict management approaches employed by the mediators in 2009 were a 
blend of facilitation and mediation, with key mediators being the FSD field official 
and the chief and elders. Other actors present in the management process were the 
taungya executives, forest guard, beneficiary taungya members, representatives of 
demonstrators (aggrieved farmers), and a teacher who acted as a secretary. The 
FSD official facilitated the resolution process by asking the taungya head to explain 
the allocation process used to distribute plots to the people. The head declared that 
the number of plots allocated was 120 plots (15 ha) measuring 25 by 50 m for each 
farmer. The opportunity was given to the demonstrators to respond, but nobody 
disputed the head’s pronouncement. The facilitator therefore said the process of 
dividing the demarcated area by the leaders was wrong because it should have 
been twenty-eight hectares instead of fifteen. He also said that the taungya leaders 
did not adhere to his instructions and asked for the list showing the number of peo-
ple registered for the scheme (139 people). However, it was ascertained that 123 
people had been registered instead of the 139 referred to by the taungya head. 
During the process, a person commented that the taungya leaders had taken four 
plots each instead of one plot to be allocated to the farmers. Nevertheless, the 
women among them argued that, in view of the task of the taungya leaders, they 
should be entitled to the four plots to which the audience agreed. Thirty-two plots 
were therefore given to the eight taungya leaders, leaving a balance of eighty-eight
a
 
plots to be shared among 139 people. It was realised that fifty-one 
b
 people would 
then not have access to the plots and, in order to provide for these people, the FSD 
official, together with the chief and elders, called for field verification. The resolution 
process was also used to elect new taungya leaders, with the rationale being that 
the old leaders had been involved in the disproportionate allocation of MTS plots 
and allegedly had taken money from some farmers without providing them with 
plots. The chief asked the FSD official to investigate the monetary issue to unearth 
the truth of the matter.  
(continues) 
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In Chirayaso, for example, the denial of plots despite fee payment resulted in a demon-
stration that led to extra demarcation of land to the aggrieved farmers. 
Within the conflict category of institutional and operational conflict, the actors in-
volved use a blend of conflict management approaches to manage the conflict inci-
dences (Figure 8.5), with meditation preventing boundary-related conflicts and conflicts 
about the disproportionate allocation of MTS plots by MTS executives (94% of the re-
spondents referred to the respective conflict categories). Mediation was also used to 
resolve non-payment of fees for land preparation (67% of the respondents referred to 
this conflict category). Dialogues, the re-demarcation of plots to clarify boundary lines 
or plot re-allocation were often used to complement mediation. The most frequent ap-
proach is for taungya leaders to resolve conflicts that involve two ordinary farmers. 
However, in the case of conflicts that involve aggrieved farmers and taungya leaders, 
mediation parties like the chief and elders and the range supervisor(s) are called in. 
(cont’d) 
 
The second resolution session took place in the field to verify the names of the 
farmers against each documented plot. The FSD official and the old and new lead-
ers of taungya visited the designated plots in the forest in the company of some 
community members. The verification began when the FSD official started calling 
the names of people to stand beside their plots. Plot 12 was declared as being 
owned by the taungya head. However, plot 12 was not among the plots allocated to 
the taungya heads. Similarly, the owners of plots 15 and 16 were not identified, and 
there was controversy about who owned plots 26 and 27. Upon seeing that the 
claims made by the agitated farmers against the leaders were true, the FSD official 
did not continue the verification process because the discrepancies were obvious. 
Instead he provided the 58 demonstrators with additional portions of the degraded 
area to restore peace within the community. However, he reprimanded the old lead-
ers for their action and warned the new leaders not to engage in such act. 
After the field visit, the FSD official and the taungya leaders visited the chiefs’ pal-
ace, where he debriefed him on the incidences that happened during the inspection 
and informed the chief and elders of the actions taken.  
 
Actions taken  
 The facilitator provided the demonstrators with portions of degraded land to re-
store peace to the community.  
 It was agreed among community members that executives should have 4 plots of 
land, compared to one each for ordinary members. 
 The FSD official promised the chief and elders to investigate the monetary is-
sues. 
 New executives were elected. 
 
a
 Consequently, 88 plots still need to be shared instead of 91 as reported in the minutes. 
b
 The number of people who did not get access to the plots is 51 instead of 54 as indicated in 
the minutes due to a wrong calculation.  
 
Source: Minutes of the conflict management committee at Chirayaso (2009). 
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Negotiation was reported to be used in boundary-related issues where farmers agree 
to mutually resolve their differences amicably (referred to by 6% of the respondents 
reporting on this conflict category). Coercion was mentioned exclusively in relation to 
conflicts arising from farmers refusing to plant trees and as the sole strategy to ‘solve’ 
these conflicts, and referred to the force applied by the FSD when it destroys crops of 
the disobedient farmers.  
Conflicts resulting from competing claims  
Twenty respondents (9% of the total of 212 respondents) mentioned three conflict issues 
in this category. The issues are food crop theft, the destruction of crops and trees 
through the use of fire for hunting
9
 and crop and tree damage by chainsaw operators. All 
these issues are inter-group conflicts that occur between farmers and actors outside the 
group. Within this category, the majority of the respondents (70%) mentioned food crop 
theft, while 25% of the respondents reported logging damage by chainsaw millers. Only 
one person reported the conflict between farmers and hunters. Crop damage by chain-
saw millers occurs during the illegal felling of trees, especially when the farmer is ab-
sent from the field for some time. Respondents perceived the motives behind the actions 
                                                 
9
  Hunters light firewood and leave it at the entrance of holes where games like rats hide. The smoke 
from the firewood prevents the animals from escaping. 
 
Figure 8.5    Conflict management strategies employed in the institutional and  
   operational conflict category (N =192)  
 
 
Source: Field survey 2010. 
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of the chainsaw millers to be greed, but with a manifest cause of refusal to pay compen-
sation. In most instances, the offenders are not found but, when identified, the parties 
employ negotiation with compensation paid to the farmer to resolve the conflict.  
Conflicts emanating from food crop theft prevail among farmers or between farmers 
and other community members. Poverty or greed is perceived as the underlying causes 
of such conflicts, which are characterised by agitation and suspicion, especially when 
the offenders are not caught. The respondents revealed that such incidences are often 
reported to the chief and his elders or to the Unit Committee members. In the case of the 
offender not being identified, the chief issues a warning to the citizenry to desist from 
the act through a public announcement (the beating of the local gong-gong). If the of-
fender is arrested, the chief and elders in the company of the Unit Committee try to re-
solve the problem through mediation (Figure 8.6).  
In this conflict category, avoidance was reported to occur in all the three issues, with 
the result being that some conflicts were never resolved because disputants pretended 
not to recognise their existence or offenders were not seen. These kinds of conflicts 
were all characterised as non-violent.  
Anticipated conflicts resulting from uncertainty about the future and means of  
overcoming them 
Even though the above conflict categories are mostly managed amicably, the local peo-
ple anticipated potential conflicts in the near future. The first issue is how to share the 
40% of the timber revenue among individual farmers when the trees mature. The basis 
of this concern is that the 40% share benefit is assigned to the group as a whole despite 
Figure 8.6    Conflict management strategies employed in the competing claims  
   category (n=20) 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2010. 
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the farmers establishing their tree plots with different degrees of success which means 
that it will be extremely difficult to identify individual farmers’ planted trees and meas-
ure their exact contribution to the scheme at the end of the rotation period. In other 
words, the farmers are going to be entitled to an equal share, which they consider to be 
unfair. The second issue mentioned is the slow pace of signing the agreement between 
the FC and the MTS farmers, as a result of which farmers are concerned about the legal 
status of their benefit-sharing rights. The third issue of concern is the litigation among 
families or some group members when the original beneficiary passes away. Finally, 
farmers are concerned about the lack of security against the incidence of wildfires, theft 
or illegal felling and about the continuity of the MTS, since forestland was not released 
to farmers in the 2009 and 2010 planting seasons. In trying to deal with these antici-
pated conflicts, discussions were held with farmers and FC officials on different plat-
forms to identify possible interventions to minimise or prevent these anticipated con-
flicts.  
From the farmers’ perspective, they have been registered by the FSD but have no 
copies of the registration forms to serve as evidence. According to the farmers the avail-
ability of such documents would enable them to know the area that has been cultivated 
by each participating farmer as the registration form contains the personal data of the 
farmer and a description of the plantations established. Furthermore, the form includes 
passport-size pictures of the beneficiary farmer, the beneficiary’s name, how many plots 
/ blocks of land each farmer has cultivated, as well as who is the next of kin in the event 
of a beneficiary’s demise. As such records facilitate the benefit-sharing procedure, cop-
ies of the registered forms should be kept with the farmers. Farmers also requested a 
share in the tree benefits before maturity to be realised through thinning or other means. 
Farmers argued that some of them will be old by the time the tree benefits are shared 
and that they therefore need intermediate tree benefits because they may not live long 
enough to see the end of the rotation period when the trees are harvested. Finally, the 
farmers urged the government to reconsider the decision of not continuing the MTS if 
indeed that was the government’s intention. They asserted that the absence of MTS in 
about a year or two would result in food scarcity and poverty. According to the respon-
dents, such a scenario would have serious implications for their children’s education 
and family harmony and lead to lawlessness, including forest encroachment. 
In response to the complaints about the slow pace of the registration process, the FC 
respondents revealed that the key challenge is the amount of work involved in getting 
all the MTS farmers registered across the country. The FC does not have enough per-
sonnel to undertake the activity. Coupled with the amount of work, the FC is also grap-
pling with the design of an efficient database system to capture and store all the data 
about the farmers. Several processes of designing and redesigning have indeed taken 
place which have all been aimed at ensuring efficiency in capturing, recording and re-
trieving the data. The third challenge referred to relates to the funds needed to undertake 
the registration process. In 2010, as a means to overcome this, the FC sourced funds 
from the National Forestry Facility (NFF) of the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) to help address some of these problems. The FC officials believe 
that the endorsement and acceptance of the MTS agreement by the Government of 
Ghana, which is enshrined in various laws, provides some assurance of security for 
farmers. The officials revealed that the benefit-sharing agreement recognises thinning as 
a potential means of providing intermediate benefits to stakeholders. However, the first 
thinning has yet to take place, despite it being long overdue for the older stands. Offi-
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cials were reluctant to discuss the issue of scheme continuity but disclosed that, from 
the legal perspective, the government (FC) cannot easily abrogate such an agreement. 
Actions  
Farmers involved in the study made some suggestions for further improvements of the 
MTS co-management arrangement. As a strategy to minimise coercive action, the re-
spondents asked for periodic education of farmers on the principles (do’s and don’ts) of 
the MTS, backed by regular monitoring by both MTS leaders and FSD officials to help 
check on farmers who decline to plant trees at the specified times. They also proposed 
the development of mechanisms for the early detection and resolution of misunderstand-
ings among farmers before they escalate into conflict situations. In order to improve the 
prospects for the food crop component of the scheme, the farmers called for a wider tree 
planting distance of 6 m x 6 m instead of the present 3 m x 3 m spacing. This would 
allow them to cultivate food crops on their tree farm for more than the usual three years 
until canopy closure, after which they cannot cultivate light-demanding food crops 
anymore. The wider the spacing, the longer it takes for the tree canopy to close, thereby 
extending the period during which food crops can be cultivated.
10
 This enables them 
stay longer on a piece of forestland and derive more benefits from it, while also creating 
an incentive to maintain the trees, with positive effects on the quality of the timber 
stand. The rolling out strategy of the MTS scheme proposed by the FC is presented in 
Box 8.3. Under this scheme, the MTS generates income from food crops in years 1-4, 
from tree thinning in years five, somewhere between year ten and twelve and in year 
eighteen, and from tree harvesting in year twenty-five. 
Conflict outcomes and their effects on governance arrangements  
Some of the conflict outcomes analysed in the previous sections influenced the func-
tioning of the MTS in a positive manner. Concerning the disproportionate allocation of 
forestland by the taungya leaders to themselves, farmers from one community (Chi-
rayaso) reported on some lessons learnt that had led to the improvement of the system 
                                                 
10
  Productivity will, however, decrease when trees mature, also with wider spacing, due to shading ef-
fects (Thomas Insaidoo, KNUST, pers. comm. October 2011). 
Box 8.3 Rolling-out strategy of the modified taungya system 
 scheme (mostly for exotic species such as teak) 
 
Years 0-4 :  Food cropping and tending of timber tree plantations  
Year 5       :  First timber tree thinning 
Years 5-10 :  Tending of tree plantations 
Years 10-12 :  Second timber tree thinning  
Years 13-17 :  Tending of plantations  
Years 18 :  Third timber tree thinning  
Years 19-24 :  Tending of tree plantations  
Years 25 :  Clear felling of trees plantations (final harvest)  
 
Source: Adapted from Forestry Commission agreement schedule C (2002). 
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during the 2009 planting season. Because of the demonstration by the aggrieved farm-
ers, the conflict management process started with field verification by a field team con-
sisting of FSD officials, representatives of chiefs and elders, the aggrieved farmers and 
the taungya farmers, to ascertain the alleged accusation against the leaders. The field 
team findings confirmed the alleged malpractice. This resulted in four decisions being 
taken by the conflict management actors in the presence of the entire community. First, 
the 58 aggrieved farmers were promised new plots of degraded land. Second, it was 
agreed that the executives should have four plots of land instead of one received by or-
dinary members to compensate for their leadership. Third, old taungya executives who 
were involved in the disproportionate allocation were replaced with newly elected ones 
and, finally, the chief and elders tasked the FSD officials to investigate the alleged ex-
orbitant fees as made clear in Box 8.2.  
The outcome of the coercive action taken by FSD officials against disobedient farm-
ers who failed to plant timber trees on their plots resulted in the exclusion of uncoopera-
tive farmers. Respondents did not clarify whether the FSD officials also learnt to supply 
the seedlings at the onset of the planting season. Respondents disclosed that it is diffi-
cult to ascertain the impacts of conflicts associated with food crop theft, destruction of 
crops and trees through the use of fire for hunting and illegal chainsaw operations, be-
cause more often than not the offenders abscond and hence the resolution processes 
does not take place. However, the public announcements to warn offenders sometimes 
result in a temporary reduction of theft incidences. Disputes concerning farm boundaries 
are settled by Taungya heads, sometimes in collaboration with village chiefs and elders 
as well as FSD officials. However, this process does not help to solve the underlying 
problem because boundary-related conflicts resurface every year. The FSD regarded the 
solution proposed by the farmers to prepare the land before allocation as being unac-
ceptable due to the labour and other costs involved. This has therefore become an unre-
solved conflict that will resurface in the near future. 
Regarding the anticipated conflicts arising from tenure security and uncertainties, the 
FC has secured donor funds to register all farmers and address outstanding issues con-
cerning the agreement.  
Discussion  
Through the Forestry Commission the government of Ghana embarked on a co-
management approach to restore degraded forestlands under the modified taungya sys-
tem after having drawn lessons from the old taungya system, in relation to which sev-
eral problems and conflicts had surfaced. It is the first collaborative arrangement be-
tween farming communities and the FC with legal backing, clearly defined institutions 
and a benefit-sharing scheme. Echoing Marfo (2009), the MTS represents a significant 
tenure reform in which, for the first time in Ghana, local communities and individuals 
have direct ownership rights over trees in state forest reserves and specifically pre-
scribed benefits through mutual agreement.  
The institutional framework shows a partnership of stakeholders ranging from state 
and non-state actors to the international community which indicates the diversity of ac-
tors and the multi-faceted character of the arrangement. The contractual agreements 
between the FC and MTS groups offer the taungya farmers some formal powers in 
terms of leasehold over land and access to the forest reserve to farm, with the decision-
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making responsibilities of the taungya committees as well as the farmers being quite 
circumscribed.  
The MTS operations are not devoid of conflicts but the outcome of most of these 
conflicts helped to continue shaping the system. This confirms the notion that conflicts 
are a means of social learning to improve a situation, and therefore serve as positive 
capabilities (Burgess & Burgess 1996, Glasl 1999).  
The institutional and operational conflict type was the prevalent conflict category 
mentioned by most (91%) of the respondents in the survey. The conflicts mostly occur 
either among the farmers or between farmers and the MTS committee members because 
of unclear boundary issues, the disproportionate allocation of forestland by the MTS 
committee members and fees charged for land preparations which were perceived as 
exorbitant. These may have roots in the institutional framework of the MTS that man-
dates the taungya leaders to allocate the demarcated lands into plots to the farmers. 
These leaders sometimes abuse this power, resulting in the reported conflicts. As a 
learning process, local communities, traditional leaders and district level FSD officials 
have learnt to use the conflict management process to bring fairness to the system, as 
seen in Chirayaso. The only unresolved conflict issue that occurs between the FSD and 
the MTS farmers is the failure of disobedient farmers who refuse to cultivate timber 
trees alongside their crops, on which the FSD responded by destroying the crops of 
these farmers. Both antecedent conditions and manifest behaviour prevail as conflict 
causes with varied effects such as fighting, quarrels, verbal exchanges and demonstra-
tion issues. Nevertheless, apart from a few indications of violent incidences reported in 
boundary-related conflicts and conflicts about the disproportionate allocation of plots to 
taungya leaders, most of the respondents viewed all the four conflict issues as non-
violent. Mediation was the lead strategy employed in almost all the conflict issues men-
tioned and involves mediators such as chiefs and elders, Unit Committee members and 
FSD officials. The fact that mediation is the key strategy employed indicates that the 
conflict issues were difficult to resolve among the parties on their own and required a 
third party to intervene. Coercive actions by the FSD officials, resulting in the destruc-
tion of crops of farmers who failed to plant trees even after several warnings, are not in 
conformity with the dispute resolution mechanism stipulated in the benefit sharing 
agreement, which calls for arbitration (FC 2005). Such action by the FSD must not be-
come standard in the MTS programme since it creates hostility between the FSD and the 
local communities. Instead, regular education and monitoring by the officials may have 
a more positive effect on the attitude of the recalcitrant farmers. In the case of avoid-
ance, which occurs when the party who is demonstrating manifest behaviour disappears, 
both parties lose without them coming together to decide on a resolution.  
The second conflict category (i.e. competing claims) occurs mostly between the 
farmers and people outside the group due to different actors claiming different or simi-
lar resources from the scheme based on need, interests, power positions or greed. This 
confirms the notion that different claimants with perceived or actual incompatible goals 
or limited resources are behind every claim (van Oosten 2011). The key actors in this 
conflict category are the farmers on the one hand and hunters, chainsaw millers and 
mostly unknown food crop thieves on the other. In this conflict category, incidences are 
often non-violent and the resolution process occurs through negotiation, mediation or 
avoidance. Interestingly, the majority of the respondents perceived the current intensity 
of conflict in the scheme as non-violent. This indeed indicates that the conflicts are 
manageable. Nevertheless, non-violence does not automatically mean an absence of 
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conflicts. It just shows the different ways the respondents perceive conflicts and through 
which lens they see the conflict incidences. In almost all the current conflict issues, the 
local traditional leaders (‘Odikros’) were involved in the conflict management process 
despite the low profile role given to them in forest management in Ghana (Ghana Con-
stitution of 1992, Mayers & Kotey 1996). For instance, the public announcement 
through the beating of the gong-gong has positive effects on food crop thefts. This 
clearly indicates that the role of the customary governing structure in forest manage-
ment cannot only be enshrined in a benefit sharing arrangement for the paramount 
chiefs, but that traditional authorities must be actively involved in aspects of forest 
management with legal recognition. 
The last conflict category is the anticipated conflict issues, such as the sharing of 
40% of the tree revenues among the farmers once the trees have been harvested, the 
slow process towards signing of MTS agreement, the security of the trees until maturity 
and uncertainty surrounding the continuity of the scheme. These anticipated conflicts by 
the farmers can be minimised if the FC proactively engages in the registration process 
and educates the farmers, especially in the adoption of the drafted constitution. This 
would resolve most of the anticipated conflicts as some intervention strategies are al-
ready outlined in the drafted constitution, but are unknown to the communities. Joint 
decision making is a key component of co-management arrangements (Singleton 1998). 
The FC should use the sourced funds not only to redress the institutional inefficiencies 
regarding the MTS registration process and data management system, but also to 
strengthen its partnership with the communities using an adaptive co-management ap-
proach. Folke et al. (2002: 20) define adaptive co-management as ‘a process by which 
institutional arrangements and ecological knowledge are tested and revised in a dy-
namic, ongoing, self-organized process of learning-by-doing’. Adaptive management 
and co-management have been evolving towards a common perspective because adap-
tive management without collaboration lacks legitimacy, and co-management without 
learning-by-doing does not develop the ability to address emerging problems. Maturing 
co-management arrangements become adaptive co-management in time, through suc-
cessive rounds of learning-by-doing (Olsson et al. 2004, Armitage et al. 2007). An 
equally important element is to address farmers’ uncertainties about the continuity of 
the MTS. Although there is no official announcement that the MTS will be discontin-
ued, farmers believe that the scheme is gradually dying out because no new plots have 
been allocated to them for two consecutive years. Due to uncertainty on the part of the 
local communities regarding the continuity of the scheme, there is a high level of specu-
lation which, in itself, could be a basis of new conflicts. Such a situation creates multi-
ple frames that undermine the co-management arrangement. The fact that the farmers 
have not officially complained in writing to the FC about their concerns not only indi-
cates the low capacity of the farmers to engage in a constructive dialogue with the FC 
but is also a sign of weak local forest governance in which hierarchical governance 
dominates. It is also evidence of the unlevel playing field for both actors in the partner-
ship, with the community level partner tending to lose out because of a lack of ‘voice’ 
and power to express its concerns. As asserted by Carlsson & Berkes (2005: 64) a 
command-and-control kind of resource management is a recipe for ecological uncer-
tainty. The abrupt discontinuity of the scheme means that one key syndrome of ecologi-
cal uncertainty that may occur in the forest reserve could be the proliferation of illegal 
farming.  
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The analysis in this chapter has shown that the current system which is in operation 
has not entirely been a continuous problem-solving process (Carlsson & Berkes 2005). 
This is because, in terms of decision making, it portrays features of a fixed state system 
which is meant to serve the interests of the FC rather than of a process that embraces 
joint decision making for the benefit of both parties. However, at operational level, the 
MTS arrangement has indeed been a learning process during which problem solving 
helped to improve the scheme. Similarly, at policy level, the FC’s ability to secure funds 
to address some key institutional challenges is a development in the right direction. 
However, the lack of clarity regarding the possible discontinuity of the scheme may 
undermine the potential of the MTS as an effective co-management arrangement where 
lessons are learnt which can be used to continue improving forest governance.  
Conclusion  
The MTS arrangement has legal backing, clearly defined institutions and a benefit shar-
ing arrangement that involves multiple actors. The three conflict categories identified 
around the MTS relate to institutional and operational problems, competing claims and 
anticipated conflicts and these are managed with a blend of conflict management ap-
proaches with mediation prevailing. The chapter also revealed that the MTS has indeed 
been a learning process in which some conflict management outcomes have been able to 
improve the system. However, the inability of the FC to provide a clear direction for the 
future of the scheme tends to undermine the MTS as an effective co-management ar-
rangement by which lessons are learnt for further governance improvement. At present 
farmers are unable to engage effectively in a constructive dialogue with the FC as equal 
partners in a co-management scheme. It is therefore necessary to strengthen their com-
petencies, since this will enable them to articulate their concerns and negotiate their 
rights. 
With a view to the future, recommendations have been presented for consideration in 
connection with the implementation of the MTS. 
 
MTS implementation 
 
1. Weak consultations with local people result in conflicts which add to the insecurity 
about the sharing of timber benefits in the future. In view of this, forest managers 
need to consider an adaptive co-management approach in which participatory sce-
nario planning is employed to overcome the uncertainties within the co-management 
arrangement. Such an approach will help create a learning process to improve the 
system. Scenario planning (Figure 8.7) helps stakeholders to cope with uncertainty, 
not by eliminating it, but rather by framing it and by understanding the range of as-
sociated implications (Wollenberg et al. 2000: 71). Two key uncertainties and their 
driving forces with potential to weaken the MTS in the near future are presented in 
Box 8.4.  
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2. The lack of income between canopy closure and timber harvesting needs to be ad-
dressed in three ways. First, plots should be regularly released to enable a farmer to 
cultivate food crops in the MTS over a longer period, without raising expectations 
that land will be released every year (which could create an incentive for forest de-
struction as it would make more degraded forest reserve land available for the 
scheme). Second, there is a need to assess the possibilities of enlarging the spacing of 
Figure 8.7    Outline of a scenario planning process (Source: Wollenberg et al. (2000). 
 
 
A focal question or problem 
 
Assessment of the certain and uncertain elements driving the focal question 
 
Creation of possible future (scenarios) 
 
Engaging with stakeholders on preferred future 
 
Developing a roadmap from the present to the possible future 
 
Developing and testing a robust strategy towards preferred future checking early warning 
signals of different futures. 
 
Box 8.4 Uncertainties in the MTS that need to be addressed in 
 scenario planning 
 
Purpose one: Forest fringe communities realise timber benefits in future 
Why to be addressed?  
 Higher survival chances of timber trees in the light of fire and theft  
 Less doubt about whether MTS farmers will fully benefit from the 40% timber 
revenue distribution of the benefits share among individual farmers   
 
Purpose two: Sustainability of the MTS co-management arrangement  
Why to be addressed? 
 Continuity of the MTS scheme 
 Alternative to illegal farming  
 Alternative to illegal logging and timber theft  
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timber trees in order to extend the period during which food crops can be planted. 
Third, suitable crops should be identified to develop the MTS into a genuine agrofor-
estry system which generates cash and non-cash income during the entire twenty-five 
year rotation period.  
 
3. The Forestry Commission needs to recognise that conflict is a phenomenon inherent 
in natural resource management. In view of that, conflict management needs to be an 
integral component of its programmes, especially of a co-management arrangement 
such as the MTS in which actors with partly diverging interests participate. This will 
help the early detection of signals of conflict and promote better communication to 
ensure sustainable forest management.  
 
4. Non-governmental organisations can play a role as ‘watchdogs’ and help empower 
MTS farmers with a view to levelling the playing field and dealing with the FC on an 
equitable basis. This will enable them to articulate their concerns and have the com-
petency to negotiate their rights.  
 
5. The stool land owners are recognised in the MTS partnership as the provider of lands 
and, as such, share in the timber revenue benefits. However, attention should be paid 
to the role of traditional authorities in all aspects of forest management, particularly 
in strategies such as the MTS that are based in local community structures. 
 
  
 
 
9 
Conflict and conflict management  
in production forests 
Introduction 
Illegal exploitation of forest resources, especially illegal logging, has been the focus of 
global attention for the past decade (see Contreras–Hermosilla 2001, Kaimowitz 2003, 
Hansen & Treue 2008, Marfo 2010). The underlying drivers of illegal exploitation of 
forest resources are attributed to, for example, tenure insecurity, poor law enforcement, 
greed and corruption (Contreras–Hermosilla 2001, Kaimowitz 2003, Mukul 2010).  
Global initiatives like the European Union Forest Law Enforcement Governance and 
Trade (EU-FLEGT) and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+) have sought to minimise this problem in forest-resourced countries. Un-
der the EU-FLEGT programme, an agreement exists to ensure a commitment to reduc-
ing illegal logging between EU and its partnering timber-producer countries through the 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) (Mayers et al. 2008, see also Chapter 5).  
As discussed in Chapter 5, Ghana signed the VPA with the EU in 2009 to improve 
the governance process in legal timber trade and law enforcement by adapting the legal-
ity assurance system (Beeko 2009). One means of overcoming the illegal timber trade 
under the VPA is to ensure stricter law enforcement. However, studies in the country’s 
forest sector on illegal chainsaw milling indicate ineffectiveness of the ban (Odoom 
2005, Adam et al. 2007). Key socio-political constraints which are hampered by weak 
law enforcement include a high level of rural unemployment, corruption among law 
enforcement agencies and high elite influence in the forestry sector (Nutakor et al. 
2011).  
From the local arena, both legal and illegal means are used to access forest resources. 
These are often driven by need and greed, with antecedent conditions being poverty, 
limited livelihood options and a scarcity of farming land (see Chapter 7). The result is 
resource users facing conflicts among themselves and with the Forest Services Division 
(FSD) officials, the Military, and the Police (Amanor 2000, Ohene-Gyan 2004, Marfo 
2006, Ros-Tonen et al. 2010, Wit et al. 2010). Conflicts therefore become inevitable, 
with institutions, mechanisms and competence to manage them being either weak or 
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absent. This poses challenges to forest governance, sustainable forest management and 
sustainable livelihoods (Ostrom 1999, Marfo 2006, Yasmi 2007, Derkyi et al. forthcom-
ing).  
Some authors have therefore questioned the efficacy of strict forest law enforcement 
(Kaimowitz 2003, Adimazoya et al. 2009, Wiersum 2010, Mukul 2010, Owusu et al. 
2010). Wiersum’s (2010) review of the FLEGT legal assurance system revealed the 
dominance of strict enforcement in the system, also referred to as ‘hard enforcement1 or 
‘suppression enforcement2, where stakeholders seek justice through legal courts. Ac-
cording to the author, a system governed by such an approach does not fit in with the 
shift towards a decentralised forest governance regime, where the attention focuses on 
improving the livelihoods of forest-dependent people (Ibid. 2010). Some are therefore 
keen to complement a strict law enforcement approach with a soft law enforcement ap-
proach with the three inter-related operational strategies of prevention, detection and 
suppression to ensure effective law enforcement (see Contreras-Hermosilla 2001, Wier-
sum 2010). The rationale underlying the call is that forest fringe communities and the 
labourers in the timber industry are the first and hardest to be hit by the hard law en-
forcement approach (Kaimowitz 2003, Inoguchi et al. 2005, Owusu et al. 2010).  
This chapter contributes to this topical debate by analysing conflicts in a production 
forest in the Tano-Offin forest reserve. The specific sub-questions addressed in this 
chapter are: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the production forest in the Tano-Offin forest reserve 
as a system-to-be-governed, particularly with regard to the interaction of local com-
munities with the natural system in their efforts to secure their livelihoods?  
2. What governing system (i.e. institutions and policy instruments) function in the pro-
duction regime?  
3. What are the perspectives of the inhabitants of the communities at the production 
forest fringe regarding the nature of forest and tree-related conflicts in the production 
regime?  
4. What are the implications of the findings for law enforcement under VPA?  
 
The chapter is based on document analysis, a semi-structured questionnaire survey 
among 137 inhabitants of Chirayaso and Kunsu Nyamebekyere No. 3, which are two 
villages bordering the production regime in the Tano-Offin forest reserve. Furthermore, 
data was collected during community and validation meetings (see Chapter 3). Secon-
dary data and the respondents’ views on the subject matter were analysed along the lines 
of interactive governance theory, i.e. in terms of the system-to-be-governed, the govern-
ing system, and governance interactions (Kooiman et al. 2005, see also Chapter 2). Ad-
ditionally, the elements of day-to-day conflict management – images, instruments and 
actions (Ibid. 2005) – were blended with the conflict wheel developed by Mason & 
Rychard (2005) (Chapter 2) for a more in-depth understanding of the nature of conflicts 
and conflict management prevailing in the study area from the perspective of the local 
                                                 
1
  Hard enforcement comes in the form of legal enforcement of existing forestry laws, including the 
criminalisation of violators through arrest, the filing of charges, court judgements and the imposition 
of punishment (see Colchester et al. 2006). 
2
  According to Contreras-Hermosilla (2002: 22), suppression enforcement of illegal forest acts involves 
the use of physical and legal force (arrest and imprisonment) and/or financial (fines) penalties to im-
pose the law. 
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people. Subsequently, the conflict outcomes were analysed and their implications as-
sessed for law enforcement under the VPA between Ghana and the EU to combat illegal 
logging.  
The next section presents the natural system (i.e. the Tano-Offin production regime) 
and the socio-economic system of the two communities and their dependence on forest 
resources. Then the governing system is presented from legislation and institutional 
perspectives. After that, the respondents’ images, instruments and actions concerning 
conflict and conflict management are presented. The discussion section synthesises the 
findings and assesses the implications of the outcomes on law enforcement under the 
VPA. The chapter ends with a conclusion.  
The system-to-be-governed (SG) 
The system-to-be-governed is analysed from the natural and human system perspec-
tives. The natural system provides brief description of the production system of Tano-
Offin forest reserve (see Chapter 4 for details on the characteristics of the natural sys-
tem). The characteristics of the inhabitants of Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 
3 and the contributions of forest resources to their livelihoods represent the socio-
economic sub-system.   
The natural system  
The description of the natural system in terms of diversity, complexity, dynamics and 
scale is given in Chapter 4, where the characteristics of the high forest zone and the 
Tano-Offin forest reserve are described. Here, the focus is on the production regime in 
Figure 9.1    Map of the Tano-Offin forest reserve indicating the two study 
   communities 
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on-reserve forests. A production forest is divided into compartments of approximately 
128 hectares each (1,600 m x 800 m). A group of such compartments constitute a con-
cession or timber utilisation contract (TUC) area. Each concession or TUC area has a 
harvesting schedule, which is a timeline for logging individual compartments (ITTO 
2005). According to the manual of procedures (MoPs)
3
 (see Chapter 5) that guides the 
Forestry Commission timber exploitation activities, the timber contractor prepares the 
logging plans. The TUC ranges from one to forty years, during which trees must be 
felled according to a harvesting schedule. Timber felling also occurs in the off-reserve 
areas, but the management system differs from the on-reserve regime (see Chapters 4 
and 10). Both commercial timber harvesting and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) 
are exploited in the on-reserve production areas and the off-reserve areas. Figure 9.1 
shows the areas in the Tano-Offin reserve under production and plantation regimes and 
the location of the two study villages where data was collected for this chapter.  
The human system 
This section deals with the human system of the Tano-Offin off-reserve area, paying 
attention to the socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants and the contribution of 
forest and tree resources to their livelihoods. 
 
– The socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants 
Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 have an estimated adult population of 770 
and 240 respectively (see Chapter 3). Generally, the inhabitants of the study communi-
ties engage in crop farming as their major occupation. Export and cash crops like cocoa, 
pineapple and oil palm are commonly grown on family or individual farmlands, whilst 
short-rotation food crops are cultivated in the forest reserve using the modified taungya 
system (MTS) scheme (see Chapter 8) or integrated with cocoa and other perennial 
crops on farmlands. Of the 212 respondents from Chapter 8, one hundred and thirty-
seven (n=137) individuals responded to the questions in this chapter, of which 56% 
(n=77) were males and 44% (n=60) females. The literacy level among the respondents 
is high (88%). The majority of the respondents (68%) have a Middle or Junior Secon-
dary School education certificate. The majority of the respondents (47%) were aged 
between 18-35, followed by the age range of 36-53. Christianity is the main religion 
among the respondents (93%) with only 1% of respondents in Chirayaso being tradi-
tionalists (Table 9.1). 
Generally, the migrants (53%) outnumbered the indigenes (47%), with relatively 
more migrants being recorded in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 (n=40 or 74%) than in 
Chirayaso (n=33 or 40%). The number of years that migrants have already lived in the 
village ranges from a minimum of one year to a maximum of sixty years. The study 
revealed that 37% of the respondents have a single occupation whereas 60% have mul-
tiple occupations and 3% reported that they were not engaged in any occupation. 
Among those with a single occupation, crop farming in the off and on-reserve areas 
under the MTS (Chapter 8) is the leading occupation. Three per cent of the respondents 
are fulltime chainsaw millers. The multiple occupation respondents also combined food 
                                                 
3
  The FC uses manuals for production, management and planning such as the 1998 Manual of Proce-
dures for Forest Resource Management Planning in the High-Forest Zone, the Manual of Procedures 
for Stock Survey and Yield Allocation (1995), and the 1998/2003 timber resources management regu-
lations (ITTO 2005). 
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crop farming (on farm and under the MTS) with jobs such as chainsaw milling, civil 
service and other artisanal occupations such as electrician, masonry and hairdressing.  
 
Table 9.1  Socio-economic characteristics of respondents (n=137)  
Variables  Observed frequency (n) and percentage of respondents 
Chirayaso Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 Total Percentage 
(%) 
Gender      
  Male  44 33 77 56 
  Female  39 21 60 44 
Age range      
  18-35 42 23 65 47 
  36-53 26 26 52 38 
  53+ 15 5 20 15 
Religion     
  Christianity  77 50 127 93 
  Islam 4 2 6 4 
  Traditionalist  1 0 1 1 
  Free Thinker  1 2 3 2 
Education      
  SSS/Secondary 12 2 14 10 
  Middle/JSS 59 34 93 68 
  Primary 6 8 14 10 
  None 6 10 16 12 
Origin      
  Indigenes 50 14 64 47 
  Migrants 33 40 73 53 
Occupation      
  Single Occupation      
    Farming in off- 
    reserve area  
10 6 16 12 
    Modified taungya  
    system (MTS) 
16 9 25 18 
    Chainsaw milling  3 1 4 3 
    Others
1
 4 1 5 4 
  Multiple occupations      
    MTS and off-reserve  
    farming  
38 32 70 51 
    MTS and others
2
 9 4 13 9 
    No occupation  3 1 4 3 
Key: SSS = Senior Secondary School; JSS = Junior Secondary School 
1 Trading, hairdressing, pastoral job, farm labourer, worker in timber firm. 
2 Chainsaw miller, teacher, artisan, prison official. 
– Contributions of forest and tree resources to people’s livelihoods 
One hundred and thirty-two (132) of the 137 responded that forest and tree resources do 
contribute to their livelihoods. The inhabitants of the two communities access the forest 
resources in the form of land under the MTS, chainsaw milling, NTFPs for domestic use 
and trade, forest services (i.e. boundary clearing, working with timber firms and as for-
est guards) (Figure 9.2). 
Most respondents (74%) are engaged in the MTS in the forest reserve. For 37% of 
the respondents, this is the only way they make use of the forest reserve, and for the 
other 37% it is one of the ways in which resources from the forest reserve contribute to 
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their livelihoods. Other forest-based livelihoods include the collection of NTFPs for 
domestic and commercial use, involving employees of timber firms, and chainsaw mill-
ing. In addition, 20% of the inhabitants make use of NTFPs for domestic use, which 
includes the collection of mushrooms and snails, harvesting of pestles, medicinal plants 
and chewing sticks and hunting for game. However, respondents mentioned that some 
of these resources are becoming extinct, while some are seasonal. Moreover, the reserve 
contributes to people’s livelihood through forest services such as being recruited as a 
boundary clearer for which the Forest Services Division occasionally pays a wage, and 
as employees of timber firms and forest guards (3%). A minor proportion (2%) engaged 
in illegal chainsaw milling.  
According to the respondents, forest and tree-based livelihoods are not without chal-
lenges. Problems related to the MTS include boundary disputes, illegal farming, food 
crop theft and the unfair distribution of taungya land (elaborated in Chapter 8). Prob-
lems associated with chainsaw milling include the confiscation of lumber and machines 
by the FSD-military task force. With respect to access to NTFPs for domestic and 
commercial use, problems are more related to denial of access to the resources by the 
forest guards in addition to the long distance to be covered to gather these products. 
The governing system (GS) 
This section presents the institutional framework by looking at institutions as a structure 
and as a rule and strategies governing the production regime. 
Figure 9.2    Use of the forest reserve by inhabitants of Chirayaso and Kunsu- 
   Nyamebekyere No. 3 
 (n=132) 
 
* Includes a collection of NTFPs for domestic and commercial use, with those involved being employees of a 
timber firm, and chainsaw mills. 
Source: Field survey 2009-2010. 
 
193 
 
 
Institutional structure  
Four governing structures were identified under the production regime, belonging to the 
statutory, market, customary and hybrid governing systems respectively. 
– District Forest Services Division (FSD)  
The District FSD of the Forestry Commission (FC) is responsible for the management 
of forest reserves at the micro level, headed by a manager and assistants. The range su-
pervisors and forest guards are the frontline officials in frequent contact with the local 
communities and the timber operators. Within the production regime, the mandates of 
the forest guards are to clear the reserve boundary and to patrol the reserve in order to 
prevent illegal activities. The range supervisors are also in charge of timber exploitation 
in a certain forest area, conduct stock surveys and measure felled trees to estimate tree 
volume using the tree information form (TIF). Additional responsibilities include the 
issuance of log conveyance certificates to contractors and conducting post-harvesting 
inspection. 
– TUC holders and chainsaw millers  
The TUC or concession holders are based in the market governing structure, but their 
operations are subject to statutory law. They have the legal right to operate in the on and 
off-forest reserves for a specified period. The TUC holders in the reserve obtain their 
contract through competitive bidding and are allowed to operate for a period of one cy-
cle, which corresponds to forty years whereas in the off reserve TUC holders operate for 
a period of five years. Another actor in the marketing structure is the chainsaw miller. 
However, this category belongs to the informal private sector because of the criminali-
sation associated with their operations since the adoption of LI 1649 (see Chapter 5).  
– Chiefs and elders at local level 
The traditional authority at village level comprises the chief, queen mother and elders. 
As in Kyekyewere village, the two communities studied in this chapter also have sub-
chiefs who support the chief to take care of the communities. They perform the same 
functions as discussed in Chapter 7, including the administration of stool lands on be-
half of the stool landowners who do not reside close to the resource base, but delegate 
their authorities along the hierarchical ladder to the village chiefs (locally referred as 
‘Odikro’). The Chirayaso chief owes allegiance to the Nyinahin stool, while the Kunsu-
Nyamebekyere No. 3 chieftaincy owes allegiance to the Hia stool.  
– Unit Committee, Community Forest Committees (CFCs) and Community  
   Biodiversity Advisory Groups (CBAGs) 
The three actors within the hybrid governing structure also play a pivotal role in the 
production regime. These are the Unit Committee, the Community Biodiversity Advi-
sory Groups (CBAGs) and Community Forest Committees (CFCs) (see Chapter 7 for a 
description of the Unit Committees and the CBAGs). The CFCs, just like the CBAGs, 
were established to serve as a channel through which the FSD could implement its col-
laborative forest management activities.  
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– Judiciary and the Police  
The roles of judiciary and the police with regards to law enforcement are discussed in 
Chapters 5, 7 and 11. 
Legislative instruments, benefit arrangement and strategies  
This section presents the legislation regarding the exploitation of timber resources in 
Ghana, the benefit-sharing arrangements in place and the Voluntary Partnership Agree-
ment with the EU to combat illegal logging and enhance good forest governance. 
– The legal framework governing timber exploitation and sanctions  
The Forestry Commission (FC) is responsible for the management and regulation of the 
forestry sector in Ghana. There are laws that govern the management, allocation and use 
of forest resources as well as sanctions. The enactment of the Forest Ordinance (Cap 
157) of 1927 gave the then Forestry Department the authority to select land suitable for 
reservation and declare them forest reserves (see Chapter 5). Access to timber for com-
mercial purposes is regulated through the Timber Resources Management Act (547) and 
amended Act 617 (Chapter 5). The granting of timber harvesting rights stipulates that it 
is illegal for any person to harvest timber from any land without a TUC. A TUC can be 
issued on any land, with the exception of land subject to alienation holding or land with 
farms. On such lands, prior authorisation in writing from groups or individuals involved 
is required before harvesting can begin. The amended Act 617 also specifies the right of 
harvesting timber from private plantations. Section 3 (a) & (b) of this act indicates that: 
‘The right to harvest trees and extract timber from a specified area of land shall not be 
granted if (i) there is a private forest plantation already on the land and (ii) there is tim-
ber already grown or owned by any individual or group of individuals on the land (Act 
617: 3). 
Act 547 (amended 617) also indicates that, when a TUC is to be issued in off-reserve 
areas, including on farmlands, an inspection of the proposed land and written authorisa-
tion from the landowners is required before any harvesting operations can begin. The 
granting of timber in off-reserve areas, especially where cocoa cultivation exists, con-
tradicts the Economic Plants Protection Act which states that felling rights with respect 
to timber ‘shall not be granted where the timber trees stand in farms where specified 
plants [cocoa] are cultivated’. It further stipulates that, ‘if timber is felled, the farmer 
should be compensated for his/her losses at a rate determined by the Minister’ (AFRCD 
47 1979). The relevant legislations, which ensure law enforcement, include:  
 Forest Protection Decree 1974 (N.R.C.D. 234). This Act defines forest offences and 
prescribes sanctions and/or penalties for such offences. 
 The Forest Protection (Amendment) Act 2002 (Act 624). This Act repealed the For-
est Protection (Amendment) Law 1986 (P.N.D.C.L.142), revised forest offences 
fines in an upward direction and introduced joint liability in the commitment and 
prosecution of forest offences (see Chapter 7). 
– Benefit sharing schemes in the production regime 
Below the three benefit-sharing arrangements in production forests are explained, which 
include royalties, social responsibility agreements and crop damage compensation.  
1. Timber royalties  
The concept of royalties in Ghana forest management can be traced back to the 1927 
Forest Ordinance Act. It was a period when stool landowners were given a role in forest 
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management under colonial rule with a percentage of the revenues generated. The cur-
rent benefit sharing arrangement is enshrined in Article 267 (6) of the constitution of 
Ghana, complemented by Act 547. The benefit-sharing scheme as stipulated in the con-
stitution still holds for the on-reserve forest, while a forest policy reform in 2002 modi-
fied the proportion in the off-reserve areas (see Table 9.2). The distribution among 
beneficiary stakeholders occurs when the FC has taken its share
4
 of 60% and 40% man-
agement fees from the royalties accrued from the on-reserve and off-reserve forest areas 
respectively.  
 
Table 9.2 Current benefit-sharing schemes for royalties from timber resources in on and off-reserve  
 areas  
Stakeholder beneficiaries Reserve (%) Off-reserve (%) 
Forestry Commission 50.0 50.0 
Administrator of stool lands 5.0 5.0 
District Assembly 24.8 24.7 
Traditional council & Stool landowner  20.2 20.3 
Source: OASL/FC (2010). 
2. Social responsibility agreement  
The social responsibility agreement (SRA) was introduced into Ghana’s forest man-
agement system as part of the TUC procedure in the late 1990s. It is an agreement be-
tween a TUC holder in both on and off-reserve production areas and the land-owning 
communities (forest fringe communities) (FC 2004). The legal instruments governing 
this arrangement are Act 547 and the Timber Resource Management Regulations (L.I. 
1649) of 1998. The agreement is made up of two parts. The first is the code of conduct 
that entails the contractors’ role to ensure that all timber operations are conducted with 
due respect for the rights of the communities in terms of their customs, beliefs, infra-
structure and livelihoods. The second part concerns the social obligations, i.e. a specific 
agreement drawn up between the community and the contractor based on the stumpage 
or the monetary value of the trees removed from the TUC area. The financial value of 
this social obligation is stipulated in the L.I. 1649 Section 13(1b) stating that:  
‘a social responsibility agreement should be entered into with the landowner ‘to assist the 
inhabitants within the contract area with such amenities as specified in the agreement at a 
cost of not less than 5% of the annual stumpage from the operations under the TUC.’ 
The SRA negotiation team in a community consists of the local chief, representatives of 
the community and the FSD, and the District Chief Executive of the District Assembly. 
Besides being a witness, the guidelines mandate the FC to play key negotiation role in 
(i) informing community representatives about the new TUC allocation procedures, (ii) 
advise communities about the SRA, (iii) educate communities on the procedure for de-
veloping SRAs, and (iv) assist communities to prioritise their development programmes 
(FC 2004). Section 6 of the SRA guidelines spells out compliance and sanctions of SRA 
to the communities, the FC official at the district level and the TUC holder. Section 6.1 
states that ‘the demand of the communities should be specific, time bound and realistic 
and for them to be able to access how much constitute 5%, there is the need for the Dis-
trict forest manager or representative to play a key role to guide in calculating the 
value of the 5%’.  
                                                 
4
  The Forestry Commission has decreased its on-reserve benefit share to 50% and increased the off-
reserve benefit share to 50% (OASL/FC 2010). 
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Similarly, in the event that the contractor fails to fulfil the agreed SRA, the sanctions 
stipulated in Act 547 (amended 617) Section 15 (1) authorises the suspension or termi-
nation of the contractor’s activities on the following grounds: 
 Failing to observe taboo days (see Chapter 7);  
 Destruction of social infrastructure without taking steps to replace or repair it imme-
diately; and  
 Failing to pay compensation for crops damaged.  
3. Crop damage compensation  
The concept of crop damage compensation is stipulated in Act 547. The Act gives 
power to farmers regarding tree felling on farmlands. The act indicates that a TUC 
holder needs the permission of the farmer before harvesting. In addition, the farmer has 
the right to negotiate ‘fair compensation for crop damage’, and when disputes occur 
between the contractor and the farmer, there will be delay in the issuance of the convey-
ance certificate until the dispute has been resolved.  
 
4. The Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) and law enforcement  
The VPA as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 is intended to improve the governance proc-
ess in legal timber trade and law enforcement. The agreement outlines stages to promote 
legal trading in timber while ensuring social safeguards for vulnerable groups during 
implementation. A key part of the document of relevance to this chapter is Annex V of 
the agreement, which indicates how Ghana will implement its Legality Assurance Sys-
tem (LAS). It outlines twelve steps to track and control the timber flow critically from 
the resource base to its place of final destination. One of the twelve steps of interest to 
this chapter refers to the source of the timber. The agreement states that ‘wood products 
coming from Ghana will be derived from legally designated areas and will be allocated 
according to legal prescription. Such products will come from designated areas within 
forest reserves, plantations, off-reserve areas and sub-merged forests’. 
As a means to ensure that Ghana fulfils its VPA commitments, several studies, ac-
tivities and meetings have been undertaken. One of these meetings was the international 
workshop held in 2010 as part of the ‘Illegal or Incompatible’ project coordination by 
the Forest and Nature Policy group of Wageningen University, which generated six 
mechanisms to minimise illegal logging in Ghana (see Chapter 5). One of the mecha-
nisms of relevance to this chapter is the introduction of soft law enforcement, i.e. creat-
ing incentives for people to adapt in the long term to the VPA system (IOI Project team 
2010). 
From images to action: Forest fringe communities’ perspectives of conflicts 
and conflict management in the production forests 
This section examines the governance elements i.e. the images, instruments and actions 
in day-to-day conflict management (first order governance), using the dimensions of the 
conflict wheel developed by Mason & Rychard (2005) (see Chapter 3). It discusses the 
respondents’ images (of conflict issues, actors involved and ‘culprits’, causes and con-
flict dynamics) and the instruments (i.e. conflict management strategies they identified) 
for each of the conflict types identified. The actions proposed by the respondents in re-
lation to the three conflict categories are also discussed. 
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Conflict issues  
Based on the survey and focus group discussions in the study villages, nine livelihood 
issues were identified from which conflicts evolved. These were grouped into three 
main categories. The first category encompasses conflicts related to access to forest 
resources and includes conflicts related to chainsaw milling, commercial NTFP extrac-
tion, the gathering of NTFPs for domestic use and hunting. The second category con-
cerns operational conflicts within TUC areas (on and off-reserve areas) which evolve 
around SRAs, log theft and crop damage compensation. The third category encom-
passes conflicts related to land use (i.e. boundary disputes and illegal farming) in both 
on and off-reserve areas. Table 9.3 indicates the number of respondents who mentioned 
each conflict type when they were asked whether they are aware of any forest and tree-
related conflict in the Tano-Offin production regime. The most frequently mentioned 
conflicts are those relating to chainsaw milling (76%) followed by access to NTFPs for 
commercial use (25%). 
 
Table 9.3  Livelihood components around which conflicts evolve 
Conflict category**  Livelihood component Number of respondents (n /%) 
who mentioned the conflict type* 
Category 1  Chainsaw milling 104 (76%) 
(resource-based) NTFPs for domestic use (plants)  6   (4%) 
 NTFPs for commercial use (plants)  34 (25%) 
 Hunting  14 (10%) 
Category 2  Social Responsibility Agreement  15 (11%) 
(operational) Log theft  15 (11%) 
 Crop damage compensation  2 (1%) 
Category 3  Boundary disputes  11 (8%) 
(land-based) Illegal farming  9 (7%) 
* N = 137; respondents were allowed to refer to more than one conflict type. **the number of respondents is based on 
each conflict type and not on a category. The nine conflict types were arranged into three categories for easy analysis. 
Source: Field survey 2009-2010. 
 
Behind each category are a number of actors competing for different or the same re-
sources in the production forest. Failure for one to attain a claim usually results in con-
flict and these are either managed or not. The outcomes of the management strategies 
have the potential to improve the regime management or negatively result in more con-
flicts, as shown in Figure 9.3 (i.e. the vicious cycle of forest livelihoods conflicts in this 
regime).  
Respondents’ images and instruments regarding conflicts over access to forest  
resources  
Conflicts related to competition for access to forest resources has four conflict types: 
those relating to chainsaw milling (n=104), plant NTFPs for domestic (n=6) and com-
mercial uses (n=34) and hunting (n=14). Chainsaw milling conflicts were mentioned by 
76% of the respondents from Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3. The issues 
within this conflict type evolve in relation to felling trees without a permit, theft among 
millers for lumber and fuel, and the confiscation of logs and crop damage. Within this 
conflict type, various actors operate at different socio-political levels. Confrontations 
occur between chainsaw millers and either FSD field staff or FSD/Military task force 
(reported by 63% of the respondents) or between chainsaw millers and TUC holders 
(15%) and chainsaw millers and farmers (8%). The rest of the respondents (14%) re-
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ported that the conflicts occur among chainsaw millers themselves, surrounding the 
stealing of logs/lumber and fuel. With respect to who to blame for the start of the con-
flicts, according to the perception of the respondents each of the actors may have started 
the conflict, especially those actors who were offended during the course of the confron-
tation. In some instances, some respondents blamed the chainsaw millers, while others 
blamed the TUC holders, farmers or the FSD for initiating the conflicts. 
The collection of NTFPs for commercial purposes without a permit is mentioned as a 
source of conflict by 25% of the respondents. The actors include forest guards, NTFP 
collectors (traders), community members employed by NTFPs traders to access the re-
sources in the forest reserve) and NTFP traders.  
In the perceptions of the respondents, conflicts relating to NTFPs for domestic use 
occur between the forest guard and a community member. However, such confronta-
tions do not occur often, provided inhabitants ask permission from a forest guard. Hunt-
ing conflicts mostly occur during the closed season (i.e. August-December when hunt-
ing is prohibited
5
) and involve hunters and forest guards. There are instances where the 
confrontation is between two hunters over the theft of a trap. Depending on the causes 
of the conflict, different actors are perceived as initiating the conflict incidences. Over-
all, the majority of the respondents from Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 
particularly blamed the hunters in the case of conflicts concerning hunting during the 
closed season.  
The antecedent and manifest causes of conflicts in this category are presented in Ta-
ble 9.4. Except for chainsaw milling conflicts, which thirty-six respondents perceived to 
be violent, the respondents reported the conflict incidences to be non-violent. In terms 
of seasonality, chainsaw milling conflicts occur all year round provided an illegal chain-
saw activity takes place and the offenders are arrested, or there is confrontation between 
the chainsaw millers and the TUC holders or among themselves. Confrontations relating 
to access to plant NTFPs and animal NTFPs (hunting) for commercial and domestic use 
were reported to be non-violent. 
Within this conflict category, the study revealed that the actors employed a blend of 
conflict management strategies to manage the conflict incidences. The analysis also 
revealed that some of these conflict incidences are not managed since the offenders of-
ten escape (avoidance) (see Chapter 2 for the various conflict management strategies). 
With respect to the chainsaw milling conflicts, respondents mentioned negotiation as 
being the lead approach. This is often accompanied by dialogue (e.g. between chainsaw 
millers and TUC holders) or bribery (of FSD/military officials). Negotiation was found 
to occur in all the other conflict types as shown in Figure 9.4 where it becomes the lead 
strategy used during conflicts related to access to NTFPs for domestic use. In the case of 
hunting conflicts, negotiation based on pleading also occurs when the victim has genu-
ine reasons for the offence such as living close to the reserve and if the meat is intended 
for family consumption. Here, the FSD official (forest guard) uses this opportunity 
 
                                                 
5
  The closed season is a seasonal restriction to hunting regulated through the Wildlife Conservation 
Regulation of 1971 (LI 685) and its amendments (LI 1284, LI 1357 and LI 1452). It is a four-month 
period from 1 August to 1 December during which it is not allowed to hunt for any animal, except 
grasscutters (Thryonomys swinderianus), which are so abundant that they do not need any protection. 
The closed season roughly overlaps with the breeding period of most target animals, thus allowing 
them to reproduce (Bokhorst 2010). 
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Key: (+) Conflict outcomes could improve system; (+ -) = Some conflict outcomes may help improve 
the management area whereas others do not; (-) = Conflicts outcome escalates. 
* Avoidance: culprits escape so no conflict management occurs.  
** Negotiation: conflict parties resolve problems among themselves. 
CBAG = Community Biodiversity Advisory Committee; CFC = Community Forestry Committee; FC= 
Forestry Commission; FSD = Forest Services Division of the FC; NTFP = Non-timber forest product; 
TUC = Timber utilisation contract. 
 
Production management area (on and off reserve) 
(Case study: Tano-Offin Reserve and environs) 
Category 1 
Conflicts related to 
access to forest  
resources 
Category 2 
Operational 
conflicts in TUC 
area 
Category 3 
Land-use conflicts 
Diverse actors compete to fulfil needs, objectives or interests etc. 
Chainsaw millers vs. FSD / Military; chainsaw operators/TUC holders/hun-
ters/NTFP collectors among themselves; farmers vs. landowners; TUC hold-
ers vs. communities; farmers vs. FSD/ CBAGS/CFCs; FSD vs. NTFP col-
lectors; illegal farmers vs. taungya heads/FSD. 
Conflict Management Strategies  
Avoidance*, Negotiation**, Mediation,  
Coercion, Adjudication 
External mediating actors / No mediating actors 
Chief and elders; FSD or FSD in collaboration with the 
military; Unit Committees 
Outcomes 
 Communities /farmers succeeded and / failed to materialise benefit 
rights. 
 Communities and individuals (chainsaw millers) lost and /gained 
access.  
 TUC holders lost timber to chainsaw millers and other TUC holders. 
 FC lost revenues to illegal loggers.  
 
 
CONFLICT CATEGORIES 
- 
 _ + 
+  
Figure 9.3    The vicious cycle of forest and tree livelihood conflicts in the production  
   forest regime 
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Table 9.4 Multiple antecedent conditions and manifest behaviour of resource-based conflict types in  
 production forest 
Activity / forest 
resource  
involved 
Antecedent conditions  Manifest behaviour  Consequences 
Chainsaw milling   Inadequate jobs because of 
economic hardship and  
poverty 
 Forest law that forbids  
chainsaw milling  
 Greed and desire to get rich 
quickly 
 Prevailing corruption (as a 
result of which conflicts arise 
when no bribes are paid to  
officials)  
 Betrayal to FSD officials, 
military or police out of  
jealously or commitment to 
the rules 
 Disobedience of the 
rules; logging without 
permit 
 Stealing of logs or fuel
6
 
 Escape of offenders  
 
 Confiscation of 
chainsaw and 
lumber without 
arrest of of-
fender(s) or with 
arrest and fine or 
imprisonment  
 Injuries and occa-
sional death 
 Mistrust and fight-
ing among chain-
saw millers 
Commercial plant 
NTFPs 
 Bureaucracy and long distance 
of accessing permit from the 
FSD District Office 
 Economic hardship and  
poverty and insufficient job 
opportunities 
 Stealing among  
collectors  
 Quarrels with forestry 
authorities over  
restrictions  
 Confiscation of 
forest products 
and occasionally 
the arrest of col-
lectors 
 
Plant NTFPs for 
domestic use 
 Need for food, tools and  
medicinal plants 
 Accessing resources 
without permission of 
forest guard 
 Confiscation of 
products 
Hunting    Need for food and income  Hunting during closed 
season and for  
endangered species  
 Stealing of game traps  
 
 Arrest and confis-
cation of meat and 
payment of fines 
 Hatred among 
hunters 
 
 
to caution the offender that he should ask for permission prior to accessing the re-
sources. 
Mediation was reported to be used in chainsaw milling, NTFP collection for com-
mercial purposes and hunting. In the case of chainsaw milling, chiefs and elders often 
mediate when conflicts occur between two chainsaw millers over theft of logs or fuel. 
Similarly, the chief mediates in the case of conflicts between two hunters. 
The use of force or coercion was reported to occur in all conflict types except those 
which evolve around the collection of NTFPs for domestic use. In this approach, of-
fenders are often arrested, fined or prosecuted in the law court (mostly within the forest 
district) and the products confiscated.  
The use of the adjudication procedure was reported in conflicts arising from chain-
saw milling where the offenders are apprehended and prosecuted in the law courts. 
The last approach employed in almost all the conflict types except those relating to 
NTFPs for domestic use is avoidance, meaning that offenders often abscond or escape, 
leaving behind the forest products as well as their work tools. In the case of chainsaw 
milling, the presence of FSD/Military task force often scares away the operators.  
                                                 
6
  Petroleum products (i.e. petrol and diesel used to operate the chainsaw machine).  
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Respondents’ images and instruments regarding operational conflicts within TUC areas  
This conflict category entails three conflict types. It evolves in relation to TUC holders 
operating in the on and off-reserve areas and their confrontation with chainsaw millers, 
local communities and among themselves. It was also reported to involve confrontations 
between TUC holders and chainsaw millers on the one hand, and FSD/military patrol 
teams and FSD officials on the other. A third type of confrontation in this category is 
between the farmers and either the chainsaw millers, or TUC holders in the off-reserve 
area. This conflict category is characterised by both antecedent conditions and manifest 
behaviours as shown in Table 9.5. The underlying causes mentioned with respect to on-
reserve areas include a TUC holder’s reluctance to adhere to SRA obligations and code 
of conducts and log theft among operators or by chainsaw millers.  
The clashes between chainsaw millers on the one hand and TUC holders or the 
FSD/Military on the other come about because of chainsaw millers stealing logs from 
TUC concession areas. These incidences result in the destruction of harvesting tools and 
equipment of both parties, the confiscation of lumber or logs, and the arrest of the cul-
prit (if he has not absconded), who is fined by the FSD or prosecuted in court, resulting 
in a fine or imprisonment. A conflict between two TUC holders may arise because of 
one stealing logs from the other, whereas a conflict between a TUC holder and the FSD 
mostly results from trespassing and the stealing of logs from the protected management 
area. In this instance, the conflict may end with a fine being imposed on the culprit by 
the FSD or the law court.  
Only two respondents from Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 referred to a crop damage 
compensation conflict that occurred in the off-reserve area. The underlining cause of 
7% 
Figure 9.4      Proportion of respondents who indicated which conflict management  
    strategies prevail for each conflict type  
 
24% 
9% 
19% 
23% 
18% 
22% 
26% 
29% 
57% 
7% 100% 
41% 
18% 
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this conflict is the reluctance of the contractor or the chainsaw miller to pay compensa-
tion for crops damaged during tree felling on farmlands.  
 
 
Table 9.5 Multiple antecedent conditions and manifest behaviour of operational conflicts within TUC 
 area  
Operational conflicts 
within TUC holding 
areas  
Antecedent conditions  Manifest behaviour Consequences 
Timber utilisation area 
(on reserve)  
 Reluctance to fulfil SRA 
obligations 
 Reluctance to fulfil SRA 
code of conduct (e.g.  
repair of bridges etc.) 
 Greed 
 Log theft  
 Barricade of road to 
prevent TUC holder 
transport logs 
 Providing employees 
with guns to confront 
chainsaw millers  
 
 Bad state of 
communities’  
infrastructures 
such as schools 
 Destruction of 
properties  
 Confiscation of 
chainsaw and 
lumber /logs with 
or without the  
arrest of the  
offender(s)  
resulting in a fine 
or imprisonment  
 Fighting and loss 
of lives 
Timber utilisation area 
(off reserve) 
 Reluctance to pay  
compensation  
 
 Crop destruction during 
tree felling  
 Argument 
 
From the perspectives of the respondents, most of the confrontations related to log 
thefts end up in violence. With respect to the SRA, peace prevails when there is mutual 
understanding between the TUC holder and the community during the negotiation proc-
ess. However, violence occurs when the contractor or his workers refuse to fulfil their 
legal obligations. The incidences in the off-reserve area become violent only when the 
permit holder or chainsaw operator refuses to pay compensation. Chainsaw millers often 
abscond before a confrontation arises.  
The actors in this conflict type use different conflict management strategies to deal 
with the conflict incidences. In relation to the SRAs, negotiation is the most frequently 
used approach, followed by mediation by the FSD or the District Chief Executive offi-
cials when negotiation fails. In conflicts that arise from the SRA code of conduct, for 
instance when a contractor fails to repair a damaged bridge, local community members 
sometimes resort to either non-violent directive action and or violent action. Various 
approaches were reported to be employed when there is a confrontation between chain-
saw millers and TUC holders. This includes mediation in cases in which the chief and 
TUC holders settle the matter or coercion in cases in which the offender is arrested. 
Sometimes millers pay a bribe when arrested to escape punishment. Alternatively, the 
offenders are fined by the FSD or prosecuted in the law court. Stealing among TUC 
holders can also be resolved through FSD intervention, in the event that the culprit pays 
a fine or is summoned to appear in court. The study revealed that TUC holders and 
chainsaw millers in off-reserve areas compensate the farmers for damaging their crop 
after a negotiation process to settle the issue. In the case of a TUC holder, the issue is 
resolved through mediation by a Forestry Official if negotiation fails (Figure 9.5). 
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Informal decision making by                   Informal    Legal (public)     Extralegal coerced 
conflict parties                                        third party  authoritative        decision making 
            decision       third party 
            making            decision  
           making 
         Arrest 
            
           Fine 
         (with/without              (with political                    
       bribery or pol./                     or elite        Court 
         elite interference)       interference) 
                         
                Fine 
                Prison 
 
Avoidance Negotiation         Mediation    Arbitration  Adjudication     Non-violent   Violence 
                    direct action 
                    
Increasing coercion and likelihood 
of win-lose outcome 
 
Source: Author, in scheme adapted from Moore (2003). 
 
Respondents’ images and instruments regarding land-use conflicts  
The conflict incidences in this category evolve in relation to boundary disputes and ille-
gal farming. Boundary disputes occur in both on and off-reserve areas. Within the re-
serve, the actors include the CBAG members, farmers and forest guards. This conflict 
type arises because of unclear boundaries which make it difficult to distinguish between 
the forest boundary and people’s farmlands. In such cases, farmers often take advantage 
of the situation by extending farms into forest reserves or illegal clearing of new areas. 
It only becomes an issue when FSD officials or CBAGs/CFCs confront the farmer(s) 
with the illegal nature of their action. Associated with this is illegal farming within the 
reserve with underlying causes attributed to greed, hardship and poverty and lack of 
farmland. All the respondents reported that these conflicts are non-violent except one 
respondent from Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 who reported that the destruction of the 
crops of an unauthorised farmer within the reserve resulted in a violent confrontation 
between the farmer and the FSD official. As far as seasonality is concerned, conflicts 
between CBAG members or forest guards and illegal farmers occur mainly at the onset 
of the farming season between February and March when land preparation begins. The 
prevailing mode in managing illegal farming or extension of farms into the reserve is 
crop destruction, although some of the respondents mentioned that, in cases in which 
the chief or a respectable community elder intervenes, the farmer is allowed to harvest 
the crops and is warned not to engage in illegal farming again.  
Figure 9.5   Perceived spectrum of conflict management strategies employed in SRA, log 
theft and crop damage compensation conflicts in TUC areas (on and off reserve) 
 
SRA 
Log 
theft 
Crop  
damage  
compensation 
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When official complaints about unclear boundary lines between the forest reserve 
and farmland are sent to the FSD, the CBAG members might be employed to clear the 
boundary for wages.  
Boundary disputes in off-reserve areas occur when there is a (i) hostile land takeover 
by neighbouring farmers or neighbouring farmers shift boundaries to acquire more land, 
(ii) sale of farmer’s land to a third party, or (iii) an inheritance problem with regard to 
land holding cocoa. Misunderstandings, arguments and the burning of farms were re-
ported as being characteristics of this conflict type. Three respondents mentioned that 
the conflicts over land ownership and boundary-related conflicts are often difficult to 
resolve completely and may re-emerge when triggered by some personal misunder-
standing among the parties. A conflict incidence related to farmland sold to another per-
son in Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 could not be resolved at village level. The chief sent 
the case to the palace of the chief of Wioso, to whom he owes allegiance, with the re-
quest to mediate in the matter. According to the respondents the case was subsequently 
settled amicably, but it was a long time before a final decision was taken.  
Proposed actions  
The respondents were asked how they perceived the effectiveness of the conflict man-
agement outcomes. The majority of the respondents (83%) perceived the conflict man-
agement actors as being able to resolve all aforementioned conflict types. According to 
the respondents, effectiveness depends on two factors: the culprit’s acceptance of faults 
and the supremacy of the intervening actors. For the first factor, a common understand-
ing among the conflict parties requires patience, the admission of fault and apologising 
to each other, as well as compensation for the affected party. Supremacy is vested in 
intervening actors such as the chief and elders, Unit Committee members, the court and 
the FSD, especially when the outcome is a fair verdict. However, 9% of the respondents 
felt that the conflicts they witnessed were not completely resolved and 8% of the re-
spondents were not sure whether the conflicts had been resolved or not.  
Among the factors that hinder effective conflict management outcomes, respondents 
mentioned inflexible and recalcitrant behaviour exhibited by some people and bad 
judgment by a party due to favouritism. Respondents proposed several roles for differ-
ent stakeholder groups that could minimise conflicts in the production regime. During 
the validation meeting, the opportunity was used to present the survey outcomes and 
create consensus on roles for the different actors. According to this consensus, the 
chiefs and elders at community level could play advisory, educating, mediating and 
monitoring roles. The hybrid actors’ roles (i.e. those of the CBAGs and CFCs) should 
centre on collaboration with FC, traditional authorities and communities, as well as on 
education and advising on issues of forestry and support of preventing and mediating 
conflicts. The role for the FSD should include education, consultation and effective im-
plementation of forestry activities such as the MTS and boundary clearing. Law en-
forcement agencies (i.e. the FSD, policy and military) must ensure efficient and fair 
enforcement and judgement. The local arm of government (i.e. the District Assembly) 
needs to engage the communities in education and support them by mediating in SRA 
negotiations (Box 9.1). 
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Discussion 
The discussion is divided into two sections. The first section examines the challenges 
and opportunities in the production forest regime and the second section analyses the 
implications of the conflict outcomes for law enforcement under the VPA. 
Challenges and opportunities within the production forest regime 
Governance outcomes in a system (either desirable or undesirable or a blend thereof) 
depend on the interaction between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system. 
That is to say, the way society manages or allocates access to forest resources based on 
prevailing laws and the impact thereof on society determine how society responds to 
these arrangements and their impacts. Such an analysis of governance interactions be-
tween the system-to-be-governed and the governing system help to assess how and why 
governance implementation sometimes falls short of desirable outcomes (Chuenpagdee 
& Jentoft 2009). 
The first challenge in the Tano-Offin production forest regime is what Peluso (1992 
cited in Amanor 2005) termed the ‘progressive criminalisation of customary rights of 
forest access’. The Tano-Offin production forest contributes to the livelihoods of local 
people by providing plant and animal NTFPs for domestic use and cash, providing ac-
cess to degraded forestland for farming under the MTS, engaging in chainsaw milling 
and earning wages by providing forest services (i.e. boundary clearing or working as a 
forest guard). This finding corroborates previous studies (e.g. Falconer 1992, World 
Bank 2001, Ros-Tonen & Wiersum 2005, Sunderlin et al. 2005) that indicate the vari-
ous benefits local people derive from the forest to build their livelihoods. However, in 
Ghana’s forest reserves, most of these resources are accessed illegally, with the excep-
tion of collecting NTFPs for domestic use, which is considered a communal right in 
management plans (Kyereh et al. 2006). In such cases there is a clash between the sys-
tem-to-be governed (i.e. the natural system and the human system) at local level and the 
governing system, due to issues of legality. However, local people do not acknowledge 
their actions as being a crime as defined by outside individuals or institutions and they 
violate state laws either as an act of defiance or in a desperate attempt to achieve subsis-
tence, thus defying the law as an act of resistance (c.f. Amanor 2005: 16). 
The second challenge is that the prevailing governing system restricts the legal ac-
cess of timber harvesting to TUC holders in accordance with Act 547 (amended 617). 
This is an example of what Ribot & Peluso (2003:154) conceptualised as ‘bundles and 
webs of powers’, meaning powers that enable some actors to gain control and maintain 
access, like in a production forest where access control and gaining access to commer-
cial timber harvesting is limited to forest managers and TUC holders. Those who per-
ceive the governing laws as being unfavourable for their survival start to become 
‘criminals’ when they access the resources in violation of the law and are apprehended 
(even if they find ways to slip past forest managers and law enforcement agencies in 
one of the ways indicated in Figure 9.5, i.e. negotiation with or without bribery or me-
diation through elite intervention). According to Nketiah et al. (2004), such criminal act 
– chainsaw milling – has become a ‘necessary evil’ in Ghana’s forestry sector, as it has 
become the main source of domestic wood supply in the country and a source of liveli-
hood for many rural and urban households (Amanor 2005, Marfo 2010). 
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The third challenge relates to community benefits from forest resources, these can 
come from different sources. One of these ways is through community-based organisa-
tions such as CBAGs or CFCs (Chapter 5) that are given specific roles to play in forest 
management in exchange for an intermittent flow of wages. Unfortunately, the members 
of such organisations often receive no wages in the name of ‘voluntarism’. Benefits that 
trickle down as communal benefit mainly come from Social Responsibility Agreements 
Box 9.1 Recommended roles for local level institutions  
  
Local level: the traditional and hybrid governing structure  
 Chiefs and elders 
 Educate and advice community members to desist from illegal activities 
that will result in conflicts, especially during church services that are at-
tended by most people. 
 Avoid favouritism in settling disputes. 
 Monitor the taungya heads to be fair in land distribution under the MTS. 
 
CBAGs /CFCs and Unit Committees  
 Strengthen patrolling and boundary clearing roles in order to protect the 
forest. 
 Educate community members to abstain from restricted forest areas. 
 Advise community members against illegal operations in the forest.  
 Support in settling of disputes in the community. 
 
District Level: the formal (statutory) governing structure 
Forest Services Division (FSD) 
 Provide regular community education on forestry issues.  
 Provide regular clearing of forest boundary lines through employing the 
CBAGs and other community members. 
 Should be proactive in their duties and avoid collecting gifts from opera-
tors. 
 Cooperate with local community members and chiefs in the day-to-day 
management of forest resources.  
 
Police and judiciary  
 Must be professional in their dealings with issues and avoid favouritism 
and bribery. 
 Control at checkpoints whether drivers transporting logs have a convey-
ance certificate 
 Provide careful judgment and imprison defaulters with a view to deterring 
others. 
 Avoid prolongation of court cases which discourages people from sending 
cases to court. 
 
District Assembly 
 Educate and advise community members on the relevance of the forest 
and on government policies. 
 Ensure that TUC holders pay SRA benefits to the communities. 
 Create jobs for the youths of the communities.  
 
 
Source: Field survey (2009) and validation meeting (2010). 
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(SRAs) and crop damage compensation for individual farmers as stipulated in Act 547 
(amended 617). The laws give de jure right of benefits to the above actors and reluc-
tance on the part of the timber contractor to fulfil these rights can lead to the suspension 
or termination of their operations. Unfortunately, due to poor education on forestry is-
sues the communities and the farmers are not aware of their legal rights as enshrined in 
the SRA and crop damage compensation arrangements. As noted by Asare (2006), the 
legislation lacks specific regulations on how to determine compensation and ensure that 
farmers are ‘fairly compensated’. Similarly, determining what constitutes the 5% of 
stumpage fees to be given by the contractor to a community is unknown and hence the 
benefits are determined on the basis of discretionary assessment. This creates suspicion 
among the parties especially on the part of the local people. Although a study carried 
out in the late 1990s by Richards and Asare (1999)
7
 recommended two types of crop 
damage compensation to be paid to the farmers (i.e. physical damage to cocoa and /or 
crops by timber contractors and cocoa yield loss due to tree micro-environmental bene-
fits), these recommendations have not yet been considered in policies. Most reported 
conflict cases relating to forest resources stem from these benefits right (Amanor 2005, 
Marfo 2006). 
The fourth challenge is related to the conflicts inherent in natural resource use. The 
nine conflict types identified in this chapter can be classified under three categories: (i) 
conflicts related to forest resources, (ii) operational conflicts in TUC areas and (iii) 
land-use conflicts. Such conflicts are inevitable in complex, diverse and dynamic envi-
ronments, where actors operate at different levels of scale (Buckles & Rusnak 1999, 
Castro &Nielsen 2003, Kooiman 2008, Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009). Each of the con-
flict categories are driven by both manifest conditions (i.e. confiscation of forest re-
sources, the arrest of offenders, crop destruction, road barricades, disobedience of rules, 
etc.) and antecedent conditions (i.e. greed, economic hardship and poverty, reluctance to 
fulfil the social responsibility agreement (SRA) obligations etc.). The multiple causes 
are related to the diversity of actors from different levels of geo-political scale, ranging 
from those at community level to actors such as chainsaw millers, TUC holders and the 
FSD/Military team, which all compete to fulfil their own needs, objectives and interests. 
Amidst these challenges, there are different opportunities as far as conflict manage-
ment is concerned. The results show that actors and institutions involved in conflict 
management and resolution processes use a combination of coping strategies (see Glasl 
1999, Moore 2003, Engel & Korf, 2005, Wehrmann 2008, Chapter 2). For example, log 
theft can be resolved at reserve level through negotiation, mediation or coercion, with 
the latter possibly being converted into negotiation as shown in Figure 9.5. Among the 
actors, the local traditional authorities play a more important role in conflict manage-
ment than is often assumed. Literature suggests that they no longer have a say in forest 
resource allocation and management since forest resources fall under the custody of the 
central state (Ghana Constitution of 1992, Mayers & Kotey 1996). However, this study 
reveals that traditional authorities at local level continue to play an important role in the 
management and resolution of conflicts over these resources.  
                                                 
7
  See Richards & Asare (1999) for a detailed analysis of incentives for Ghanaian cocoa farmers to 
maintain timber trees and a calculation of the compensation rates that cocoa farmers in Ghana deserve. 
The compensation proposed refers to physical damage to cocoa and/or crops by timber contractors and 
compensation for cocoa yield loss due to loss of tree micro-environmental benefits such as nutrient re-
cycling, soil and air temperature, loss of NTFPs etc. In addition to these two compensations comes 
‘additional positive incentive payment’ to compensate the farmer for his skills in tree identification. 
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Implications of the conflict management outcomes on law enforcement under the VPA  
Based on the analysis of survey results, four possible outcomes of conflicts and conflict 
management strategies were identified (see Figure 9.3). The first possible outcome is 
that communities and farmers succeed and/or fail to materialise their benefits rights. 
This is the case in the following situations: 
 Communities fail to fulfil their benefit rights when TUC holders deny them their 
SRA or when illegal chainsaw operators log trees on farmlands and thereby negotiate 
benefits with individuals instead of the entire community. 
 Communities only acquire benefit rights after effective negotiation about the SRA 
obligation between the communities and the TUC holders and if the latter adhere to 
the code of conduct related to the SRA. However, the regular occurrence of road 
blockades indicates that some negotiations fail. In such cases, local communities 
succeed in claiming their rights through mediation by either the FSD or the District 
Chief Executive or through coercive action until the TUC holders meet their de-
mands.  
 Farmers also fail to claim their crop damage compensation rights when chainsaw 
millers abscond. 
 Compensation rights materialise when farmers are able to negotiate a ‘fair compensa-
tion’ with TUC holders. When negotiation fails, the FSD mediates. 
 
The second possible outcome is that the communities and chainsaw millers’ gain 
and/or lose access to timber resources.  
 De facto access is obtained by community members who illegally enter the forest 
reserve to gain access to farming land, NTFPs and, on a few occasions, to engage in 
chainsaw milling. Chainsaw millers beyond community settings gain access to tim-
ber resources. Both actors lose when they are arrested or confronted by forestry offi-
cials or law enforcement agencies.  
 
The third possible outcome is that TUC holders lose timber to chainsaw millers and 
other TUC holders.  
 Through theft, some of the logs within TUC areas are appropriated by chainsaw 
millers and sometimes by a neighbouring TUC holder with the excuse being uninten-
tional trespassing. 
 
The fourth possible outcome is that the FSD fails to materialise revenue rights due to 
illegal logging.  
 In this case, the revenue intended for economic development and/or key stake-
holders’ royalties go to individual pockets.  
 
As indicated in Figure 9.3, the desirable outcome of conflict management is to im-
prove the system-to-be-governed. However, among the identified outcomes only pay-
ment of SRA may have a positive impact on community development, while fines from 
illegal logging may help improve the management of the forest resources. In the latter 
case, however, there are so many escape routes (as indicated in Figure 9.5) that it may 
be difficult for the nation to generate sufficient revenue from fines to impact positively 
on the natural system. Furthermore, such revenues are probably insufficient to compen-
sate for the damage done by illegal logging that escaped supervision by the FSD.  
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The outcomes indicate that stricter law enforcement under the VPA is urgently 
needed to save the forest resources. However, there is a risk that this will result in a 
temporary ‘pseudo-reduction’ of illegal forest activities. If the underlying factors as 
identified in this chapter and other studies are not addressed, the system may be re-
versed to its original state of illegalities. The situation may even escalate if local people, 
driven by need or greed, succeed in creating alternative routes to access the same re-
sources despite stricter enforcement.  
As asserted by Christy et al. (1997: 143), law enforcement plays an essential role in 
forest management, but is limited because of the complex nature of the forest and is 
therefore the last resort for obtaining compliance with the law. Several authors 
(Contreras–Hermosilla 2001, Kaimowitz 2003, Inoguchi et al. 2005, Owusu et al. 2010, 
Wiersum 2010) have therefore proposed complementing the hard or suppressive means 
of enforcement with ‘soft’ or ‘preventive and detection’ enforcement mechanisms. 
Based on the analysis in this chapter of the governability challenges within the produc-
tion regime in Ghana’s forests, the aim is to contribute to this debate by presenting three 
issues for consideration in the design of strategies for soft law enforcement. First, de-
velop the capacity of stakeholders (particularly resource managers and FSD frontline 
staff) in conflict management and integrate conflict management into the VPA system 
just as REDD+ has initiated (see Chapter 5). Second, enhance forestry extension by 
strengthening forestry education at local level. Lastly, engage inhabitants of forest 
fringe communities in forest management on a remunerated basis. To this end, the FC 
and other institutions should make efforts to secure funds from REDD+ and other cli-
mate-related financial mechanisms to enhance the budget available for such measures. 
The rationale behind this recommendation to align VPA and REDD+ mechanisms is 
that the factors that drive illegal logging are very much the same as those that drive de-
forestation. Access to climate-related funds will enable Ghana put into practice some of 
the actions proposed above, and thus tackle both VPA and REDD issues related to en-
suring good forest governance. 
Conclusion  
Ghana derives most of its timber revenues from the production regime. This chapter 
revealed that interaction between the prevailing governing system and the human sys-
tem poses challenges to the governability of the natural system. Local people and indi-
viduals from other levels of scale often access forest resources illegally and this is char-
acterised by conflicts. Law enforcement as envisaged under the VPA is therefore 
essential. However, strict law enforcement has to be combined with an efficient strategy 
of soft law enforcement in the form of building conflict management capacity, promot-
ing extension on forestry issues at local level and creating income-generating activities 
in forest management. The suggestion is that VPA and REDD+ processes should be 
aligned because the drivers of illegal logging and deforestation are very much the same, 
as are the objectives of both processes to improve forest governance. 
 
 
  
 
 
10 
Social capital construction between a  
timber operator and local community in  
the Tano-Offin off-reserve forest:  
Interactive governance at micro level 
Introduction  
Over the past two decades, the concept of social capital has been evolving in various 
academic disciplines. In the early 1990s, it became one of the key assets of the sustain-
ability livelihood framework (DFID 1999). The concept of social capital has also been 
employed in literature on natural resources and environmental governance (see Pretty & 
Ward 2001, Trimble & Berkes 2010). There are different definitions for social capital. 
However, the central tenet of the concept is the ‘interaction’ between or ‘relations’ 
among individuals or institutions which are bonded by trust, reciprocity, common rules, 
norms and networks among other features developed in an iterative process (Portes 
1998, Pretty & Ward 2001,Woolcock & Narayan 2002). This general principle of social 
capital aligns with interactive governance theory through the concept of ‘interaction’ 
(between stakeholders in the system-to-be-governed, between governing actors and be-
tween the governing system and the system-to-be-governed (Kooiman et al. 2005, see 
Chapter 2). These interactions are analysed with a view to assessing governability (i.e. 
the overall capacity for governance, which is understood as being the interaction be-
tween public and private actors to find solutions for societal problems and create oppor-
tunities, see Chapter 2). If the ‘societal goal’ is the sustainable management of natural 
resources, this comes close to the focus in studies that relate social capital to environ-
mental governance. For example, Pretty & Ward (2001) analysed social capital as social 
action for sustainable resource management (incl. watershed management, integrated 
pest management and forest management). Drawing from a study of artisanal fisheries 
in Uruguay, Trimble & Berkes (2010) propose a social capital framework as a basis for 
creating synergy between the concepts of interactive governance and social capital in 
fisheries management. They argue that social capital can foster our understanding of the 
socio-economic system (i.e. the system-to-be-governed), the governing system, and the 
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system of governing interactions and therewith help to assess governability. In this 
chapter, the social capital concept is used to analyse the interaction between actors in 
Ghana’s off-reserve areas. 
Ghana’s off-reserve area is a mosaic of patches of forest, fallow and farmlands (Bih 
2006). Over the years, it has been a major contributor to timber harvesting for domestic 
and exports markets despite its sharp decline by the turn of the millennium. Between 
2003 and 2006, has generated between 19% and 27% respectively of the annual timber 
revenues in Ghana (Affum-Baffoe 2009, Hansen & Treue 2009). Nonetheless, stake-
holders in the sector are uncertain of its sustainability in view of the rapid deforestation 
and lapses in the current legislation, which has a disincentive effect on farmers’ who 
tend and nurture the naturally grown timber trees during farming (TBI 2009).  
The inequitable sharing of timber resource benefits and restricted access to timber for 
commercial purposes for actors such as chainsaw operators have become sources of 
conflict and contestation. These are between the timber operators (both illegal and ille-
gal) and the farmers, among legal and illegal timber operators and between the Forestry 
Commission and the timber operators (i.e. legal and illegal) (see Chapter 9, Amanor 
2005, Asare 2006, Marfo 2006, TBI 2009, Ros-Tonen et al. 2010). Payment of crop 
damage compensation and social responsibility agreement (SRA) to farmers and local 
communities respectively are often the focus of these conflicts.  
The initial objective of this chapter was to understand the nature of forest and tree 
livelihood conflicts and conflict management strategies in the Tano-Offin off reserve. 
This would enable me to contribute to the off-reserve conflict debate on crop damage 
compensation and SRA. However, when the first meeting with the inhabitants of the 
study area – the Awisasu community ‒ was held in June 2009, the initial objective had 
to be changed since there was an indication of cooperation between the inhabitants, 
farmers and the timber contractor operating in the off-reserve area. The research ques-
tion was therefore redefined to read ‘What factors facilitated the cooperation between 
the local community and the timber operator in Tano-Offin off-reserve area?’ This cen-
tral question was further split into four sub-questions: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the Tano-Offin off-reserve area as a system-to-be-governed 
in terms of the natural and socio-economic sub-systems and the interaction between the 
two?  
2. What governing systems (i.e. challenges and opportunities, access to farming lands, cus-
tomary and statutory arrangements) operate within the Tano-Offin off-reserve area?  
3. What are the perceptions of the inhabitants and the timber operator on why crop damage 
compensation and SRA conflicts are minimal or absent?  
4. What are the views of government officials with regard to crop damage compensation and 
recommended actions for improvement?  
 
The chapter is based on document analysis, a community meeting with 45 inhabi-
tants, a semi-structured questionnaire with seventeen farmers, and a telephone interview 
with the timber contractor. Prior to this, a focus group meeting was held with three off-
reserve timber operators in the environs of the Tano-Offin forest reserve. The views of 
the off-reserve issues that emerged from this meeting are also presented in this chapter. 
Another community meeting was conducted in 2010 to validate the findings. Even 
though there were no conflicts between the timber operator and the farmers, decisions 
had to be made regarding the issue of how much compensation should be paid and who 
should mediate during compensation payment negotiation emerged. Informal interviews 
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were therefore organised with officials of the District Forest Services Division, the Dis-
trict Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) and the Land Valuation Division of the 
Land Commission of Ghana (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of the meth-
odology).  
As in the previous chapters, the data and the respondents’ views on the subject mat-
ters are analysed from an interactive governance perspective (Kooiman et al. 2005). 
Furthermore, elements of interactive governance theory (images, instruments and ac-
tions) are used for an in-depth understanding of the cooperation that resulted between 
the timber operator and the local people from their respective perspectives.  
 
Table 10.1  Stakeholder groupings who participated in the TBI workshop in 2007 
Governing structure  Organisation  
Statutory Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines 
Forestry Commission (Wildlife Division and Forest Services Divi-
sion) 
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 
Local government (District Assemblies) 
 
 
 
Civil society NGOs - TBI Ghana, Ricerca e Coperazione, Forest Watch Ghana, 
Care International  
Market  Timber industry – Abor Nova  
Chainsaw operators  
Sawn lumber sellers 
 
 
Customary Land owner  
Resource Management Support Centre 
Forestry Research Institute of Ghana,  
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
University of Ghana 
National supportive structure 
International supportive structure  Danish Centre for Forest, Landscape and Planning 
Proforest Ltd  
FAO 
Tropenbos international  
ITC Netherlands  
 
 
 
 
The next section presents the natural sub-system (i.e. Tano-Offin off-reserve) and the 
socio-economic sub-system of the study community and their dependence on the off-
reserve area. After that the governing system is presented. With respect to the statutory 
governing system, a timeline of legislations dealing with timber revenue benefits for 
local communities and farmers is presented. Also the customary governing system that 
regulates access to farming land is addressed. Next, the various stakeholders’ images 
(i.e. those of the local community, farmers, the timber operators and government offi-
cials) are presented, as well as their views of the instruments guiding off-reserve timber 
operations, benefit sharing and cooperation and the proposed actions. When doing so, 
first the key challenges and opportunities in the off-reserve areas are analysed based on 
a multi-stakeholder workshop organised by Tropenbos International Ghana in 2007
1
, 
which involved actors from several constituencies (see Table 10.1). Then the results of a 
focus group meeting held with off-reserve timber operators in 2008 are presented. Next, 
the images, instruments and actions from a community perspective, based on a commu-
                                                 
1
  The workshop was organised by Tropenbos International-Ghana in collaboration with the Danish 
Centre for Forest, Landscape and Planning and with financial support from CARE International-
Ghana in 2007. The workshop outputs were published in 2009 and proceedings are available on URL: 
http://www.tropenbos.org/publications/strengthening+off-reserve+timber+management+in+ghana 
(accessed on 10 November 2011). 
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nity meeting, the results of the questionnaire survey and a validation meeting are pre-
sented. Finally, the outcomes of semi-structured interviews with government officials 
are presented, these focus on their roles in negotiating social responsibility agreements 
(SRAs) and crop damage compensation. The penultimate section discusses the govern-
ance interactions and the features of social capital (see Pretty & Ward 2001) that con-
tribute to the absence of conflicts about timber benefit sharing between the contractor 
and the local community (including farmers). The chapter ends with a conclusion. 
The system-to-be-governed  
In line with the previous chapters, the system-to-be-governed is analysed in terms of 
both the natural and human sub-systems. The subsection on the natural system provides 
a brief description of the off-reserve in the environs of Tano-Offin forest reserve (see 
Chapters 4 and 9 for a more detailed description). The social characteristics of the in-
habitants of Awisasu and the contribution of off-reserve forest resources and agricul-
tural products to their livelihoods are analysed in the section on the socio-economic sub-
system. 
The natural system: The Tano-Offin off-reserve area  
Generally, there was no delineation of forest estates in Ghana before the reservation in 
the early 1900s. The reservation processes brought about a physical demarcation of 
what is termed ‘forest reserves’ and any forest land that falls outside the forest reserves 
is termed ‘outside forest reserves’ or ‘off-reserve forest area’. The off-reserve forest 
area represents about 5,482 million hectares out of the 7.5 million hectares of the high 
forest zone (Affum-Baffoe 2009). Table 10.2 presents the distribution of off-reserve 
areas according to vegetation zones.  
 
 
Table 10.2 Total off-reserve within the high forest zone of Ghana according to vegetation zones 
Vegetation zone  Total area off-reserve (ha) 
Wet /moist evergreen (ME/WE) 1,618,738 
Moist semi-deciduous South East (MSSE) 1,559,236 
Moist Semi-deciduous North West (MSNW) 1,071,758 
Dry semi-deciduous (DS) 1,232,446 
Source: Affum Baffoe 2009. 
 
 
The off-reserve timber resources encompass naturally regenerated trees on farms and 
agricultural fallow lands and patches of natural forest stands. The fallow lands are sec-
ondary growth on abandoned farms, with high potential for producing timber trees, 
whilst the farm areas are lands used for active farming under various cropping systems 
(TBI 2009, Bih 2006). According to Kyereh et al. (2006), a national botanical survey 
conducted in the area between 2001/2 by the Forestry Commission of Ghana recorded 
three rare species in some farmlands around Tano-Offin. The three species were two Black 
Star species (Guibotia dinklagei and Aubregrinia tainsis) (see note to Table 10.3 for 
Ghana’s star rating of timber species) and one Blue Star species (Pterocarpus mildbraedii), 
which are widespread internationally but rare in Ghana. Within the Tano-Offin forest re-
serve environs, the Akyikon range is one of the seven off-reserve ranges in the Nkawie 
Forest District where a timber utilisation contract (TUC) has been issued for a period of 
five years. 
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This reserve area is an important component of the natural resource base of the coun-
try, which contributes to the timber trade and provides agricultural livelihood sources 
for local people and sites for private plantations development (TBI 2009). For Stools 
and District Assemblies without on-reserve production forest or minerals, revenues 
from off-reserve timber constitute a significant funding source (Ibid.: viii). Nonetheless, 
the farmers in this area who nurture naturally generated timber trees on their farms do 
not have a monetary share in the royalties derived from the timber trees nurtured and 
only receive negotiated money from the contractor in the event that their food or cash 
crops are damaged during the timber operation (OASL/FC 2010, Act 547).  
 
 
Figure 10.1    Map of Awisasu community bordering Tano-Offin Forest Reserve 
 
The socio-economic system 
This section deals with the socio-economic system, addressing respectively the socio-
economic characteristics of the Awisasu community and their dependence on forest and 
tree resources. 
– Socio-economic characteristics  
Awisasu community is located about 40 km
 
from the capital town Nyinahin of Atwima 
Mponua District in the Ashanti Region (see Figure 10.1). The community falls within 
Akyikon off-reserve range. The estimated population aged over eighteen years is 435 
(AMD Electoral Office 2010). In terms of infrastructure, the community has a school 
from the kindergarten to primary level and three boreholes, of which only one actually 
serves as a source of drinking water for the population. The inhabitants complement this 
water source with streams from which they draw water for other uses. In addition to the 
aforementioned infrastructure, there is a pit latrine, which serves both males and fe-
males in the community. The community is without electricity. 
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As an agrarian community, the inhabitants are involved in the cultivation of food 
crops (e.g. plantation, cassava, vegetables, and rice), cash crops (e.g. cocoa) and live-
stock rearing for both domestic and commercial purposes. Just like Kyekyewere admit-
ted village (Chapter 7), the Awisasu community pays allegiance to the stools to which it 
belongs, in this case Nyinahin and Nkawie Panin. The community therefore has two 
chiefs known called as ‘Odikro’ who represent each of the stool landowners (see also 
the section on the customary governing system). Like a typical community in the south-
ern part of Ghana, Christianity dominates with other religions such as Islam and tradi-
tionalists. 
– Contribution of forest resources to the local people’s livelihoods  
During the community meeting, the inhabitants revealed that about fifty-six of the in-
habitants were engaged in the modified taungya system in 2006 (see Chapter 8 for more 
information on the MTS). According to the inhabitants, in the past, they used to extract 
NTFPs from the forest reserve such as snails, mushrooms and game from the forest re-
serve, but currently do not use these resources anymore because they hardly ever access 
the reserve since they are no longer engaged in the MTS. People still extract NTFPs 
such as pestles, mushrooms and snails from the off-reserve area, especially from the 
fallow lands. These resources contribute to the households’ cash and non-cash income 
on a seasonal basis. With regard to tree planting in off-reserve area, only a few farmers 
have planted timber trees such as Cedrella odorata (cedrella) and Tectona grandis (teak) 
on their farmlands, albeit on very low scale. However they reported that they tended and 
nurtured different types of indigenous timber species when farming. According to the 
farmers, some of these trees (e.g. Ceiba pentandra) serve as shade for them to rest when 
tired during farming, while others (e.g. Terminalia ivorensis (emire) and Terminalia 
superba (ofram) serve as shade for some crops especially cocoa.  
The governing system  
Most of the issues (i.e. the social responsibility agreement (SRA), crop damage com-
pensation and legislations) related to the off-reserves have been discussed in Chapters 5 
and 9. This section first presents the trends and status of legislations regarding timber 
revenue benefits for local communities and farmers, and then looks at the management 
roles of various actors and their respective benefits derived from timber resources. Next, 
it examines the customary governing structure at local level to gain a better understand-
ing of why social capital is strong in this case and as a further background to the com-
plexities of separation between land and tree tenure arrangements.  
The statutory governing structure 
Farmers and local communities’ current rights to timber resources and revenue benefits 
can be traced back to the colonial and post-colonial era (Figure 10.2).  
Prior to the introduction of scientific forestry in 1908, farmers had the right to sell 
timber trees on farmlands with permission from the local town chief based on specific 
byelaws (Amanor 2005). The introduction of scientific forestry brought about changes 
in tree tenure rights through which the rights of farmers and their local chiefs were as-
signed to the paramount chiefs governed by statutory and customary laws. In 1962, dur-
ing the post-colonial area, the state became (and still is) the custodian of forest re-
sources with timber revenue (royalties) benefits shared among a few stakeholders while 
exempting others (see Figure 10.3). Between 1994 and 2003, policy reforms and new 
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legislations resulted in improved recognition of the rights of local communities and 
farmers to a share in the benefits and revenues from timber resources. Local communi-
ties began to enjoy the SRA (see Chapters 5 and 9) and were also able to apply for a 
timber utilisation permit (TUP) to access timber resources for community development 
projects. Since then, farmers in off-reserve areas have also benefited from crop damage 
compensation by the timber contractor based on negotiation. Other benefits for local 
communities and farmers established in this period are shown in Figure 10.2. Since 
2008, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy and legislations have been under review with 
one of the issues to be addressed being related to the question of whether farmers will 
have a monetary share in the royalties from trees that they tend and nurture on the off-
reserve farmlands.  
 
Based on a review of literature on the subject matter (notably OASL/FC 2010) and 
the results of the questionnaire survey and interviews, the actors involved in off-reserve 
timber management, their roles and their shares in timber revenues were reconstructed 
as presented in Figure 10.3. 
Figure 10.2   Timeline of changes in legislations recognition of farmers/local communities’ 
benefits in timber resources 
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* Stakeholders’ royalty benefits were calculated on the basis of the FC’s new disbursement arrangement: 50% 
of any shareable revenue from forest reserves and off-reserve areas is retained by the FC as a management fee, 
whilst 50% is disbursed to stakeholders. The disbursement is based on Section 267 (Sub-Section 6) of the 
1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, which stipulates that the net revenue accruing from stump-
age/rent after providing for FC’s management fees and 10% for the OASL is to be distributed among the 
stakeholders as follows: 25% to the Stool, 55% to the District Assembly and 20% to the Traditional Council 
(OASL/FC 2010). 
 
 
Actor’s benefit from the tim-
ber resource/revenue* 
Actor’s role in managing off-
reserve timber resources 
Actor 
FSD 
Receives 50% of royalties. 
Allocate timber felling right to 
TUC holders; occasionally 
mediate in crop damage/SRA 
disputes; no silvicultural man-
agement responsibilities. 
 
Fairly negotiate compensation 
(no fixed amount given). 
Tend and nurture saplings of 
economically valuable timber 
species when farming. 
 
Farmers (both tenant farmers 
and landowners) 
Access to timber trees. Fell trees and pay stumpage for 
the trees to be harvested. 
 
TUC holders 
Receives 24.75% of royalties. Mediate in SRA negotiation (in 
some districts). 
 
District Assembly 
Receives 5% of royalties. Disburse timber royalties 
among beneficiaries. 
 
Office of Administrator of 
Stool Land (OASL) 
Receives 20.25% of royalties. Providing access to farming 
land. 
 
Traditional council and stool 
land owners 
Receives 5% of stumpage fee 
as SRA from the timber con-
tractor. 
No specific role unless the 
need arises to protect timber 
trees against fire outbreaks 
 
Community 
Free rider access to timber 
unless arrested. 
No formal role; accesses tim-
ber resources illegally, some-
times pay a moderate compen-
sation for the farmers 
 
Chainsaw operator 
Figure 10.3    Actors and their roles in, and benefits from, off-reserve timber resource management 
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Legally, the FSD of the FC is mandated to manage the off-reserve forests resources. 
Through the FSD the FC allocates timber-felling rights to TUC holders for a period of 
five years in return for stumpage fees. Occasionally the FSD mediates in SRA and crop 
damage compensation negotiations when a contractor fails to come to an agreement 
with a local community or a farmer. Nonetheless, this mediation occurs when the ag-
grieved party (i.e. the contractor, community or farmer) reports the matter to the FSD. 
Unlike the situation in on-reserve areas, the FSD has no silvicultural management re-
sponsibilities such as site preparation, firebreaks establishment, enrichment planting, 
etc. Nonetheless the FC receives 50% of the revenues from the stumpage fees (royalties) 
paid by the contractor. The farmer, who can be a tenant or landowner, often tends and 
nurtures economic timber species while farming, either to provide shade for resting or to 
facilitate the growth of some crops such as cocoa. By law (Act 547) the farmer is enti-
tled to negotiate his/her right to a monetary benefit from the contractor. The chainsaw 
operator has no formal role in terms of timber management, but illegally accesses the 
timber in return for a moderate compensation amount to the farmer on the condition that 
he will not be arrested. The active and passive roles of other actors in the management 
of off-reserve timber resources and the benefits they derive from the resources can be 
found in Figure 10.3.  
Figure 10.3 does not include the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), which 
has no direct responsibility in off-reserve forest and timber resource management. How-
ever its work interferes with off-reserve forest and timber resource management due to 
poor coordination between the two agencies. An interview with two MOFA extension 
officers in Nyinahin highlighted the poor working relationship between the MOFA and 
the FSD regarding off–reserve forest management and poor communication about man-
agement and policy directions. A clear example is advice on how to deal with trees on 
cocoa farms. MOFA prefers a combination with gliricidia (Gliricidia sepium) (also re-
ferred to as ‘mother of cocoa’), which is a multi-purpose leguminous tree used for shad-
ing. This is, however, not a tree which is of interest to the FC. Timber species that 
MOFA considers compatible with cocoa farming are Terminalia ivorensis (emire) and 
Terminalia superba (ofram), but they discourage trees such as Ceiba pentandra (ony-
ina), Cola gigantea (watapuo) and Musanga smithi (odwuma) that are not suitable for 
cocoa farms. They advise cocoa farmers to cut these trees because they carry diseases, 
require a lot of water and prevent sunlight from reaching the cocoa trees. According to 
the FC perspective, however, it would be preferable to tend such trees. In the field, con-
fusion often arises because MOFA extension officers and forest guards of the FSD use 
identical uniforms.  
The customary and hybrid governing structure 
The strong social ties and connections within the village can be partly explained by the 
prevailing customary and hybrid governing structures. There are two traditional coun-
cils made up of the local chiefs, the queen mothers and the elders (including sub-chiefs) 
representing the stools of Nyinahin and Nkawie Panin respectively who are in charge of 
the general welfare of the community. These chiefs and their sub-chiefs have the same 
functions as outlined in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. The reason that the community has two 
chiefs and traditional councils is because the committee land belongs to two different 
stools. In practice this means that each of these local chiefs are caretakers of these lands 
and are responsible for the allocation of lands, collection of land rents and settling dis-
putes on land issues in their domain. When it comes to general community welfare (that 
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is, community development projects, communal labout, etc.) both chiefs and their elders 
collaborate to facilitate such duties in order to ensure harmony within the community. 
Embedded in the customary structure are community social groups such as the 
‘Peace and Love’ and ‘Odo ne kruye kuo’ (Love and Unity), which are responsible for 
supporting community members during marriage, sickness or a funeral of family mem-
bers and relatives. 
In addition, there are two hybrid governing structures. One of these is the water and 
sanitation committee (WATSAN) formed by a government institution at district level 
(the Community Water and Sanitation Agency) that oversees water and sanitation ac-
tivities in the village. The other one is the Community Biodiversity Advisory Group 
(CBAG) created by the FC to involve community members in clearing the boundaries 
of the protected area of the reserve and in serving as a watchdog against illegal activities 
in the forest.  
As indicated before, trees on farming land fall under the custody of the state 
(FC/FSD), but land falls under the custody of the stool (see Chapter 5). Within the 
community setting, there are two ways a farmer can access farming land. The farmer 
within the community who calls her/himself a ‘landowner’ accesses the farmland 
through the stool, which in this case is the family of Nyinahin and Nkawie Panin. This 
is either by outright purchase or leasing, with the latter being the most common option. 
In both cases, the farmer pays an annual land rent known locally as ‘ento’ to the tradi-
tional council of Nyinahin or Nkawie-Panin depending on the stool from which the land 
was acquired. This generally amounts to GH¢ 8 (US$ 5) per year for an acre of land. 
The second category of farmer is the ‘tenant farmer’. This tenant farmer accesses 
land from a landowner through a leasehold or sharecropping system. Within the com-
munity, the leasehold of land in return for cash rent usually applies to land rented for a 
short period of three years, which is used for food crop cultivation. In the case of a 
sharecropping arrangement, a piece of land is given to the tenant in return for a share of 
the farm produce. In Ghana, the two most common sharecropping arrangements are 
‘abunu’ and ‘abusa’. Abuna means ‘share in two parts, indicating that the crops are 
shared equally between the tenant farmer and landowner. Abusa means ‘share in three 
parts, which indicates that one party takes two-thirds of the crops whereas the other is 
entitled to the remaining one-third. Which party is entitled to the largest share depends 
on which party has invested more input. While food crops are generally cultivated under 
the ‘abunu’ system, cash crops are often cultivated under the ‘abusa’ system.  
Based on Hill (1956, cited in Amanor & Dierutuah 2001)
2
 a further distinction in the 
‘abusa’ system can be made between the ‘abusa labourer, the ‘abusa tenant’ or ‘care-
taker’ and the ‘abusa land tenant’ (Box 10.1). All the modalities occur within the study 
community. The third variant enables a farmer to become a landowner, provided the 
stool or family landowners acknowledge this. In this new status, the former tenant 
farmer pays the yearly land rent (‘ento’) to the respective traditional councils (i.e. Nyi-
nahin or Nkawie-Panin).  
                                                 
2
  Amanor & Dierutuah (2001) also provide an interesting analysis of the origin of the different sharing 
cropping systems in Ghana. 
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From images to action 
This section focuses on the images, instruments and actions regarding timber manage-
ment in off-reserve areas from the perspectives of various stakeholders. The first sub-
section presents a multi-stakeholder perspective, based on the outcomes of a national 
multi-stakeholder workshop held by Tropenbos International Ghana in 2007. As these 
outcomes were presented as a collective outcome, irrespective of diverging perspectives 
between different stakeholder groups, the subsequent subsections present the images, 
instruments and actions from the perspectives of timber operators, community members 
and government officials respectively. The timber operators’ perspective is based on the 
outcomes of a focus group meeting, which was held with three off-reserve timber opera-
tors in 2008 and a telephone interview with the timber operator active in the study area. 
The community perspective is based mainly on a community meeting with 45 villagers. 
These three analyses show that, despite being generally depicted as a contested battle-
field, Ghana’s off-reserve forest areas also include scenarios of cooperation instead of 
conflict. The last subsection examines more specifically the images, instruments, ac-
tions regarding benefit sharing and damage compensation from the perspective of gov-
ernance officials. 
A multi-stakeholder perspective of challenges and opportunities regarding off-reserve 
timber resources  
Past studies in Ghana’s off-reserve areas have revealed two prevailing key issues in off-
reserve tree harvesting: the SRA and crop damage compensation payments and the con-
flicts that these generate between timber operators (both legal and illegal) and local 
Box 10.1 The different ‘abusa’ relations in Ghana farming system 
 
1. The ‘abusa labourer’ works on an established cocoa plantation where s/he 
weeds, plucks the cocoa, ferments and dries the beans and markets them, for 
which s/he receives one third of the proceeds in return. The landlord provides 
the tools, clothing, and a plot of land on which to cultivate food crops, in return 
for which s/he receives two thirds of the proceeds. 
 
2. The ‘abusa tenant’ is generally a migrant without land rights, who has contacted 
the stool (the chief) for land to cultivate cocoa. After being allocated a piece of 
forestland, the abusa tenant establishes a cocoa farm with his own labour and 
capital, without the landlord’s assistance in the form of tools, food, seeds or 
other inputs. When the farm starts producing, the abusa tenant pays one third 
of the proceeds to the chief and is entitled to two thirds of the proceeds. 
 
3.  The ‘abusa land tenant’ is like the previous variant, with the difference being 
that the farmer is allowed to keep all the cocoa during the early years of fruit 
bearing and can keep one third of the cocoa plantation once the cocoa  ma-
tures. The rest of the plantation then goes to the landowner. This system is 
sometimes used to cover a sale or grant of land. 
 
Source: Hill (1956) cited in Amanor and Diderutuah (2001: 1-2). 
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communities and farmers (Amanor 2005, Marfo 2006, Hansen 2011, see also Chapter 
9). A study by Lambini (2010) revealed that these conflicts, particularly those related to 
crop damage compensation, affect the social, natural and financial capitals of the farm-
ers negatively. 
The participants in the multi-stakeholder workshop identified several problems in the 
off-reserve area and formulated several recommendations for policy and research. These 
are presented in Box 10.2 as images, instruments and actions. Generally, the participants 
asserted that off-reserve timber resources are dwindling because of (i) inequitable bene-
fit sharing between state agencies and timber operators on the one hand, and local 
communities and farmers on the other, (ii) inappropriate financial incentives for farmers 
who tend naturally generated timber trees resulting in the destruction and illegal har-
vesting of trees, and (iii) failure on the part of the FC to manage off-reserve forests and 
tree resources sustainably.  
The perspective of timber operators 
In November 2008, a focus group meeting was held with some timber operators work-
ing in the off-reserve areas of the Tano-Offin forest reserve. The discussion centred on 
problems they encounter in their operations, how they overcome them and how they 
should be addressed. Similarly to the outcomes of the multi-stakeholder workshop, the 
timber operators’ views are presented in Box 10.3 according to the three elements (i.e. 
images, instruments, actions) of first order governance (i.e. day-to-day management). 
When interviewed, the timber contractor active in the study area narrated how he man-
aged to establish a good relationship with the residents of the study community. He had 
previously worked in the Akikyon range in the early 2000s. During that period, he en-
countered some problems with farmers with regard to compensation payments. Having 
learned from this experience, he planned to establish a good relationship with the resi-
dents once he had obtained a TUC that granted him legal right to work again in the 
study area, in order to enable a smooth operation this time. To that end, he fulfilled his 
SRA and employed some young community members during his second term, including 
one active tree hunter. The task of this young man is not only to identify timber trees but 
also to lobby and negotiate with the farmers on a compensation rate. As the contractor 
he or any of his workers engages in the negotiation process only when difficulties arise. 
According to him, this has not occurred as yet, as social ties play an important role in 
the negotiations because the young man is a citizen of the village. He also narrated that 
the SRA has been effective because, in addition to providing the farmers with money 
for crop damage compensation, he also provides a token of money as an incentive and 
compensation for tending and nurturing the trees. When asked why he does not pay out-
right when the trees are felled, he reported that he originally intended to do so in order 
to commit the farmers to caring for the standing tree and not having to compete with 
chainsaw millers who only pay for a felled tree. He also said that conflicts between 
farmers and timber operators could be minimised if the operators deal directly with the 
community members rather than with the chief and elders only, and if they fulfil their 
legal obligations. In addition, he recommends the involvement of some young people 
from the local community who are willing to work during the timber operation. The 
lessons learned from this experience are summarised in Box 10.4. 
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Box 10.2 Images, instruments and actions: multi-stakeholder 
 perspectives of off-reserve management in Ghana’s high 
 forest zone 
Images  
Inequity in benefit sharing: The current benefit-sharing scheme favours state agencies 
and landowners but denies local people access to timber resources. Farmers who care 
for trees on farmlands do not receive any benefit when these trees are harvested. Nei-
ther do farmers receive adequate compensation from timber companies for crop damage 
resulting from logging activities on their farms. This has prompted farmers to neglect, 
and in some cases, deliberately kill off trees on farms. This is also a primary cause of 
illegal chainsaw operations, which directly and promptly reward the farmer, but have 
contributed greatly to the degradation of off-reserve forests.  
Unclear definition of roles and responsibilities in the management of off-reserve 
timber: Currently, not all stakeholders identified for the sustainable management of off-
reserve timber resources have clearly defined roles and responsibilities that correspond 
with their individual territorial and functional interests in the resource. This does not pro-
vide a good basis for negotiating an equitable distribution of timber revenues. 
Absence of a platform to engage in a dialogue about off-reserve problems: There 
is no multi-stakeholder platform for continuous discussion and dialogue on long-term 
solutions to current and potential off-reserve timber management problems.  
Deficient legislation: The current forest legislations Act 547 and 617 do not provide 
enough financial benefits to farmers who manage the resources.  
Royalties’ disbursement problems: The disbursement of timber revenues by the FC or 
the Office of Administrator of stool land is often late and characterised by a lack of trans-
parency. 
Instruments (proposed) 
 Equitable benefit sharing and additional incentives to boost farmers’ motivation to 
cater for trees on farmland. 
 Improved allocation procedures of logging rights, resource pricing (timber rights fees, 
stumpage fees and other fees) and documentation of the distribution and the use of 
timber revenues by beneficiaries to increase accountability of the financial manage-
ment of timber revenues.  
 A platform for dialogue about off-reserve problems.  
Actions 
Policy review: The current socio-economic context within which off-reserve timber trees 
are grown potentially creates tree tenure and benefit sharing conflicts, discourages 
farmers from raising and nurturing the trees because they receive no reward for these 
efforts and poses a problem for sustainable management. This calls for a review of cur-
rent forest policies, particularly with regard to tree tenure and benefit sharing and even-
tual devolution of management to the farmer. 
 Review of institutional roles: The present complexities of off-reserve timber resource 
management, institutional and communication means reforms are necessary. This in-
cludes the need to establish a platform for information sharing, sensitization and creat-
ing a common understanding between landowners and land users in terms of land and 
tree tenure. 
 Improvement in techniques for managing off-reserve trees: More research is 
needed on options to improve the management of naturally regenerated trees in off-
reserve areas, with a view to enabling farmers to respond appropriately to changes in 
agricultural technology. 
 
Source: TBI Ghana, 2009: ix-x. 
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Box 10.3 From images to action: The views of off-reserve timber 
 operators 
 
Images  
The operators revealed that in their operations they constantly interact with actors 
such as the FSD, chiefs, farmers, local communities, chainsaw operators and the 
FSD/Military task force. In such interactions, they face problems regarding:  
 SRA negotiation with local communities;  
 Negotiation of compensation for destroying farm produce during the felling of trees; 
 Tree theft by chainsaw operators;  
 Low pricing of the logs by saw millers who buy the logs.  
According to the timber operators, the first two problems arise because there is a 
lack of education on SRA and compensation negotiation on the part of the FC to the 
local communities. As regards the third problem, farmers instruct chainsaw operators 
to fell trees on lands given to contractors because this enables them to gain more 
directly from the trees on their farmland. The last problem that relates to the pricing 
of logs arises because saw millers who are supposed to buy the logs from the opera-
tors have large concession areas and hence control timber pricing. In the views of 
these respondents, these problems affect their operations because they reduce their 
profit margin, delay the operation and result in additional costs.  
Instruments  
In dealing with problems of SRA and crop damage compensation with local commu-
nities and farmers respectively, the participants’ indicated the use of negotiation as 
the first means of dealing with the problems. According to them, these are often suc-
cessful but sometimes require mediation by the District Chief Executives (DCE) and 
the FSD as well as by an opinion leader in the community in which they operate. 
As far as tree theft by the chainsaw operators is concerned, arrest with the support of 
the FSD/military task force or the police was indicated as the most appropriate in-
strument. However, this is only feasible if the person is actually met during the opera-
tion.  
The low pricing of logs could best be dealt with by negotiating with prospective buy-
ers to access the price before logging. However, since the logging process takes so 
long, the buyer could change the proposed price for that particular species and tim-
ber operators would then have no other option but to sell to the buyer. 
Actions  
 The operators mentioned the following strategies to minimise off-reserve problems 
that result in conflicts: 
 The DCE and FC representatives must educate the local communities on the SRA 
negotiations to explain the 5% of the annual royalties as their social right. 
 The MOFA must educate the farmers about the need to grow trees on the bounda-
ries of their farmland rather than inter-mixing them with their farm products, since 
felling destroys food crops and the trees compete for nutrients in their farms. 
 The FC must go beyond granting timber permits and must also include educating 
the stakeholders, including the timber operators. 
 The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources should make it a priority to open 
negotiations between sawmillers and timber contractors on the issue of wood pric-
ing. 
Source: Focus group meeting with timber operators, November 2008. 
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Local community and farmers’ perspectives for cooperation in off-reserve timber man-
agement  
Images, instruments and actions from a community perspective were discussed during a 
community meeting attended by forty-five inhabitants. In addition, a survey question-
naire was employed and a focus group held with seventeen farmers on whose land trees 
had been harvested. 
Box 10.4 Strategies used by the timber contractor and the local 
 people to achieve a good relationship during tree felling in 
 the off-reserve area 
 
Drawing lessons from past working experience: The timber contractor had 
previously worked with the local community and during that time he had experi-
enced some problems. He therefore drew lessons to enable him to establish a 
better relationship during another term of timber operation in the area. 
 
Networking: At the onset of the operation, the contractor established a network 
not only with the chiefs and elders but also with the youths in the community by 
providing some with employment in relation to his operations. He also employed 
one of the youngsters as his spokesperson to communicate and engage in dia-
logue with farmers from his own village, therefore making use of existing social 
ties. 
 
Fulfilment of SRA and other benefits: the contractor adhered to the legal bene-
fits that local communities are entitled to in the form of SRA and paid promptly and 
made sure that the negotiation process was properly documented. He also as-
sisted the community in a number of ways and this earned him trust and respect 
from the local people. 
 
Social ties: The tree hunter used the existing social ties with his people (i.e. farm-
ers) to facilitate conflict-free negotiations  
 
Monetary incentive in addition to crop damage compensation payment: Be-
sides paying compensation for cash and food crop damage, the contractor gave a 
token amount of money to the farmers as an incentive for tending and nurturing 
timber species. 
 
Shared responsibility: The contractor avoided outright payment of an agreed 
amount of money for harvested trees because he wanted the farmers to share the 
responsibility of protecting the logs from chainsaw millers.  
 
Reciprocity evolved: The contractor enjoyed an atmosphere of peace in his tim-
ber harvesting operation, which was bereft of conflicts. On the other hand the local 
community enjoyed some investment in community development in addition to a 
cash incentive from the SRA. The farmers received a payment for crops destroyed 
in addition to cash for nurturing the timber trees, whereas some youths gained 
access to employment. 
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– Images 
The inhabitants reported that the timber felling process begins with FSD range supervi-
sors visiting the village to inform them about the allocation of off-reserve timber trees to 
a timber contractor for a certain period. The officials then briefly inform the inhabitants 
about the SRA and crop damage compensation arrangements. During pre-felling, the 
FSD official, accompanied by Unit Committee representatives and some farmers, visits 
farm and fallow lands to mark the trees that qualify for possible allocation under a TUC. 
The inhabitants confirmed that the current contractor employed a local ‘tree hunter’ ‒ a 
person who searches and negotiates for trees ‒ as well as several youths to work in the 
timber harvesting process.  
According to the inhabitants, the timber operator supported the construction of the 
primary school in the village with cement and a cash contribution of GH¢ 700 (US$ 
467) during his previous work in the area in 2001. For this current operation, he pro-
vided the community with ten bags of cement for renovation of the school building. He 
had yet to fulfil the SRA at the time of data collection in 2009. However, during the 
validation meeting in 2011, the inhabitants (n=36) revealed that the contractor had ful-
filled the SRA obligation in the meantime. To this end, the two chiefs and the contractor 
had signed an agreement with two community members serving as witnesses and then 
sealed it in the presence of the Unit Committee chairperson. The elders were, however, 
reluctant to mention the amount of money the contractor paid. The inhabitants were 
unanimous in praising the contractor for fulfilling his SRA and reported that he had pre-
viously supported community development by repairing equipment used to spray their 
farms and for boreholes. As far as the villagers are concerned, the timber contractor is 
welcome to work in their village again when the current term of operation has ended. 
On the question of why farmers usually destroy naturally grown timber trees on their 
farmland, they collectively responded that they do so because they do not benefit from 
timber like they benefit from cocoa. In their view, it is therefore a waste of time to nur-
ture and protect the trees. They referred to a former contractor who operated in the area 
and did not completely fulfil his SRA obligations. This further undermined the incen-
tives to care for the trees. The reasons are summarised in Box 10.5. 
Box 10.5 Why farmers destroy naturally grown timber trees on farmlands 
 
 Timber contractors destroy the crops when harvesting the timber trees. 
 They do not pay crop damage compensation as required. 
 Sometimes farmers are not even informed that the trees on their farmlands or fallow 
lands have been made available to a timber contractor.  
 If the farmer is absent, some timber operators log timber on farmlands without the 
farmer’s consent. These farmers only have an opportunity negotiate informally if 
they meet the contractor in person. 
 Farmers receive no benefits from timber trees, except compensation for crop dam-
age. Farmers consider this to be for ‘survival’ when compared to cocoa, which is for 
posterity.  
 Cocoa is affected by the black pod disease because of being shaded by large timber 
trees.  
 
Source: Community meeting held in Awisasu, 2009.  
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Table 10.3 Species available on farmers’ (n=17) fallow and farmlands 
Trade name/local name  Scientific name  Star rating*  
African mahogany  Khaya spp. Scarlet 
Akata  Rhodognaphalon buonopozense Pink 
Asanfina Aningeria robusta Pink 
Bako Tieghemella heckelii Scarlet 
Danta  Nesogordonia papaverifera Pink 
Edinam  Entandrophragma angolense Red 
Emire  Terminalia ivorensis Scarlet 
Esia  Petersianthus macrocarpus Green 
Kyenkyen Antiaris toxicaria / Antiaris Africana Pink 
Kyereye (koto)  Pterygopta macrocarpa Red 
Odum Milicia excels Scarlet 
Ofram  Terminalia superba Pink 
Onyina  Ceiba pentandra Pink 
Otie  Pycnanthus angolensis Pink 
Penkwa (Sapele)  Entandrophragma cylindricum Scarlet  
Sapele Entandrophragma cylindricum Scarlet 
Wawa  Triplochiton scleroxylon Scarlet 
* Green = no threat of extinction; pink = significantly exploited, but no threats yet to their economic future; red = 
current rates of exploitation present a significant danger of economic extinction; scarlet = under imminent threat of 
economic extinction. For an explanation of Ghana’s star rating of conservation priority for timber species see Chap-
ters 5 and 7.Source: Field survey 2009. 
 
Additional data on off-reserve tree harvesting was gathered through survey and focus 
group meetings attended by five women and twelve men who had trees on their farms or 
fallow lands. Only two of the males claimed to be tenants with the rest being landown-
ers. The crops normally grown on their farms are cocoa, maize, oil palm and plantain, 
with cocoa being the lead cash crop. The respondents stated that they had cultivated 
various timber tree species on their farm and fallow lands (Table 10.3), to which the 
botanical names and their star rating (based on Hawthorne & Abu-Juam 1995, see also 
Chapter 4 and 7) were added. The individual combinations of timber trees and crops are 
presented in Table 10.4.  
Of the seventeen farmers who mentioned that they have trees on their farm/fallow 
lands, thirteen indicated that the contractor had felled some of the trees between 2005 
and 2009. The rest reported that their trees has been earmarked but had not been har-
vested yet. The most common species harvested was Ceiba pentandra (onyina) fol-
lowed by Antiaris toxicaria (kyenkyen) and Terminalia superba (ofram). The farmers 
confirmed the timber operator’s account that they received compensation payment as 
compensation for crop damage and as a cash incentive for nurturing the trees. They re-
ceived no compensation for crop damage on fallow land, as these are not considered to 
be actively cultivated, hence the timber operator feels there is no need to pay for crop 
damage. However, farmers do receive the incentive payment for nurturing trees on fal-
low land. The amount received by seven of the farmers during the time of data collec-
tion ranged from GH¢ 20 to GH¢ 160 (US$ 13 to US$ 107) (Table 10.5). The maxi-
mum compensation paid by the contractor as at the time of data collection included both 
compensation for damaged crops and a cash incentive for nurturing trees ans involved 
the removal of 11 timber trees including Antiaris toxicaria (kyenkyen), Terminalia su-
perba (ofram), Ceiba pentandra (onyina) and Pycnanthus angolensis (otie) (Table 
10.5). Four of the respondents had received a partial payment of the negotiated amount, 
whereas two farmers reported that they had not received any money for the trees that 
were harvested. 
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Table 10.4 Crop and tree combinations on farm and fallow lands (n=17) 
Ownership of land  Types of crops grown  Types of timber trees nurtured in local names  
Tenant  Landowner 
  Yes  Cocoa, maize  Wawa, onyina, African mahogany, ofram, asanfina 
Yes   Cocoa  Otie, African mahogany 
 Yes  Cocoyam, cocoa Ofram, emire  
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain  Onyina, odum 
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain Ofram, onyina, wawa 
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain, 
vegetables  
Onyina, ofram, kyenkyen*, otie  
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain  Onyina, otie, ofram, akata, esia  
Yes   Cocoa, cassava,  
vegetables  
Onyina, edinam, wawa, kyenkyen, emire, danta  
 Yes  Cocoa, oil palm, 
Cocoyam 
Kyenkyen, ofram, onyina  
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain, 
orange 
Wawa, odum, bako, edinam 
 Yes  Cocoa, oil palm, 
orange, mango 
Sapele, African mahogany, onyina, odum, wawa 
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain Onyina, kyenkyen, ofram, wawa 
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain Onyina, ofram 
  Cocoa, plantain Ceiba, ofram 
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain, 
cocoyam 
Odum, bako, ceiba, kyenkyen 
 Yes  Cocoa, plantain, yam Ceiba, koto, kyenkyen 
 Yes  Cocoa  Wawa, ceiba, koto, kyenkyen 
* Kyenkyen (Antiaris africana) is also known as chenchen and ako. 
 
 
Table 10.5 Compensation paid for harvesting trees from farm and fallow land  
Area where 
trees were 
harvested 
Year of 
harvest 
Number of trees 
harvested 
Kind of tree har-
vested (vernacular 
names) 
Compensation paid (GH¢) 
Farmland 2009  12 Wawa, onyina, edi-
nam, ofram, kyen-
kyen, asanfina 
GH¢ 20 for cocoa  
destroyed  
 
 
Fallow land  2008   6 Kyenkyen, ofram, 
koto, onyina 
No payment because trees 
were fell on fallow land  
Farmland 2009  3 Onyina  GH¢ 50 
Farmland 2009  8 Onyina  Not paid yet since logs 
have not been transported 
Farmland 2007  13 Ofram, wawa, onyina  GH¢ 60 
Farmland 2009  11 Kyenkyen, ofram, 
otie, onyina  
GH¢ 160 including cocoa 
compensation 
Fallow land  2009  8 Onyina, akata, otie  GH¢ 60 
Farmland 2009  3 Kyenkyen, onyina, 
ofram 
Not yet paid 
Farmland 2009  2 Onyina Partial payment made  
Farmland 2009  15 Onyina, ofram GH¢ 30 partial payment  
Farmland 2009  12 Odum, bako, onyina, 
kyenkyen 
GH¢ 40 
Farmland 2009  4 Onyina, koto, kyen-
kyen 
GH¢ 20 
Farmland 2009  17 Wawa, onyina koto, 
kyenkyen 
No payment 
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– Instruments  
According to the farmers, negotiation begins between the tree hunter and the farmer. 
First they negotiate on the trees that the farmer will allow the contractor to fell and the 
timing. When the crops are almost ready to be harvested, the farmer proposes postpon-
ing tree felling until after the crops have been harvested. If negotiations are successful, 
there will be no need for the contractor to intervene. The tree hunter then pays the 
agreed amount to the farmer. The amount of incentive payment for nurturing trees de-
pends on the species to be harvested, with a higher amount generally being paid for tree 
species with a high market value such as those with a scarlet star rating. However, the 
amount to be paid it is determined at the discretion of the timber contractor (through the 
tree hunter).  
The procedure for establishing crop damage is more subjective, but generally the 
amount paid for cocoa is higher than that for food crops. Since the farmers receive a 
lump sum for crop damage compensation and tree nurturing, it was difficult to ascertain 
what prices are paid for individual timber species or crops. During assessments of crop 
damage between them and the tree hunter there are no government officials (e.g. MOFA 
or FSD) to help them assess the actual cost of the damage. They therefore receive a 
payment at the discretion of the tree hunter and the contractor. However, the farmers 
reported that the negotiation process with the tree hunter and, occasionally, the contrac-
tor, does not generate any conflicts and that they are satisfied with the current arrange-
ments. However, they do not know what would happen with another contractor. The 
only problem they experience is the mode of payment. Farmers would prefer the con-
tractor to pay the agreed amount outright instead of receiving a partial payment at the 
onset of harvesting and the rest when the logs are loaded onto the truck. As it takes 
some time before the logs are actually loaded, the small amount of money agreed upon 
will have lost value by the time it is actually paid. 
During the validation meeting with some of the inhabitants of Awisasu, a discussion 
was held to decide what, in the inhabitants’ view, would constitute a ‘fairly negotiated’ 
compensation as stipulated by law. The inhabitants felt it would be fair for them to re-
ceive a 30% share of the royalties from the forest reserve (instead of 5%) as they live 
closest to the forest and help to maintain it. Regarding the benefits from naturally gen-
erated trees on farm and fallow lands they advocated 10% of the stumpage fee for the 
farmer in addition to the crop damage compensation which they felt should be GH¢ 10 
for a cassava plant and GH¢ 20 for a cocoa tree. Some of the participants felt the benefit 
should go to the farmer (i.e. local landowner) who received the land directly from the 
chief of Nyinahin or Nkawie-Panin and not to the tenant farmer, as the ‘landowners’ are 
the ones who have to pay the annual rent to the actual landowner in Nyinahin or 
Nkawie-panin. According to the inhabitants, the latter already receive a benefit in the 
form of their share in the royalties, so would not need to receive an additional stumpage 
fee.  
– Actions  
The final question discussed at the validation meeting centred on how to minimise prob-
lems and conflicts arising from off-reserve tree harvesting. The responses were as fol-
lows: 
 Efforts should be made to create a common understanding between communities, 
farmers and timber contractors about the payment of compensation and SRA. 
 Timber contractors should pay promptly for destroyed crops.  
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 Timber contractors should invest in a good relationship with communities and farm-
ers and inform them properly when an area is allocated to them. 
 Arrangements should be made for compensation payments for trees felled on fallow 
land.  
Government officials’ perspectives of their role in the compensation negotiation process  
This section presents the views of government officials on compensation payment pro-
cedures and how they could be improved.  
– Images 
An informal interview with an FSD district officer revealed that the FC mediates in 
SRA negotiations, but in compensation payment negotiations only when the contractor 
and farmer do not reach an agreement and one of the parties sends a petition letter. He 
admitted it would be better to mediate before any conflict arises. However, due to a lim-
ited number of staff and an already heavy workload for range supervisors adding the 
responsibility for mediation is not feasible. He thought that one possible solution would 
be the appointment of a customer services officer who could play a mediating role be-
tween the FC and stakeholders as well as among different stakeholders. The FC pro-
moted the concept of a customer service officer in the early 2000s, but it has not been 
institutionalised thus far in all the forest districts. 
– Instruments 
Interviews held with two MOFA extension officers in Nyinahin centred on how they 
calculate compensation payments for farmers when invited to mediate. In the event of 
destruction by timber contractors, they take the following steps to determine: 
 The economic lifespan of the crop destroyed (i.e. 30 years for a cocoa tree). 
 The age of the crops and existing properties on the field. 
 The number of plants or trees affected or the area destroyed. 
 The average crop yield per plant/tree or per acre). 
 The current market prices (excluding interest rates, inflation or bank charges. 
 
Generally, the crop damage compensation for cocoa is calculated as follows: 
 
The Land Valuation Division
3
 (LVD) of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources is 
also occasionally involved in crop damage compensation assessments. An interview 
with an LVD official in the Ashanti region revealed that the LVD has documented rates 
for crops and property for compensation purposes, but that these are not regularly re-
viewed as should be. When services are requested in compensation mediation, they use 
the Investment Method of Valuation (Box 10.6), through which they assess the follow-
ing:  
                                                 
3
  The Land Valuation Division was established as part of the Land Administration Project in 1999 that 
was set up to implement the National Land Policy to establish an efficient land administration system 
with a view to solving land disputes, improving tenure security and resolving ambiguities as regards 
the demarcation of customary lands (http://www.ghanalap.gov.gh/ (accessed on 10 November 2011). 
Crop damage compensation payment = 
Number of individual trees destroyed x Average crop yield x Current market price x  
Relative lifespan of the crop 
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 Inputs used in the acquisition of the property; 
 The prevailing price of the property; 
 The interest rate; 
 The lifespan of the property; 
 Maturity at destruction; 
 Characteristics of the crops, e.g. exotic or local species. 
The LVD also occasionally advises on compensation assessments in the law court. 
 
‒ Actions 
The officials interviewed made the following recommendations to minimise the con-
frontations between farmers and timber contractors:  
 Appointment of a customer services officer at the FC who could play a mediating 
role between the parties.  
 The timber contractors must meet with the community and village authorities and 
show them where their logging activities are going to take place. 
 Those who are going to be affected should be identified.  
 Logging plans should be shown to and discussed with affected farmers.  
 Procedures for negotiating compensation should be discussed with farmers for peace 
to prevail. 
Discussion  
This section discusses the results regarding off-reserve timber resource management, 
access and benefits from two perspectives. The first subsection examines them from an 
interactive governance perspective, i.e. in terms of governance interactions between the 
system-to-be-governed and the governing system. The second subsection assesses the 
results from the perspective of social capital and how different strategies employed by 
the contractor and the local people help to establish cooperation instead of conflict.  
Governance interactions between the system-to-be-governed and the governing system  
The system-to-be-governed that was analysed in this chapter are Ghana’s off-reserve 
areas, which are endowed with timber resources in patches of forest, fallow and farm-
lands. These areas are an important source of timber revenues for the country and some 
 
Box 10.6 The investment method of valuation  
 
The investment method of valuation is used to convert a commercial property’s income 
flow (rent) into an appropriate capital sum (value), thereby relating the capital value of 
a property to its income-producing power. The formula to valuate a property is: 
 
Value = Market Rent (MR) x Years’ Purchase (YP) perpetuity 
 
The Years’ Purchase (YP) perpetuity is a multiplier that corresponds with the investors’ 
target rate of return. It allows converting a property’s rent into value. 
 
Source: Wyatt 2007. 
 
 
Box 11.1: Reported and unreported cases in Ghana’s judicial system  
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of its stakeholders as they still hold some rare timber species (Kyereh et al. 2006, Af-
fum-Baffoe 2009, Hansen & Treue 2009, TBI 2009). It is also the major source of agri-
cultural livelihood for local people who cultivate cash and food crops for income and 
domestic use. This landscape therefore presents two competing land uses, which if not 
well managed, result in conflicts associated with loss of livelihoods and environmental 
degradation (Ohlsson 2000). The results revealed that, even though the local inhabitants 
of Awisasu live close to the Tano-Offin forest reserve, they collect NTFPs for domestic 
and commercial use mainly from fallow land in the off-reserve area due to restricted 
access to the reserve. In addition, the off-reserve area provides them with their major 
sources of income from cash crops (especially cocoa) and food crops. 
The off-reserve landscape presents a complex governing system because of the mul-
tiple governing structures involved and the different governing rules for land and timber 
trees. Land for the cultivation of crops is accessed mostly through the stool or family, 
via a chain of hierarchy. A person who acquires land directly from the stool could also 
engage in different crop-sharing arrangements with other farmers. Through one of these 
arrangements, the ‘abusa’ land tenant farmer can also become a local landowner (Hill 
1956 cited in Amanor & Diderutuah, 2001). On the positive side, this mode of land 
transfer enables a tenant to become a local landowner. However, the system also con-
tributes to land fragmentation.  
Prior to the introduction of scientific forestry in the early 20
th
 century, the right to ac-
cess and explore timber resources in off-reserve areas was in the hands of the farmer 
and the local town chief (Amanor 2005). Scientific forestry changed this pattern by 
vesting the custody of land in the paramount chiefs (see Chapter 5), which excluded 
local people and farmers from timber resource benefits. A general call for collaboration 
resulted in a policy that granted rights to benefits to local people and farmers. These 
benefits range from SRAs for local communities, to crop damage compensation to 
farmers in off-reserve areas, ownership of planted trees and consultation of local people 
before logging proceeds in off-reserve areas (see Figure 10.2). The implementation of 
these policy directions in practice is still a challenge, despite there not being any ade-
quate policy response to the inequitable sharing of timber revenues. These problems, 
coupled with accelerating deforestation and lapses in current legislation that create dis-
incentives to farmers who tend and nurture naturally grown trees on farmland, make 
stakeholders question the sustainability of off-reserve timber resource management 
(TBI 2009). Figure 10.3 depicts a situation in which current legislation still ignores the 
farmer in off-reserve areas who is actually the only actor to contribute to off-reserve 
timber tree management. As proposed by the participants in the multi-stakeholder work-
shop organised by Tropenbos International in 2007 and the timber contractors who en-
gaged in the focus group meeting organised for this study in 2008, there is a need to 
review policy and institutions and promote community education to help ensure the sus-
tainability of timber tree management in the off-reserve landscape. The core issue is that 
local communities in off-reserve areas, and farmers for that matter, must have an equi-
table share of the timber revenues generated. However, the complexity surrounding land 
ownership as analysed in this chapter, means that a clarification is required of what 
really constitutes a ‘farmer’ or ‘landowner’ within the context of Ghana and who of 
them should be entitled to benefit from the royalties. 
In addition, it is important that government agencies assume a more active role in the 
negotiation of crop damage compensation payments, rather than waiting passively until 
they are called when negotiation fails. For negotiation to be effective, the parties in-
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volved must have equal negotiation skills. However, those of the timber operator are 
larger thanks to his interaction with other actors in the market governing structure. As 
Asare (2006) has noted, the farmers’ expectations are often not realistic, and legislation 
lacks specific regulations on how to determine compensation and ensure that farmers 
are ‘fairly compensated’. What constitutes ‘fairly compensated’ is still unknown, and 
this increases the likelihood of misunderstandings in the negotiations between farmers 
and timber contractor, with conflicts often being the result. As argued in Chapter 9, the 
study carried out by Richards & Asare (1999)
 4
 in the late 1990s needs to be re-visited 
and given due policy consideration for farmers to enjoy the timber benefits to which 
they are entitled. Similarly, community inhabitants are insufficiently aware of what con-
stitutes the SRA equivalent to 5% of stumpage fees to which the community is entitled 
as compensation for logging in their area. As a result, the benefits are set at the discre-
tion of the timber contractor, and this makes local people suspicious. As shown in this 
chapter, there are still some governability challenges that require policy attention. How-
ever, the discussion in the next section shows that a timber contractor’s ability to con-
struct social capital can change conflict situations into cooperation. This underpins 
Portes’ (1998: 3) statement that ‘social networks are not a natural given and must be 
constructed through investment strategies oriented around the institutionalisation of 
group relations, and usable as a reliable source of other benefits’. 
The role of social capital and its implications for interactive governance theory  
Within the Awisasu community, the diversity of governing structures (i.e. the statutory, 
customary and hybrid governing structures) creates an environment conducive to strong 
social ties and networks. The customary governing structure system portrays three of 
the five elements
5
 of ‘connectedness’ identified by Pretty & Ward (2001), namely local 
connections – strong connections between individuals and within local groups and 
communities – and horizontal local-local connections between groups within communi-
ties. Examples of the first are social groups such as ‘Peace and Love’ and ‘Odo ne kruye 
kue’ (Love and Unity) which are based in the customary governing structure, where 
members help each other when the need arises. Local-local connections emerge when 
different community groups become interconnected. An example is the different reli-
gious groups (i.e. Christianity, Islam and traditionalist). The hybrid governing structure 
generates local-external connections – vertical connections between local groups and 
external agencies or organisations, being one-way (usually top-down) or two-way (Ibid.: 
212). Examples of the latter are WATSAN and the CBAGS, which constitute collabora-
tions between the community and the Community Water and Sanitation Agency and the 
FC respectively. The different dimensions of social networks at the community level is 
what Boissevain (1974: 31 cited in Portes 1998) labels as ‘multiplexity’, referring to 
                                                 
4
  Richards & Asare (1999) present a detailed analysis of incentives for Ghanaian cocoa farmers to 
maintain timber trees and a calculation of the compensation that cocoa farmers in Ghana deserve for 
their efforts. The compensation proposed takes account of physical damage to cocoa and/or other 
crops by timber contractors and a compensation for cocoa yield loss due to loss of tree micro-
environmental benefits such as nutrient recycling, soil and air temperature, loss of NTFPs etc. In addi-
tion to these two forms of compensation there is what Richards & Asare termed the ‘additional posi-
tive incentive payment’ to compensate the farmer for his skills in tree identification. 
5
  The other elements of connectedness identified by Pretty & Ward (2001) which are not dealt with here 
are i) external-external connections -horizontal connections between external agencies that could lead 
to collaborative partnerships; and iii) External connections-strong connections between individuals 
within external agencies. 
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overlapping social networks where the same people are linked together across different 
roles.  
In trying to understand the concept of social capital, Portes (1998: 6) distinguishes 
between (a) the possessors of social capital (those making claims); (b) the sources of 
social capital (those agreeing to these demands) and (c) the resources themselves. In this 
study, this corresponds respectively with (a) the local inhabitants of Awisasu who claim 
SRA, and the farmers whose trees are felled who claim compensation from the timber 
contractor; (b) the timber contractor who established a network with the community 
through the appointment of a ‘tree hunter’ who negotiates compensation payments with 
his own kin; and (c) benefits from timber resources. This scenario represents an inter-
pretation of social capital as a source of benefits through extra-familial networks
6
 
(Portes 1998): the timber contractor establishes relations with the local people not only 
for their benefit but also to his own advantage because it creates a conflict-free envi-
ronment for him to conduct his timber harvesting operations in a smooth manner.  
The timber contractor’s previous experience with the inhabitants of Awisasu and the 
challenges he had faced enabled him to act in a more strategic manner during his second 
term. One key strategy was to establish a network with the chief and elders of the com-
munity as well as with the youths. In the latter case he selected one to function as a ne-
gotiator. Apparently, the timber contractor has taken a cue from the aphorism ‘It is not 
what you know, it’s who you know’ (Woolcock & Narayam 2000: 225), which enabled 
him to establish a better relationship with the local people. By employing a local tree 
hunter who was made responsible for damage compensation negotiation and incentive 
payment for nurturing timber trees, the contractor took advantage of existing social ties 
– local connections in the terminology of Pretty & Ward (2001) – between the tree 
hunter and his people, thereby facilitating the negotiation process. These social ties be-
come evident in the expression, ‘He is a child of ours’. In a small village like Awisasu, 
the tree hunter could simultaneously be the son, the nephew or grandson or neighbour of 
the inhabitants and this intensity of ties helps create trust. Furthermore, the timber con-
tractor fulfilled the SRA obligations and additionally supported the local people in other 
agricultural and infrastructure needs. These strategies created respect and trust on the 
part of the local people to the extent that they expressed their willingness to work with 
the timber contractor again, when his term of operation ends and he reapplies. Accord-
ing to Pretty & Ward (2001) the relations of trust facilitates cooperation, reduces trans-
action costs between people and frees up resources.  
According to Kramer et al. (1993), negotiation – either formal or informal – plays an 
important role in regulating social and organisational life. In this case study, the tree 
hunter negotiated with the farmers before felling the trees, as a mechanism to develop 
consensus and compromise on the payment of crop damage and to avoid social and 
natural resource conflicts. This resulted in conflict-free outcomes for both the operator 
and the farmers, despite the fact that some farmers were aggrieved that the contractor 
did not pay for trees logged from fallow lands and that they would have preferred out-
right payment for the trees felled. This gap in communication could have been avoided 
if the farmers had been informed of the ‘rules’ of the game at the onset of the negotia-
tions. 
The fact that social capital is not a panacea for all social groupings is well illustrated 
in literature (see Portes 1998, Woolcook & Narayan, 2000; Pretty & Ward 2001). Nev-
                                                 
6
  Other functions of social capital distinguished by Portes (1998) are the source of social control and the 
source of family support. 
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ertheless, this particular case has shown that the strategic use of social capital can pro-
mote cooperation instead of conflict in the management of off-reserve timber resources. 
Other timber operators can learn from this case to build a collaborative relationship with 
local communities. Echoing Portes (1998: 3), ‘such features are not natural but must be 
constructed through investment strategies oriented to the institutionalisation of group 
relations, usable as a reliable source of other benefits’.  
By analysing the interactions between stakeholders in the system-to-be-governed in 
terms of social capital, this chapter has confirmed the argument by Trimble & Berkes 
(2010) that synergy can exist between interactive governance theory and the social capi-
tal framework. As proposed by Trimble and Berkets (Ibid.) this can be taken a step fur-
ther: the social capital framework can also be used to analyse the interactions within the 
governing system (i.e. the government social capital) and the interactions between those 
who govern and those who are governed (i.e. the system of governing interactions). 
Conclusion  
Ghana’s off-reserve forest landscape generates timber revenues for the country and in-
dividual stakeholders and is a major source of agricultural livelihood for local people. 
Inequitable sharing of timber resources and benefits in this landscape has turned the 
area into a contested battlefield. In literature and interviews, the conflicts are attributed 
to the prevailing legislation, which excludes farmers and local people who manage the 
timber resources from timber benefits. However, the case study of the Awisasu commu-
nity presents a scenario of cooperation that contrasts the frequently cited conflict status 
of off-reserve areas. This cooperation could be achieved on the basis of the construction 
of social capital elements such as networking, shared responsibility, and the creation of 
social ties and trust by the timber contractor, which was reciprocated by the local peo-
ple. Even though this case is not representative of Ghana’s off reserves as a whole, it 
shows that there is a need for other contractors to facilitate social capital in their opera-
tional areas in order to foster cooperation and minimise conflicts. In substantive terms, 
the case showed that the concept of social capital aligns well with interactive govern-
ance theory. 
  
 
 
11 
Forest offences and law enforcement  
in Nkawie Forest District 
Introduction   
Ghana’s forest sector has an extensive range of laws to govern the management of forest 
resources (see Chapter 5). In practice, however, it appears that the enforcement of such 
laws is compounded by political and institutional challenges which result in the preva-
lence of illicit forest activities that eventually lead to environmental damage, revenue 
loss and the destruction of livelihood sources of forest fringe communities (Larbi et al. 
2011, Nutakor et al. 2011, Oduro et al. 2011). Oduro et al. (2011) mention three weak-
nesses that undermine the regulatory and legislative instruments of Ghana, namely (i) 
non-compliance with the regulations by the sector itself, (ii) too many regulations gov-
erning the forestry sector, and (iii) low penalties for default. Christy et al. (1997) attrib-
ute weak forest law enforcement to (i) the remoteness of forested areas, (ii) the absence 
of a road network, or a deficient road network which impedes movement, and (iii) a 
closed canopy that hinders direct observations. In 2008, when Ghana committed itself to 
the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI)
1
, one of the four 
key policy objectives stakeholders recommended for urgent policy consideration in or-
der to start realising sustainable forest management was strengthening law enforcement. 
This was in line with the United Nations Forestry Forum (UNFF) NLBI policy measure 
resolution 6(n), which states, ‘Review, and as needed, improve forest-related legisla-
tion, strengthen forest law enforcement and promote good governance at all levels in 
order to support sustainable forest management, to create an enabling environment for 
forest investment and to combat and eradicate illegal practices according to national 
legislation, in the forest and other related sectors’ (UNFF 2008). In an effort to achieve 
                                                 
1
  The NLBI, also known as ‘the Forest Instrument’ is a voluntary agreement under the auspices of the 
United Nations Forum on Forests by which UN members commit themselves to develop policies and 
take measures to stimulate sustainable forest management. Ghana was the first developing country 
that is taking concrete steps to implement the NLBI with support of the FAO and the National Forest 
Programme Facility (http://www.csir-forig.org.gh/nlbi/docs/implementation_nlbi.pdf, accessed on15 
December 2011).  
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this policy objective, one of the strategies used is to document forest offences in the 
NLBI monitoring and evaluation framework as a baseline for monitoring illegal forest 
activities and as a means of checking whether existing measures have led to a minimisa-
tion of these offences (FORIG 2010).  
This chapter aims to contribute insights that may support the national objective to 
strengthen law enforcement by analysing forest offences and their judgments in law 
courts in Nkawie forest district and the views of representatives of law enforcement 
agencies and the judiciary regarding institutional challenges and means of overcoming 
them.  
The specific questions addressed in this chapter are: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the Nkawie Forest District reserves as a system-to-be-
governed?  
2. What governing system (i.e. institutions and legislative framework) with regard to 
law enforcement is available in the forest district?  
3. What governance interactions arise from the system-to-be-governed and the govern-
ing system and what are their outcomes?  
4. How do officials of the Forestry Commission, the Ghana Police Services and the 
judiciary perceive their institutional roles in dealing with forest offences?  
 
Law students
2
 at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
(KNUST) conducted research under my supervision into research questions 3 and 4 and 
it was partly on the basis of this research that they graduated with a Bachelor of Law 
(LLB) degree in 2011. Although the key findings from their research study are used in 
this chapter, they are presented here from a different analytical perspective. 
The chapter is based on document analysis of forest laws, offence records at the 
Nkawie Forest District from 2005-2010 and court judgements on 12 accessible forest 
cases in the Nkawie, Nyinahin, Mankranso districts courts and Kumasi circuit court. 
These are so-called unreported judgements, which are cases heard in district courts or 
tribunals but not published in a series of law reports (see Box 11.1 for a difference be-
tween reported and unreported cases). Furthermore, semi-structured questionnaires were 
sent to 19 officials from the Forestry Commission, Ghana Police Services and the judi-
ciary mostly in the Nkawie Forest District (see Chapter 3 for details on the methodol-
ogy).  
Both primary and secondary data were analysed from an interactive governance per-
spective (Kooiman et al. 2005) to obtain an in-depth understanding of the factors that 
facilitate or hinder forest law enforcement and sanctions in the law courts. The percep-
tions of officials belonging to the FC, police and judiciary with regard to these factors 
are analysed in terms of images, instruments and actions (see Chapter 2). 
The next section, which is devoted to the system-to-be-governed, presents the natural 
sub-system (i.e. the forest reserves in Nkawie Forest District). Next, the governing sys-
tem is presented with a focus on the actors in the governing structures, the mandates of 
the Nkawie Forest District, and the legislation and sanctions that govern forest offences. 
The subsequent section describes the governance interactions based on an analysis of 
                                                 
2
  They are Larbi Esther, Yankson Joseph; Annang Edwin Sarfo; Koomson Faustina Abeka; Boakye 
Kwabena Akyeampong. The LLB thesis is titled ‘Judicial attitude towards forest related offences in 
the Nkawie forest district of Ghana’ (unpublished April 2011). The research was funded from my re-
search budget.  
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records on forest offences of Nkawie FSD and twelve unreported judgements of forest 
offences in the law courts. After that, the perceptions of officials affiliated with the FC, 
police and the judiciary regarding forest offences and ways of dealing with them are 
presented. The chapter ends with a discussion of the findings, conclusions and recom-
mendations.  
The system-to-be-governed: Forest reserves in Nkawie Forest District 
The natural and human sub-systems of the system-to-be-governed were analysed in 
Chapter 4. This section is limited to the natural sub-system, i.e. the forest reserves in 
Nkawie forest district and its environs to which the forest offences analysed in this 
chapter refer.  
 
Table 11.1  The forest reserves, total area, perimeter and stool land owners in Nkawie Forest District  
* Others were not specified in the data source. 
Source: Nkawie Forest information leaflet (2010).  
 
The Nkawie Forest District is one of the seven forest districts in the Ashanti region 
under the jurisdiction of the FC/FSD (see Chapter 4). The Forest District headquarters 
are at Nkawie, about a forty-five minute drive from Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti 
Region. The forest district covers six political districts, namely Atwima Nwabiagya, 
Atwima Mponua, Atwima Kwawoma, Bosomtwi, Ahafo-Ano South and Ahafo-Ano 
North. The Nkawie Forest District shares common boundaries with eight other forest 
districts, namely Bechem and Offinso Forest Districts in the north, Juaso Forest District 
Forest Reserve Total area 
(km
2
) 
Total perimeter 
(km) 
Stool land owners (caretakers) 
Asenanyo 227.92 100.26 Nkawie Panin, Nkawie Kuma,  
Nyinahin, Domi-Keniago, Manso 
Nkwanta and Akwamu 
Desiri 150.95 63.46 Hia and Akwaboa 
Jimira 62.85 49.78 Toase and Nkawie under Bantama 
Offin Shelterbelt 60.23 40.26 Toase and Atwima Agogo 
Tano-Offin 402.23 117.90 Kontri, Hia, Nkawie Panin and  
Nyinahin 
Tinte Bepo 115.54 64.62 Afari, Akyempin and others* 
Total 1019.72 436.28  
Box 11.1 Reported and unreported cases in Ghana’s judicial system 
 
This chapter is based on the analysis of twelve forest cases which were heard in court 
but not published in a series of law reports. By contrast, published cases or law reports 
are written accounts of a court proceedings and judicial decisions. In Ghana, reported 
cases can be described as a published volume of judicial decisions and it is related to 
the superior court of judicature (High courts, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court) 
and not the District or Circuit Courts where illegal forest offences are prosecuted. The 
Circuit court and the District courts are lower courts (see Figure 11.3). 
 
Sources: URL: http://www.library.otago.ac.nz/pdf/userguide.pdf, accessed on 18 November 2011 
and Boakye Kwabena Akyeampong, pers.comm. 2012). 
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in the east, Kumawu Forest District in the northeast, Goaso, Bibiani and Sefwi Wioso 
Forest Districts in the west, and Bekwai Forest District in the southwest.  
Six forest reserves are managed by the Nkawie Forest District covering a total area 
of 1,019.72 km
2
. These are Asenayo, Desiri, Jimira, Offin Shelter, Tano-Offin and Tinte 
Bepo forest reserves (see Figure 11.1). All the reserves are vested in the Golden Stool 
(i.e. the Asantehene) under the care of some stools who act as caretakers, as shown in 
Table 11.1. 
The governing system  
This section presents the institutional framework established to ensure law enforcement 
by looking at institutions as a structure and as legislations and rules that govern forest 
resources. First, the actors in the statutory governing structure and their roles in forest 
law enforcement are reviewed. This is followed by a detailed description of sections of 
two forest laws (i.e. Act 547 and L.I. 1649) and the associated sanctions, in order to 
clarify what are considered criminal offences in Ghanaian law. Most of the legislative 
issues regarding forest offences and their sanctions have been discussed in Chapters 5 
and 7.  
Figure 11.1    Forest reserves in Nkawie Forest District  
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The statutory governing structure in forest law enforcement 
In the statutory governing structure three key governing actors play a role in forest law 
enforcement. These are the Forestry Commission (FC), the Ghana Police Service and 
the judiciary (Figure 11.2).  
– The Forestry Commission  
As discussed Chapter 5, the FC’s responsibilities include ensuring effective implemen-
tation of the policies, laws and goals related to sustainable forest and wildlife manage-
ment and the development of the timber industry. The FC is made up of three divisions 
and two centres that are responsible for the implementation of the functions of protec-
tion, management and regulation of forest and wildlife resources. The three divisions 
are the Forest Services Division (FSD), the Wildlife Division (WD) and the Timber 
Industry Development Division (TIDD). The two centres are the Wood Industries Train-
ing Centre (WITC) and a technical and research wing known as the Resource Manage-
ment Support Centre (RMSC). The FC is the administrative body responsible for the 
management and enforcement of forestry legislation. Within the FC headquarters in 
Accra, a Legal Division is responsible for defending the FC on legal matters, for medi-
ating between the FC and its stakeholders and for signing international contracts, 
agreements and memorandums of understanding. Internally, the Legal Division also 
advises the FC on issues relating to arbitration (Joseph Appiah, FC pers. comm. 2011). 
The Forest Services Division (FSD) is a public institution with responsibility for pro-
Key: Governance interactions  
 
 
The judiciary  
Mandated  
Mandated to verify charges on of-
fenders based on evidence, and to 
pronounce sentences 
The Forestry  
Commission  
(Forest Services  
Division) 
Mandated to enforce  
legislation and report  
offenders to the police  
for interrogation  
The Ghana Police  
Service 
Mandated to arrest,  
investigate and  
prosecute cases 
 
Figure 11.2  The institutions within the statutory governing structure involved 
in law enforcement 
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tecting, managing and developing the nation’s forests resources for the benefit of all 
segments of society (FWP 1994). 
– Nkawie Forest District officials and mandates 
The District FSD of Nkawie Forest District, which is headed by a manager and two as-
sistants, is responsible for the management of forest reserves at micro level. The range 
supervisors and forest guards are the frontline officials in direct and frequent contact 
with the local communities and the timber operators. Their core functions include:  
1.  Managing and protecting forest resources within the District in the national interest. 
2.  Maintenance of forest reserve boundaries. 
3.  Regulating the harvesting of on and off-forest reserve resources within the Forest 
District. 
4. Collection and disbursement of stumpage revenues to stool land owners and other 
beneficiaries. 
5. Facilitating the development of forest plantations.  
6.  Promoting awareness, understanding and support for forest resources conservation 
and protection. 
 
As far as forest management is concerned, the District FSD monitors and regulates 
the harvesting of forest resources, especially timber, in reserve and off-reserve areas. 
With regard to protection, the District FSD protects the reserves by maintaining forest 
reserve boundaries, preventing wildfire and taking steps to keep out illegal loggers, 
chainsaw millers, farmers, etc. especially in hill sanctuaries, convalescence areas, glob-
ally significant biodiversity areas (GSBAs) and along river banks. It is the mandate of 
the forest guards to keep reserve boundaries clear and patrol the reserve in order to pre-
vent illegal activities. In some of these activities, the District FSD collaborates with 
forest-fringe communities. 
The range supervisors are in charge of regulating timber exploitation in a designated 
forest area. Using the tree information form (TIF), they conduct stock surveys and 
measure felled trees to estimate tree volume. Additional responsibilities are issuing log 
conveyance certificates to contractors and conducting post-harvesting timber inspec-
tions. 
An important core activity of the District FSD is forest plantation development. This 
activity is carried out in collaboration with District Assemblies when plantations are 
established in the administrative districts, with local communities under the modified 
taungya system (Chapter 9) and with plantation developers under the commercial plan-
tations scheme (NFSD 2010).  
The last activity is forestry education, which encompasses public awareness creation. 
This is done in collaboration with other entities such as radio stations, district assem-
blies, the Ghana National Fire Service and some NGOs. Topics addressed in educational 
and sensitisation programmes include, but are not restricted to, wildfire prevention, af-
forestation and reforestation. The District FSD also provides technical advice to indi-
viduals or institutions who wish to engage in forestry activities such as tree nursery and 
plantation establishment.  
The District FSD is currently involved in two projects, namely the Voluntary Part-
nership Agreement (VPA) with the EU to combat illegal logging (see Chapters 5, 7 and 
9) and the Wildfire Management project. The Nkawie Forest District is one of the dis-
tricts where the VPA is piloted, with a project being carried out in the Asenanyo forest 
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reserve that aims to ensure that timber trees taken from Asenanyo are legal. The ration-
ale behind this project is to get ready for the EU market and to generate maximum reve-
nue for the stakeholders involved. The Asenayo reserve has a productive area of 
15,991.97 ha comprising 139 compartments. Since only one timber company has har-
vesting rights in this reserve, monitoring the extraction of logs from the reserve is rela-
tively easy (NFSD 2010). The second project is the Wildfire Management project which 
is being undertaken in the Jimira forest reserve. The purpose of the project is to reduce 
and prevent wildfire incidences with the involvement of local communities. The project 
is supported by the wildfire component of the Natural Resources Environment and Gov-
ernance Programme (NREG) that was discussed in Chapter 5. Under the project, the 
forest-fringe communities are contracted to clear the green fire belt established around 
the reserve in return for a wage payment (NFSD 2010). 
Legislation is enforced through collaboration with the military and the police, with 
whom a timber monitoring taskforce has been formed. The taskforce arrests illegal tim-
ber operators and people engaged in other illicit activities such as illegal farming and 
mining. 
– The Ghana Police Service3  
British Colonial Authorities introduced professional policing in the former Gold Coast 
(now the Republic of Ghana) in 1821. Before that, maintaining law and order was the 
responsibility of traditional authorities that employed unpaid messengers to perform the 
executive and judicial tasks in their communities. In 1894, a civil police force was 
formed when the police ordinance was passed to formalise the institution of a Police 
Service. The functions of the Ghana Police Service, which are based on the Police Ser-
vice Act, 1970 [Act 350] of Ghana are:  
1. Crime detection and prevention;  
2. Apprehension (arrest) and prosecution of offenders; 
3. Maintenance of law and order; and  
4. Due enforcement of the law.  
– The judiciary4  
As stated on its website (www.judicial.gov.gh), ‘The judiciary is the third arm5 of gov-
ernment empowered by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Ghana, 
autonomous and vested with the Judicial Power of the nation’. According to the 1992 
Constitution of Ghana, the Judicial Service is a public service institution responsible for 
the day-to-day administration of the country’s Courts and Tribunals. It is responsible for 
interpreting the Constitution and laws, administering justice and providing other related 
services. Figure 11.3 illustrates the hierarchy of structures, with the Supreme Court be-
ing the highest in rank and the so-called Inferior Courts (e.g. the juvenile court) at the 
lowest end of the hierarchy. 
                                                 
3
    Information derived from the website of the Ghana Police Service at 
http://www.ghanapolice.info/history.htm (accessed on 12 August 2011). 
4
  Information based on the website of the Ghana Judicial Service at http://www.judicial.gov.gh (ac-
cessed on 5 November 2011). 
5
  The other two arms of government are the executive and the legislative.  
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Box 11.2 The Timber Resources Management Act, 1997(Act 547), 
 Section 17 stipulates that: 
 
‘(1) Any person charged with the management or protection of a forest resource by 
virtue of his employment in any institution of government who (a) By any act or 
omission in the performance of his duties facilitates the breach of any provision 
of this Act; or (b) condones or connives with any other person in breach of a 
provision of this Act, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to 
a term of imprisonment of not less than 6 months and not exceeding two years 
without the option of a fine.  
(2)  Any person who (a) harvests timber to which this Act applies without a valid 
Timber Utilization Contract; or (b) operates a vehicle to carry, haul, evacuate or 
transport timber harvested in contravention of this Act*, or (c) offers for sale, 
sells or buys timber harvested in contravention of this Act; or (d) stocks timber 
harvested in contravention of this Act; or (e) carries, hauls or evacuates by non-
mechanical means any timber harvested in contravention of this Act, or (f) is the 
owner of a vehicle or not being the owner causes to be operated a vehicle to 
carry, haul, evacuate or transport timber harvested in contravention of this 
Act**, commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment 
for a term of not less than 6 months and not exceeding 2 years. 
(3) Where a person is convicted under subsection (2) the court shall order the con-
fiscation to the State of any tool, equipment and machinery involved in the 
commission of the offence; and the court shall order to be confiscated and sold 
any timber harvested in the commission of the offence.  
(4)  Notwithstanding the right of the court to sentence a person convicted under 
subsection (2) of this section to imprisonment, the court may in lieu of sentence 
of imprisonment impose in respect of the offences specified in- (a) subsection 
(2) (a) or (b), a penalty in the sum of 1000% of the market value of the timber 
involved in the commission of the offence; or (b) subsection (2) (c) or (d), a 
penalty in the sum of 500% of the market value of the timber involved in the 
commission of the offence; or (c) subsection (2) (e), a penalty in the sum of 
100% of the market value of the timber involved in the commission of the of-
fence.’ 
 
* As amended by the Timber Resources Management (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 
671), s. 4(a). 
** As inserted by the Timber Resources Management (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 
617), s. 4(b). 
 
Source: Ghana Forestry Commission (undated) http://76.12.220.51/library.php?id=15 (ac-
cessed 6 on October 2011) 
 
Decrease in hierarchy in terms of judicial institutional structures  
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Figure 11.3    The hierarchical structure of the judicial system in Ghana 
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According to its mission statement,
6
 the judiciary aims to fulfil its mandate by:  
 upholding the independence of the judiciary;  
 showing commitment to the true and proper interpretation of the Constitution and 
laws of Ghana;  
 ensuring that speedy and unfettered administration of justice is brought to people’s 
doorsteps;  
 providing other services for all manner of persons, groups and institutions without 
fear or favour; and  
 maintaining a high standard of efficiency in the delivery of justice.  
                                                 
6
  http://www.judicial.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6 (accessed on 
5 November 2011). 
Box 11.3 Timber Resources Management Regulation, 1998, (L.I. 1649) 
 Regulation (41) deals with the offences and declares that: 
 
‘(1) Any person who (a) obstructs an authorized person of the Forest Products In-
spection Bureau or the Forestry Department in the exercise of his duties contrary to 
sub-regulation (2) of regulation 15; or (b) is found in possession of any timber prod-
uct that is not properly marked or numbered contrary to sub-regulation (3) of regula-
tion 20; or (c) is found moving or in possession of any timber without a conveyance 
certificate in respect of the product contrary to sub-regulation (1) of regulation 24; or 
(d) being the owner of a chainsaw fails to register the chainsaw with the relevant 
District Assembly contrary to regulation 28(1); or (e) uses a chainsaw not registered 
with the District Forest Officer to fell any tree or saw any timber contrary to regula-
tion 29(1); or (f) fails to mark the stump of a tree he fells with the timber registration 
number contrary to regulation 33; or (g) sells or offers for sale lumber cut with a 
chainsaw contrary to regulation 32(2); or (h) being a landowner permits an unregis-
tered chainsaw to be used on his land for felling trees or sawing timber contrary to 
regulation 34; or (i) fells or is found in possession of a restricted species of timber 
contrary to sub-regulation (1) of regulation 40, commits an offence and is liable on 
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ¢5 million* (equivalent to GH¢ 500 or 
US$ 333) or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both, and 
where the offence continues to a fine not exceeding ¢100,000.00 (GH¢ 10 or US$ 
7) for every day or part of a day during which the offence continues.  
(2) Where a person fells any tree or saws any timber with an unregistered chainsaw 
the court shall, in addition to the punishment imposed under sub-regulation (1) of 
this regulation order that the chainsaw or the tree or timber products in respect of 
which the offence was committed be forfeited and disposed of as the court may 
direct. (3) Any officer who- (a) declares a false measurement of timber contrary to 
sub-regulation (1) of regulation 23; or (b) falsely calculates stumpage fees; or (c) 
assists a contractor to under declare tree volumes used in the calculation of stump-
age fees; commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not ex-
ceeding ¢5 million or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months and shall be 
liable to be dismissed from the public services.’ 
 
* The new Ghana cedi and US dollar equivalents of the old Ghana cedi were added by the 
author. 
 
Source: Ghana Forestry Commission (undated) http://76.12.220.51/library.php?id=15 (ac-
cessed 6 October 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
Laws governing forest offences and their sanctions    
Three sets of legislation which are relevant to forest offences are: (i) the Timber Re-
sources Management Act, 1997 (Act 547) and its amended Act 617; (ii) the Timber Re-
sources Management Regulation, 1998, (L.I. 1649), and (iii) the Forest Protection De-
cree 1974 NRCD 243 as amended by the Protection Amendment Act 2002, Act 624. All 
these laws fall under the 1960 Ghana Criminal Offence Act. This section presents only 
two pieces of forest legislation and criminal offences as stipulated in Ghana Constitu-
tion of 1992 (see Boxes 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4). The Forest Act NRCD 243 (amended as 
Act 624) was presented in Chapter 7. 
Governance interactions 
This section presents the outcomes of the interactions between the system-to-be-
governed and the governing system which result in forest offences committed when 
people access the resources illegally. First, these outcomes are analysed on the basis of 
the FSD forest offence records in the period 2005-2010. Second, twelve unreported 
Box 11.4 Criminal Offences (sections) as stipulated in Article 19 of the 
 1992 Constitution of Ghana  
 
Article 19. 
 
(1) A person charged with a criminal offence shall be given a hearing within a rea-
sonable time by a court. 
 
(2) A person charged with a criminal offence shall – 
(c) be presumed to be innocent until he is proven, or has pleaded, guilty; 
(d) be informed immediately in a language he understands, and in detail, of the 
nature of the offence charged; 
(e) be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
(f)  be permitted to defend himself before the court in person or by a lawyer of 
his choice; and  
(i)  be permitted to have, without payment by him, the assistance of an inter-
preter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial. 
 
(10) No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be compelled to give evi-
dence at the trial. 
 
(11)  No person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is de-
fined and the penalty for it is prescribed in a written law. 
 
(12) Clause (11) of this article shall not prevent a superior court from punishing a 
person for contempt of itself notwithstanding that the act or omission constitut-
ing the contempt is not defined in a written law and the penalty is not pre-
scribed. 
 
(21) For the purposes of this article; ‘criminal offence’ means a criminal offence 
under the laws of Ghana. 
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judgements
7
 in the law courts under the jurisdiction of the Nkawie Forest District and 
the Ashanti Region are presented, with a view to assessing how the legislation is applied 
in such judgements. 
Forest offence types and trends: An analysis of FSD offence records from 2005-2010 
A review of the forest offences records in Nkawie Forest District indicated a total of 
121 offence cases in the six forest reserves and the off-reserve areas from 2005-2010. 
Of these cases, twenty (17%) occurred in the off-reserve area, whereas 101 (83%) oc-
curred in the six forest reserves. Figure 11.4 shows the different types of forest offence 
cases recorded. The most frequently recorded offence type was chainsaw milling (44%) 
followed by illegal logging (41%)
8
 and illegal farming (7%). The other cases (8%) were 
charcoal burning, canoe carving, illegal mining, human induced wildfire and intentional 
destruction of established timber plantations. 
Table 11.2 shows the various offences in the specific years. In 2005 Nkawie Forest Dis-
trict recorded 24 chainsaw milling cases. In subsequent years fewer offences were 
 
                                                 
7
  The twelve unreported judgements in the law courts that were accessible to the law students during 
data collection occurred in the period of 2001-2004 with only one which occurred in 2011. They 
therefore do not form part of the 121 offence cases accessed in the Nkawie FSD District office that 
occurred between 2005 and 2010. 
8
  Illegal logging refers to the removal of trees from the forest without a Timber Utilization Contract or 
Timber Utilization Permit; chainsaw milling refers to the on-site conversion of logs into sawnwood 
for commercial purposes using chainsaws (Marfo 2010). 
Figure 11.4    Distribution of forest offence types in Nkawie Forest District (2005-2010) 
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recorded, a trend that is also evident for the other offence types. In 2005, four cases of 
illegal farming were recorded, with no such incidences in 2006 and incidental inci-
dences in subsequent years. The trend in recorded offences is presented in Figure 11.5. 
More specific details are provided below about the major forest offences and the means 
of dealing with them.  
 
Table 11.2      Occurrence of forest of offence types in the district from 2005-2010 
Offence type  Number of offence cases from 2005-2010 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Sawn lumber (chainsaw  
    milling) 
24 9 9 8 1 2 
Illegal logging  12 9 6 9 7 7 
Illegal farming  4 0 1 1 1 2 
Others*  2 0 1 2 1 3 
*  Including charcoal burning, canoe carving, illegal mining (galamsey), human-induced wildfire and deliberate 
destruction of plantations. 
– Chainsaw milling (n=53)  
Of the 53 recorded chainsaw milling offences, 79% occurred in the six forest reserves, 
with the Tano-Offin forest reserve recording the highest number of cases (n=17), and 
21% were reported from the off-reserve area (Figure 11.6). Generally, those who were 
arrested were fined by the FSD, while the lumber, chainsaws and vehicles carrying the 
illegal lumber were confiscated. Confiscated lumber is generally auctioned. In some 
cases, offenders absconded while others were arrested by the police or the FSD military 
team.  
The majority of cases (n=35) were dealt with through police investigation and ad-
ministrative means available to the FSD. In sixteen of the recorded cases, the culprits 
absconded, although the FSD managed to confiscate the lumber and some of the chain-
saws. Only two cases were sent to the district court for judgement, where the offenders 
were sentenced to a fine of GH¢ 250 and GH¢ 400 respectively in 2005. The records 
showed that cases related to chainsaw milling are charged under Act 547 sec 17 (2) (a) 
and (b) and its amended Act 624 Sec 1(a) (h) (Box 11.2). 
Figure 11.5  Trend in the number of recorded forest offences in Nkawie 
Forest District 
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Table 11.3   Types of tree species sawn into lumber (2005-2010) (n=40 cases)* 
Scientific name  Trade/local name  No. of trees/logs 
felled 
Star rating**  
Triplochiton scleroxylon Wawa  40 Scarlet  
Piptadeniastrum africanum Dahoma 17 Red 
Khaya spp. African  
mahogany  
9 Scarlet  
Mansonia altissima Oprono 8 Red 
Aningeria spp. Asenfena 6 Scarlet  
Milicia excels Odum 5 Scarlet  
Nesogordonia papaverifera Danta 5 Pink  
Chrysophyllum albidum Akasaa 3 Red  
Terminalia superba Ofram 3 Red 
Entandrophragma angolense Edinam 2 Scarlet  
Turraeanthus africanus Avodire 1  
Ceiba pentandra Onyina 1 Red  
Terminalia ivorensis Emire 1 Scarlet  
Antiaris toxicaria Kyenkyen 1 Red  
Cola gigantea  Waterpuo 1 Pink  
Entandrophragma cylindricum Sapele 1 Scarlet  
* In 13 cases, the tree species types were not indicated in the records.  
** See Chapters 5 and 7 for an explanation of Ghana’s star rating system, which indicates conservation priorities for 
timber species as follows: green = no threat of extinction; pink = significantly exploited but no threats yet to their 
economic future; red = current rates of exploitation present a significant danger of economic extinction; scarlet = 
under imminent threat of economic extinction. 
Source FSD reports Nkawie Forest District (2005-2010).  
 
The three most common trees felled by these offenders were Triplochiton scleroxy-
lon (Wawa), Piptadeniastrum africanum (Dahoma) and Khaya spp. (African mahog-
any), which fall under the scarlet and red star rating respectively (Table 11.3). A total of 
102 tree species were reported to be sawn during these periods. In thirteen cases, both 
on and off-reserve, records did not indicate the tree species types felled by the culprits.
Figure 11.6    Distribution of chainsaw milling offences in the on and off-reserve 
areas in Nkawie Forest District (2005-2010) 
 Nkawie Forest District (2005-2010) 
Source: FSD reports Nkawie Forest District (2005-2010).  
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Table 11.4:  Tree species exploited under illegal logging (2005-2010) 
Scientific name  Trade name/ 
local name 
No. of trees/logs 
felled 
Star rating  
Triplochiton scleroxylon Wawa  168 Scarlet  
Milicia excels Odum 37 Scarlet  
Ceiba pentandra Onyina 28 Red  
Piptadeniastrum africanum Dahoma 22 Red 
Antiaris toxicaria Kyenkyen 21 Red  
Pterygopta macrocarpa Koto  19 Scarlet  
Nesogordonia papaverifera Danta 15 Pink  
Terminalia superba Ofram 13 Red  
Khaya spp. African mahogany  13 Scarlet  
Entandrophragma utile  Utile  11 Scarlet  
Tieghemella heckelii Bako 10 Scarlet  
Celtis mildbreadi Esa 9 Pink  
Aningeria spp. Asenfena 8 Scarlet  
Entandrophragma cylindricum Sapele/ Penkwa 9 Scarlet  
Mansonia altissima Oprono 5 Red 
Chrysophyllum albidum Akasaa 5 Red  
Albizia ferruginea Awiemfosamna 4 Scarlet  
Daniella ogea Hyedua 4 Scarlet  
Petersianthus macrocarpus Esia 3 Pink  
Cylicodiscus gabunensis Denya 2 Pink  
Lovoa trichiliodes Dubinibiri 2 Red  
Afzelia Africana Papao 2 Red  
Klainedoxa gabonensis Kroma 1 Green 
Distemonanthus bentamianus Bonsamdua 1 Pink  
Albizia zygia Okoro 1 Green 
Figure 11.7    Recorded occurrence of illegal timber logging in 
 Nkawie Forest District (2005-2010) 
 
Source: FSD reports Nkawie (2005-2010).  
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– Illegal logging (n=50) 
From 2005-2010, fifty cases of illegal logging were reported. The majority of the cases 
(82%) were recorded in the on-reserve areas (Figure 11.7), with Tinte Bepo reserve re-
cording most cases and Desiri forest reserve having no reported cases in this offence 
type. 
Similarly to illegal chainsaw milling, Act 547 sec 17 (2) (a) and (b) is the main law 
which applies to the arresting, prosecuting and fining of perpetrators of this illicit activ-
ity (Box 11.2). In three of the cases, the offenders were arrested and prosecuted in the 
law courts. The records indicate that the two culprits attracted fines of between GH¢ 
200 and GH¢ 300 (US$ 133 and US$ 200). The number of logs confiscated was three 
logs of kyenkyen (Antiaris toxicaria) in the Tano-Offin reserve and five logs (i.e. bako 
(Tieghemella heckelii), papao (Afzelia Africana) and African mahogany (Khaya spp.)) 
in the Offin Shelterbelt in 2005. The third case occurred in the Tano-Offin reserve 
which involved the exploitation of four logs of wawa (Triplochiton scleroxylon) (Table 
11.4). The case was sent to court. The offence record mentions a second hearing in 
2005, but no outcome of that hearing was stated in the report.  
According to the records, thirty-one cases were under police investigation, of which 
15 referred to culprits who had absconded. The FSD used administrative means to deal 
with the other 16 cases. In other words the offenders were arrested, fined and some logs 
auctioned. Some of the cases involved legal timber operators who were fined by the 
FSD mainly because their vehicles carried illicit logs. In these cases the FSD often de-
flated the tyres of the vehicles in order to prevent movement.  
As in the case of chainsaw milling, wawa was the most felled tree species. In this of-
fence type wawa was followed by odum (Milicia excels) and onyina (Ceiba pentandra) 
(see Table 11.4). Over these years, the total number of trees recorded in the district in 
relation to illegal logging was 413, comprising twenty-seven timber species. The star 
ratings of these species were scarlet (eleven species), red (eight species), pink (five spe-
cies) and green (two species) (Table 11.4). 
 
– Illegal farming (n=9) 
Nine cases of illegal farming were recorded in four of the reserves namely Tano-Offin, 
Desiri, Asenanyo and Tinte Bepo. The total recorded area cleared for farming was 166 
ha over the period of 2005-2010. There was one case in the Tano-Offin forest reserve in 
which the area of the cleared forest was not stated but covered large tracts in six com-
partments. From these nine cases, one offender was sent to the Nyinahin community 
tribunal
9
 and was fined GH¢ 300 (US$ 200). Four culprits were arrested and handed 
over to the police with confiscated chainsaws. In some cases, the culprits were arrested 
and handed over to the regional FSD office for investigation, while their farms were 
destroyed. The legislation for the prosecution of offenders were the NRCD 243 
(amended Act 642) sec 1 (1b) (see Chapter 7) and Act 547 sect 17. Sub. Sec. 2 (a) (Box 
11.2). There were also four cases in which the offenders could not be apprehended but 
                                                 
9
  The court structure under the Provisional National Defence Council government 1981-1992 consti-
tuted the tribunal system, which operated parallel to the judicial court system. The core objective was 
trial of criminal offences except the community tribunal which deals with both civil and criminal 
cases. In terms of hierarchy, there used to be (i) the National public tribunal, (ii) the regional public 
tribunals, (iii) the district public tribunals, and (iv) the community tribunal. Currently, structures (i), 
(iii) and (iv) have been repealed and the new structure is as presented in Figure 11.3 (Brobbey 2000). 
250 
 
the farms were destroyed. In such instances, surveillance was put in place to arrest any 
culprit. In some reserves where national plantations are being established, the cleared 
areas are being replanted to replace lost stocks.  
The outcomes of the nine offences are presented in Table 11. 5.  
 
Table 11.5  Illegal farming offence outcomes from 2005-2010 
Offence outcome  Number of cases*  
Culprit sent to court with fine 1 
Cases under police investigation  2 
Cases resolved by administrative means (destruction of farms, converting it 
into a national forest plantation) 
6 
* The reporting system does not indicate names of the culprits.  
– Other offence types (n=9) 
The other offence types are made up of four categories that occurred sporadically. These 
were offences related to canoe carving (n=2), charcoal burning (n=2), human-induced 
wildfire incidence (n=2), deliberate destruction of plantations (n=1) and illegal mining 
(n=2). With regard to canoe carving cases occurred in both the Tano-Offin GSBA and 
Asenayo forest reserve in 2010 with the carving of 10 canoes whose owners absconded. 
The Tano-Offin GSBA offence case was charged under the NDPC 243 sec (1) (a) 
(amended Act 642) (see Chapter 7), whereas that of Asenayo was under Act 547 Sec. 17 
sub-sec 2(a) (see Box 11.2). Since the culprits absconded, the matter was reported and 
preparations made for the auctioning of the canoes.  
Two cases of charcoal production in the reserve were reported in the offence records 
of 2005 in the Asenayo and Desiri forest reserves. The culprit in one of the cases was 
handed over to the police for prosecution. The outcome of the investigation since 2005 
is not reflected in the offence records. 
The last offence type in the rest category is human-induced wildfire. The legislation 
applicable to this offence is the PNDC law 229 (see Chapter 5, Table 5.1). The two 
cases reported were all human-induced, but the culprits were never arrested. The wild-
fires were brought under control with the help of people from the forest-fringe commu-
nities. Another offence type was related to the intentional destruction of national forest 
plantations based on a personal grudge by a farmer. This led to the arrest of the offender 
and prosecution under Act 624 Sec 1 Sub-sec. (1) (a) in the district court (Table 5.1). As 
in most cases, the outcome of the court case was not indicated in the reporting system. 
The last offence type in this category was illegal mining which took place in the Offin-
Shelterbelt and destroyed about 4 ha of forestland. In one of the cases, the offenders had 
to appear in court and were fined GH¢ 300 whereas in the other case, which resulted in 
the clearing of about 0.8 ha of forest land, the offenders were sent to court. There was, 
however, no mention of the court outcomes. 
Judicial records of some forest resource offences 
In the law courts, 12 unreported judgement cases (see Box 11.1) were assessed from the 
community tribunal and district courts in Nkawie, Nyinahin, Mankranso and Kumasi 
circuit court from 2002, 2003 and 2011. The laws applicable to these cases were the 
Forest Protection (Amendment) Law, 1986 (PNDCL 142) (repealed by Forest Protec-
tion (Amendment) Act 2002 (Act 624) (Table 5.1), and the Timber Resources Manage-
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ment Act, 1997 (Act 547) (Box 11.2). All the cases were between the state represented 
by ‘The Republic’ versus ‘The Accused’ as presented below.10 
– Case 1: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 111 
In this case, the offence was farming in a protected forest reserve. The accused was 
therefore convicted based on Section 13 of PNDCL 142 (now repealed by Act 624). He 
was asked to sign a bond not to enter into the forest reserve without a permit from a 
forestry official for two years or in default pay GH¢ 20
12
 or serve 18 months imprison-
ment in hard labour. 
– Case 2: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 213 
The offence was conveying timber logs felled without a felling permit. The accused was 
the driver whose vehicle was carrying the illegal logs. The key culprits of the stolen logs 
absconded, leaving behind the driver. The driver pleaded guilty but was sentenced to a 
fine of GH¢ 150 or nine months in prison with hard labour. The court ordered the police 
to intensify their search for the real culprit. The vehicle used by the driver was ordered 
to be released upon payment of the money or after the prison sentence had been served. 
– Case 3: The Republic vs. V ‘The Accused’ 3a and b (absconded)14 
The offence was conveying timber logs felled without a felling permit. The accused was 
the driver whose vehicle was carrying the illegal logs. The key culprit of the stolen logs 
absconded, leaving behind the driver. The accused driver pleaded guilty but was sen-
tenced to a fine of GH¢ 200 (US$ 133) or six months imprisonment with hard labour. 
The logs were to be sold by the FSD and the money paid to government consolidated 
fund. The vehicle used by the driver was ordered to be released upon payment of the 
money or after the prison sentence had been served. 
– Case 4: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 415 
In this case the offence committed by the accused was conveying timber logs without a 
permit. She pleaded guilty but provided an explanation. Nevertheless, the court did not 
accept her explanation and she was sentenced to a fine of GH¢ 400 (US$ 267) or nine 
months imprisonment with hard labour. From this amount, GH¢ 200 (US$ 133) was to 
be paid to the timber monitoring task force and GH¢ 150 (US$ 100) to the Forestry De-
velopment Fund. In addition, the eight logs were to be sold by FSD and the money paid 
to government consolidated fund and the vehicle released to the owner. 
                                                 
10
  In order to protect the privacy of the accused names have been replaced with numbers. 
11
  In the District Community Tribunal held at Mankranso on Wednesday 14 March 2001, before his 
Worship J.B.A. Benehene (SGD). 
12
  All conversion of old to new Ghana cedi and the US dollar equivalents was done by the author, based 
on an exchange rate of US$ 1= GH¢ 1.5. 
13
  In the District Community Tribunal held at Nkawie on Wednesday, 16 January 2002, before his Wor-
ship Kwaku Dampare (ESQ). 
14
  In the District Community Tribunal held at Nkawie on Monday, 21 January 2002, before his Worship 
Kwaku Dampare (ESQ). 
15
  In the District Community Tribunal held at Nkawie on Friday, 16 August 2002, before his Worship 
Kwaku Dampare (ESQ). 
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– Case 5: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 5a, b and c16 
The offence was conveying of chainsaw lumber. The two accused people pleaded 
guilty. The first accused was sentenced to a fine of GH¢100 or, in default, twelve 
months imprisonment with hard labour. In addition, the first accused was ordered to pay 
compensation of GH¢ 200 (US$ 133) to the Forestry Development Fund. The chainsaw 
lumbers which comprised beams (112 pieces of red wood) were to be sold by the FSD 
and the revenue to be paid to government consolidated fund. Upon payment or comple-
tion of the prison terms the vehicle was to be released to the owner. The second accused 
was given a bail in the sum of GH¢ 500 (US$ 333).  
– Case 6: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 6a and b17 
The offence was illegally engaging in chainsaw milling. In this case both accused per-
sons pleaded guilty and were convicted and sentenced to a fine of GH¢ 200 (US$ 133) 
each or, in default, twelve months imprisonment with hard labour.  
Of this money, GH¢ 100 (US$ 67) was given to the timber monitoring ask force. The 
lumber was confiscated by the State. 
– Case 7: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 7a (absconded) and b18 
The offence was conveying chainsaw lumber. In this case the first accused escaped. The 
second accused pleaded guilty to the offence but provided an explanation that he was 
illiterate and could not read the paper presented to him by the first accused. Despite this 
the court convicted and sentenced him to a fine of GH¢ 50 (US$ 33) or, in default, nine 
months imprisonment with hard labour. In addition, he had to pay compensation of GH¢ 
250 (US$ 167) to the Forestry Development Fund. Upon payment of the fine and the 
compensation, or completion of the prison term, the tractor used to carry the lumber was 
to be released to him. The police were ordered to search for the first accused. 
– Case 8: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 819 
In this case, the accused pleaded guilty and was convicted accordingly. The court real-
ised that the accused had been convicted on a similar offence not long before. The court 
therefore sentenced him to a fine of GH¢ 400 (US$ 267) or, in default, eighteen months 
imprisonment with hard labour. Two hundred Ghana cedis of the money was to be paid 
to the arresting team as compensation and his truck released to him. 
– Case 9: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 920 
The offence was carving canoes without a permit. In sentencing the convicted accused 
the magistrate placed reliance on s. 17(2) of Act 547 but decided to use alternative pro-
vision of the recommended sentence in s.17(4)(c) rather than the imprisonment pre-
scribed by s.17(2). The reasons are twofold. First, records indicated that the accused 
                                                 
16
  In the District Community Tribunal held at Nkawie on Wednesday, 24 of September, 2003, before his 
Worship Kwaku Dampare (ESQ). 
17
  In the Circuit Court of Ghana held in Kumasi on Monday, 24 November, 2003, before his Worship 
E.Y. Obimpe (ESQ) 
18
  In the District community tribunal held in Nkawie on Friday, 19 December, 2003, before his Worship 
Kwaku Dampare (ESQ). 
19
  In the Circuit Court of Ghana held in Kumasi on Friday, 25 April, 2003, before his Worship E.Y. 
Obimpe (ESQ). 
20
  In the District Magistrate Court held at Nyinahin on Tuesday, 10 August 2004, before his Worship 
Beresford Acquah (ESQ). 
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was a first offender. Second, the prosecutor failed to attach any value to the timber in-
volved. The magistrate had to base his decision on s.17 (4)(c) and used his discretion to 
assess a value of GH¢ 30 and charged the accused based on the 1000% penalty as stipu-
lated in the law for such value. The accused was therefore fined 150 penalty units (GH¢ 
300) or, in default, six months imprisonment with hard labour. The canoe that was made 
out of the timber was to be confiscated and sold to the National Canoe Carvers Associa-
tion or any interested party.  
– Case 10: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 1021 
The offence was conveying timber logs without a conveyance certificate. The accused 
pleaded guilty and provided an explanation that the court did not accept. The accused 
was sentenced to a fine of GH¢ 100 (US$ 67) or, in default, nine months imprisonment 
with hard labour. He was also made to pay compensation of GH¢ 200 (US$ 133) to the 
Timber Monitoring Development Fund and the timber monitoring task force. Upon this 
payment or completion of the prison term his vehicle was to be released to him. The 
confiscated logs were to be auctioned off by the FSD.  
– Case 11: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 11a, b, c and d22  
All the four accused pleaded guilty to charges of engaging in illegal chainsaw milling. 
They were therefore convicted on their plea and sentenced to a fine of GH¢ 200 (US$ 
133) each or, in default, twelve months imprisonment with hard labour each. Two hun-
dred Ghana cedis of the amount to be paid was to be given to the timber monitoring task 
force. The lumber was confiscated by the state. 
– Case 12: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused’ 12 a and b (absconded)23 
The offence was conveying illegal logs. The first accused pleaded guilty and was con-
victed accordingly. He was sentenced to a fine of GH¢ 500 or, in default, twelve months 
imprisonment with hard labour. The logs were to be handed over to the Forestry Com-
mission. Upon payment of the amount or after the prison term had been served the vehi-
cle was to be released to the accused. A bench warrant was issued for the arrest of ac-
cused number two. 
Based on the individual cases, the five law students using focus group discussions 
subjected the judgements of the individual cases to ‘a student’s expert view’ and scored 
the judgement pronounced by the court based on five criteria:  
1 = Sanctions applied without due consideration;  
2 = Sanctions lightly applied; 
3 = Sanctions fairly applied; 
4 = Sanctions satisfactorily applied and 
5 = Sanctions strictly applied 
 
They then presented the outcomes of these scoring in Table 11.6 for a common conver-
gence indicative of level of enforcement. 
 
                                                 
21
  In the District Community Tribunal held at Nkawie on Monday 10 March 2003, before his Worship 
Kwaku Dampare (ESQ). 
22
  In the Circuit Court of Ghana held in Kumasi on Monday, 15 December 2003, before his Worship 
E.Y. Obimpe (ESQ). 
23
  In the Circuit Court held at Nkawie on Tuesday 5 April 2011, before his Worship Jerome Noble 
Nkrumah (ESQ). 
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Table 11.6 Evaluation of judiciary enforcement of forest and tree-related offences on some selected  
 unreported judgement in the courts under the jurisdiction of the Nkawie Forest District  
Name of case Individual case scoring indicative of 
judiciary enforcement 
1 2 3 4 5 
Case 1: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 1’       
Case 2: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 2’       
Case 3: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 3’       
Case 4: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 4’       
Case 5: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 5a and b’       
Case 6: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 6’       
Case 7: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 7a and b’       
Case 8: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 8’       
Case 9: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 9’       
Case 10: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 10’     .  
Case 11: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 11 a, b, c, d’  
Case 12: The Republic vs. ‘The Accused No. 12 a b’ 
   
            
              
 
 
  
  
 
The ranking or weight (i.e. without due consideration, lightly, fairly, satisfactorily 
and strictly applied) on the sanctions was based on the groups’ collective assignment of 
a common and desirable weight after each group member had assigned his/her individ-
ual weight and justified why it should be the final or indicative value. Hence this was 
subject to deliberations and common agreement in relation to how the judgement of the 
court ranked vis-à-vis the prescribed sanctions of the forest enactments. According to 
one of the students, cases scored as ‘lightly’ were applied with less recognition for the 
prescribed legal sanctions than those scored as ‘fairly’, ‘satisfactorily’ or ‘strictly’ 
(Boakye Kwabena Akyeampong, pers.comm. 2012).  
From images to actions: Perceptions of the judiciary, police and FSD  
officials in forest law enforcement  
This section presents the views of the judiciary, the police and the FSD officials on the 
outcomes of forest offence cases in the law courts. The section presents the governors’ 
perceptions on forest law enforcement and ways to strengthen it in terms of images 
(‘guiding lights’ in the form of visions, judgements, presuppositions, etc.), instruments 
(that link images to actions and may be soft or hard) and actions (which put the instru-
ments into effect) (see Chapter 2 and Kooiman et al. 2005).  
Images  
Among the nineteen respondents from the three institutions, 84% (n=16) were of the 
view that state agencies generally lack the institutional capacity and willingness to 
prosecute forest offences. They attributed this situation to the law court’s qualification 
of forest offences as being trivial, the judiciary’s poor knowledge of forestry laws and 
the lack of capacity on the part of the Forest Services Division (FSD) and the police 
Service to put in place a coherent set of legal procedures for prosecuting forest cases. 
These respondents also highlight the lack of human capacity in the courts to prosecute 
on behalf of forestry, a lack of facilities to investigate and prosecute (i.e. inadequate 
logistics to visit the forest for evidence) and the fact that the FSD is not very well 
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equipped to detect and arrest offenders. Whereas the majority of respondents stressed 
the limitations, three respondents (16%), who were all police personnel, made firm 
statements about law enforcement. These respondents argued that it is the state agen-
cies’ mandate to detect, investigate and prosecute forest offences because (i) the state 
has the resources as well as the judicial personnel to do so, (ii) the laws are there for any 
institution to enforce them, and (iii) illegal actions are criminal and should be prose-
cuted in court, supported by the police through arrest, investigation and prosecution. 
Being part of the Police Service, they indicated that they did not perceive a lack of insti-
tutional capacity on their part because their only responsibility is to enforce the applica-
tion of the laws when they bring offenders to court. They also stated that there are many 
laws to back the prosecution processes.  
A second aspect expressed in the interviews was that the extent to which the three in-
stitutions cooperate plays a vital role in the effective application of the prescribed sanc-
tions. Of the interviewees, 58% reported that no cooperation takes place between the 
court and the FC to ensure appropriate levels of penalties. On the other hand police offi-
cials (representing 26% of the respondents) said that cooperation did take place between 
the FC and the court. Two respondents (16%) perceived cooperation as being dependent 
on the relationship between particular official and therefore stated that this would de-
pend on the circumstances and the people involved.  
With regard to effective cooperation between the law courts and Police Service as 
regards handing out appropriate levels of penalties on forest cases, 50% of the respon-
dents indicated that there is little or no effective collaboration between the two parties 
since none of them are aware of the damage these offences cause to the environment. 
However, 40% of the respondents believed there is effective teamwork between the 
above state agencies, whereas 10% had no opinion regarding the collaboration between 
the courts and the Police Services. 
Third, the respondents were asked whether the judges and prosecutors take sufficient 
consideration of the negative impacts of forest loss during prosecution and judgement. 
Sixty-five per cent of the respondents were of the opinion that judges and prosecutors 
do not take into consideration the significance of the negative impact of forest loss on 
the environment before imposing penalties. Thirty per cent indicated that all issues are 
taken into consideration before judgement is passed, as stipulated in the Forest Acts and 
Decrees. The other 5% had no opinion on how judges carry out their duties.  
Instruments  
Sixty per cent of the respondents consider the penalties meted out to forest offenders as 
not being severe enough to deter the culprits from engaging in illegal activities in the 
forest. They attribute the failure of court officials to apply severe penalties for forest 
offences to political (43%), social (27%), economic (21%) and environmental (9%) mo-
tives. According to FSD officials, their fines appear to be relatively higher and more 
deterrent than those imposed by the courts. In contrast to this assertion, 60% of the re-
spondents are of the opinion that the practice of releasing objects to offenders (e.g. 
trucks that were used for the transportation of illegal logs) after payment of fines to the 
Forestry Commission significantly reduces the deterrent value of the law enforcement 
process. These respondents believe that the fines are too small and invariably lead to 
rent-seeking behaviour of elites in the forest sector. Moreover, the culprits immediately 
return to the forest estate to recover their losses, which leads to a cyclical wave of forest 
offence, arrest, subsequent release upon payment of fines and a new offence. Moreover, 
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the resale of lumber and objects of forest offences is usually beneficial to the culprits 
and does not deter them from repeating the same offences. As these offenders are not 
prosecuted and sent to jail and the deterrent value of the law enforcement process is 
derailed, practice is in contravention of the expectation of the legislative arm of gov-
ernment.  
Another instrumental factor that emerged from the interviews as being a hindrance to 
effective juridical processes is deficient documentation of offences and limited adminis-
trative means for the FSD to deal with offenders. Fifty-five per cent of the respondents 
were of the opinion that poor documentation of forest offences during a trial poses diffi-
culties as regards law enforcement. Another 35% indicated that documentation of forest 
offences does not play any major role in securing positive law enforcement outcomes, 
since the judges and prosecutors are professional and are very much aware of their de-
liverables. Ten per cent of the respondents had no opinion on the situation.  
The lack of manpower is related to the previous point. It transpired that 70% of the 
respondents strongly believed that the effective administration of justice is affected by 
the inadequacy of manpower and equipment in relation to the cases submitted. Twenty 
per cent of the respondents also believe otherwise as they think that, irrespective of the 
inadequacies of manpower and logistics, results can still be achieved with regard to the 
effective administration of justice.  
Finally, it is noticeable from the interviews that prosecutors are not very conversant 
with forestry laws. Sixty per cent of the respondents supported the assertion that prose-
cutors have little or limited knowledge of forestry laws. Nonetheless, 35% of the re-
spondents opposed this majority view, whereas 5% had no knowledge of whether 
judges and prosecutors were conversant with the forestry laws. Sixty per cent of the 
respondents indicated that the courts lack the willingness to investigate and adjudicate 
crimes such as illegal logging, which they seemingly consider as unimportant crimes.  
This could be attributed to a lack of capacity on the part of the court regarding their 
knowledge on forestry or environmental issues.  
The combination of inappropriate descriptions of offences with the general lack of 
reference to relevant laws seriously weakens the legal validity of the charges for suc-
cessful prosecution. About 75% of the respondents agreed with this scenario, whereas 
25% believed that this does not adversely affect the legal validity of charges for suc-
Box 11.5 Perceived factors that result in downgrading forest offences  
 
 A lack of effective cooperation between enforcement agencies and the courts. 
 Inadequate communication between the FC and the courts.  
 A lack of shared perceptions of the significance of illegal forest offences.  
 A lack of motivation on the part of the forestry officials to support cases pend-
ing trials.  
 A lack of knowledge of relevant laws on the part of the prosecutors and the 
judges.  
 Inadequate access to copies of the relevant laws and new laws (amendments) 
by the court.  
 Inadequacy of the documentation provided by the FSD and /or prosecutors. 
 Impression that offenders are forced into illegal actions through poverty.  
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cessful prosecution. A summary of the factors that result in the downgrading of forest 
offences by the FSD, the prosecutor and the judiciary is presented in Box 11.5. 
Actions: Recommended institutional strengthening to ensure effective law enforcement  
Respondents had different opinions on the actions necessary to raise awareness of the 
judiciary of the seriousness of forest and wildlife crimes. However, the dominant propo-
sition was to organise workshops and in-service training for relevant staff of the judici-
ary, the police and the FSD field staff on the importance of forest, on the negative im-
pact of forest loss on the environment and on forest laws. In addition, field trips to the 
forest estate for staff of the judiciary, Forestry Commission, police and other key stake-
holders was considered important to reveal the extent of encroachment into protected 
forests and the damage caused to the forest. Ninety per cent of the respondents consider 
the FC, with support from the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR), as the 
most appropriate actor to undertake such initiatives, whereas 10% were of the view that 
NGOs and the private sector should take action to help raise the awareness of the judici-
ary and the Police Services on the seriousness of forest and wildlife crimes. 
With regard to the question of how the judiciary and the police can become knowl-
edgeable about vital forestry-related issues, such as the extent of environmental damage, 
67% of the respondents recommended that organising consultative and educative work-
shops and seminars would be the best platform. Twenty-two per cent of the respondents 
suggested that the management of the FSD should, first of all, interact with the judiciary 
on a regular basis, interspersed with field visits. Eleven per cent of the respondents ad-
vocated the integration of forest and wildlife policies and legislations in the curricula of 
the law schools in the country. 
Discussion  
The discussion is divided into three sections. First, the nature of forest offences is dis-
cussed in terms of interactions between the system-to-be-governed and the governing 
system. Then, the discussion centres on the judicial decisions regarding forest offences. 
The last section addresses how law enforcement officials and the judiciary perceive the 
challenges and opportunities in enforcing forest laws. 
Interaction between the system-to-be-governed and the governing systems  
Nkawie Forest District is endowed with six forest reserves categorised into different 
management regimes. The accessing, processing and conveying of forest resources 
without a permit constitutes a criminal offence as stipulated in the Act 547 (amended 
617), LI.1649 and NRCD (amended 642). Thus every illicit activity in forest reserves 
and off-reserve areas especially related to timber resources is treated as a criminal of-
fence. Such a situation makes it difficult to assess what is criminal and not criminal 
when it comes to people’s livelihood needs. According to Christy et al. (1997) this 
makes compliance with law enforcement difficult especially when offences are entan-
gled with issues of tenure. Is it a crime to access forest resources to meet one’s liveli-
hood needs? Amanor (2005) argues that such questions make it difficult for local people 
to acknowledge that what the law says is a crime and they perceive that as injustice. 
According to the same author, they respond to the perceived injustice by ‘a culture of 
conspiracy’ and by violating forest laws, ‘as either an act of defiance or a desperate at-
tempt at achieving subsistence’ (Ibid.:16). As indicated by Vasan (2002), policy imple-
mentation is always challenged because it is not just a mechanical translation of stated 
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goals into activities, but rather influenced and mediated by multi-stakeholder percep-
tions and attitudes. 
In the context of Ghana, both the police and the FC are law enforcement agencies. 
The duty of the FC is to enforce the regulations that govern the country’s forest and tree 
resources; the role of the police is to ensure due enforcement of laws. These two agen-
cies exist to ensure that the government machinery fulfils its policies, objectives and 
programmes while protecting life and natural resources. Whereas the FC and the police 
are the executive branches of government and thus answerable to it, the judiciary is the 
wing of the judicature and is autonomous. While the law enforcement agencies aim to 
secure a way of preventing crime and of punishing offenders, the judiciary aims to ad-
minister the law impartially while observing human rights and fair judgement. The re-
spondents perceive the collaboration between them as weak, and this affects the law 
enforcement process. 
The governance interactions and their outcomes  
The study of documented forest offences with the FSD indicated eight forest offence 
types with prevalent cases being chainsaw milling, illegal logging and illegal farming. 
This confirms the conflict types reported by the local communities in this study as 
shown in Chapters 7 and 9. Between 2005 and 2010, the district recorded 121 offences 
with more offences occurring in the on-reserve areas than in off-reserve areas. These 
contrasts with the findings of Abugre & Kazaare (2010) in a similar study in three forest 
districts in Brong Ahafo region where most offences tend to occur in off-reserve areas 
than on-reserve areas. The difference between the two studies could be due to the dif-
ferent location of the study areas with peculiar needs of inhabitants and ease of access to 
on-reserve and off-reserve forest. Nonetheless, both studies have highlighted the fact 
that the timber species which is most exploited illegally is Triplochiton scleroxylon 
(wawa), a scarlet star-rated species which is under imminent economic threat. Under the 
chainsaw milling and logging offence types, eight and eleven scarlet species respec-
tively had been exploited between 2005 and 2010. This contributes to a loss of timber 
revenues to the state since these trees were taken illegally and not all of the culprits 
were arrested and fined for the state to generate revenue. Equally exploited species are 
those of red and pink star rating which face potential economic extinction. Only two 
species (i.e. Klainedoxa gabonensis and Albizia zygia) of the trees felled under illegal 
logging are less valuable species with a green star rating. These rating classifications are 
prescribed by Hawthorne & Abu-Juam (1995) (see Chapters 4 and 10). Illegal logging 
and chainsaw milling thus create a potential of losing high economic value timber spe-
cies if access to these resources is not regulated by the FSD. 
There is empirical evidence that large numbers of cases are resolved by the FSD 
through the imposition of fines and the subsequent release of vehicles associated with 
the particular forest offence. For example, the FSD uses several approaches to resolve 
illegal farming offences within forest reserves. The forest farms are often destroyed and 
the subsequent measure involves three strategies: the culprit is sent to the police station 
and the matter ends there, or the offence is dealt with by the FSD officials at the re-
gional or district level, or the offender is arrested and prosecuted in court and fined. The 
use of administrative sanctions in civil law to deal with natural resource offences with-
out judicial involvement is acceptable in countries like the United States (Christy et al. 
1997), but is harder to implement in developing countries. An alternative procedure is 
what Christy et al. call ‘compounding’, in which case an executive body (like the FC) is 
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empowered to levy fines without involvement of the court (Ibid.: 149). In order for the 
FC to legally exercise its administrative powers, the FC needs to be empowered by an 
administrative Act to guide its actions and enable it to have a standard prosecuting or 
fining mechanism across its jurisdiction in the country. As this study made clear, most 
of the cases reported in court had either no evidence or inadequate evidence since the 
offenders absconded, making it difficult to present such cases in the law court under 
criminal penalty. Evidence of the violation of law is an essential ingredient before one 
can be sentenced to a fine or imprisonment. Article 19 (2) (c) of the Constitution of 
Ghana (presented in Box 11.4) clearly states that ‘A person charged with a criminal 
offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proven or has pleaded guilty’. As-
signing prosecuting powers to the FC could help solve the impunity of forest offences, 
provided measures are taken to prevent non-transparent charges and corruption. 
Analyses of the official records revealed lapses in record keeping since the outcomes 
of offences, especially regarding cases under police and regional FSD investigations are 
not indicated. This makes it difficult to assess whether actions taken against these of-
fenders actually have a positive impact on the level of offences in the district. Even 
though there has been a decline in recorded forest offences between 2005 to 2010, this 
decline may be due to the (in) efficiency of the FSD monitoring system or to the FC’s 
incapacity to detect the offenders and record the offences. A call for capacity develop-
ment of FC officials, both staff trained at university level and field officers, may be es-
sential as has also been recommended by forest governors and experts in Chapter 6. In 
South Carolina in the United States, for instance, the Forestry Commission officers are 
trained and certified in criminal justice in addition to training in forest law, forest inves-
tigation and incident management.
24
 Law enforcement therefore becomes part of the 
training of the forest manager and somehow this is missing in the current training of 
forest managers in Ghana’s forest sector. The legal department of the FC could extend 
its mandates from representing the FC in legal matters to advocacy for the FC to estab-
lish a prosecuting system as well as building capacities of FC officials in legal issues 
and conflict management. There is also a need for officials of the legal department to 
have knowledge of natural resource management in addition to knowledge of law, so 
that they have a better and more in-depth understanding of the negative environmental 
effects of forest offences and how best to quantify them during presentation of cases in 
the law courts.  
Among the twelve forest-related unreported judgments analysed, only two of the 
cases made reference to the legislation that governed the forest offences and their sanc-
tions. These cases were between ‘The Republic vs. The Accused No. 1’ and ‘The Repub-
lic vs. The Accused No. 9’ and charged under Act 547 and PNDCL 142 respectively. In 
the latter case, the court relied on Section 17(2) of the Timber Resources Management 
Act, 1997(Act 547) which deals with offences, with an alternative provision made to 
Section 17(4), which speaks about fines rather than ‘imprisonment’ prescribed by Sec-
tion 17(2). This was considered more appropriate given the fact that the accused was 
regarded as a first offender. The rest of the court rulings on the other cases were silent 
on relevant legislations. The sanctions were not applied strictly in any of the twelve 
cases because it was unclear what the maximum prescribed penalty was, as stipulated in 
legislation. Even though the legislation clearly states that vehicles carrying illegal prod-
ucts must be confiscated by the state, none of the rulings were strictly applied. Rather, 
                                                 
24
  http://www.state.sc.us/forest/le.htm (accessed on 25 October 2011). 
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when an offender had been fined or served his/her prison term, the vehicles were re-
leased to the owner. In the majority of cases sanctions were applied lightly and in three 
cases sanctions were moderately applied. One could easily conclude that the judges or 
magistrates were lenient when it came to pronouncing judgement on forest cases or that 
they were less knowledgeable in forest laws. However, that does not need to be the case 
because the Constitution in Article 19(12), which is a clause to 19(11), stipulates that 
the judge or magistrate has the mandate to punish a person ‘for contempt of itself’, even 
if the act or omission constituting the contempt is not defined in a written law and the 
penalty is not prescribed. 
Perceptions of FC, police and judiciary officials: images, instruments and actions  
Although forestry laws are designed to be applied, most of them seem to exist on paper 
only. This study revealed a common belief in inadequate institutional capacity among 
the FC, police and the judiciary to apply existing sanctions and enforce the law in prac-
tice. This is clearly demonstrated by the high volumes of illegally produced chainsaw 
lumber and timber logs, widespread illegal farming and illegal mining among others. It 
can therefore logically be inferred that the status quo aligns perfectly with the percep-
tion of forestry officials that the judicial trials of forest offences imposes very low fines 
which is a hindrance to effective law enforcement. However, this was also disputed by 
some of the respondents. Equally, the administrative means that the FSD uses to deal 
with forest offences (such as fines and FC/ military taskforce) contribute to an increase 
in illegalities because the fines are considered to be low. The respondents called for 
forest and wildlife policies and laws to be included in the curriculum of the Ghana law 
schools. This corresponds to the proposals recommended by the forest governors and 
experts in Chapter 6.  
It is noteworthy that the failure of Court officials to apply severe penalties for forest 
offences implies the downgrading of these kinds of offences. By organising consultative 
workshops and seminars to educate the judiciary and the police on the effect of envi-
ronmental damage to the nation, they will become knowledgeable about vital forestry-
related information that includes the extent of environmental damage. These proposals 
for capacity building correspond to the recommendation for training of police, prosecu-
tors and judges by Christy et al. (1997: 153).  
Conclusion 
This study revealed that there is a broad range of legislation which governs the forest 
sector Ghana and work to develop these is geared towards effective forest governance. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of these laws is challenged because of the prevalence 
of forest offences and low fines attached to these offences. It was clearly noted that the 
mechanism designed for law enforcement requires effective cooperation and collabora-
tion of the relevant state agencies, which are the Forestry Commission, the Police Ser-
vice and the Judicial Service. However, it was also observed that there was an apparent 
lack of cooperation regarding the procedures for reporting forest offences, the coordina-
tion of court processes for effective law enforcement and the eventual determination of 
the offences by the court as well as a sometimes arbitrary disposition of offence reports 
by the FC. A wide range of reasons has been assigned for those pertinent traits of the 
forest sector. The general character of the enforcement mechanism is that it appears 
satisfactory bearing in mind the institutional limitations and the limited capacity of the 
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forest sector organisation.  
To conclude, it is fair to say that forest law could be enforced more effectively if at-
tention were paid to capacity development (both human and logistic) of forest officers, 
the police and the judges, in addition to decriminalising some forest offences and mak-
ing them subject to civil law or granting legal administrative power to the FC so that it 
can deal with some of the offences beyond the scope of the judiciary. 
 
 
  
 
 12 
Synthesis, recommendations and conclusions 
Introduction 
By the turn of the millennium, forest governance had been given recognition on 
Ghana’s development agenda by state and non-state actors with influence from the in-
ternational community. Examples are the Ghana Natural Resource and Environment 
Governance (NREG) Review, the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
(FLEGT) Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the European Union to combat 
illegal logging and strengthen forest governance, and Reducing Emissions from Defor-
estation and Degradation plus (REDD+) (see Chapter 5). The emergence of these gov-
ernance initiatives increased the diversity of actors in decision-making, resource use and 
management. This resulted in a growing competition for resources and conflicting ob-
jectives between and among actors in the system-to-be-governed and the governing sys-
tems, with emerging conflicts being the result. However, conflict management – al-
though a key building block of forest governance – has received little or no con-
sideration in forest management, policy and most on-going governance initiatives. A 
study on this topic in Ghana’s high forest zone that was intended to generate an under-
standing and find a means of dealing with forest and tree livelihood conflicts therefore 
became an important research area under the ‘Governance for sustainable forest-related 
livelihoods’ programme, which was carried out as a joint effort by Tropenbos Interna-
tional (TBI) Ghana, the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) at 
the University of Amsterdam and Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technol-
ogy (KNUST) from 2008-2012. 
The high forest zone, which contains most of Ghana’s forest resources, has been 
categorised into on and off-reserve forest areas. It is the area where conflicts and ille-
galities occur with regard to the utilisation and management of forest and tree resources. 
The study therefore set out to explore and analyse governance arrangements, conflicts 
and conflict management in Ghana’s high forest zone using the Tano-Offin forest re-
serve in Nkawie Forest District as a case. An important reason for selecting the Tano-
Offin forest reserve as the study area was that it contains all governance regimes that 
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occur in Ghana’s forests, i.e. protection, production and plantation areas, while an off-
reserve area with relevant forest resources was located nearby.  
Situated in four theoretical strands related to political ecology, forest-based liveli-
hoods, interactive governance and conflict and conflict management (see Chapter 2), 
this study provided answers to six main research questions in eight empirical studies 
(Box 12.1).  
Theoretically, the analysis in this thesis is grounded in interactive governance theory 
(Kooiman et al. 2005), combined with the multi-dimensional conflict wheel developed 
by Mason & Rychard (2005). This implied, first, that a distinction was made between 
the system-to-be-governed (Ghana’s high forest zone, consisting of a natural and socio-
economic sub-system and the interactions between them), a governing system and the 
governance interactions between them. Both were analysed in terms of complexity, di-
versity, dynamics and scale. Second, it meant the centrality of the concept of interac-
tions in understanding both governance (defined by Kooiman et al. (2005:17) as ‘the 
whole of public as well as private interactions that are initiated to solve societal prob-
lems and create societal opportunities’) and the governability of a system. The latter is 
defined as ‘the overall capacity for governance of any societal entity or system’ (Kooi-
man 2008: 173, see Chapter 2). Third, the interactive governance perspective permitted 
the deconstruction of the governing system in terms of (i) governance orders (first order 
or day-to-day management, second order or institutions, and third order or meta govern-
ance that encompasses the normative principles and values that guide first and second 
order processes); (ii) governance modes (hierarchical governance, co-governance and 
self-governance); and (iii) governance elements (images, instruments and actions). 
Fourth, the use of Mason and Rychard’s conflict wheel implied an analysis of conflicts 
over forest and tree resources along various dimensions, including context, issues, ac-
tors, causes, dynamics and conflict management strategies. Finally, the study sought to 
find means of constructively managing forest and tree livelihood conflicts inherent in 
Box 12.1  Key research questions 
 
1.  What are the natural and socioeconomic characteristics of Ghana’s high forest zone 
and how do they interact? (Chapter 4) 
2.  What are the features, orders, modes and elements of the governing system that 
contribute to the governability of Ghana’s forest sector and how does the system 
deal with forest and tree-related conflicts? (Chapter 5) 
3.  What are the perspectives of forest governors and experts in the forest sector re-
garding the nature of forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts and conflict man-
agement options in Ghana’s high forest zone? (Chapter 6) 
4.  What conflicts occur in relation to forest and tree resources and what conflict man-
agement strategies are employed under several governance regimes in the Tano-
Offin forest reserve and what are their implications for forest governance? (Chapter 
7 on a protected area, Chapter 8 on a plantation forest, Chapter 9 on a production 
forest) 
5.  What factors facilitated the cooperation between the local community and the tim-
ber operator in Tano-Offin off-reserve area? (Chapter 10) 
6.  What are the characteristics of forest offences and their judgements in law courts in 
Nkawie forest district and the views of representatives of law enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary regarding institutional challenges and means to overcome them? 
(Chapter 11). 
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the forest and tree systems in order to improve the governance process. This corre-
sponds with the last dimension in the conflict wheel and was analysed in terms of the 
elements (images, instruments and actions) distinguished in interactive governance the-
ory (Kooiman et al. 2005). 
The study employed mixed methods (i.e. an integrated combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods) with different research techniques in the data collection proc-
ess, including document analysis, community meetings, surveys, a self-completion 
questionnaire, interviews, validation meetings and workshops. The main rationale for 
the use of mixed methods research in this study was to obtain a complete and compre-
hensive picture of forest resource conflicts and conflict management strategies from 
different actor perspectives and to enable the triangulation of quantitative and qualita-
tive data (see Chapter 3). 
The next section synthesises the empirical findings from the study with respect to the 
main research questions. Then the theoretical implications of this study are outlined, 
with a focus on theories of political ecology, forest-based livelihoods, interactive gov-
ernance, conflict and conflict management, complemented with those on co-
management and social capital. The last part of this chapter presents suggestions for 
further research, recommendations for policy and practice, and the final conclusions.  
Synthesis of the empirical findings  
This section brings together the most important results from the empirical chapters by 
responding to the main research questions. 
What are the natural and socioeconomic characteristics of Ghana’s high forest zone 
and how do they interact?  
This question was addressed in Chapter 4, which focused on the system-to-be governed: 
Ghana’s high forest zone. Here (as in subsequent subsections) the main findings are 
presented, organised according to the sub-questions that were specified in Table 1.1 and 
complemented with the main challenges identified. 
 
1.  What is the nature of Ghana’s high forest zone in terms of diversity, complexity, dy-
namics and scale?  
The high forest zone is a key contributor to the nation’s GDP, as a source of raw ma-
terial for the timber industry and a source of livelihoods for both rural and urban 
people. It is a nested continuum of subsystems existing across five regions in Ghana 
at different levels of geo-political scale. The high forest zone is diverse as it holds a 
mixture of ecological vegetation types ranging from evergreen rainforest to dry semi-
deciduous forest characterised by a wide range of flora and fauna species. The inter-
dependency and interaction within and among the different parts of the system brings 
to fore the system’s complexity. This complexity also prevails in the human system 
in which different forest users (mainly farmers, timber operators, chainsaw millers 
and non-timber forest product collectors) compete for timber and non-timber forest 
resources and farming land. Furthermore, complexity is related to the different man-
agement regimes which each have their own specific governing system and institu-
tions that regulate access to forest and tree resources. In terms of dynamics, changes 
in policies governing forest resource management and use over the years and con-
flicting interactions with other land-use systems have increased the high forest zone’s 
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vulnerability to excessive exploitation. These dynamics in natural resource systems 
are confirmed in many previous studies, both in Ghana (e.g. Kotey et al. 1998, Teye 
2005, Appiah et al. 2009) and elsewhere (Kooiman et al. 2005, ITTO 2006).  
 
2. Which forest users prevail and how do they interact with the natural system? 
The actors who access forest resources were found to be diverse in terms of composi-
tion, interests and levels of geographical scale. They were divided into actors at 
community level (farmers, gatherers of non-timber forest products, hunters) and 
market actors (timber operators, illegal loggers and chainsaw millers, plantation de-
velopers and non-timber forest product traders). Both categories are far from ho-
mogenous: the diversity of actors and their interests in accessing resources is linked 
to differential powers and needs. This poses a challenge to the governability of the 
system due to conflict incidences as reported in this study and previous ones carried 
out in the high forest zone (see for instance Ohene-Gyan 2004, Marfo 2006).  
 
3. Challenges  
Based on these findings, the main challenges identified relate to the questions of 
whether (i) the high forest zone (and its embedded sub-systems) has the resilience to 
withstand the excessive pressure of over-exploitation of its resources and associated 
degradation, and (ii) the socio-economic system will enable the actors to derive so-
cial and livelihood benefits from the forest resources on a sustainable basis with less 
conflict or constructive means to manage them. Chapters 7-11 provide input to an-
swer such questions. 
What are the features, orders, modes and elements of the governing system that con-
tribute to the governability of Ghana’s forest sector and how does it deal with forest 
and tree-related conflicts?  
This question has been dealt with in Chapter 5 which analysed the governing system of 
Ghana’s forest sector from a historical perspective and in terms of its current character-
istics. The latter was done employing the notions of interactive governance theory as 
expressed in the sub-questions below. 
 
1.  What is the historical context of the Ghanaian forest governing system in terms of its 
policies, legislations and conflicts? 
Results in Chapter 5 show that prior to the introduction of scientific forestry, access 
rights to forest resources were at the discretion of the local community and town 
chiefs. The introduction of scientific forestry in the early 1900s and the associated 
‘timberisation’ of forest governance and conflicts during the reservation process, left 
behind legacies of unresolved tenure and access rights issues. In addition, it revealed 
that rights to forest resources were taken away from local communities and town 
chiefs (see Francois 1987, Amanor 2005, Agyeman et al. 2010). These processes 
provided an arena for multifaceted conflicts related to restricted access to timber, 
NTFPs and farming land.  
 
2.  What features prevail in the forest governance process (in terms of diversity, scale, 
complexity and dynamics)?  
The emergence of the collaborative and governance policies has broadened actor par-
ticipation in forest use, management, decision making and benefit sharing and has 
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also increased the diversity and complexity of the governing system. This has been 
influenced by principles and governance processes in both the national and interna-
tional arenas (e.g. the Forest Principles adopted at the United Nations Conference on 
the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, the good governance debate 
in World Bank circles and, more recently, the Voluntary Partnership Agreement and 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation plus (REDD+) processes). 
This study revealed actors in the forest sector to be operating in six governing struc-
tures. These include (i) the statutory governing structure, (ii) the civil society govern-
ing structure, (iii) the customary governing structure, (iv) the market governing struc-
ture, (v) a hybrid governing structure, and (vi) an international governing structure. 
This differs from most authors who distinguish between the state, the market and 
civil society (e.g. Kooiman & Bavinck 2005, Owusu 2009). The hybrid governing 
structure was introduced in this study as a number of actors do not fit neatly into one 
specific category due to the transitional nature of the Ghanaian governance process, 
as a result of which actors continuously change from one governing mode to another 
and operate at different levels of scale while being positioned at one geo-political 
level. This implies that the concept of hybrid governing structure as understood in 
this study is related to, but more dynamic than, the notion of neo-African governance 
proposed by Siloma & Zaal (2005) which refers to hybrid governance forms in which 
formal governing bodies, traditional leadership structures and non-governmental and 
community-based organisations amalgamate. 
 
3.  What is the quality of the three governance orders (principles, institutional arrange-
ments and day-to-day management of conflicts) in the forest governing system? 
This study has shown that much has been done in Ghana in terms of introducing col-
laborative governance initiatives. Nevertheless, the current legislations are still not 
favourable in terms of people’s access to resources due to criminalisation associated 
with access to these forest resources. The denial of some actors’ access rights to re-
sources, coupled with implementation challenges and dynamics in population 
growth, have resulted in illegalities characterised by conflicts. Unfortunately, the ad 
hoc conflict management strategies applied over the years have not been able to 
manage these conflicts constructively. It was in view of these that the forest gover-
nors and experts who took part in this study expressed the need for conflict manage-
ment to become an integral component of the forest governance process in Ghana.  
 
4.  What is the responsiveness of the governance modes (hierarchical, co-governance 
and self-governance)?  
 Hierarchical governance, co-governance and self-governance co-exist in Ghana, and 
this supports the identification by Kooiman et al. (2005) of such modes of govern-
ance in the fisheries governing system. However, within the formal forestry sector a 
blend of hierarchical governance and co-governance commonly prevails, with the hi-
erarchical mode of governance tending to prevail over co-governance. The forest 
governors and experts who took part in this study identified this as one of the weak-
nesses in Ghana’s forest governance process. Self-governance was found to prevail 
prior to the introduction of scientific forestry when traditional authorities were in 
charge of forest management. It still occurs at local level, where the traditional coun-
cil manages civil conflicts and convicts offenders without government influence or 
mediation by government officials (Chapter 7). Regarding the responsiveness of 
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these modes to the needs of the stakeholders, this study showed that most governance 
initiatives introduced in the forest sector have promoted co-governance and have 
therefore broadened actors’ participation in decision making, management and bene-
fit sharing). However, a lot them are project driven and financially time-bound. 
Hence, the sustainability of the new governance initiatives becomes a challenge 
unless the sector undergoes reforms that will eliminate most of its hierarchical no-
tions enshrined in legislations and embrace co-governance as an integral component 
of forest management. From a self-governance perspective, scientific forestry has 
given little recognition to the devolution of forest resources and management author-
ity to local communities, since forest resources are vested in statutory government.  
 
5. How do governance elements (in terms of forest actors’ images, instruments and 
actions) fit in with conflict management and how do actors assess the potential to 
strengthen forest conflict management in the governance process? 
 Despite intentions to move towards co-governance and sustainable forest manage-
ment, the forest governors and experts involved in this study identified challenges 
with regard to dealing with forest conflicts and their driving forces in day-to-day 
natural resource management (see point 6 below). This indicates a misfit between ac-
tors’ ‘images’ of the problem (i.e. conflicts over forest and tree resources), the in-
struments they have to solve the problem (i.e. conflict management strategies) and 
the actions that are needed (i.e. integrated conflict management). The forest gover-
nors and experts identified various actions which have the potential to strengthen 
forest conflict management in the governance process. In order to improve the way 
in which they deal with the various stakeholders, they suggested several soft instru-
ments that could complement the existing legislation, such as the capacity develop-
ment of forest managers and the creation of a platform for stakeholders to engage in 
dialogue and express their grievances. They hope that this will create new opportuni-
ties which help to accommodate the multiplicity of actors and promote effective in-
teractive forest governance. In order to ensure that constructive conflict management 
becomes an integral component of the forest governance process, workshop partici-
pants proposed strategies to be embedded in the governing system with a view to 
strengthening both second and third order governance (i.e. institutions and their un-
derlying principles respectively). As regards the strengthening of institutional ar-
rangements and instruments, their main recommendation was to institutionalise con-
structive conflict management strategies in the forestry sector. They called for a unit 
within the Forestry Commission which would be specifically designed to manage 
conflicts and enforce laws, and to arbitrate, become involved in adjudication, medi-
ate, educate and constantly engage in a dialogue with its stakeholders, clients and 
other sectors. They judged a periodic assessment of the performance of such a unit to 
be essential in order to identify weaknesses and apply the necessary remedy on time. 
This should be based on underlying principles that they considered essential and 
many of which emanate from the good (forest) governance debate (transparency, ac-
countability and public participation; stability of forest institutions and conflict man-
agement; quality of forest administration; coherence of forest legislation and rule of 
law; and economic efficiency, equity and incentives) (c.f. World Bank 2009).  
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6.  Challenges  
 A key challenge inherent in Ghana’s governing system is the pervasiveness of con-
flicts over forest and tree resources, with inadequate conflict management mecha-
nisms being in place. This is caused by the weak institutional structures in terms of 
staffing and logistical equipment of the Forest Services Division of the Forestry 
Commission and weak collaboration between the Forestry Commission, the judiciary 
and the police, leading to weaknesses in law enforcement. Another challenge is the 
supremacy of the top-down governance style which exists in the formal sector and 
which overshadows the co-governance style inherent in the decentralised structures 
in the various districts and the participatory initiatives based in the 1994 Forest and 
Wildlife Policy. An equally important challenge is the allocation of resource owner-
ship and management to separate actors (i.e. traditional authorities and statutory gov-
ernments respectively). This makes it difficult to reconcile statutory and customary 
systems to manage conflicts constructively. Other challenges identified in Chapter 5 
include an inadequate political and administrative will to address natural resource 
management problems because of the influence of politicians and powerful loggers, a 
diffusion of decision-making power in certain co-management cases, and forest laws 
not being sufficiently differentiated for forest reserves and off-reserve areas, despite 
the different contexts and actors.  
What are the perspectives of forest governors and experts in the forest sector regarding 
the nature of forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts and conflict management op-
tions in Ghana’s high forest zone? 
This question guided the analysis in Chapter 6, for which the data was derived from a 
four-step methodology that included desk-study, semi-structured interviews with key 
respondents, self-completion questionnaires and a workshop with forest governors and 
experts. 
 
1.  What are respondents’ ‘images’ regarding forest and tree-based livelihood options 
and associated conflicts? 
 The forest governors and experts identified various forest and tree-based livelihood 
options in Ghana’s high forest zone (on and off-reserve) that provide both direct and 
indirect services and products to numerous actors in Ghana. Examples include the 
modified taungya system commercial plantations, HIPC (highly indebted poor coun-
tries)-funded plantations, admitted and illegal farming, chainsaw milling, and non-
timber forest product extraction for both domestic and commercial purposes. The 
range of forest and tree-based livelihoods found in Ghana’s high forest zone and ac-
knowledged by the respondents corresponds to assertions in livelihood literature that 
hundreds of millions of people depend to varying degrees on forests for their liveli-
hoods (World Bank 2001, Sunderlin et al. 2005). These livelihood components are 
associated with conflicts involving actors spread across the five governing structures 
at national level and triggered by causes such as poor law enforcement and farming 
land scarcity. These causes fit well into five categories of causes identified in conflict 
literature: policy and legislative lapses and institutional failures (Tyler 1999), per-
ceived goal incompatibility and perceived opportunities for deliberate interference 
with the other’s goals resulting in blocking behaviour (Schmidt & Kochan 1972), and 
environmental scarcity, including structural scarcity related to the unequal distribu-
tion of natural resources (Homer Dixon 1994). These categories cover most of the 
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conflict causes mentioned by the respondents, but are not mutually exclusive (Chap-
ter 6, Box 6.1).  
 
2.  What are respondents’ perceptions regarding the instruments available to manage 
these conflicts? 
This study indicates that dealing with forest conflicts occurs on a case-by-case basis. 
It ranges from avoidance to violence, in accordance with the continuum of conflict 
management approaches developed by Moore (2003).  
 
3.  What actions do forest governors and experts propose to improve conflict manage-
ment? 
The forest governors and experts highlighted the need for policy consideration of two 
action plans that they proposed. The first refers to scale-specific but inter-linked rec-
ommendations for a stepwise conflict management model, which integrates statutory 
and customary institutions. This model revolves around three key sources of forest 
and tree conflicts that are very prevalent in the sector, i.e. conflicts relating to (i) 
compensation and land use (e.g. illegal farming in forest reserves and crop damage 
compensation payments), (ii) forest boundary conflicts, and (iii) illegal chainsaw op-
erations and logging. Each of these conflict types is associated with specific conflict 
management strategies. In the proposed model, the Forestry Commission is the me-
diating actor (provided it maintains close linkages with traditional authorities) that 
indicates the steps required to achieve each solution. The second action plan encom-
passes a proposal to assess the feasibility of re-introduction of a prosecution system 
within the forestry sector (Chapter 6). 
 
4.  Challenges 
Challenges with regard to conflict management identified in Chapter 6 include, first, 
the prevalence of coercion in the administrative system, which has resulted in hostil-
ity between officials of the Forest Services Division and actors engaging in forest of-
fences, apathy among the stakeholders as regards providing support for forest man-
agement, and fighting and injuries. Second, the District Forest Manager or his/her 
representative are often absent as witnesses and mediators during social responsibil-
ity (SRA) agreement negotiations between communities and timber operators. This 
often results in disagreement between the parties which may lead to disputes that 
may escalate if not resolved on time. A third challenge involves interference by poli-
ticians and elites during conflict resolution processes who sometimes plead on behalf 
of the offenders, thereby preventing the necessary punishments being meted out. Fi-
nally, respondents noted the overall problem that it is often difficult to arrange trade-
offs that are acceptable to all conflict parties involved, and that an efficient mecha-
nism capable of minimising conflict incidences would be an important means for 
achieving sustainable resource management. 
What governance arrangements and conflicts occur and what conflict management 
strategies are employed in the protected Globally Significant Biodiversity Area in 
(GSBA) in Tano-Offin reserve and what are their implications for on-going trends in 
forest governance such as the Voluntary Partnership Agreement and REDD+? 
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This question was addressed in Chapter 7, which studied prevailing conflicts in a pro-
tected governance regime, the Globally Significant Biodiversity Area (GSBA) in the 
Tano-Offin forest reserve, where the inhabitants of the ‘admitted village’ Kyekyewere 
find themselves excluded from forest resources in the middle of a forest reserve. 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the Tano-Offin GSBA as a system-to-be -governed in 
terms of the natural and socio-economic sub-systems and the interactions between 
the two? 
The natural system analysed in Chapter 8 is the Tano-Offin Reserve GSBA, created 
for its rich biodiversity and water bodies (Kyereh et al. 2006). The admitted village 
of Kyekyewere and its inhabitants whose livelihoods are linked to forest resources 
represent the socio-economic sub-system. The location of the village in the middle of 
the forest reserve makes its inhabitants highly dependent on forest resources and 
farming activities, resulting in growing pressure on forest and land resources due to 
the growth of the village’s population since the creation of the forest reserve and the 
GSBA. The inhabitants of the admitted village of Kyekyewere have few legal forest 
livelihood options other than accessing non-timber forest products for domestic use. 
Most forms of forest-based livelihood components – non-timber forest product ex-
traction for commercial use without a permit, chainsaw milling, extension of admit-
ted farms and farming in the reserve – are illegal according to prevailing laws such as 
Act 624, Act 547 and LI1649. In 1998 Ghana banned the use of chainsaws to process 
lumber. Farming within forest reserves is illegal, except in the case of admitted farms 
and farming under reforestation schemes such as the modified taungya system (see 
Chapter 8).  
 
2. What governing systems operate within the Tano-Offin GSBA? 
Analysis of the governing system in the Tano-Offin protected GSBA regime from an 
interactive governance perspective revealed a tension between rules and laws that re-
strict inhabitants’ access to forest resources and their dependence on the same (Chap-
ter 5). The above noted illegality of most forest-based livelihood activities supports 
the assertion of Peluso (1992 cited in Amanor 2005) about the ‘progressive crimi-
nalisation of customary rights of forest access’. In the statutory governing system a 
command and control approach prevails, termed a top-down ‘fence and fine’ ap-
proach by Adams & Hulme (2001) or an ‘ecototalitarian’ approach by Dietz (1996). 
This study furthermore revealed that traditional authorities (i.e. the customary gov-
erning structure) play a more important role in conflict management than is often as-
sumed. Literature suggests that they no longer have a say in forest resource alloca-
tion and management as forest resources fall under the custody of the central state 
(Mayers & Kotey 1996, Ghana Constitution of 1992). However, the findings re-
vealed that traditional authorities at local level still play an important role in the 
management and resolution of conflicts relating to these resources. The same obser-
vations were also made in Chapters 8 and 9 of this thesis. 
 
3.  What are the perceptions of the inhabitants of Kyekyewere regarding the nature of 
forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts in Tano-Offin GSBA? 
 The two conflict types observed in this study were those related to forest resources 
(timber and non-timber forest products, including game) and those related to forest 
land use (illegal farming and extension of admitted farms). This reaffirms previous 
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studies that portray conflicts as being inherent in natural resource use due to the 
complexity, diversity and dynamics of their natural and socioeconomic environ-
ments, in which actors operate at different levels of scale (Castro & Nielsen 2003, 
Buckles & Rusnak 1999, Kooiman 2008, Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009). Second, 
these conflicts were found to occur among resource users and between resource users 
and Forestry Commission officials. The multi-level presentation of the actors in-
volved in the conflicts brings to the fore the spatial distinctions between actors in-
volved in conflict situations (Bryant 1992, Dietz 1996). These conflicts portray both 
manifest behaviour (such as entering the forest reserve without a permit or stealing 
crops or logs from others) and underlying causes (termed ‘antecedent conditions’ by 
Pondy 1967) such as land scarcity and poverty. In terms of dynamics, conflicts in-
volving only actors at community level are perceived as being the least violent, with 
more violence occurring when conflicts escalate to district level or beyond. Third, 
the combination of conflict management strategies mentioned by the respondents 
corresponds with coping strategies identified in conflict literature (e.g. Glasl 1999, 
Moore 2003, Engel & Korf 2005, Wehrmann 2008). 
 
4.  What do the findings mean for ongoing trends in forest governance such as the Vol-
untary Partnership Agreement (VPA) and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation 
and forest Degradation plus (REDD+) processes?  
Strengthening law enforcement under the VPA or more stringent control of protected 
areas due to REDD commitments is likely to restrict villagers’ access to forest re-
sources even more. Building social safeguards implies rethinking the governance 
conditions of protected areas, especially the status of admitted villages and farms 
where people have restricted access to forest resources and few options to build a 
livelihood. Where re-settlement of the inhabitants is not the first option, REDD+ 
payments and joint reforestation schemes with multiple benefits such as the modified 
taungya system and other innovative co-management systems that will bring direct 
benefits to communities may provide important social safeguards. Furthermore, it is 
key to enhance the conflict management capacity of Forest Services Division offi-
cials and the judiciary, with due attention being paid to the role of traditional authori-
ties. 
 
5. Challenges 
The illegality related to forest resource and land use in a protected regime results in 
conflicts that prejudice local people’s wellbeing. Unfortunately, most of the per-
ceived illicit activities (including illegal farming, non-timber forest product exploita-
tion and chainsaw logging) are the main sources of livelihoods of people living in 
such a protected area. Given that people who do not have a Forestry Commission 
permit are excluded from access to forest resources in the GSBA, those who do ac-
cess the resources to meet their livelihood needs are treated as criminals. The ques-
tion is what is criminal and not criminal when it comes to people’s livelihood needs? 
Is it actually a crime to access forest resources to meet one’s livelihood needs? 
Amanor (2005) argues that such questions make it difficult for local people to ac-
knowledge that what the law says is a crime is criminal indeed and they perceive that 
as injustice. According to the same author, they respond to the perceived injustice via 
‘a culture of conspiracy’ and by violating forest laws, ‘as either an act of defiance or 
a desperate attempt at achieving subsistence’ (Ibid.: 16). 
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What conflicts over forest and tree resources occur and what conflict management 
strategies are employed around the modified taungya system in a plantations forest in 
the Tano-Offin forest reserve and what are their implications for the co-management 
scheme? 
Based on a case study of the modified taungya system in the Tano-Offin Forest Reserve, 
Chapter 8 analyses the co-management context of the system and the arising conflict 
issues from the perspectives of the local communities. 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the plantation forest (i.e. the modified taungya system 
scheme) in the Tano-Offin forest reserve as a system-to-be-governed, particularly 
with regard to the interaction of local communities with the natural system in their 
efforts to secure their livelihoods? 
The modified taungya system (MTS) is a co-management scheme between the For-
estry Commission and forest fringe communities for the reforestation of degraded 
forest reserves in Ghana, with the ultimate objectives being to realise sustainable for-
est management and poverty reduction. Under this system, participating farmers are 
co-owners of trees and entitled to a 40% share in the timber benefits. They further-
more have the right to plant food crops between the trees until canopy closure in re-
turn for their share in tree planting and maintenance. The plantation regime within 
the Tano-Offin forest reserve (mostly located in the production management area) 
consists of various compartments
 
in degraded parts of the reserve, of which 82 ha 
and 70 ha respectively were allocated to the study villages of Chirayaso and Kunsu-
Nyamebekyere No. 3 from 2004-2007 in order to realise a given plantation estab-
lishment target. The trees commonly planted by farmers under the MTS scheme 
(with food crops such as plantain, cocoyam, vegetables and maize) include the exot-
ics Cedrella odorata (cedrella) and Tectona grandis (teak) and indigenous species 
like Terminalia Superba (ofram) and Entandrophragma spp. (African mahogany). 
With farming being the major occupation in the two villages, the food crop compo-
nent of the modified taungya system has contributed to the livelihoods of the inhabi-
tants who participate in the scheme. Some key benefits that have improved the well-
being of the MTS farmers are (i) employment in the form of farm labour and micro-
enterprises (notably petty trading) that could be established thanks to the revenues 
from the MTS plots, (ii) improvement in school attendance by their children, (iii) 
improved quality of their housing, and (iv) food security throughout the year. 
 
2. What are the characteristics of the governing system (i.e. institutional arrangements) 
that steers the plantation regime?  
The modified taungya system is a first collaborative arrangement between farming 
communities and the Forestry Commission with legal backing, clearly defined insti-
tutions and a benefit-sharing scheme. The institutional framework shows a partner-
ship of stakeholders ranging from state and non-state actors to the international 
community, which indicates the diversity of actors and the multi-faceted character of 
the arrangement. The contractual agreements between the Forestry Commission and 
MTS groups offer the taungya farmers some formal powers in terms of leasehold 
over land and access to the forest reserve to farm, with the decision-making respon-
sibilities of the taungya committees as well as the farmers being quite circumscribed. 
The findings support Marfo’s (2009) statement that the modified taungya system 
represents a significant tenure reform in which, for the first time in Ghana, local 
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communities and individuals have direct ownership rights over trees in state forest 
reserves and specifically prescribed benefits based on mutual agreements. 
 
3. What are the perspectives of the inhabitants of the communities at the forest planta-
tion fringe regarding the nature of forest and tree-related conflicts in the plantation 
regime? 
The modified taungya system operations were found to centre around three conflict 
categories. These were (i) conflicts related to institutional and operational arrange-
ments, (ii) conflicts resulting from competing claims, and (iii) anticipated conflicts 
resulting from uncertainty about the future of the partnership. The study revealed that 
the outcomes of most of these conflicts helped to continue shaping the system. This 
confirms the notion that conflicts are a means of social learning to improve a situa-
tion, and should therefore be regarded as positive capabilities (Burgess & Burgess 
1996, Glasl 1999). 
 
4. What conflicts outcomes arise and what are their effects on the governance ar-
rangements? 
Some of the conflict outcomes analysed in Chapter 8 influenced the functioning of 
the modified taungya system in a positive manner. After field verification of com-
plaints about the disproportionate allocation of forestland by the taungya leaders to 
themselves, farmers from one community (Chirayaso) reported some lessons learnt 
that led to the improvement of the system during the 2009 planting season. The field 
verification team consisted of Forest Services Division officials, representatives of 
chief and elders, the aggrieved farmers and the taungya farmers, which ascertained 
the alleged accusation against the leaders and took four decisions in the presence of 
the entire community to solve the conflict, with consequences for the composition of 
the MTS committee and the governance arrangements in place for the allocation of 
plots and the fees to be paid. The outcome of another conflict – the coercive action 
taken by Forest Services Division officials against disobedient farmers who failed to 
plant timber trees on their plots – resulted in the exclusion of non-cooperating farm-
ers. Regarding the anticipated conflicts arising from tenure insecurity and uncertain-
ties, the Forestry Commission has secured donor funds to register all farmers and ad-
dress outstanding issues concerning the agreement. Disputes over farming 
boundaries and conflicts associated with food crop theft, the destruction of crops and 
trees through the use of fire for hunting and illegal chainsaw operations turned out to 
be much harder to resolve, although public announcements sometimes result in a 
temporary decline of timber and crop theft. 
 
5. Challenges 
Unfortunately the co-management component of the partnership between the For-
estry Commission and the modified taungya system farmers has not entirely been a 
continuous problem-solving process. This is because, in terms of decision making, it 
portrays features of a fixed state system that are meant to serve the interests of the 
Forestry Commission rather than of a process that embraces joint decision making 
for the benefit of both parties. This was clearly seen in the context of the third con-
flict category of uncertainty about the future of the partnership, which may under-
mine the potential of the modified taungya system as an effective co-management ar-
rangement where lessons are learnt for further improvement of forest governance. 
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Several options for improvement of the system are provided in Chapter 8. 
What conflicts over forest and tree resources occur and what conflict management 
strategies are employed in a production forest in the Tano-Offin forest reserve and what 
are their implications for law enforcement? 
Chapter 9 addressed conflict incidences in the production forest regime in Ghana’s high 
forest zone and the implications of the findings for law enforcement under the Volun-
tary Partnership Agreement. The analysis is based on a review of documentary sources, 
the administration of semi-structured questionnaires among 137 inhabitants of the vil-
lages of Chirayaso and Kunsu-Nyamebekyere No. 3 bordering the Tano-Offin reserve, 
and validation meetings. 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the production forest in the Tano-Offin forest reserve 
as a system-to-be governed, particularly with regard to the interaction of local com-
munities with the natural system in their efforts to secure their livelihoods? 
Ghana derives most of its timber revenues from the production regime in forest re-
serves, Chapter 9 revealed that interaction between the prevailing governing system 
and the human system poses challenges for the governability of the natural system. 
Local people rely on forest resources in the form of land under the modified taungya 
system, chainsaw milling, NTFPs for domestic use and trade, and forest services (i.e. 
boundary cleaning, working with timber firms and as forest guards). Individuals from 
other levels of scale often access forest resources illegally and this is associated with 
conflicts. Law enforcement as envisaged under the Voluntary Partnership Agreement 
is therefore essential.  
 
2. What governing system (i.e. institutions and policy instruments) functions in the pro-
duction regime?  
Four governing structures were identified under the production regime, belonging re-
spectively to the statutory, market, customary and hybrid governing systems. Under 
the statutory governing system, the Forest Services Division of the Forestry Com-
mission is the main actor, particularly the range supervisors (in charge of timber ex-
ploitation in a certain forest area and responsible for conducting stock surveys and 
measuring felled trees to estimate tree volume) and forest guards (responsible for 
clearing the reserve boundary and patrolling the reserve in order to prevent illegal ac-
tivities). The judiciary and police also play a role, as outlined in Chapter 11. Under 
statutory law, production forests are divided into compartments of approximately 128 
hectares each (1,600 m x 800 m), a group of which constitutes a concession or timber 
utilisation contract (TUC) area where trees are felled according to a harvesting plan 
as stipulated in the Manual of Procedures. Actors based in the market governing 
structure (but subject to statutory law) are the TUC holders, who obtain contracts 
through competitive bidding and who are allowed to operate for a period of one cy-
cle, which corresponds to forty years, and chainsaw millers, who operate illegally. 
Traditional authority at village level takes the form of the chief, queen mother and 
elders, who are based in the customary governing structure, Finally, the hybrid gov-
erning structure encompasses the Unit Committee, the Community Biodiversity Ad-
visory Groups (CBAGs) and Community Forest Committees, which operate at com-
munity level as intermediaries between the statutory and customary structures, 
Benefit arrangements include royalties (that accrue to the Forestry Commission, the 
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Administrator of stool lands, the District Assembly and traditional council and stool 
land owner), Social Responsibility Agreement payments to the community and crop 
damage compensation for the farmers.  
 
3. What are the perspectives of the inhabitants of the communities at the production 
forest fringe regarding the nature of forest and tree-related conflicts in the produc-
tion regime? 
Chapter 9 showed that, in view of the multiple kinds of resource users and their di-
verging interests, the regime is characterised by conflicts that can be classified into 
three conflict categories, namely (i) conflicts related to forest resources (related to 
chainsaw milling, non-timber forest products for domestic use and for trade, and 
hunting), (ii) operational conflicts with timber utilisation contracts (TUC) holders 
(related to log theft and negotiations about Social Responsibility Agreement pay-
ments and crop damage compensation), and (iii) land-use conflicts (boundary dis-
putes and illegal farming). Each of the conflicts are driven by both manifest behav-
iour (e.g. confiscation of forest resources, arrest of offenders, crop destruction, road 
barricades, disobedience of rules, etc.) and antecedent conditions (e.g. greed, corrup-
tion, economic hardship and poverty, reluctance to fulfil Social Responsibility 
Agreement obligations, bureaucracy and poor law enforcement).  
 
4. What are the implications of the findings for law enforcement? 
In relation to these conflict situations, four possible outcomes were identified: (i) 
communities and farmers succeed and/or fail to materialise their benefit rights, (ii) 
communities and chainsaw millers gain and/or lose access to forest resources, (iii) 
timber utilisation contract (TUC) holders lose timber rights to chainsaw millers and 
other TUC holders through timber theft and (iv) the Forest Services Division fails to 
materialise revenue rights due to illegal logging. The outcomes indicate that stricter 
law enforcement under the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) is urgently 
needed to save the forest resources. However, there is a risk that it results in a tempo-
rary ‘pseudo-reduction’ of illegal forest activities and that the system may be re-
versed to its original state of illegalities if the underlying factors are not addressed. 
The situation may even escalate if local people, driven by need or greed, succeed in 
creating alternative routes to access the same resources despite stricter enforcement. 
Law enforcement should, however, be the last resort for ensuring compliance with 
the law and should be complemented with ‘soft’ enforcement mechanisms. In con-
nection with this, three issues were suggested for consideration in the design of 
strategies for soft law enforcement, namely to (i) develop the capacity of stake-
holders (particularly resource managers and frontline staff of the Forest Services Di-
vision) in conflict management and integrate conflict management into the VPA sys-
tem, (ii) enhance forestry extension by improving forestry education at local level, 
and (iii) engage inhabitants of forest fringe communities in forest management on a 
remunerated basis. Funds from REDD+ and other climate-related financial mecha-
nisms could be used to enhance the budget available for such measures.  
 
5. Challenges 
In addition to persisting conflicts, three challenges influence the Tano-Offin produc-
tion forest regime. First, the regime contributes to the livelihoods of local people, in 
accordance with findings in general literature on forest-based livelihoods (e.g. Fal-
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coner 1992, World Bank 2001, Ros-Tonen & Wiersum 2005, Ros-Tonen & Dietz 
2005, Sunderlin et al. 2005) that identify the various benefits local people derive 
from the forest to build their livelihoods. However, Chapter 9 indicates that most re-
sources are accessed illegally with the exception of collecting non-timber forest 
products for domestic use, which is considered a communal right in management 
plans (Kyereh et al. 2006). In such cases, the issues of legality result in a clash be-
tween the system-to-be governed (i.e. the human system) and the governing system 
(i.e. rules, laws etc.). Second, Act 547 (amended 617) restricts legal access of timber 
harvesting to timber utilisation contract holders, thereby denying some actors access. 
This supports what Ribot & Peluso (2003: 154) conceptualised as ‘bundles and webs 
of powers’, meaning powers that enable some actors to gain control and maintain ac-
cess, as in a production forest where access to, control of and gains from commercial 
timber harvesting are limited to forest managers and timber utilisation contract hold-
ers. Those who perceive the governing laws as being unfavourable to their survival 
start to be regarded as ‘criminals’ when they access the resources in violation of the 
law and are apprehended. Third, the study revealed that the flow of benefits to local 
communities from timber resources trickles down from social responsibility agree-
ments and crop damage compensation for individual farmers as stipulated in Act 547 
(amended 617). However, these do not often reach local people and even when they 
do, they are often inadequate and that leads to suspicion. Conflicts of this kind 
mostly occur either between or among timber contractors, local communities and 
farmers. Asare (2006) noted that the legislation lacks specific regulations on how to 
determine compensation and ensure that farmers are ‘fairly compensated’.  
What factors facilitated the cooperation between the local community and the timber 
operator in Tano-Offin off-reserve area? 
The off-reserve landscape is usually a contested field where conflicts occur between 
timber operators, officials of the Forest Services Division, local communities and their 
traditional leaders and farmers. The diversity of actors coupled with diverging govern-
ing rules for land and timber trees underlies the complexity of this landscape. However, 
the case study addressed in Chapter 10 revealed a situation of cooperation rather than 
conflict, and this raised the question of what factors facilitated this cooperation.  
 
1. What are the characteristics of the Tano-Offin off-reserve area as a system-to-be-
governed in terms of the natural and socio-economic sub-systems and the interaction 
between the two? 
Chapter 10 focuses on Ghana’s off-reserve areas as the system-to-be-governed, 
which as a natural system is endowed with timber resources in patches of forest, fal-
low and farmlands. These areas are an important source of timber revenues for the 
country and some of its stakeholders as they still hold some rare timber species 
(Kyereh et al. 2006, Affum-Baffoe 2009, Hansen & Treue 2009, TBI 2009). They 
are also the major source of agricultural livelihood for local people who cultivate 
cash and food crops for income and domestic use. The results revealed that, even 
though the local inhabitants of Awisasu live close to the Tano-Offin forest reserve, 
they collect non-timber forest products for domestic and commercial use, mainly 
from fallow land in the off-reserve area. In addition, the off-reserve area provides 
them with their major sources of income from cash crops (especially cocoa) and food 
crops. 
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2. What governing systems (i.e. challenges and opportunities, access to farming lands, 
customary and statutory arrangements) operate within the Tano-Offin off-reserve 
area? 
The off-reserve landscape presents a complex governing system because of the mul-
tiple governing structures involved and the different governing rules for land and 
timber trees. Access to land for the cultivation of crops is mostly through the stool or 
family, through a chain of hierarchy. A person who acquires land directly from the 
stool could also engage in different crop-sharing arrangements with other farmers. 
Through one of these arrangements, the abusa sharecropping system, a tenant farmer 
can also become a local landowner (Hill 1956 cited in Amanor & Diderutuah 2001). 
On the positive side, this mode of land transfer enables a tenant to become a local 
landowner, but the system also contributes to land fragmentation. Prior to the intro-
duction of scientific forestry in the early 20
th
 century, the right to access and explore 
timber resources in off-reserve areas was in the hands of the farmer and the local 
town chief (Amanor 2005). Scientific forestry changed this pattern by vesting cus-
tody of land in the paramount chiefs (see Chapter 5), which excluded local people 
and farmers from timber resource benefits. A general call for collaboration resulted 
in a policy that granted rights to benefits to local people and farmers. These benefits 
range from social responsibility agreements for local communities, to crop damage 
compensation for farmers in off-reserve areas, ownership of planted trees and consul-
tation with local people before logging proceeds in off-reserve areas. In the Awisasu 
community, the diversity of governing structures (i.e. the statutory, customary and 
hybrid governing structures) created an environment conducive to strong social ties 
and networks.  
 
3. What are the perceptions of the inhabitants and the timber operator on why crop 
damage compensation and social responsibility agreement conflicts are minimal or 
absent? 
The case study of Awisasu community presents a scenario of cooperation that con-
trasts with the frequently cited conflict status of off-reserve areas. This cooperation 
was achieved based on the construction of social capital elements such as network-
ing, shared responsibility, and the creation of social ties and trust by the timber con-
tractor, which was reciprocated by the local people. This confirms Portes’ (1998: 3) 
statement that ‘social networks are not a natural given and must be constructed 
through investment strategies oriented around the institutionalisation of group rela-
tions, usable as a reliable source of other benefits’. This case study also showed that 
the concept of social capital aligns well with interactive governance theory, and this 
supports the argument by Trimble & Berkes (2010) that there can be synergy be-
tween interactive governance theory and the social capital framework. 
 
4. What are the views of government officials with regard to crop damage compensation 
and recommended actions for improvement? 
The informal discussions held with government officials centred on the governance 
elements – images, instruments and actions. The Forestry Commission mediates in 
social responsibility agreement negotiations, but in the case of compensation pay-
ment negotiations only when the contractor and farmer do not reach an agreement 
and one of the parties sends a petition letter. When consulted, the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MOFA) and Land Valuation Division (LVD) have an instrument to 
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calculate compensation payments for crop or property damage. The officials recom-
mended strategies such as the installation of a customer services officer at the For-
estry Commission to play a mediating role and design procedures for negotiating 
compensation with farmers as a means to minimise confrontations between farmers 
and timber contractors. 
 
5. Challenges 
Due to the diversity of actors in the off-reserve landscape and the different land-use 
systems competing claims are common. If these are not managed properly they result 
in conflicts associated with loss of livelihoods and environmental degradation (Ohls-
son 2000). Generally speaking, the procedure for establishing crop damage compen-
sation is subjective and controlled by the timber contractor. This was also the case in 
this study, despite its conflict free scenario. Another challenge is inherent in the pre-
vailing legislation which denies farmers and local people access to timber resources 
from naturally regenerated trees on their farmland, while compensating them inade-
quately through crop damage compensation and social responsibility agreement obli-
gations. However, such a scenario was not observed in this study.  
What are the characteristics of forest offences and their judgements in law courts in 
Nkawie forest district and the views of representatives of law enforcement agencies and 
the judiciary regarding institutional challenges and means to overcome them?  
Chapter 11 aimed to contribute insights into challenges related to forest law enforce-
ment by analysing forest offence records from the period 2005-2010, court judgements 
on twelve forest cases in the Nkawie forest district and based on semi-structured inter-
views with nineteen officials from the Forestry Commission, Ghana Police Services and 
the judiciary.  
 
1. What are the characteristics of the Nkawie Forest District reserves as a system-to-
be-governed? 
The Nkawie Forest District is one of the seven forest districts in the Ashanti region 
under the jurisdiction of the Forest Services Division of the Forestry Commission 
(see Chapter 4). The Forest District is headquartered at Nkawie, about forty-five 
minutes’ drive from Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Region. There are six forest 
reserves under the management of the Nkawie Forest District with a total area of 
1,019.72 km
2
. These are the Asenayo, Desiri, Jimira, Offin Shelter, Tano-Offin and 
Tinte Bepo forest reserves. 
 
2. What governing system (i.e. institutions and legislative framework) with regard to 
law enforcement is available in the forest district? 
The accessing, processing and conveying of forest resources without a permit consti-
tutes a criminal offence as stipulated in the Act 547 (amended 617), LI.1649 and the 
National Redemption Council Decree (NRCD) (amended 642). Thus, every illicit ac-
tivity in forest reserves and off-reserve areas especially related to timber resources is 
treated as a criminal offence. In the context of Ghana, both the police and the For-
estry Commission are law enforcement agencies. The duty of the Forestry Commis-
sion is to enforce the regulations that govern the country’s forest and tree resources 
and the role of the police is to ensure due enforcement of the law. These two agen-
cies exist to ensure that the government machinery fulfils its policies, objectives and 
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programmes while protecting life and natural resources. Whereas the Forestry Com-
mission and the police are the executive branches of government and thus answer-
able to it, the judiciary is the wing of the judicature and is autonomous. Whereas the 
law enforcement agencies aim to secure a way of preventing crime and punishing of-
fenders, the judiciary aims to administer the law impartially while observing human 
rights and fair judgement. 
 
3. What governance interactions arise from the system-to-be-governed and the govern-
ing system and what are their outcomes? 
The documented analysis of the forest offences revealed eight forest offence types 
with prevalent cases being chainsaw milling, illegal logging and illegal farming. Be-
tween 2005 and 2010, the district recorded 121 offences with more offences occur-
ring in the on-reserve areas than in off-reserve areas. This contrasts with the findings 
of Abugre & Kazaare (2010) in a similar study in three forest districts in Brong 
Ahafo region, where most offences tend to occur more in off-reserve areas than in 
on-reserve areas. The difference between the two studies could be due to the differ-
ent location of the study areas with particular needs of inhabitants and ease of access 
to on-reserve and off-reserve forest. Nonetheless, both studies have highlighted that 
the timber species which is most exploited illegally is Triplochiton scleroxylon 
(wawa), a scarlet star-rated species which is under imminent economic threat. Analy-
ses of the official records revealed lapses in record keeping since there are no refer-
ences to the outcomes of offences, especially those relating to cases under investiga-
tion by the police and regional Forest Services Division. If the twelve forest-related 
unreported judgements analysed, only two of the cases referred to the legislation that 
governed the forest offences and their sanctions. The rest of the court rulings made 
no mention of relevant legislation. Even though the legislation clearly states that ve-
hicles carrying illegal products must be confiscated by the state, none of the rulings 
were strictly applied. Rather, once an offender had been fined or had served his/her 
prison term, the vehicles were released to the owner. 
 
4. How do the Forestry Commission, the Ghana Police Services and the Judiciary per-
ceive their institutional roles in dealing with forest offences?  
The perceptions of officials of law enforcement agencies revealed that they perceived 
the collaboration between them as weak, and this affects the law enforcement proc-
ess. This study revealed a common belief in the inadequate institutional capacity 
among the Forestry Commission, police and the judiciary to apply existing sanctions 
and enforce the law in practice. This is clearly demonstrated by, for example, the 
high volumes of illegally produced chainsaw lumber and timber logs, widespread il-
legal farming and illegal mining. Some of these problems are attributed to existing 
legal instruments. First the failure of the court to apply severe penalties for forest en-
croachment in order of priority was attributed to political, social, economic and envi-
ronmental motives. In addition, forest offences are poorly documented. Even though 
respondents had different opinions with regard to the necessary actions to manage 
forest and wildlife crimes, they advocated the organisation of consultative workshops 
and seminars to educate the judiciary and the police on the effect of environmental 
damage to the nation. These proposals for capacity building correspond with the rec-
ommendation for training of police, prosecutors and judges by Christy et al. (1997: 
153).  
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5. Challenges 
Although applicable forestry laws exist, they largely seem to exist only in the stat-
utes. At the same time, of the twelve forest-related judgements analysed, only two re-
ferred to the legislation that governed the forest offences and their sanctions. In none 
of the twelve cases were the sanctions applied strictly because it was unclear what 
maximum prescribed penalty was stipulated in the legislation. It also became clear 
that (for instance with regard to the confiscation of vehicles carrying illegal products) 
none of the rulings had been strictly applied. The analyses of the official records also 
revealed lapses in record keeping, since the outcomes of offences were not regis-
tered. This applied to cases under police and regional Forest Services Division inves-
tigation in particular. This makes it difficult to assess whether actions taken against 
these offenders actually have a positive impact on the level of offences in the district. 
Even though there has been a marginal decline in recorded forest offences from 
2005-2010, this marginal decline might be due to the inefficiency of the Forest Ser-
vices Division monitoring system or to the Forestry Commission’s incapacity to de-
tect the offenders and record the offences. 
Governability implications of the study 
The ultimate aim of interactive governance theory is to assess governability – ‘the over-
all capacity for governance of any societal entity or system’ (Kooiman 2008: 173) – and 
to dissect the key variables that help understand how and why governance implementa-
tion falls short of achieving desirable outcomes’ (Chuenpagdee & Jentoft 2009: 113). 
Based on the conceptual framework (Figure 2.4) developed in Chapter 2, three possible 
assumptions on governability outcomes for forest and tree-related conflicts in Ghana 
were formulated. Scenario 1 presents a positive outcome, which implies that the system 
is governable and that one can sense an atmosphere of cooperation or collaboration or 
even competition, but without conflicts. This also implies that the interaction between 
the system-to-be-governed and the governing system is mutually responsive. It was as-
sumed that such a scenario does not often occur in reality, especially in the natural re-
source arena where different kind of actors operate at different spatial scales and com-
pete for limited resources and where policies restrict access rights for some actors and 
impose other limitations. However, the study in the Tano-Offin off-reserve area proved 
otherwise. Here, a timber contractor learnt from his previous experience with the local 
community to build a cooperation scenario. This was based on constructing elements of 
social capital, including networking, shared responsibility and the creation of social ties 
and trust by the timber contractor, which was reciprocated by the local people. This 
situation, which refuted my first hypothesis regarding governability outcomes, can be 
regarded as the ideal situation that interactive governance theory is looking for and one 
in which mechanisms and instruments are well formulated, in which policy becomes a 
learning process and actors are actively involved in the governance process.  
Scenario 2 assumes that the system is not governable, which signifies a situation of 
social unrest or complete resource degradation and lawlessness. Such a scenario could 
happen in practice and may call for a complete governance reform or a new innovation. 
It is interesting to note that such a situation of complete non-governability has not been 
observed in any of the case studies. 
Scenario 3 assumes that the system may be governable but with limitations. This was 
the scenario that applied to most of the analysed cases. With the exception of Chapter 
10, the analyses in Chapters 4-11 presented scenarios of inherent governability chal-
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lenges in the components of the governance system, in either the system-to-be-
governed, the governing system or governance interactions. The main limitations identi-
fied in the study are (i) the absence of recognition of the importance of conflict man-
agement as an integral component of forest governance in Ghana forest sector, and (ii) 
restrictions imposed on local people enclosed in a forest reserve and a governing system 
that does not function in their favour, thereby prejudicing their livelihood options.  
Conclusions regarding the empirical chapters 
The eight empirical chapters and findings from this study justify the four research 
propositions presented in Chapter 1. The study has demonstrated that forest resource use 
and management are indeed complex, dynamic and involve multiple users at different 
levels of scale and consequently, and that they are characterised by conflicts (proposi-
tion 1). Ineffective conflict management and absence of appropriate conflict manage-
ment systems in the forestry sector is one of the main causes of the widespread conflicts 
and the resultant rapid rate of deforestation (proposition 2). The interactive governance 
approach provided analytical and normative means of understanding the governability 
of the different components of the forest management regimes (i.e. protection, planta-
tions, production, and off–reserve) (proposition 3). A combination of interactive gov-
ernance theory and conflict analysis presented a clear picture of the nature of conflicts 
and their underlying factors based on the forest actors’ images, as well as the prevailing 
conflict management mechanisms (instruments and actions) in Ghana’s high forest zone 
(proposition 4).  
Theoretical implications   
Some theoretical implications of this research have already been stated in the previous 
sections in support of the empirical findings. This section briefly revisits the theoretical 
strands of this study in order to enhance our understanding of forest governance, con-
flicts and conflict management strategies in the high forest zone and how they can be 
improved and constructively managed.  
Political ecology suggests, first, that there are multi-scalar and dynamic interactions 
between people and natural resource systems, which are mediated by institutions (Dietz 
1996). Using an interactive governance approach allowed me to analyse the interactions 
between resource users (i.e. local people and timber contractors) and forest resources as 
means of livelihoods under different forest governance regimes, as well as to comple-
ment this by studying governance interactions between the system-to-be-governed and 
the governing system. Second, political ecology highlights the politics of these interac-
tions and the power imbalances involved (Bryant 1992, Dietz 1996, Gezon 1997, Blakie 
& Brookfield 1987, Peet & Watts 1996). This study illustrated these politics and power 
imbalances by analysing the conflicts between various actors within and beyond the 
community level and by revealing their direct causes (manifest behaviour) and indirect 
causes (antecedent conditions). It also showed that power plays by either politicians or 
important actors in the logging industry may affect the political will to deal effectively 
with forest offences and thus hinder law enforcement. Third, political ecology stresses 
uneven access to resources as a cause of imbalanced interactions, as became obvious 
particularly in Chapter 7 which illustrated how local people living in a protected area 
were excluded from access to forest resources, and in Chapter 8, where uneven access to 
degraded forestland to establish forest plantations under a co-management arrangement 
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resulted in conflicts. Hence, this study has shown that political ecology aligns well with 
interactive governance theory developed by Kooiman et al. (2005), whereas the conflict 
analysis wheel developed by Mason & Rychard (2005) helped to deconstruct the vari-
ous conflict dimensions. The conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2 illustrates 
how these different theoretical components were connected. 
Scholarly literature on forest-based livelihoods explains how forest and tree re-
sources contribute to livelihoods and society as a whole in diverse ways, ranging from 
timber to non-timber forest resources, ecological services and farming land (Angelsen & 
Wunder 2003, Kaimowitz 2003, Sunderlin et al. 2005, Ros-Tonen & Dietz 2005). These 
varied contributions are also noted in this study, which identified timber, NTFPs, farm-
ing in the forest reserve under the modified taungya system and illegal farming as direct 
livelihood sources and compensation payments in the form of social responsibility 
agreement and crop damage compensation (see Chapters 9 and 10) as indirect ones. 
Remarkably, indirect contributions by forest environmental services to livelihoods were 
not mentioned by either forest governors and experts or forest users involved in this 
study. As yet, intangible benefits of forest resources are not widely recognised in 
Ghana, with the exception of the local people around the Tano-Offin forest reserve (see 
Chapter 4). This may change in the near future if environmental services become a 
source of cash income through carbon credit schemes and other payments for environ-
mental services (PES) under REDD+ schemes, as a compensation for keeping the forest 
intact. 
Literature on conflict and conflict management by a variety of authors (Moore 2003, 
Homer-Dixon 1994, Engel & Korf 2005, Buckles & Rusnak 1999, Wehrmann 2008) 
was used to analyse natural resource conflicts’ contexts, issues, actors, causes, dynam-
ics, dimensions, characteristics and conflict management strategies. Three theoretical 
reflections apply here. The first refers to the definition of conflict. The commonly 
agreed definition of conflict among the respondents involved in this study is relevant to 
conflict theories, as no such definition can be found in conflict literature (Fink 1968, 
Schmidt & Kochan 1972, Wall & Callister 1995). Their common understanding of a 
forest and tree-related livelihood conflict (Chapter 6) is ‘a dispute over natural resources 
by two or more parties regarding the allocation, access, use, ownership and/or benefits 
of dwindling resources’. This definition and other answers reveal two things. First, they 
make it clear that policymakers, resource managers and forest experts in Ghana use the 
terms ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ interchangeably when discussing types of forest and tree-
related conflicts in the high forest zone. This confirms the statement by Spangler & 
Burgess (2003) that it may in fact be difficult for most people to recognise the differ-
ence between the two. Second, the definitions provided by the respondents are also eva-
sive in respect of seeing conflict as violent incidences, and this could result in destruc-
tion of properties and even death. This is, however, in line with the findings in the case 
studies in Chapters 7-9, which confirm that local people perceive most of the forest con-
flict types as being non-violent rather than violent. This study is therefore a contribution 
to overcoming a pitfall in conflict literature mentioned by Axt et al. (2005: 5) that most 
conflict studies focus on violent rather than non-violent conflicts. This relates to the 
second reflection on conflict theory regarding the causes of conflict. The conflict causes 
identified in this study align well with those identified in general conflict literature (e.g. 
Tyler 1999, Schmidt & Kochan 1972, Homer Dixon 1994) and confirm statements in 
literature that conflicts differ according to context (Moore 2003, Wall & Callister 1995). 
Most conflicts in Ghana’s on and off-reserve forest areas are related to people’s liveli-
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hoods and to laws that restrict their access to forest resources. Particularly Chapter 7 
revealed the prevailing scarcity of farming land and forest resources among the inhabi-
tants of the admitted village of Kyekyewere, which partly supports the environmental 
scarcity and conflict theory of Homer Dixon (1994, 1999). This theory sees conflicts as 
inevitable due to the increased scarcity of natural resources, which in the context of this 
study emerged from restricted access according to prevailing forest laws. As already 
clarified above, the findings of this study differ, however, from Homer Dixon’s proposi-
tion in that the majority of conflicts in the study area cannot be qualified as violent. The 
third theoretical observation is that categorisations and continuums of conflict manage-
ment strategies by scholars such as Moore (2003) and Wehrmann (2008) (see Chapter 
2) are also applicable in Ghana’s high forest zone.  
Finally, this study showed that interactive governance theory, developed for the fish-
eries sector (Kooiman et al. 2005), can be easily applied in a forest context. Interactive 
governance theory suggests that conflicts can be managed constructively if societal 
problems are identified and analysed collectively by actors with a view to creating op-
portunities. By blending interactive governance theory (from both an analytical and a 
normative perspective) with the conflict analysis wheel (Mason & Rychard 2005), this 
study has provided a better understanding of the governance context of Ghana’s high 
forest zone, the nature of conflict and conflict management strategies, and proposals for 
their improvement. However, this study has also made it clear that in Ghana, and other 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa for that matter, actor analysis needs to go beyond the 
conventional division between the state, the market and civil society as used by Kooi-
man & Bavinck (2005, 2008), Owusu (2009) and many other authors. Considering the 
transitional nature of the Ghanaian governance process, a number of actors do not fit 
neatly into one of these categories. This study therefore suggests that a distinction be 
made between statutory, customary, market, civil society and a hybrid governing struc-
ture, embedded in an overarching transnational governing structure.  
Whereas these four theoretical strands were selected as the major ones guiding the 
analysis of conflict and conflict management in Ghana’s high forest zone, it became 
clear in the course of the research process that (adaptive) co-management and social 
capital provided additional theoretical notions that proved to be useful for an interpreta-
tion of the co-governance arrangements in the modified taungya system (Chapter 8) and 
the cooperation scenario in off-reserve areas (Chapter 10) respectively. 
Recommendations for further research 
This study has identified some areas for follow-up research which could further our 
understanding of forest conflicts and provide more insights into interactive governance 
theory and its applicability in the forestry sector. 
 
1.  Understanding the complexity and dynamics of forest conflicts: Further research 
could examine the application of a causal loop diagram – as developed, for example, 
by Noorduyn (2005) – to link the causes and effects of the identified conflict types 
from an inter-related and interconnected point of view, thus doing justice to the com-
plexity and dynamics of the situation. This may require a different management ap-
proach than a linear viewpoint. Secondly, research that would improve the categori-
sation of forest and tree-related conflict types into conflicts and disputes may be 
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essential before different conflict management strategies can be created separately 
for issues relating to the two terminologies.  
 
2.  Assessing the governability criteria of the forest governance components: Thanks to 
this study, interactive governance theory, which has hitherto been applied exclu-
sively to fisheries, has now also been applied to forestry. Analytically, this study has 
used the theory to understand the opportunities and challenges within the three com-
ponents of the forest sector, i.e. the system-to-be-governed, the governing system and 
governance interactions. Based on these analyses and a discussion thereof, the forest 
governors and experts involved in this study interpreted the theory from a normative 
perspective and suggested interventions to improve the governance process. There is 
a need for follow-up research to determine what the governability criteria are for 
each of the three governance components and how they function in practice. This 
would take interactive forest governance theory beyond conflict management, which 
was the focus of this study. For instance, the diversity, complexity, dynamics and 
scale issues prevailing in the system-to-be-governed that were analysed in this study 
based on documentary analysis can be further specified based on empirical research 
in each of the different forest governance regimes. Such research would provide pri-
mary data on the different management regimes (protection, production, etc.) and 
provide insights into the questions raised in this thesis on whether the high forest 
zone has the resilience to withstand the excessive pressure of over-exploitation of its 
resources and associated degradation by the socio-economic sub-system. Such a fol-
low-up study would enable us to determine the governability of the system-to-be-
governed and to contribute to informed policy decisions on how each forest govern-
ance regime is to be governed and managed. This calls for multi-disciplinary re-
search involving researchers with a background in ecological and social sciences. In 
addition, the different principles and substantial values of third order governance 
(e.g. effectiveness, legitimacy, effective dialogue and conciliatory negotiations) pro-
posed by the forest governors and experts (see Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5) need further 
analysis to assess their workability in the Ghana forest sector.  
 
3. A comparative analysis of farm land availability in admitted settlements in forest re-
serves and off-reserve settlements: One key problem identified in Chapter 7 of this 
study is the restricted access to farming land among inhabitants of admitted villages 
in protected areas. As this is a major cause of forest encroachment, there is a need for 
research to verify whether restricted access to farming land is limited to only the in-
habitants of admitted villages or also applies to people living in areas outside forest 
reserves. This issue has not yet been properly researched in Ghana and it would be 
presumptuous to attribute forest illegalities solely to confinement and inability to ex-
pand farms beyond the forest boundaries. In the midst of poverty and no direct bene-
fits from the forest, encroachment is likely to happen in any case in which forest law 
enforcement is weak. This is what is happening in many forest fringe communities in 
Ghana as well as elsewhere. The question of whether people in admitted settlements 
access land in a different way to those in ‘open areas’ presents three issues that merit 
further research. First, research is needed to establish the linkages between forest en-
croachment and law enforcement and their implications for the governing system. 
Second, further research can make a comparison of the factors that facilitate forest 
encroachment in the two areas and their underlying causes and means of controlling 
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them. Finally, research is needed to assess whether local people in admitted villages 
take advantage of these farms to engage in other forest illegalities besides the illegal 
expansion of their farms. Such research is needed for informed decisions to be made 
regarding strategies to restrict the number of people in such areas. 
 
4. Assessment of conflict capability among forest managers: Before building the capac-
ity of forest managers in conflict management and other governance concepts there is 
a need to conduct an assessment of their competency in this field. Likewise, a needs 
assessment could serve as a baseline for capacity and curriculum development in for-
est conflict management. 
 
5.  Explore opportunities to improve income security from the modified taungya system: 
There is a need to increase security and the generation of intermediate income from 
the MTS between canopy closure and tree harvesting. Further research is needed on 
how such income can be realised through thinning, engagement in carbon schemes 
and cultivation of shade-tolerant crops to enable a farmer to stay on the piece of land 
until the trees mature. 
Recommendations for policy and practice 
This study generated substantive recommendations for consideration in the policy arena. 
These recommendations not only reflect the views of the researcher, but also those of 
the research respondents (i.e. forest governors and experts, members of local communi-
ties, actors working in international organisations, civil society and timber operators). 
Chapters 5-11 contain recommendations based on the empirical findings of each study. 
This section presents some core policy recommendations of relevance to the various 
forest actors.  
Recommendations to the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and the Forestry 
Commission 
 
1. Integrate conflict management into forest management, policy and governance:  
The entire study has clearly indicated that conflicts are part of Ghana’s forest sector. 
However, little consideration has been given to conflict management as an integral 
component of forest management, policy and governance initiatives. Conflicts are in-
herent in any natural resource to which multiple claims exist and should be regarded as 
challenges which need to be addressed by setting up appropriate institutions, structures 
and mechanisms for their non-violent management. This can be seen as a potential to 
strengthen forest governance if the process of problem solving is done in a transparent 
and fair manner, ensuring the equitable sharing of benefits and access rights and pro-
moting conditions that can help create cooperative relationships. Considering these 
challenges, the forest governors and experts involved in this study have expressed their 
views on what actions they see as a point of entry for the establishment of constructive 
conflict management in the forest sector. Based on suggestions of the workshop partici-
pants, these challenges can be overcome by a combination of (i) a decentralised and 
interactive approach to forest governance with feedback loops during implementation, 
(ii) differentiated laws and regulations adapted to the specific conditions both on and off 
reserve, and (iii) the Forestry Commission sharing responsibilities, equitable benefits 
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and power and ensuring cooperation with key actors in communities and the private 
sector in order to facilitate the smooth operation of its activities. Furthermore, they iden-
tified the need to pay due attention to conflict management skills for forest practitioners 
in natural resource management academic curricula and a clearly defined position of 
customary laws within the statutory forest laws, with defined roles for traditional au-
thorities. Such actions are to be integrated into the myriad of ongoing governance initia-
tives in the sector, of which the REDD+ framework is most relevant to conflict resolu-
tion. Due consideration must be given to the recommendations of forest governors, 
experts and local people in Chapters 6 and 9.  
 
2. Embrace an interactive governance approach in Ghana’s forest sector:  
This study indicated that a hierarchical mode of governance prevails in Ghana. This 
confirms the findings of Marfo (2006) who indicated that policymaking is the primary 
scope of politicians and bureaucrats, with occasional consultations with some estab-
lished stakeholders. The same applies to the customary governing structure in which 
local political actors and traditional authorities are taking the lead. In a recommendation 
for improving conflict management in Ghana’s forestry sector, Marfo (2006) proposed a 
change in governance culture; one that accepts the multiplicity and diversity of actor 
representations and which allows the various actors to demand accountability from their 
representatives (Marfo 2006: 175). This study has shown that, from a normative per-
spective, the principles of interactive governance theory may lay the foundation for a 
new governance culture that creates space for a multiplicity of actors. An effective gov-
ernance system would therefore mean that all key actors (those pertaining to the statu-
tory, customary, market, civil society and hybrid governing structures) must be able to 
cooperate through consensus or compromise in a way that common needs and conflict-
ing issues can be effectively addressed. 
 
3. Recognise protected areas in the Voluntary Partnership Agreement initiative:  
The Voluntary Partnership Agreement process that aims to combat illegal logging and 
improve forest governance does not consider protected areas as a management regime in 
its efforts to ensure the legality of timber resources and therefore does not seek to create 
social safeguards for the livelihoods of local people in these areas. Nevertheless, law 
enforcement may affect all forest management regimes, which means that the forest-
related livelihoods of protected area inhabitants like the inhabitants of admitted villages 
in protected areas will be further restricted. The implementation of the Voluntary Part-
nership Agreement will have serious implications for protected area management. This 
means rethinking the governance conditions of protected areas, especially the status of 
admitted villages and farms where people have restricted access to forest resources and 
few legal options to build a better livelihood. Bodegom (2010) cautions that, although 
the Voluntary Partnership Agreement process is participatory, it is impossible to talk 
about its contribution to good forest and environmental governance if no measures are 
put in place to curtail resource depletion in protected areas. The recognition of protected 
areas in the Voluntary Partnership Agreement implementation process is therefore 
paramount for sustainable forest management (Chapter 7). 
 
4. Capacity development of the Forestry Commission officials in law enforcement:  
Capacity development of the Forestry Commission officials, both academically trained 
staff and field officers, is essential as already noted in Chapter 6. The example of the 
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South Carolina Forestry Commission in the United States can be followed, where offi-
cers are trained and certified in criminal justice in addition to, for example, forestry law, 
forest investigation and incident management.
1
 Law enforcement therefore becomes 
part of the training of the forest manager which is somehow missing in the training of 
forest managers in Ghana’s forest sector. The legal department of the Forestry Commis-
sion could extend its mandate from representing legal matters to advocacy for the For-
estry Commission to establish its own prosecution system and building capacities of 
Forestry Commission officials in legal issues. There is also a need for officials of the 
legal department to have knowledge of natural resource management in addition to 
knowledge of laws, so that they have an in-depth understanding of the negative envi-
ronmental effects of forest offences and how best to quantify them during presentation 
of cases in the law courts. 
 
5. The codification of forest law:  
There is a need for a codification of the laws that are directly related to forest manage-
ment, meaning that vigorous attempts should be pursued to coordinate them effectively 
in a systematic manner. The superfluous nature of our legislation will not by itself solve 
the intricate and complex problems of forest management. Only a blend of soft and hard 
enforcement of these laws and imposing deterrent penalties on violators may help pro-
tect Ghana’s forests. 
Recommendations for academia  
 
1. Recognise conflict management in Natural Resources Management studies:  
This study has revealed that conflicts in the forestry sector are inevitable, but that the 
management of these conflicts is ad hoc and occurs on a case by case basis, with tradi-
tional leaders playing a crucial role that in many cases exceeds the role of the Forestry 
Commission. The forest governors and experts involved in this study attributed this in-
capability among resource managers to their training. It is in view of this that this study 
proposes the introduction of conflict management in the academic curriculum of natural 
resources management in tertiary institutions (see Chapter 6). 
 
2. Promote interdisciplinary teaching in natural resource management:  
There is a need to teach forest law and prosecution procedures to staff of the Forest Ser-
vices Division of the Forestry Commission and other natural resource management in-
stitutions by training them, posting students as interns at the police and judiciary and by 
integrating these topics into all academic curricula related to natural resource manage-
ment. Revisiting the example of the South Carolina Forestry Commission in the United 
States cited in Chapter 11, the officers are trained and certified in criminal justice in 
addition to forestry law, forest investigation and incident management and among other 
topics. Law enforcement therefore becomes part of the forest manager training which is 
somehow absent in the training of forest managers in Ghana’s forest sector. 
Recommendation to civil society and international donors  
 
1. Help building the capacity of forest managers and other forest actors in natural re-
source conflict management:  
                                                 
1
  http://www.state.sc.us/forest/le.htm (accessed on 25 October 2011). 
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The call to enhance conflict management capability among actors in natural resource 
management (both managers and users) is not new but is an echo of previous studies on 
natural resource conflict management (e.g. Marfo 2006, Yasmi 2007). Based on his 
study in Indonesia, Yasmi (2007: 168) advocated the empowerment of stakeholders in 
decentralised natural resource management to support their efforts to institutionalise 
conflict management. Similarly, in Ghana, Marfo (2006: 176) recommended building 
actor capacity to effectively mobilise and deploy useful instrumental resources in con-
flict management. In line with these researchers, this study calls for capacity develop-
ment in conflict management among forest managers and other forest actors. This goes 
beyond providing knowledge on conflict and conflict management, to include equipping 
the actors with the requisite logistics to facilitate their work. First, strengthening the 
Forestry Commission frontline staff in the implementation of conflict management and 
legal proceedings is important because of their constant interactions with various forest 
actors. Gaining such skills may help detect early signals of conflicts and promote better 
communication to ensure sustainable forest management. These skills must be accom-
panied by logistics such as vehicles and protective clothing in order to enable them to 
monitor the activities in the forest on a regular basis, which helps to curtail illegalities at 
an early stage. In addition, there is a need equip the Forestry Commission district offices 
with computers and accessories to enable their staff to keep proper records and track of 
forest offences cases. It is believed that training Forestry Commission officials will have 
a multiplier effect on other stakeholders, but this will not occur without technical and 
financial support from civil society and international donors.  
Recommendation to the timber industry:  
1. Strengthen the timber industry’s role in forest governance:  
The role of timber contractors in forest governance tends to focus on accessing timber 
resources and benefit sharing in the form of royalties, social responsibility agreement 
payments and crop damage compensation for local communities and farmers. These 
roles have been reported to be entangled with conflicts (Amanor 2005, Marfo 2006, see 
also Chapter 9). It is therefore interesting to note that this study revealed a situation of 
cooperation instead of the frequently cited conflict scenario. This has been possible be-
cause the timber contractor in the study area invested in building social capital in the 
form of networking, shared responsibility and the creation of social ties and trust, which 
was reciprocated by the local people (Chapter 10). Such steps can be achieved by other 
timber contractors in order to bring unity between them and the local people. In view of 
this, attention is needed for capacity building in relation to the creation of social capital 
and conflict management skills. 
Recommendation to the forest law enforcement agencies (i.e. judiciary, police and For-
estry Commission)  
 
1. Reform of the judiciary system in a way that recognises the importance of forest of-
fence cases: 
The judiciary must embark on a dramatic change in the way in which the legal system 
and its officials appreciate the nation’s forest and wildlife ecosystem and their associ-
ated benefits. If the law or forest legislature is not recognised as a catalytic tool to aid 
development of the forest sector through a blend of soft and hard law enforcement the 
nation stands to lose its rich plant and animal resources in the near future. Without such 
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drastic changes, the infusion of financial resources into the forest sector by governmen-
tal, non-governmental and international donor organisations to promote good forest 
governance in Ghana will not guarantee the transformative progression envisaged in 
ongoing governance processes such as the Natural Resource and Environmental Gov-
ernance (NREG) programme, the Voluntary Partnership Agreement with the EU and 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation through the enhancement of 
conservation, sustainable forest management and forest carbon stocks (REDD+).  
 
2. Institutional collaboration and strengthening:  
There should be complementarity between the law enforcement agencies and the judici-
ary. Drawing from Lubinda (2007) it is therefore recommended that:  
 
For the judiciary to be effective, law enforcement agencies must: 
 Be up-to-date on the laws they are enforcing; 
 Possess up-to-date knowledge of crimes and how they occur;  
 Investigate cases thoroughly and conclusively;  
 Present witnesses and evidence that is properly corroborated;  
 Avoid adjournments and discontinuations of cases that are before the courts; 
 Study court rulings/judgements of matters they are responsible for;  
 Present cases in a clear, analytical and precise manner to convince ‘beyond any rea-
sonable doubt’. 
 
For the law enforcement agencies to be effective, the judiciary should be: 
 Up–to-date on the laws they are interpreting;  
 Possess up-to-date knowledge of crimes and how they occur;  
 Possess up-to-date knowledge on public aspirations and desperations;  
 Analyse cases critically and conscientiously; 
 Make references to rulings on similar matters;  
 Avoid adjournments of cases before them;  
 Present their rulings / judgement in a clear, analytical and precise manner to con-
vince the prosecution and other interested parties. 
Conclusions  
This study demonstrates that interactive governance theory which was developed for 
fisheries is applicable in the context of forestry. It also illustrates the fact that the inter-
active governance framework can be adapted to include concepts related to conflict 
analysis, political ecology, co-management and social capital for a better understanding 
of the interactions between actors and between the natural and human system and the 
conditions under which these lead to either conflict or cooperation in a given system. To 
conclude, I reflect on the academic contribution of this work.  
This study has provided an insight into constructive conflict management pathways 
capable of minimising conflicts and contributing to the strengthening of the ongoing 
forest governance process in Ghana. The answer to the key question of ‘what has this 
study revealed that was not known before?’ is that this thesis provides some intellectual 
contributions. 
First, the thesis provides a theoretical framework to explore, analyse, understand and 
provide interventions for forest governance, conflict and conflict management (or coop-
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eration) in forestry by complementing four key theoretical strands (political ecology, 
interactive governance theory and forest livelihood and conflict theories) with theoreti-
cal concepts related to co-management and social capital.  
Second, in the analysis of forest and tree-related livelihood conflicts in specific man-
agement regimes in Ghana’s high forest zone, this study has looked beyond the forestry 
(i.e. timber) sector proper to include the perspectives of other stakeholders from non-
governmental organisations, the transnational community, academia, judiciary, the po-
lice, the private sector and local communities with a view to obtaining a deeper under-
standing of the societal problem at hand and to be aware of opportunities. Going beyond 
the timber sector allowed us to cover the full range of forest-related livelihood activities 
in relation to which conflicts occur in the high forest zone and the full range of forest 
management regimes, namely protection, plantation, production and off-reserve areas. 
Moreover, this study analysed both the statutory and customary structures that govern 
the various management regimes in addition to adding to documentation on forest of-
fences and court proceedings to understand the constraints within law enforcement. 
Third, this study shed new light on conflicts in off-reserve forest areas and illustrated 
that these can be properly managed to minimise conflict when timber operators learn to 
play an active role in the interactive forest governance process by building social capi-
tal. 
Despite the many ongoing forest governance initiatives in Ghana that are intended to 
ensure sustainable forest management and good forest governance, conflict management 
still receives minimal attention. I hope this study will contribute to widespread recogni-
tion of the importance of this key building block of forest governance. 
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Appendix 1 
Questions guiding the various case studies on forest 
and tree livelihood conflicts, conflict management and 
forest governance  
 
Research instruments and questions per case study  
 
A. Study contexts 
 
Research instruments: document analysis, community meetings, interviews and personal communication, 
survey and workshop. 
 
1. System-to-be-governed and governance interactions  
 
1.1a. Natural sub-system:  
 
Question:  What is the nature of Ghana’s high forest zone, the four case study areas in the Tano-Offin 
forest reserve (i.e. protection, production, plantation and off-reserve land) and the reserves in 
the Nkawie forest district in terms of diversity, complexity, level of scale and dynamics? 
  
1.1b. Socio-economic sub-system  
 
Question:  What forest users prevail in and around these natural systems? 
 
1.1c. Governance interactions  
 
Question:  How do the socio-economic sub-systems interact with the natural sub-systems in terms of ac-
cess (formal and informal) to forest resources, land, use rights and benefits?  
 
2. Governing systems and governance interactions 
 
Question 2a:  What is the historical context of the Ghanaian forest governing system in terms of its poli-
cies, legislation and conflicts? 
Question 2b:  What features prevail in the forest governance process (in terms of diversity, scale, com-
plexity and dynamics)?  
Question 2c:  What is the quality of the three governance orders (principles, institutional arrangements 
and day-to-day management of conflicts) in the forest governing system? 
Question 2d: What is the responsiveness of the governance modes (hierarchical, co-governance and self-
governance)? 
Question 2e:  What is the fit of governance elements (in terms of forest actors’ images, instruments and 
actions) and how do actors assess the potential of strengthening forest conflict management 
in the governance process? 
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B. Case study of forest governors and experts (i.e. officials from the state, non-state and transnational 
organisations)  
 
Research instruments: interviews, personal communication, survey and workshop. 
 
1. Nature of conflicts and conflict management strategies  
 
Question 3a:  How do you understand conflict and conflicts over forest and tree resources? 
Question 3b:  What forest and tree livelihoods components prevail, what types of conflicts prevail and 
who are the actors in the conflict situations? 
Question 3c:  What are the existing mechanisms of managing forest and tree resources conflicts in 
Ghana’s high forest zone, challenges prevailing and means to improve them?  
Question 3d:  Specifically indicate one way in which conflicts over forest and tree resources could be 
minimised constructively at community, district, regional and national levels? 
 
2. Forest governance and interactive governance concept  
 
Question 4a:  What is the nature (i.e. mode of governance, actors, opportunities and challenges and means 
of overcoming them) of forest and tree governance in Ghana’s forest sector? 
Question 4b:  How do you think interactive governance (after defining the concept in the survey questions 
and explaining it during a workshop) could enable both forest governors and actors to find 
amicable strategies, systems or mechanisms to minimise conflicts over forest and tree re-
sources?  
Question 4c:  Interactive governance means the right mechanisms have to be found to deal with the actors 
within the system. How best could this be achieved?  
Question 4d:  What mechanisms/strategies should be put in place for governors in forest sector to manage 
conflicts over forest and tree resources in their day-to-day activities in order to realise first 
order governance (solving problems and creating opportunities)?  
Question 4e:  How best could the capacities of these governors be built into conflict and conflict man-
agement skills in order to deal with forest conflicts effectively and realise second order 
governance (building governing institutions)? 
Question 4f:  What substantial principles, values and procedural principles are needed in the interactive 
forest governance process to ensure that conflicts over forest and tree resources are mini-
mised to shape third order governance (principles and values to guide the behaviour of ac-
tors involved in the governing interaction)? 
Question 4g:  What are the workshop participant’s actions for minimising forest and tree resource con-
flicts based on the survey findings? 
 
C. Case study of Tano-Offin forest reserve and environs (Respondents include diverse stakeholder 
groups in the local communities, FC officials, MOFA, Land Valuation Division, District FSD offi-
cials, timber operators ) 
 
Research instruments: interviews, personal communication, survey, community meetings, field observa-
tions) 
 
1. Communities in and around on-reserve forest regimes (i.e. protection, plantation and production 
areas). 
 
Question 5a:  What is the bio-data of the study respondents with regard to gender, age, education, occupa-
tion and origin etc.? 
Question 5b:  What is the nature of forest and tree related livelihoods in the Tano-Offin forest reserve and 
their contributions to local people’s livelihoods? 
Question 5c:  What kind of conflicts prevail based on the conflict analysis wheel components (i.e. con-
text, issues, actors, causes, dynamics and strategies/options for conflict management) re-
lated to forest and tree-based livelihoods?  
Question 5d:  How are the conflict management strategies employed and what are the main strategies for 
improving them?  
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2. Community living in the off-reserve area 
 
Question 6a:  What factors facilitated the cooperation between the local people and the timber operator?  
Question 6b:  How do government officials view (i.e. what are their images and instruments regarding) 
crop damage compensation challenges and what are the recommended actions for im-
provement? 
 
3. TUC holders on and off-reserve  
 
Question 7a:  Which timber contractor or company operates in the study area?  
Question 7b:  What is the nature of conflicts encountered during operations, with whom, and how are 
they managed? 
Question 7c:  What means are available to improve existing conflict management strategies that could 
lead to (a) improved timber operations and (b) sources of income or incentives to farmers 
and local people?  
 
D. Nkawie forest district case (key respondents: FC officials, the judiciary and the police) 
Research instruments: interviews, personal communication, survey, document analysis. 
 
Question 8a:  What governance interactions arise from the system-to-be-governed (Nkawie Forest Dis-
trict) and the governing system (i.e. institutions, including the legislative framework with 
regard to law enforcement) and what are their outcomes? 
Question 8b:  How do the Forestry Commission, the Ghana Police Service and the Judiciary perceive 
their institutional roles with regard to dealing with forest offences? 
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Appendix 2 
Characteristics of Ghana’s forest districts and reserves  
Region  District Reserve  Vegetation type           Size 
(km
2
) 
Year of  
gazettement 
Ashanti  Bekwai  Apamprama MSSE 123.30 1908 
  Bosumtwi Range MSSE 34.70 1952 
  Denyau Shelterbelt ME 78.70 1931 
  Fum Headwaters MSSE 12.40 1939 
  Jeni River MSNW 72.50 1932 
  Nkrabia ME-MS 21.50 1937 
  Oda River MS-ME 100.20 1940 
  Pompo Headwaters  * 164.20 1929 
  Subin Shelterbelt ME 12.20 * 
  Supuma Shelterbelt ME 22.50 1940 
 Juaso  Bandai Hills (south)  * 0.00 * 
  Bobiri MSSE 54.60 1939 
  Dome River MSSE 80.50 1929 
  Mirasa Hills MSSE 67.30 1937 
  North Bandai hills DSFZ 72.80 1928 
  North Fomangsu MSSE 42.70 1925 
  Onyimsu  * 8.50 * 
  Prakaw MSSE 9.80 1942 
  South Fomangsu MSSE 41.40 1925 
 Kumawu Anum Su North  * 0.00 * 
  Anum Su South  * 0.00 * 
  Boufum  * 0.00 * 
  Dampia Range MS-ME 80.30 1937 
  Kronwam DSIZ 5.70 1928 
  Kumawu Water 
Supply  * 0.00 * 
  Asonari DSIZ 1.60 1928 
 Mampong  Aboma DSFZ 45.60 1962 
  Abrimasu DFSZ 10.10 1940 
  Awura DSFZ 133.90 1940 
  Chirimfa DSFZ 114.00 1932 
  Ofin Headwaters DSIZ 13.00 1951 
  Ongwam 1 DSIZ 2.60 1951 
  Ongwam 2 DSIZ 8.80 1951 
  Ongwam 3 DSIZ 21.84 1951 
  Pru Shelterbelt * * * 
 New Edubiase Afia Shelterbelt MSSE 20.00 1940 
  Chiremoasi Bepo MSSE 6.00 1931 
  Kokotintin Shelter-
belt MSSE 9.10 1940 
  Numia MSSE 50.20 1938 
  Onuem Bepo MSSE 34.40 1930 
  Onuem Nyamibe 
Shelterbelt MSSE 24.90 1936 
      
     (continues) 
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     (cont’d) 
Region  District Reserve  Vegetation type          Size 
 (km
2
) 
Year of  
gazettement  
 Nkawie Asenanyo MSNW 227.90 1938 
  Desiri MSNW 151.00 1954 
  Jimira MSNW 62.90 1932 
  Jimira Ext  * 0.00 * 
  Offin Shelterbelt  * 0.00 * 
  Tano Ofin MS-UE 402.20 1949 
  Tinte Bepo MSNW 115.50 1928 
 Offinso Afram Headwaters MSSE 201.20 1928 
  Afrensu Brohuma DSFZ 72.50 1934 
  Asufu Shelterbelt 
East DSIZ 11.40 1950 
  Asufu Shelterbelt 
West MS-DS 13.50 1951 
  Gianima DSIZ 17.10 1939 
  Kwamisa DS-MS 82.90 1928 
  Mankrang DSFZ 85.50 1933 
  Opro River DS 129.20 1929 
  Asubima DSFZ 78.70 1945 
Brong 
Ahafo  
Bechem 
Amama Shelterbelt MSNW 44.00 1940 
  Aparapi Shelterbelt MSNW 19.20 1939 
  Bosumkese MSNW 138.30 1937 
 Dormaa Mpameso MSNW 322.50 1937 
  Pamu Berekum DS-MS 189.10 1932 
 Goaso Aboniyere Shelter-
belt MSNW 41.20 1940 
  Ayum MSNW 194.30 1937 
  Bia Shelterbelt ME-MS 29.50 1940 
  Bia Tano MSNW 194.30 1937 
  Bonkoni MSNW 75.50 1934 
  Bonsam Bepo MSNW 124.30 1934 
  Goa Shelterbelt MSNW 23.80 1940 
  Subim MSNW 238.30 1956 
 Kintampo Bosomoa DSFZ 170.90 1930 
  Buru * 0.00 * 
 Sunyani Nsemre DSFZ 18.10 1939 
  Sawsaw DSFZ 62.90 1976 
  Tain 11 DSFZ 509.20 1934 
  Tain Tributaries I DSFZ 30.60 1932 
  Yaya DSFZ 51.30 1930 
Central  Cape Coast Bemu ME 43.80 1950 
  Ankaful Fuelwood   0.00  
  Assin Apimanim ME 11.40 1927 
  Brimso SM-DS 10.60 1951 
  Komenda Fuelwood   0.00  
  Pra Suhien 2 ME 82.10 1928 
  Pra Suhien 1 ME 104.10 1933 
 Dunkwa Bonsaben ME 155.40 1939 
  Minta ME 21.80 1938 
     (continues) 
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     (cont’d) 
Region  District Reserve  Vegetation type          Size 
 (km
2
) 
Year of  
gazettement  
  Angoben Shelterbelt  * 0.00  
  Ben East ME 25.40 1954 
  Ben West ME 55.70 1954 
  Bowiye Range ME 120.20 1930 
  Bura River ME 103.10 1932 
  Nkonto Ben ME 14.50 1950 
  Opon Mansi ME 116.10 1930 
  Tonton ME 146.60 1936 
  Totua Shelterbelt ME 63.50 1941 
  Upper Wassaw ME 100.80 1925 
 Assin Foso Bimpong ME 104.10 1937 
  Krochua ME 10.60 1932 
  Krochua ME 10.60 1932 
  Ochi Headwaters ME 3.40 1940 
  Supong MSSE 35.70 1954 
  Wawahi MS-ME 138.90 1928 
 Winneba  Abasumba SM 1.00 1927 
  Ahirasu1 SM 1.00 1927 
  Ahirasu2  * 0.00 * 
  Akrabone SM 2.60 1930 
  Kwanyarko  * 0.00 * 
  Obrachere  * 0.00 * 
  Obrahere1  * 0.00 * 
  Opimbo1 DSIZ 1.00 1927 
  Opimbo2 DSIZ 0.00 1927 
  Winneba State  * 0.00 * 
  Yenku A SM 21.20 1937 
  Yenku B  *  * * 
Eastern  Kade  Ajenjua MSSE 5.70 1930 
  Aiyaola MSSE 34.70 1929 
  Auro River MSSE 8.50 1948 
  Bediako MSSE 7.00 * 
  Kajeasi MSSE 26.70 1932 
  Mamang River MSSE 54.40 1938 
  Nsuensa MSSE 62.70 1929 
 Akim Oda Birim MSSE 39.10 1927 
  Birim Ext MSSE 21.80 1940 
  Esen Epam MSSE 46.10 1936 
  Esuboni MSSE 28.50 1927 
  Oboyow MSSE 63.70 1927 
 Begoro Afram Bukunaw  * 0.00 * 
  Afram Dawa  * 0.00 * 
  Apedwa  * 0.00 * 
  Atewa Range UE-MS 323.30 1926 
  Atewa Range Ext UE-MS 26.40 1951 
  Dede DSFZ 51.00 1955 
  Southern Scarp MSSE 154.60 1935 
      
     (continues) 
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     (cont’d) 
Region  District Reserve  Vegetation type          Size 
 (km
2
) 
Year of  
gazettement  
  Worobong South 
(Akim) 
 * 
106.06 
* 
  Worobong 
South(Kwahu) 
 * 
14.58 
* 
 Mpraeso Abisu  * 0.00 * 
  Esukawkaw MSSE 122.20 1929 
  Jade Bebo MSSE 5.20 1932 
  Kade Bepo MSSE 16.80 1930 
  Nkawanda MSSE 0.00 1939 
  Northern Scarp East DS 49.20 1935 
  Northern Scarp West DS 64.80 1935 
  Worobong North 
(Kwahu) DS 13.20 1927 
 Somanya Bunkunaw   0.00  
  Sapawsu & Exten-
sion SM 15.30 1957 
  Volta River DS-SM 50.50 1928 
  Yogaga   0.00  
  Yongwa SO 7.80 1957 
Western  Bibiani  Afao Hills  * 34.72 * 
  Anhwiaso North MSSE 3.60 1926 
  Anwhiaso West  *  * 
 Enchi  Boi Tano WE 128.50 1968 
  Boin River WE-ME 277.60 1932 
  Dadiaso ME-WE 171.20 1977 
  Disue River  * 0.00  
  Jema Assamkrom WE 66.00 1977 
  Tano Nimiri WE-ME 205.90 1935 
  Yoyo ME 235.70 1932 
 Juabeso Bia Bia North MSNW 356.10 1940 
  Krokosua MSNW 481.70 1935 
  Krokosua MSNW 481.70 1935 
 Sefwi Wiaso Bia Tawya  * 0.00 * 
  Bodi ME 175.30 1967 
  Suhuma ME-MS 358.50 1935 
  Sui River  * 0.00 * 
  Tano Anwia ME 153.10 1935 
  Tano Ehuro  * 0.00 * 
  Tano Suhyien MS 84.40 1934 
  Tano Suraw MSSE 28.50 1934 
  Tano Suraw Exten-
sion MS 75.10 1935 
 Takoradi  Cape Three Points MS 51.00 1950 
  Inchaban ME 0.00 * 
  Sekondi Waterworks 
1 & 2  * 10.10 1938 
  Sekondi Waterworks 
Blk2 MSSE 0.00 1938 
     (continues) 
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     (cont’d) 
Region  District Reserve  Vegetation type          Size 
 (km
2
) 
Year of  
gazettement  
 Tarkwa  Bonsa River ME 160.60 1932 
  Draw River WE 235.40 1937 
  Ebi River Shelterbelt WE 25.90 1941 
  Ndumfri WE 72.50 1937 
  Neung North  * 0.00 * 
  Neung South  * 0.00 * 
  Subri River ME 587.90 1949 
Compiled by author. Source: Resource Management Support Centre, 2009.  
* Data not available at the time of accessing this data from the source.
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Appendix 3 
Respondents’ definition of conflicts and conflict over 
forest and tree resources 
Definitions for ‘Conflict’  
Conflict is a useful concept for explaining disagreement and fights between individuals or 
groups. 
It is a situation of open discontent between two people or institutions. 
It is the actual or perceived opposing needs values and interests. 
It is a clash of interests of stakeholders over access, allocation, utilisation and management of a 
resource. 
Conflict arises when two or more stakeholders perceive that their interests are at stake. 
Conflict is a relationship between two or more people based on their needs and interests for the 
same resource.  
A process occurs between two or more persons when they have different goals and values and 
they fight over limited resources to address them. 
It is a condition where harmony does not exist and can occur between people, communities, 
countries etc. over a particular resource. 
It is a dispute between people because of interests or needs. 
It is a misunderstanding between two or more people over an issue. 
It occurs when two people or groups disagree on an issue and they are intolerant of one another. 
Definitions for ‘conflict over forest and tree resources’ 
It is a clash of interests between individuals or groups over the use rights to and benefits over 
forest and tree resources. 
It is competition for a resource by different interest groups. 
It is a situation in which stakeholders with conflicting interests are suspicious of each other. 
It occurs because of stakeholders’ interest in ever-dwindling resources.  
It is based on differences in the ownership and usage of forest resources by stakeholders. 
Forest and trees may have different uses, overlapping ownership, management regimes etc. Con-
flicts can occur in a situation in which the above-mentioned aspects cannot be met because of 
different interests, claims and roles among stakeholders. 
It is lack of equity to access resources.  
It is dispute due to a lack of flow of information and benefits to stakeholders.  
It is about different groups of people having different uses for the same resources especially 
when the resources are dwindling.  
It means unresolved differences about access to and expectations of the outcomes of forest man-
agement. 
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Appendix 4  
Respondents’ recommendations on scale-specific 
means of minimising conflicts over forest and tree  
resources  
National level recommendations  
Thematic area Individual responses  
Sharpening governing 
systems  
Strengthening accountability  
Integrating statutory and traditional systems into policies and 
legislation on ownership and rights 
Designing strategies, work plans and systems and adhering to 
them 
Developing a policy framework to encourage exemplary forest 
stewards to align with corresponding adjudication system 
Effective implementation of conflict management and responding 
promptly to conflict incidences 
Enactment of workable laws and provide resources for effective 
enforcement 
Formulation of enabling policies in the interest of all actors and 
defining responsibilities and rights 
Government should have the political will to implement policies 
and regulations 
Ensure transparency (information flow and education) 
Strengthen supervisory role through effective monitoring 
Strengthening stake-
holder collaboration  
Involve stakeholders in forest decision making 
Strengthening financial 
mechanisms  
Mobilise both internal and external funds to execute activities 
 
 
Regional level recommendations  
Thematic area Individual responses  
Inter-sectoral coordina-
tion 
Effective coordination in the enforcement of forest laws and 
legislations 
Establish effective coordination measures to promptly address 
district issues 
 Involve regional coordinating council to advise and mediate 
Joint implementation and monitoring of policies and strategies 
among stakeholders 
Involve regional coordinating council to advise and mediate 
Strengthen coordination and information flows  
Joint implementation and monitoring of policies and strategies 
among stakeholders 
Clear and documented resource ownership and rights 
Strengthen coordination and information flows  
 
Internal coordination and 
capacity development  
Design strategies, work plans and systems and adhering to them 
Clear and documented resource ownership and rights 
Provide regular training to districts staff 
Design strategies, work plans and systems and adhering to them 
Strengthen interactions between districts and regional FSD offi-
cials Provide regular training to districts staff 
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District level recommendations  
Thematic area Individual responses  
Capacity development  Adequate resource district offices that are able to function effec-
tively 
Capacity building and resources for effective implementations 
especially on new and emerging forestry issues 
Capacity building on local bye-laws enforcement and when these 
should be applied 
Improving efficiency in 
operations  
Design strategies, work plans and systems and adhere to them 
Strengthen education of stakeholders 
Ensure effective monitoring and control 
Ensure equitable allocation of resources among all interest 
groups 
Set up conflict monitoring and resolution units within the districts 
assemblies 
317 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Profile of the Modified Taungya System (MTS) and 
number of farmers involved in the Tano-Offin Forest 
Reserve in Nkawie Forest District  
Community Year 
coupe 
Target 
(ha) 
Area 
planted 
(ha) 
No. of 
farmers 
Forest reserve com-
partment no. 
 
Chirayaso (6 
km from 
Kyekyewere ) 
2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
30 
30 
17 
5 
30 
30 
17 
5 
100 
170 
221/272 
270 
270 
270 
Asuntaa 2006 
2005 
2004 
12 
5 
5 
12 
5 
5 
54 283 
283 
283 
Kramokrom 2006 
2005 
2004 
20 
11 
12.5 
20 
11 
12.5 
91 282 
282 
Desireagya 
 
2006 
2005 
2004 
15 
10 
10 
15 
10 
10 
83 
 
163 
Kwadwotire 2006 
2005 
2004 
11 
8 
5 
11 
8 
5 
78 256 
256 
Akantansu 2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
15 
24 
22 
20 
26 
40 
15 
24 
22 
20 
26 
23 
32 
102 
182 
149/182 
182 
182 
182 
182 
Bofaso 2007 10 10  271 
Awisasu 2006 13 13 50 201 
Nyinahin 2006 15 15 72  
Adiembra 2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
16 
11 
4 
3 
10 
16 
11 
4 
3 
10 
68 
 
 
93 
93 
Mpasaaso1 2006 
2004 
2003 
2002 
25 
15 
5 
40 
25 
15 
5 
20 
102 88 
Mpasaaso11 2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
38 
20 
10 
10 
20 
38 
20 
10 
10 
10 
78 
67 
90 
90 
Oforikrom 2006 
2005 
2003 
2002 
10 
10 
3 
10 
10 
10 
3 
10 
33 44 
 
 
(continues) 
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     (cont’d) 
Koojourkrom 2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
10 
10 
5 
2 
10 
10 
10 
2 
60 44 
44 
Domeabra 2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
32 
12 
15 
25 
40 
32 
12 
15 
25 
40 
105 11 
11 
Awaduwa 2007 
2006 
2005 
2003 
2002 
12 
10 
10 
10 
10 
12 
10 
10 
10 
10 
31 
46 
35 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
Nyinanufu 2007 
2004 
2003 
2002 
10 
10 
5 
10 
10 
10 
5 
10 
56 7 
Bonkrom 2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
21 
17 
10 
10 
10 
21 
17 
10 
10 
10 
69 18 
18 
Dotiem Kunsu 2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
20 
38 
22 
20 
20 
20 
20 
38 
12 
10 
10 
10 
55 
106 
37/38 
37/38 
37 
Enyehwee 2006 30 30 54 18 
Saakrom  2007 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
20 
22 
10 
12 
10 
20 
22 
10 
10 
10 
 
97 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
Kunsu-
Nyamebekyere 
No. 3 
2007 
2006 
2004 
2003 
2002 
10 
30 
10 
10 
10 
10 
30 
10 
10 
10 
43 
105 
 
7 
7 
Apenemadi 2004 
2003 
10 
10 
10 
10 
  
Wioso 2002 20 20   
Adadekrom 2004 
2003 
2002 
5 
3 
30 
5 
3 
30 
  
Ofirikrom 2003 3 3   
Oseikrom 2003 
2002 
2 
10 
2 
10 
  
Most commonly planted exotic species planted: Cedrella odorata (cedrella); indigenous species: Terminalia superba 
(ofram), Entandrophragma spp. (African mahogany). Planting design used: MS (3*12) for 2006 and 2007 planting 
season. 
 
Source: Nkawie FSD Plantations unit (2008). 
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